Williams v. United States

Citations: 711 F. Supp. 2d 1195; 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34602; 2010 WL 1406615Docket: CV 08-00437 ACK-BMK

Court: District Court, D. Hawaii; April 7, 2010; Federal District Court

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Tarshia Williams, both individually and as the Personal Representative of the Estate of her deceased daughter Talia Williams, filed a complaint against the United States government on October 3, 2008, regarding the alleged child abuse leading to Talia's death on July 16, 2005, while living on a military base in Hawaii. Talia's father, Naeem Williams, a U.S. Army specialist, had legal custody of her and moved her to Hawaii in December 2004. The case involves motion practices, including the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on February 8, 2010, and subsequent responses from Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs submitted a declaration from their attorney to authenticate evidence, while the Defendant provided supporting facts for their motion. The hearing for this motion took place on March 25, 2010. Key personnel at the Child and Youth Services (CYS) Central Enrollment and Registration (CERO) office, where Talia's stepmother worked, had no direct responsibility for the care of Talia or other children in the Army's programs. The CYS CERO office was located at least a mile from the Child Development Center where Talia was cared for in the afternoons.

On January 10, 2005, Naeem Williams moved into barracks following a conflict with Delilah, who assaulted him the next day, leading to her arrest for two counts of Assault and Endangering the Welfare of a Minor. A social worker from the Army's Family Advocacy Program, Terry Martin, interviewed both parties on February 1, 2005, noting signs of family violence but incorrectly stating that Talia, their child, was not present during the incident. The case review committee subsequently recommended no action against Delilah or Naeem after discussing the arrest.

On February 28, 2005, staff at a federal child care facility reported potential signs of abuse on Talia, prompting an investigation by the military police. Talia's statements included claims of being harmed by her family, but a doctor concluded that her skin condition, identified as desquamation, was likely due to improper skin maintenance rather than abuse, with a high degree of certainty.

Talia remained in care until March 18, 2005, when her parents withdrew her. On June 27, 2005, CYS employee Donna Small expressed concerns to social worker Hilda Borja about Talia's safety, reporting that Delilah had made alarming comments about child discipline. Borja, who did not file a report or take action, failed to follow up with Small.

On June 29, 2005, military police responded to a report of a child screaming and found Talia in a distressing state, naked and mute, with visible scratches on her face and feces on the floor. Talia did not respond to the officers or the investigator who later examined the situation.

Investigator Meyers inquired about marks on Talia Williams, to which Naeem Williams attributed one mark to a scratch from another child at a birthday party days earlier. On July 5 and July 8, 2005, Delilah's cousin, Chasidy Taijeron, overheard Naeem and Delilah abusing Talia during phone calls. Following these incidents, on July 11, Ms. Taijeron reported the abuse to Child Protective Services (CPS) anonymously, indicating that Delilah, the stepmother, was suspected of mistreating Talia. The CPS intake log noted a lack of detailed identifying information, such as a phone number or address for the family. Talia Williams was pronounced dead on July 16, 2005, at Wahiawa General Hospital.

The document also outlines the standard for summary judgment, emphasizing that it aims to eliminate unsupported claims and defenses. Summary judgment is warranted if the record shows no genuine issue of material fact, meaning that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party. The burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue, either through affirmative evidence or by highlighting the lack of evidence from the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must present significant probative evidence to counter the motion. The court must view all evidence in a light favorable to the nonmoving party and deny summary judgment if reasonable minds could differ regarding the evidence's interpretation.

The Court is evaluating whether there are legal grounds for a negligence claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA allows for government liability for personal injury, property loss, or wrongful death caused by negligent actions of government employees acting within the scope of their employment, similar to a private individual under local law (28 U.S.C. 1346, 2674). A successful negligence claim must establish four elements: 1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff; 2) a breach of that duty; 3) a close causal connection between the breach and the injury; and 4) actual damages incurred by the plaintiff. The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment argues primarily that the United States had no duty in this case. Generally, individuals do not have a duty to protect others unless a "special relationship" exists or under the "good Samaritan" doctrine, which requires due care when assuming a duty. Hawaii follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states there is no duty to control a third person's conduct unless a special relationship exists that imposes such a duty.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, 314A outlines scenarios establishing a special relationship that obligates a defendant to protect a plaintiff from third-party conduct, but this list is not exhaustive. The Hawai'i Supreme Court ruled that the State has an affirmative duty to protect individuals in a custodial relationship from foreseeable harm. In Kaho'ohanohano, a special relationship between the Department of Human Services (DHS) and endangered children was recognized under H.R.S. 587, even without custodial ties, establishing a duty for DHS to safeguard a specific class of individuals, including the plaintiff. The court referenced the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 286, allowing courts to adopt statutory standards aimed at protecting particular groups. Plaintiffs argue that a report of suspected abuse to the Army’s child protective system parallels the Kaho'ohanohano case, asserting that the Federal Government's AR 608-18 and related regulations impose a similar duty. While the court acknowledged that these regulations outline procedures akin to the State's child protective system, it concluded that they do not establish a "special relationship" or duty under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA holds the United States liable only to the extent a private individual would be, as clarified by the Supreme Court in United States v. Olson, which emphasized that liability cannot be based on duties imposed by federal regulations. Therefore, the court rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on H.R.S. 587 to assert a duty of care owed by the government.

