Richardson v. Valley Asphalt, Inc.

Citations: 109 F. Supp. 2d 1332; 11 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 363; 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12195; 2000 WL 1200160Docket: 2:00CV378K

Court: District Court, D. Utah; August 21, 2000; Federal District Court

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Daniel S. Richardson and Jamee L. Richardson filed a lawsuit against Valley Asphalt, Inc. and Western Aggregates, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, raising multiple motions from the defendants, including motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, bifurcate the trial, and extend the time to answer the complaint. A hearing was held on August 2, 2000, with both parties represented by legal counsel.

The case centers on a discrimination charge filed by Daniel S. Richardson with the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor Division and the EEOC, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The EEOC issued a Right-to-Sue Notice approximately 161 days after the charge was filed, and Richardson subsequently filed his lawsuit on May 5, 2000, exceeding the 180-day waiting period stipulated by Title VII before suit can be initiated.

Defendants argue that the premature issuance of the Right-to-Sue Notice by the EEOC deprives the court of jurisdiction and necessitates dismissal of the ADA claim, while plaintiffs counter that the notice's timing does not prevent federal litigation and assert that the defendants seek to delay proceedings. The court's consideration revolves around the validity of the EEOC's regulations regarding its obligations under Title VII, specifically referencing the statutory requirement that allows for civil action if the EEOC has not acted within specified timeframes.

Title VII grants the EEOC the authority to create procedural regulations for its enforcement, as stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-12(a). In 1977, the EEOC established a regulation allowing for the issuance of a right-to-sue notice before the standard 180-day administrative processing period concludes, provided the Commission certifies it is unlikely to complete processing within that timeframe (29 C.F.R. 1601.28(a)(2)). The legality of this regulation is in question, particularly regarding whether it undermines Title VII's mandated waiting period, a concern with no definitive resolution from the Supreme Court.

The District of Columbia Circuit ruled in Martini v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n that Congress intended to restrict private lawsuits within the initial 180 days post-filing, aligning this with Title VII's directive for the EEOC to investigate all charges (178 F.3d 1336, 1346-47). The court clarified that while the 180-day period is not jurisdictional, it is akin to a statute of limitations and can be subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling (Id. at 1348). Nevertheless, the court found no equitable grounds to exempt the plaintiff from the waiting period, rejecting arguments that an early suit would be futile if the EEOC is aware it cannot investigate promptly (Id. at 1347).

The ruling suggested that if the EEOC could not allow early suits, it would face increased pressure to enhance its investigative efficiency, potentially prompting requests for additional funding if necessary. Ultimately, the Martini court vacated the district court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff and remanded the case, directing the dismissal of the complaint without prejudice, allowing the plaintiff to refile after an additional 159 days of EEOC processing. Other district courts, including within the Tenth Circuit, have similarly found the EEOC's regulation to be in conflict with Title VII's waiting period, reinforcing the Martini decision.

The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, along with several district courts, have upheld the validity of a regulation concerning the EEOC's authority under Title VII, emphasizing the ambiguity in the statutory language and legislative history. Key cases include *Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan* and *Saulsbury v. Wismer, Becker, Inc.*, where both circuits affirmed that the EEOC is permitted to issue a right-to-sue notice before the 180-day investigation period concludes. This interpretation aims to protect aggrieved parties from unnecessary delays in administrative processes. The Tenth Circuit has not directly ruled on this issue, but in *Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc.*, it indicated that challenges to premature notices do not affect district court jurisdiction, viewing Title VII's timing requirements more like statutes of limitations. The court noted that the validity of the regulation hinges on a two-tiered analysis under *Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council*: first, determining if Congress has clearly addressed the issue, and if not, assessing whether the agency's interpretation is permissible. Deference is given to the agency's interpretation if Congressional intent is ambiguous or unclear.

Section 2000e-(5)(f)(1) of Title VII outlines two scenarios where the EEOC must issue a right-to-sue notice: after 180 days without a conciliation or suit, and upon charge dismissal. The statute indicates a mandatory EEOC action within 180 days, which can be interpreted as both a maximum waiting period and a minimum time for investigation before private lawsuits can be filed. The EEOC may issue a right-to-sue notice prior to the 180 days, contradicting the Martini court's interpretation that the statute prohibits such action before this period elapses. Legislative history reveals ambiguity regarding the EEOC's role, indicating that Congress intended for the agency to handle employment discrimination claims, with the 180-day waiting period aimed at encouraging conciliation. This provision seeks to prevent undue delays and allows individuals to pursue their remedies if the EEOC is inactive or resolves the charge unsatisfactorily. The Seybert court noted the EEOC's overwhelming workload, highlighting that the agency struggles to manage the volume of claims effectively. The differing interpretations by various courts underscore the ambiguity in Title VII's language and legislative intent. Following Chevron deference principles, this court agrees with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits that the EEOC's interpretation is permissible, aligning with the legislative goal of ensuring prompt remedies for aggrieved individuals.

When the Commission is unable to process a claimant's charge within the designated timeframe, it certifies this inability, allowing claimants to seek a "prompt remedy" through the courts. Despite a potential interpretation by the Martini court that Title VII's language is clear and that the regulation conflicts with the EEOC's obligations, equitable considerations favor allowing Plaintiffs to move forward in federal court. The EEOC has indicated it will likely not complete administrative processing within the 180 days following the charge filing, and Plaintiffs should not suffer due to the EEOC's premature issuance of the Right-to-Sue Notice. Citing the case of Commodari v. Long Island University, the balance of equities supports waiving the 180-day waiting period. The court also disagrees with the argument that remanding cases to the EEOC would expedite action, noting the Commission's substantial backlog and insufficient funding. With a pending inventory of 40,234 charges as of fiscal year 1999 and an average processing time of 265 days, it is unlikely that the EEOC would improve its handling of cases if prevented from terminating charges before the 180-day period. Consequently, remanding would only prolong the resolution, which is particularly detrimental given Mr. Richardson's diagnosis of AIDS.

