Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania; June 9, 2010; Federal District Court
Michael and Brandy Park, along with their minor children, are plaintiffs in a civil rights case against Gary Veasie, the chief of police, and police officers Michael Bogart and Brian Markochik, as well as the Borough of Weatherly, following a search of their home on September 18, 2008. The Parks allege that Veasie, acting without the presence of a parent, interrogated their 7-year-old son, Joshua, about suspected drug paraphernalia found at school. During the interrogation, which lasted about thirty minutes, Veasie asked suggestive questions that led Joshua to confirm the existence of drug paraphernalia in their home. Veasie then obtained a search warrant based solely on Joshua's statements, without contacting the parents or conducting further investigation. The Parks assert that Veasie was aware of his obligation to have a parent present and had personal animus towards Michael Park from a previous incident regarding parking rights. Veasie also chose Bogart and Markochik, who had limited experience with drug raids, to assist in executing the search warrant, contrary to standard police procedures. The case is currently before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim.
Veasie, along with Bogart and Markochik, conducted a raid on a residence at approximately 4:45 p.m. on September 18, 2008, despite knowing that small children lived there. They approached the house with drawn guns, did not announce their identity or purpose, and forcibly broke down the front door, shattering its window. Upon entering, they aimed their firearms at Brandy Park and the children, demanding that the occupants remain still. Although they attempted to handcuff Brandy Park, they ultimately refrained due to her pleas not to do so in front of the children. During the five-hour search, Brandy Park was guarded by an armed officer while she sat with her children. Michael Park arrived home during the search, was handcuffed with flex cuffs, and held outside in view of neighbors until the search concluded. Despite using a drug detection dog, no illegal substances were found, although two small pipes were seized; these were not submitted for testing. Michael Park was initially charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, but the charges were later dismissed. Following the incident, the couple moved to stay with relatives due to their children's distress.
On October 20, 2009, the Parks filed a complaint in the Carbon County Court, asserting violations of their constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, along with Pennsylvania common law claims. After removal to federal court, an amended complaint was filed, asserting sixteen counts, including federal claims of unlawful arrest, prosecution without probable cause, excessive force, and due process violations, as well as supplemental state law claims. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
On January 19, 2010, Plaintiffs submitted their opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss, with no reply brief filed. The case was reassigned on May 3, 2010, due to the elevation of Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie. The motion to dismiss is ready for resolution.
The legal standard for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim requires the court to accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true while disregarding legal conclusions. To establish a 'plausible claim for relief,' the complaint must demonstrate entitlement to relief through factual allegations rather than mere assertions. The Supreme Court mandates that if the facts do not allow for a reasonable inference of misconduct, the complaint fails to show entitlement to relief.
Claims must have 'facial plausibility' based on factual content allowing inferences of liability. Conclusory statements without factual support are insufficient. Courts typically consider allegations in the complaint, attached exhibits, and public records. Authentic documents attached by the defendant may be included if the claims rely on them, as can documents referenced in the complaint if their authenticity is undisputed.
A district court cannot consider external matters during a motion to dismiss but can include documents integral to the complaint without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. In the Third Circuit, plaintiffs must be granted leave to amend deficient civil rights complaints unless dismissal is warranted due to bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility.
Plaintiffs in the Amended Complaint assert both federal and state law claims, primarily under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows individuals to seek redress for constitutional violations committed by persons acting under state law. To succeed under § 1983, a plaintiff must show a constitutional right was violated and that the violation occurred under color of state law. In this case, there is agreement that the Defendants acted under state law. The court evaluates whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation.
Defendants argue that all federal claims should be dismissed for failing to state a cause of action and request the court to decline jurisdiction over state law claims. Specific points raised include: (1) claims against Defendants Veasie, Bogart, and Markochik in their official capacities are redundant to claims against the Borough of Weatherly; (2) claims for punitive damages against the Borough should be dismissed; and (3) remaining claims should be dismissed as either unrecognized constitutional violations or for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiffs have conceded to the dismissal of the punitive damages claim against the Borough, which the court will not further address. Regarding official capacity claims, the court agrees with Defendants that such claims against the individual Defendants are redundant, as they essentially replicate the claims against the Borough. Consequently, the court will dismiss the official capacity claims without allowing for amendment, as no modification would remedy the identified defects.
The Fourth Amendment safeguards individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, while lacking in clarity, presents sufficient factual allegations to support a claim of Fourth Amendment violations. They assert that Defendants' questioning of 7-year-old Joshua Park resulted in unreliable information leading to a search warrant for their home. The execution of this warrant allegedly breached the knock-and-announce rule, involved unlawful seizure of the Plaintiffs, and employed excessive force.
Key allegations include that Defendant Veasie, who had animosity towards Plaintiff Michael Park, questioned Joshua without involving his parents and used the unreliable information to secure a search warrant. The complaint details that Veasie led a team of untrained officers, who approached the home with drawn weapons, failed to announce their presence, and forcefully broke down the door. The ensuing five-hour search involved officers pointing guns at Brandy Park and the children, restraining them on the couch, and handcuffing Michael Park upon his arrival home. The search yielded only two small pipes, attributed to a guest, which led to Michael Park's arrest for drug paraphernalia—charges that were later dismissed.
The Plaintiffs argue that the circumstances did not justify a no-knock entry, as the initial tip involved possible drug paraphernalia rather than drugs, and no exigent circumstances were present. The specific actions described in the complaint support the assertion of misconduct rather than mere legal conclusions, demonstrating a plausible violation of the Fourth Amendment based on the alleged excessive force and unlawful seizure by the Defendants.
