Bouchard v. New York Archdiocese

Citations: 719 F. Supp. 2d 255; 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28796; 2010 WL 1173001Docket: 04 Civ. 9978(PGG)

Court: District Court, S.D. New York; March 24, 2010; Federal District Court

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Angie Bouchard filed a lawsuit on August 31, 2004, against the New York Archdiocese, Cardinal John Egan, Church of Our Saviour, and Father Fernando Kennedy, alleging sexual abuse by Father Kennedy. The case was removed to federal court on December 17, 2004, under diversity jurisdiction. Following prior rulings, the only claims that remained were for negligence and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention against the Archdiocese and the Church. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that Bouchard failed to provide evidence that they knew or should have known of Father Kennedy's propensity for sexual abuse, which is necessary for her claims to succeed. 

The factual background indicates that Father Kennedy, a visiting priest from Sri Lanka, served at the Church of Our Saviour in the summer of 2001 during a transitional period without a permanent pastor. He performed priestly duties without direct supervision or training from the Archdiocese. Bouchard, who was 24 at the time, met Kennedy at mass, where he inquired about her past abuse. This led to private meetings in the church sacristy where Kennedy guided her through a method he claimed would help her cope with her trauma. Bouchard did not perceive anything inappropriate during these interactions. The court concluded that because there was no evidence of the defendants' knowledge of Kennedy's behavior, Bouchard's negligence claims could not stand, leading to the granting of the defendants' summary judgment motion.

Plaintiff expressed dissatisfaction with therapy sessions led by Father Kennedy, stating they were ineffective and uncomfortable. Kennedy attributed this to the lack of a proper setting, suggesting a private room with a bed was necessary for the therapy to work. Their third and final session occurred at Plaintiff’s apartment in September 2001, where Kennedy instructed her to perform acts involving wiping her body and imagining her abusers. He then proceeded to engage in sexual acts with her, claiming it was part of his method. After the encounter, Kennedy informed Plaintiff he would be leaving the country soon and would not return. 

Plaintiff did not report the abuse until late 2002 or early 2003 during therapy with Delores McCullough, who subsequently notified Monsignor Desmond O'Connor of the allegations on April 27, 2004—marking the first notice to the Defendants. O'Connor identified Kennedy as the alleged abuser and communicated the allegations to the relevant church authorities. Although the Church funded some therapy for Plaintiff, they took no further action regarding the allegations.

Procedurally, Plaintiff filed her lawsuit on August 31, 2004. The court dismissed her claims for battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty on May 18, 2006, while denying the Defendants' summary judgment motion on remaining claims. However, on October 24, 2006, the court ruled that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred by the one-year statute of limitations, dismissing all claims against Defendant Egan due to lack of evidence of his knowledge of Kennedy's alleged misconduct. 

Defendants sought summary judgment, arguing no evidence showed they were aware of Kennedy's propensity for sexual abuse. The court found that Plaintiff had not provided any evidence of such knowledge despite full discovery, leading to the granting of the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, determined by substantive law.

The movant satisfies their burden by demonstrating a lack of evidence supporting an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. In summary judgment motions, the court resolves ambiguities and credits factual inferences favorably to the opposing party. However, mere speculation cannot be used to counter a motion for summary judgment. Pro se plaintiffs, while granted liberal construction of their submissions, are still required to meet evidentiary standards.

In negligence claims, an employer may be liable for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision if they placed an employee in a position to foreseeably cause harm. Under New York law, to establish such claims, a plaintiff must show: 1) an employer-employee relationship, 2) the employer's prior knowledge of the employee's propensity for harmful conduct, and 3) that the tort occurred on the employer's premises or involved the employer's property. A claim requires allegations that the employer failed to investigate an employee when reasonably prudent facts warranted such action.

The defendants argue for summary judgment due to a lack of evidence that they were aware of Father Kennedy's alleged propensity for sexual abuse. The plaintiff fails to provide substantive evidence, relying instead on conclusory statements and speculation from her deposition and affidavits. The plaintiff's assertion that Kennedy had helped women with a history of abuse does not imply the defendants had knowledge of his prior conduct. Additionally, the claim regarding Monsignor O'Connor's admission about tracking visiting priests does not establish notice of Kennedy's potential misconduct. The plaintiff admitted to having no other information about Kennedy's history with the church. Consequently, the defendants had no duty to investigate or warn Kennedy against misconduct as they had no reason to suspect such behavior. Under New York law, there is no common-law duty to implement specific hiring procedures absent knowledge of facts that would prompt a reasonable investigation. The defendants presented admissible evidence demonstrating their lack of knowledge regarding Kennedy's propensity for sexual abuse.

Monsignor O'Connor testified that, in the summer of 2001, priests did not need formal appointments by the Archdiocese's director of priest personnel and could be invited by individual pastors. Neither he nor the priest personnel office were aware of Father Kennedy until O'Connor investigated allegations made by the Plaintiff in 2004. Cardinal Egan, who led the Archdiocese during the relevant period, stated in an affidavit that visiting priests rarely required his attention and he had never met or authorized Father Kennedy, nor had he heard of him until 2004 when Ms. Bouchard raised complaints. The case references *Ehrens v. Lutheran Church*, where a court ruled that there was insufficient evidence of the church's knowledge of a minister's misconduct, leading to summary judgment for the defendants. In the current case, O'Connor and Egan's claims of ignorance regarding Father Kennedy's alleged abusive behavior are the only pertinent evidence regarding the Defendants' knowledge. The Plaintiff did not provide evidence creating a material issue of fact on this point, resulting in the grant of the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Additionally, the Clerk of the Court has been instructed to terminate the motion and close the case, rendering any other pending motions moot. The notes indicate various procedural details, including the Plaintiff's pro se status, prior dismissals, and evidentiary considerations related to the case.

Testimony from Father Thomas Doyle and Father Robert Hoatson, presented as expert opinions on clergy sexual abuse, lacks the required evidentiary support. Judge Haight highlighted that Hoatson's affidavit was inadmissible due to his lack of personal knowledge regarding the Archdiocese's practices and Cardinal Egan's supervision of visiting priests like Father Kennedy in 2001. Hoatson's assertions regarding what the Defendants knew or should have known about Kennedy improperly encroach upon the jury's role in determining facts and therefore hold no admissible weight. Additionally, Hoatson acknowledged during his deposition that he had no personal knowledge of the Defendants' awareness of Kennedy's past. Doyle, for his part, admitted he had no information indicating that any Church of our Saviour employee had prior knowledge of Kennedy's propensity for sexual abuse before September 11, 2001.