Ralph's Concrete v. Concord Concrete Pumps

Citation: 225 P.3d 1035Docket: 63297-3-I

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; February 21, 2010; Washington; State Appellate Court

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Service of process by mail on a foreign corporation, Concord Concrete Pumps, Inc., under Washington's Superior Court Civil Rule (CR) 4(i)(1)(D) is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction when personal service as required by the long-arm statute (RCW 4.28.185) is not performed. Ralph's Concrete Pumping, Inc. did not execute personal service or submit the necessary affidavit indicating that service could not be achieved within Washington. As a result, the default judgment exceeding $175,000 against Concord is void. 

Ralph's, a Washington corporation, sued Concord, a British Columbia corporation, for breach of contract related to the sale of a concrete pump and truck. Although a representative of Concord signed for the mail delivery of the summons and complaint, this does not satisfy the service requirements. Concord's appeal contends that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction due to Ralph's non-compliance with the long-arm statute, a position the court agrees with. Proper service is fundamental to establishing personal jurisdiction, and mere receipt of documents cannot substitute for the required legal procedures. The court reviews the denial of Concord's motion to vacate the default judgment de novo, underscoring the necessity of strict adherence to statutory service requirements.

The long-arm statute, RCW 4.28.185(2), outlines the procedure for serving defendants outside Washington who fall under its jurisdiction, allowing service by personal delivery outside the state as per RCW 4.28.180. In this case, Ralph's did not personally serve Concord but instead mailed the summons to Concord's offices in British Columbia, asserting that this method complies with CR 4(i)(1)(D), which permits service by mail requiring a signed receipt for foreign parties.

Ralph's argues that the permissive language of the long-arm statute allows for alternative methods of service and that RCW 4.28.185(6) does not restrict the use of other lawful service methods. However, this argument is deemed unpersuasive because CR 4(e)(1) specifies that service must follow the manner prescribed by the relevant statute, which in this case is the long-arm statute that mandates personal service. Since the long-arm statute explicitly requires personal service, the conditions of CR 4(e)(1) are not satisfied, making the service by mail invalid.

Ralph's further contends that if there were a conflict between CR 4(i)(1)(D) and RCW 4.28.185(2), the court rule should take precedence. However, it is determined that no conflict exists in this case, as the statute's requirements are clear and controlling. As a result, the service of the summons was invalid.

In *In re Marriage of Tsarbopoulos*, the court addressed a dissolution proceeding where the wife, having moved to Washington, served her husband in Greece through a process server at his office. The husband, who did not appear at the initial proceedings, later sought to vacate the default orders, claiming improper service. The superior court agreed, but the court of appeals reversed, confirming that Washington courts could issue a dissolution decree if one party is domiciled in Washington and the other is served according to Washington's rules. The husband was deemed validly served under Greek law, thus affirming jurisdiction.

Ralph's attempts to draw parallels to this case by arguing that service by mail under CR 4(i)(1)(D) fulfills British Columbia's service requirements and grants jurisdiction in Washington were rejected. The court clarified that the service methods outlined in CR 4(i) are contingent upon CR 4(e), which requires personal service for non-residents as dictated by the long-arm statute. The Tsarbopoulos decision did not consider the interaction between these rules because it involved valid service under Washington law.

This case, unlike Tsarbopoulos, pertains to jurisdiction claims under the long-arm statute, not marriage dissolution. Ralph's did not effectuate valid personal service on Concord as mandated by state law, and thus, the court lacked personal jurisdiction, rendering the default judgment void due to improper service. Additionally, Concord argued that Ralph's failed to meet the affidavit requirements of RCW 4.28.185(4), which the court also found significant enough to warrant vacating the judgment.

RCW 4.28.185(4) mandates that personal service outside the state is valid only if an affidavit is filed affirming that service cannot be made within the state, which was not done in this case. Substantial compliance with this requirement is allowed, meaning that prior affidavits must logically indicate that service could not occur within the state. Without compliance with the affidavit requirement, personal jurisdiction over the defendant is lacking, rendering the judgment void. Ralph's did not file the required affidavit, leading to the default judgment being deemed void.

Ralph's contends that it served Concord using an alternative method outlined in CR 4(i)(1)(D), which does not necessitate an affidavit. However, the court found that this alternative did not apply here, and the absence of the affidavit was critical for establishing personal jurisdiction, thus invalidating the judgment.

Concord claimed entitlement to attorney fees under RCW 4.28.185(5), but the court determined that the statute only permits such fees when a defendant is personally served, which was not the case since service was executed by mail. Therefore, attorney fees were not awardable.

The court reversed the order denying Concord's motion to vacate the default judgment and set aside the entry of default.

State v. Coughlin emphasizes the necessity of proper personal service to establish personal jurisdiction, citing various Washington cases. The precedent set in Haberman v. Washington Public Power Supply Systems reinforces that strict compliance with service requirements is mandatory. Failure to achieve proper service can lead to a void default judgment, as highlighted in Rodriguez v. James-Jackson and In re Marriage of Hill. The significance of following procedural rules is echoed in multiple cases, including Sharebuilder Securities Corp. v. Hoang, which further illustrates that jurisdiction hinges on appropriate service of process. The document underscores that without proper jurisdiction, any judgment rendered is invalid.