Pointing guns at individuals and handcuffing them does not automatically constitute an arrest; however, such actions must be justified by the circumstances. The aggregate assessment of the incident indicates substantial invasion of the Plaintiffs' personal security due to the use of guns, handcuffs, and the duration of detention, especially considering the Defendants' search was based on the mere presence of potential drug paraphernalia. This situation supports plausible claims for unreasonable search and seizure, as well as excessive force under the Fourth Amendment against Defendants Veasie, Bogart, and Markochik in their individual capacities.
Regarding supervisory liability, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Veasie is responsible not only for his own actions during the alleged improper search and seizure but also for directing and supervising the other Defendants. Traditional precedent requires that supervisors can only be held liable under §1983 if they participated in, directed, or were aware of the constitutional violations. The Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal raised questions about the applicability of this standard, indicating that vicarious liability does not apply in such cases. Instead, each official must be shown to have violated the Constitution through their actions. Despite the implications of Iqbal, personal involvement remains essential for establishing liability. Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Veasie was involved in the improper actions and directed others to violate their rights, including intentionally selecting inexperienced officers for the drug raid.
On the issue of Monell liability, Defendants argue that the Borough of Weatherly cannot be held liable for its employees' conduct unless there is evidence of an unconstitutional policy or custom.
To establish liability under Monell, a plaintiff must identify a specific policy attributed to the municipality, demonstrating a causal link between that policy's execution and the injury incurred. A policy is established when a decision-maker with final authority issues an official policy, while a custom is considered law when the practices by state officials are longstanding and entrenched. In this case, plaintiffs allege that Defendant Veasie was the policymaker for the Borough of Weatherly Police Department and that the Borough had multiple policies. However, they fail to connect these policies to the events of September 18, 2008, involving Joshua Park's questioning and the search of their residence, merely reciting Monell claim elements without factual support. The court finds the allegations insufficient to demonstrate that a responsible decision-maker issued a policy violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights or that a custom existed that constituted law. Consequently, the court will grant the motion to dismiss the claims against the Borough of Weatherly but will allow plaintiffs limited leave to amend their complaint to properly assert Monell liability, advising them to meet the higher pleading standards set by the Supreme Court in Iqbal.
Regarding the claim of prosecution without probable cause, the plaintiffs assert this as part of their Fourth Amendment claims rather than as a separate constitutional tort. They correctly note that such a claim cannot be pursued under §1983 based on substantive due process since the Supreme Court mandates using the specific amendment that provides protection for the behavior in question. The Third Circuit clarifies that the constitutional violation lies in the deprivation of liberty arising from prosecution. The plaintiffs' allegations do not plausibly support a claim for prosecution without probable cause, as they assert this claim broadly for all plaintiffs rather than specifically for Michael Park, who is the only one charged with a crime.
Plaintiff Michael Park's allegations do not establish that he was seized as a result of a legal proceeding, leading the court to grant Defendants' motion to dismiss the claim for prosecution without probable cause. The court denies Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend this claim, deeming any future attempts futile. Regarding the deprivation of liberty and property without due process, the court finds that the claims lack a factual basis, as there are no indications that Park was ever incarcerated following his arrest. The claims are tied to alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment, rather than a generalized substantive due process claim, prompting the dismissal of these allegations as well.
In the First Amendment retaliation claims, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they engaged in protected activity, faced retaliation from the government, and that the activity caused the retaliation. The court notes that only Michael Park has a potential claim against Defendant Veasie, stemming from a past parking citation. However, the allegations are insufficient, lacking specific details regarding the timing and nature of the protected activity and its connection to the subsequent search and seizure. The court concludes that the claims provide only an inference of misconduct, which falls short of the legal standard set forth in Iqbal, resulting in the dismissal of the First Amendment claim.
A claim has 'facial plausibility' when the plaintiff presents factual content that enables a reasonable inference of the defendant's liability for the alleged misconduct. In this case, the court found that the allegations made by the plaintiffs do not support such inferences, except for Michael Park's First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Veasie, which contains sufficient factual basis to warrant an amendment. The court will allow the plaintiffs limited leave to file a second amended complaint to adequately assert this claim, as well as their Monell liability claim against the Borough of Weatherly.
The plaintiffs withdrew their claim for summary punishment, acknowledging its lack of merit. Regarding state law claims, although the defendants urged the court to dismiss these based on the perceived weakness of the federal claims, they did not provide substantive arguments for dismissal. Since the court is denying the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims, it will retain jurisdiction over the state law claims.
In conclusion, the court partially granted and partially denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. It denied the motion concerning the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims against Veasie, Bogart, and Markochik, which were sufficiently pled, and also denied the motion regarding the state law claims. The court granted the motion in all other respects and permitted the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint within 20 days to substantiate their claims against the Borough of Weatherly and Veasie. No other amendments will be allowed. An appropriate order will be issued.
Plaintiffs must reassert their Fourth Amendment claims against Defendants Veasie, Bogart, and Markochik in their individual capacities, along with their state law claims, if they choose to file a second amended complaint. Should they fail to do so within the specified timeframe, the case will proceed solely on the existing Fourth Amendment claims and state law claims. A case management conference will be scheduled by the court. Additionally, there are notes indicating that a date in the Amended Complaint may contain a typographical error and that it is unclear whether Plaintiffs intended to assert a separate cause of action regarding Veasie’s questioning of Joshua Park without parental presence. The court presumes this information is part of the broader Fourth Amendment claims. Lastly, the only specific policy mentioned by Plaintiffs relates to Veasie’s alleged disregard for standard procedures when assembling his raid team, which does not support a claim of Monell liability, as it indicates a failure to follow policy rather than a de facto policy.