Mr. Richardson was diagnosed with AIDS in May 1999 and claims he was wrongfully terminated by Valley Asphalt after disclosing his condition. Following a leave of absence, he returned to work on August 18, 1999, but was told the next day that no one wanted to work with him due to his illness. Subsequently, he was terminated for this reason. Mrs. Richardson alleges that Valley Asphalt's representatives pressured her to convince her husband to withdraw his unemployment claim under threats of retaliation against her job security. She asserts that the Defendants exploited their awareness of the emotional distress they were causing due to Mr. Richardson's diagnosis and the potential health risks to their children. Ultimately, under pressure, Mrs. Richardson quit her job, fearing the stress of the situation.

Mr. and Mrs. Richardson have filed claims for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress against the Defendants, asserting that the Defendants' actions were outrageous and shocking to societal standards. Mrs. Richardson additionally claims constructive discharge. 

Defendants seek dismissal of these claims, arguing that the alleged conduct does not meet the threshold of outrageousness required under Utah law for intentional infliction and that the claims do not fulfill the necessary criteria for negligent infliction. They further contend that both claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.

For negligent infliction, the Defendants cite the case of Mounteer v. Utah Power, Light Co., where the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of similar claims, stating that emotional distress damages are covered under workers’ compensation, thus precluding such claims.

Regarding intentional infliction, the court outlines that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in outrageous conduct with the intent to cause emotional distress, which resulted in such distress. The Workers' Compensation Act protects employers from liability for injuries caused by intentional or reckless acts, unless it is proven that the employer intended the harmful act. While the Plaintiffs did not explicitly state this in their Complaint, their arguments imply such intent.

The court, favorably viewing the allegations, finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently claimed outrageous conduct that could merit a jury's favor. Specifically, if Mr. Richardson substantiates his claims of discriminatory treatment due to his disability with the requisite intent, this may satisfy the elements for intentional infliction of emotional distress, provided he also demonstrates the emotional distress suffered.

The Utah Supreme Court has classified sexual harassment as outrageous and intolerable conduct, which, when performed with the requisite intent, satisfies the elements of the tort. The court draws a parallel to disability discrimination, suggesting it falls within the same category if the conduct is proven to have been performed with the requisite intent and has caused emotional distress. In Mrs. Richardson's case, she alleges that the Defendants exploited her need to retain her job, which was crucial for providing health insurance for her husband, to coerce her into persuading him to drop a legal claim.

Regarding the constructive discharge claim, the Defendants argue that Mrs. Richardson must show that her working conditions were objectively intolerable and that she had no choice but to resign. They contend that if an employee resigns voluntarily, even due to employer actions, it does not constitute constructive discharge. However, the court finds that when considering the facts in favor of Mrs. Richardson, sufficient allegations exist to suggest a reasonable person would find her conditions intolerable, thus supporting her claim.

Western Aggregates seeks dismissal, asserting that it is not connected to Valley Asphalt as a parent or subsidiary and lacks authority over it. The Plaintiffs allege that Western Aggregates threatened Mrs. Richardson regarding her husband’s unemployment claim and that it negligently or intentionally caused emotional harm by wrongfully terminating him due to his disability. Despite Western Aggregates pointing out that the threats originated from Valley Asphalt employees and claiming no direct relationship with the Plaintiffs, the court declines to dismiss the case at this stage, allowing for the possibility of further examination following discovery.

Mr. Richardson claims wrongful termination by Valley Asphalt due to his disability, asserting violations of the ADA and emotional distress. Mrs. Richardson alleges constructive discharge following her husband’s AIDS diagnosis and also claims emotional distress related to threats about her employment if she did not persuade him to stop pursuing unemployment benefits. The Defendants argue for bifurcation of the trials, citing potential jury confusion and prejudice if the cases are tried together. They fear that evidence from Mrs. Richardson's case could improperly influence Mr. Richardson's ADA claim. Conversely, the Plaintiffs contend that the cases are interconnected, with many witnesses relevant to both, making bifurcation inefficient. The court retains discretion over bifurcation, weighing factors such as judicial economy and potential prejudice. Ultimately, the court denies the motion to bifurcate, finding that a joint trial is more efficient and unlikely to confuse the jury, although some prejudice risks can be mitigated with jury instructions. 

Additionally, Defendants sought an extension to file their Answer, which the court grants, allowing them until September 5, 2000. The court's rulings include: denying the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting in part and denying in part the Motion to Dismiss (dismissing negligent infliction claims); denying Western Aggregates' Motion to Dismiss but allowing for future motions; denying the Motion to Bifurcate; and granting the extension for the Answer.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be granted only if it is evident that plaintiffs cannot prove any facts that would support their claims for relief. Courts accept the allegations in the complaint as true and interpret them favorably towards the plaintiff. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure maintain a strong presumption against dismissing claims for failure to state a claim. Dismissing a claim is viewed as a severe action that requires careful consideration to uphold the liberal pleading standards and ensure justice. Additionally, there is a dispute regarding the filing date of a charge, which is not material to the current motion. To establish a claim for emotional distress, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted in a manner that a reasonable person would recognize as likely to cause such distress, unless there is evidence of actual intent to inflict emotional distress.