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the United States is not held to an independent duty based solely on its internal policies if state law does not recognize a similar private liability. The court cites several cases to support the principle that negligence findings, even on federal property, must be based on state law. Specifically, any duty owed to an individual must derive from state law, not from federal regulations, which only become relevant when a state law duty is established. There is no duty under Hawaii Revised Statutes (H.R.S.) Chapter 587 for the United States regarding the protection of abused children, as this duty is limited to the Department of Human Services and children reported to it.

Regarding H.R.S. Chapter 350, which mandates certain individuals to report suspected child abuse, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant failed to notify appropriate agencies about abuse, claiming this duty arises under the statute. However, the Hawaii Supreme Court has not clarified whether a violation of this statute can lead to tort liability against mandated reporters. The defendant suggests that the court should analyze the legislative intent and context of H.R.S. Chapter 350 to determine if it creates a tort duty, following the framework established in Kaho'ohanohano. The court aims to ascertain the legislature's intention by examining the statute's language and overall purpose.

H.R.S. Chapter 350 lacks a clear legislative intent and contains ambiguous language regarding penalties for non-reporting, which is classified as a misdemeanor without reference to civil penalties or damage actions. Civil suits mentioned in the chapter are explicitly stated to not constitute a cause of action against relevant departments. Immunity is granted to individuals participating in good faith reporting or assuming duties under the statute, shielding them from civil or criminal liability. The precedent set in Cuyler v. United States indicates a legislative reluctance to impose liability for negligent violations, underscoring that the only penalties apply to willful violations. The statute specifies that knowingly preventing reporting or failing to provide required information results in a petty misdemeanor, suggesting that mere negligence does not incur liability, which aligns with the plaintiffs' allegations. The government contends that the primary obligations of mandated reporters differ from those of the Department of Human Services (DHS), which focuses solely on preventing child abuse, while medical providers, police, and childcare workers have broader responsibilities. The court rejects the government's comparison between Army and DHS employees as overly broad and inconsistent with the Federal Tort Claims Act, concluding that the legislative intent does not indicate that H.R.S. Chapter 350 establishes a duty that would expose the government to tort liability.

H.R.S. Chapter 350 lacks the detailed legislative guidelines found in H.R.S. Chapter 587, which includes comprehensive regulations and internal directives for the Department of Human Services (DHS). Chapter 350 only mandates an oral report followed by a written report "as soon as possible," without outlining specific obligations for municipal police departments, private childcare providers, or private medical providers beyond reporting child abuse. The Hawai'i Supreme Court, in Kaho'ohanohano, emphasized that DHS has both the duty and authority to act on reports of child abuse in contrast to the more limited framework of Chapter 350.

Additionally, when examining similar child abuse notification statutes in other jurisdictions, the weight of authority generally supports the absence of a private right of action for failure to report. The Cuyler case reviewed multiple jurisdictions and concluded that most cases do not recognize a private right under analogous statutes, with one outlier case being distinguished due to its limited scope. 

After analyzing the legislative intent, level of detail in Chapter 350, and precedents from other jurisdictions, it is determined that the Hawai'i legislature did not intend to impose a tort liability on private parties or the government for failing to report under Chapter 350.

Good Samaritan liability arises when an entity voluntarily undertakes a duty, requiring them to perform that duty with care. The U.S. Supreme Court has established that the United States can be held liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for good Samaritan liability as applicable under state law. In the case of Indian Towing Co. v. United States, the Court determined that while the Coast Guard was not obligated to provide lighthouse services, once it chose to operate a light, it was required to maintain it and respond to any failures. Similarly, Sheridan v. United States reaffirmed that by establishing regulations concerning firearm possession and caring for an intoxicated individual, the Government assumed a careful duty of care.

The document emphasizes the need to examine Hawai'i's good Samaritan law, which aligns with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, specifically Section 324A. This section holds that a party who voluntarily provides services necessary for another's protection may be liable for harm caused by their failure to exercise reasonable care. The liability arises if their negligence increases the risk of harm, if they undertake a duty owed to a third party, or if harm results from reliance on their undertaking. Relevant cases illustrate the application of this doctrine, highlighting the requirements for establishing good Samaritan liability.

