Donato v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat. Bank

Citations: 52 F. Supp. 2d 317; 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9253; 1999 WL 404681Docket: 97-283L

Court: District Court, D. Rhode Island; June 15, 1999; Federal District Court

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Louis Donato, as the executor of Gloria Zinni's estate and guardian of her heir Dana Zinni Donato, initially filed a case in state court in 1992 against the Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, James Winoker, and the law firm Hinckley, Allen. Snyder, alleging nonfeasance. The case was removed to federal court in 1997, where it was determined that Donato's state law claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). On April 12, 1999, Donato filed a motion for the presiding judge to recuse himself due to prior acquaintanceship with Winoker, claiming this relationship might create bias or the appearance of bias. The defendants opposed this motion and sought sanctions against Donato and his attorneys under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for filing what they deemed frivolous. The court denied the recusal motion, stating that the standard for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. 455(a) requires a reasonable person to harbor doubts about a judge's impartiality based on all known circumstances. The court also criticized Donato's attorneys for failing to uphold their professional responsibilities but chose not to impose monetary sanctions to expedite the case's progress to a hearing on the merits.

The trial judge is obligated to hear cases unless there is credible evidence indicating potential bias. In this matter, the judge disclosed two prior connections with Winoker: a joint bank account managed by the judge’s wife and past interactions when their sons attended the same school. At an April 1998 hearing, both the judge and the attorneys for the parties acknowledged that these connections did not warrant recusal. Donato later requested the judge's recusal, primarily citing the judge's past contacts with Winoker, despite an attorney stating that the bank account issue was not problematic. During a May 1999 hearing, the judge clarified that his relationship with Winoker was minimal and dated, characterized by brief, superficial interactions related solely to school activities, with no substantive contact for over two decades. The judge concluded that such a distant and trivial connection does not necessitate recusal, emphasizing that no reasonable person would perceive bias from a long-ago, polite acquaintance. The judge also noted the importance of impartiality but highlighted the complication that no other judges in the district were available to take on the case.

Judge Ernest Torres has recused himself from the case, and Judge Mary Lisi's husband represents Winoker, which could lead to the case being transferred to New Hampshire, causing unnecessary costs and delays given the lack of bias. Donato's motion for recusal, filed nearly a year after the original hearing, is deemed waived because his attorney, Violet, explicitly waived the issue at the April 1998 hearing, where all parties were present and acknowledged the judge's disclosures. 

Under the law of waiver, as established in In re Cargill, a party may waive disqualification grounds if there is full disclosure and the party's attorney states there is no objection to the judge's continued service. In this instance, Donato was present during the judge's disclosures and his attorney's waiver, yet he waited over 11 months to assert the recusal motion, demonstrating a lack of reasonable action compared to the party in Cargill. Despite later expressing concerns about the judge's impartiality, this was addressed significantly after the initial hearing, indicating a strategic delay in raising the issue.

The Cargill panel established that a party can waive the right to seek recusal based on perceived bias. In this case, the defendants' counsel did not argue the waiver explicitly but noted an 11-month delay as grounds to deny the motion, a point the Court chose not to address. Despite the defendants citing precedents that might support their position, the Court found Donato's motion failed on two independent grounds, rendering the issue of timeliness irrelevant.

Donato, feeling aggrieved by the defendants and the federal court, faced a preemptive removal to federal court due to an amendment regarding a pension plan just before trial in state court. The Court acknowledged that while ERISA preemption offers little comfort to Donato, he acted unjustifiably by compelling the defendants to respond to a motion based on his mistaken recollection. The Court emphasized that Donato received a fair hearing and took his concerns seriously.

Attorneys Violet and Marran were criticized for their failure to adequately represent Donato. They had a responsibility to ensure their motions were factually and legally sound. The Court assessed various factors to determine the reasonableness of their inquiry, concluding that they did not order the transcript of a relevant hearing despite having ample time and familiarity with the case. Their motion to recuse lacked a credible legal basis, and they should have recognized its futility. Moreover, their knowledge of Donato's flawed memory highlighted their failure to appropriately guide him. The Court asserted that attorneys must sometimes refuse client demands that are frivolous, and Violet and Marran should have either explained the legal context to Donato or allowed him to seek alternative representation.

The motion to recuse the judge based on alleged social relationships with a defendant was deemed frivolous, with claims lacking factual support. The court noted that a basic investigation would have discredited the allegations. Although attorneys Violet and Marran displayed misconduct, the court opted not to impose monetary sanctions, prioritizing the impartiality of the proceedings and the need to resolve the case between Donato and the defendants. The judge acknowledged that the costs incurred by the defendants were not substantial in the context of eight years of litigation and that imposing sanctions could complicate the case further. The publication of the decision was viewed as a sufficient form of sanction. 

The court confirmed that Donato has received fair hearings and will continue to do so. Consequently, the motion to recuse was denied, and no monetary sanctions were imposed on Donato, Violet, or Marran.

In the appendix, it is noted that Louis Donato, as executor of Gloria Zinni's estate and guardian of her heir Dana Zinni Donato, initiated the case in 1992 against defendants including Rhode Island Hospital Trust Bank and others. After the third amended complaint in 1997, the case was removed to federal court due to ERISA implications, which the magistrate judge upheld as proper, dismissing the plaintiff's objection to the removal. The standard of review for this appeal is whether the magistrate's conclusions were clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

Magistrate Judge Lovegreen's decision is upheld as neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law, aligning with established precedents, including Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon and Carlo v. Reed Rolled Thread Die Co. The complaint is deemed to 'relate to' an ERISA plan, as the inquiry must focus on the plan itself. Although the plaintiff argues that their cause of action stems from the defendants' actions rather than the retirement plan, they overlook ERISA's broad preemption scope, which encompasses state laws related to employee benefit plans. The First Circuit's ruling in Carlo supports this, as claims can be preempted if resolving them necessitates examining an ERISA-covered plan, regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks greater benefits. Consequently, the court finds that the defendants' responsibilities are closely tied to ERISA, affirming the decision to deny the motion to remand and confirming proper removal. The discussion also highlights that claims under ERISA may leave plaintiffs without remedies, reflecting legislative intent. Additionally, the court addressed procedural matters regarding trial scheduling and the plaintiff's options moving forward, emphasizing that it is not the court's responsibility to dictate the plaintiff's litigation strategy.