In *White v. Sabatino*, 415 F.Supp.2d 1163 (D.Haw.2006), the court analyzed the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 324A, determining that under Hawai'i law, a designated driver assumes a common law duty to protect third parties. This conclusion was influenced by Hawai'i Supreme Court rulings, public policy, and Dean Prosser's insights on good Samaritan liability arising from the assumption of duty. The court emphasized that a designated driver, by taking on responsibilities for an intoxicated individual, must recognize that their actions are meant to safeguard third parties, such as other drivers, and can be held liable for injuries resulting from a failure to exercise reasonable care. Liability may arise if their actions increased risk, if they assumed a duty owed by another (like a commercial alcohol supplier), or if third parties relied on their undertaking.

The court identified genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the party had commenced their duties as a designated driver, indicating that the specific circumstances and conversations surrounding the undertaking should be evaluated by the trier of fact. Additionally, the court acknowledged that federal regulations could establish a state-law duty under the good Samaritan doctrine, particularly in the context of mandated reporting of child abuse by military personnel. The government’s argument against a duty under Section 324A was rejected, as the court found that the regulations imposed a good Samaritan duty that must be fulfilled with care.

The court clarified that under Section 324A(a), a duty arises only when a voluntary undertaking increases the risk of harm to a third party, and not merely when harm is greater than it would have been without negligence. Hawai'i courts support the notion that while there is no obligation to assist those in peril, there is a duty to avoid actions that exacerbate their situation.

A duty to assist someone in peril is not mandated by law, but there exists a duty to refrain from actions that could exacerbate the individual's circumstances. This concept of "misfeasance" makes it easier to establish liability. Consequently, a well-meaning good Samaritan may face legal repercussions, in contrast to those who neglect to help. The principle of voluntarily assuming responsibility through affirmative actions is evident in various legal cases, though the specifics of when this duty begins and ends remain ambiguous. Historically, a mere promise to provide assistance does not create a tort obligation, even if the promise is relied upon to the detriment of the promisee. Despite its perceived harshness, this principle has evolved, requiring minimal action to establish a duty.

In the case of Fochtman, the Hawai'i Supreme Court, while not directly citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, appeared to adopt its principles. The court indicated that there were genuine issues of fact regarding whether Officers Souza and Carlos' actions worsened the situation for the decedent. The context involved an individual, Schrader, who suspected someone was in trouble and called the police, who failed to locate the source of distress after a 20-minute search. The officers did not follow up with the power company or other agencies that could assist, ultimately leading to a delayed rescue operation. This delay resulted in the tragic discovery of two hikers' bodies the following day. Schrader suggested that had the officers not intervened, he might have been able to assist the individuals in distress himself.

A captain from the Honolulu Fire Department indicated that knowledge of certain lights and their last location could have expedited a rescue operation to the same night rather than the following morning. The court acknowledged that further evidence might reveal that officers had no obligation to act but determined that unresolved factual questions precluded summary judgment. Plaintiffs contended that failures by government employees in reporting and investigating suspicions of abuse increased the risk of harm to Talia. The court concurred that the government’s establishment of a child abuse investigation system on military bases may have inadvertently increased Talia's risk by hindering CPS's investigation capabilities. This situation relates to the military’s assumption of CPS duties and the reliance created by military regulations. 

Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 324A(b), liability can arise if an entity undertakes a duty owed to a third party. The Military Services in Hawaii and the Department of Human Services established a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) outlining procedures for investigating child abuse on military installations. The MOA designates military commanders as responsible for protecting abused children within their commands. Army regulations provide detailed mandatory procedures for reporting, evaluating, and treating child abuse. The government refuted the plaintiffs’ claims that the Army had usurped DHS's investigatory role, citing the language of the Army regulations and the MOA, asserting that DHS retains all its obligations and responsibilities.

The Court finds that the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) establishes a dual responsibility for investigating child abuse cases on military installations, primarily placing the Army in charge while the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) retains some oversight. Section 6(b) of the MOA designates the DHS-CWSB as responsible for child abuse intake and protective services in Hawaii, yet Paragraph 7(a) assigns the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command the role of investigating felony crimes, including child abuse, on military property. Additionally, Paragraph 10 outlines that military law enforcement will initially address on-installation incidents, with DHS social workers assisting in the investigation of credible intra-familial maltreatment reports referred by military personnel.

The excerpt also discusses potential liability under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, specifically Section 324A(c), which may arise if reliance on Army regulations leads parties like Child Protective Services (CPS) to overlook other remedies. CPS maintains a central registry for reported child abuse cases, designed to identify patterns of abuse, but the Army's parallel system has resulted in instances where reports were neither made to CPS nor investigated by the Army. Examples include the failure to report Delilah Williams’ arrest for endangering a minor to CPS, a February 2005 incident that was not recorded or reported, and concerns regarding potential child abuse reported to the Army Family Advocacy Program instead of CPS. In all instances, the Army's handling of these cases resulted in missed opportunities for proper investigation and intervention.

Borja, a manager of the Army Family Advocacy Program, failed to report allegations of child abuse to the RPOC or CPS, despite the program's responsibility for child abuse reporting and investigation on military installations. Major General Mixon determined that Borja was negligent in her duty to report suspected abuse and was facing termination when she secured another position unrelated to Schofield Barracks. On June 29, 2005, military police responded to a report of a child screaming for over an hour at the Williams' home, discovering Talia in a distressing condition but failing to report the incident to CPS. Had reports been made, Talia might have been identified, and the Army could have recognized a pattern of abuse leading to preventive action. The United States is acknowledged to have a good Samaritan duty to prevent and investigate child abuse, with material facts suggesting negligence in fulfilling this duty. The United States does not contest negligence based on undisputed facts but focuses on the lack of duty, a position the Court has rejected. Major General Mixon noted that Talia's death resulted from missed opportunities to prevent it and directed an investigation into the actions of DCA employees concerning the Williams family, which indicated that Borja was negligent in her reporting responsibilities.

The United States acknowledges that its child care workers had a duty of care to Talia Williams while she was under their supervision. The Government contends that, according to Hawai'i law, the standard of care can be defined by H.R.S. Chapter 350, which applies to mandated reporters like day care workers. It argues that the child care workers acted appropriately by reporting concerns to military police, who subsequently sought a medical opinion that concluded the marks on Talia were not indicative of physical injury or abuse.

The Court concurs that the child care workers fulfilled their duty to report the marks observed on Talia and agrees that H.R.S. Chapter 350 establishes the relevant standard of care, which the workers met by reporting the incident. It is noted that there is no claim or evidence that Talia was harmed while in the care of the workers. The Court also highlights that the Memorandum of Agreement outlines the responsibilities for reporting allegations of child abuse, confirming that the child care workers complied by notifying military law enforcement.

Despite the subjective feelings of fear expressed by one worker regarding the doctor's competence, the Court emphasizes that such feelings do not affect the objective standard of care, which required them to report suspicions without conducting their own investigation. While the Court agrees that the child care workers met the standard of care, it identifies unresolved factual issues concerning whether the military police similarly met this standard when evaluating the medical opinion regarding child abuse.

The excerpt addresses the obligations of law enforcement officers, particularly Officer Parker, regarding the investigation of suspected child abuse. It highlights that there are unresolved factual issues concerning whether Officer Parker adhered to the standard of care required in such investigations. The Court refrains from making definitive findings at this stage but points out potential gaps in Officer Parker's investigation, particularly in relation to Talia’s statements about the origins of her injuries. 

In its conclusion, the Court grants the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the child care workers' alleged negligence, affirming they met the standard of care by promptly reporting the observed marks on Talia to military police. Conversely, the Court denies the rest of the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, indicating remaining questions regarding the investigation's adequacy. 

The Court clarifies that its recitations of facts are not to be construed as findings for future proceedings and underscores that immaterial factual disputes do not prevent summary judgment. It also discusses the burdens of proof for moving and nonmoving parties in summary judgment motions, noting that uncorroborated claims do not constitute genuine issues of material fact. Additionally, the excerpt states that even if mandated reporters may have failed to provide required information, the applicable statute does not impose tort liability in private actions. Lastly, it references a Seventh Circuit case regarding the hypothetical outcomes of timely reporting suspected abuse.

The excerpt addresses issues related to the statutory duty to report child abuse under H.R.S. Chapter 350 and its implications for tort liability. It emphasizes that mere commencement of an investigation may deter further child abuse but acknowledges this as speculative. The Illinois legislature did not intend to create tort liability through the statute, as indicated by the court's analogy to good Samaritan cases, where bystanders are not legally obligated to intervene. The court in Cuyler established that a plaintiff needs a statutory basis to maintain a suit, as there is no common law duty to be a good Samaritan.

The court agrees with the defendant that Delilah's co-workers had no duty to report the alleged abuse based on the statute, supporting the notion that H.R.S. Chapter 350 does not create an independent reporting duty. The government's argument against establishing a duty highlights that Army regulations impose stricter obligations than state law, suggesting that imposing a duty could deter voluntary compliance by private parties. Despite general criticisms of the good Samaritan duty, it remains applicable.

The government seeks summary judgment regarding federal employees' adherence to the standard of care in a specific incident involving Delilah Williams, but the argument lacks undisputed material facts, as there are unresolved issues concerning the investigation by social worker Terry Martin. Although a doctor expressed a high degree of certainty that no child abuse occurred, the court does not need to ascertain the reasonableness of child care workers' reliance on this conclusion since they had no investigative duty. Their obligation was solely to report suspected abuse, which they did regarding a separate incident. The court clarifies that this ruling is narrow and does not impact any potential liability the government may face for failing to exercise reasonable care in fulfilling its assumed duties.