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In Re ELECTRICAL CARBON PRODUCTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION

Citations: 447 F. Supp. 2d 389; 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64399; 2006 WL 2505881Docket: MDL No. 1514. Master Civil No. 03-2182 (JBS)

Court: District Court, D. New Jersey; August 30, 2006; Federal District Court

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Civil complaints were filed alleging antitrust violations related to the sale of electrical carbon products, subsequently consolidated in the United States District Court, New Jersey. The plaintiffs' Third Amended Class Action Complaint accuses the defendants of unlawfully conspiring to fix prices and allocate markets for electrical carbon products, violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The proposed class includes all individuals and entities (excluding federal entities and the defendants) who purchased these products from January 1, 1990, to December 31, 1999.

The allegations arose following a Department of Justice investigation, which resulted in guilty pleas from Morganite, Inc. for price-fixing and from Morgan Crucible Company PLC for witness tampering. Additionally, investigations by the European Community led to fines against various defendants for anti-competitive practices outside the scope of this litigation.

The Court is currently reviewing motions from Class Counsel for final approval of the proposed Settlement Class under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) to determine if the settlements are fair, reasonable, and adequate. This includes a request to dismiss released claims and approve payment of legal fees and expenses from the settlement fund. The Court will assess four proposed settlements involving different groups of defendants.

Settlement agreements have been reached to resolve a Multidistrict Litigation by certifying a class of plaintiffs eligible for pro rata distribution of a settlement fund totaling $21.9 million, which is subject to reductions for attorneys' fees, expenses, and incentive awards. The requested attorneys' fees are approximately $5.7 million (around 26% of the fund) plus nearly $500,000 in expenses. The settlements involve four groups of defendants with the following total amounts: 

1. **Morgan Defendants** - $15 million
2. **Carbone Defendants** - $3.7 million
3. **Schunk Defendants** - $2,975,000
4. **SGL Defendant** - $225,000

Preliminary approval for the settlements and class certifications was granted on May 11, 2005, alongside authorization for notice distribution to potential class members. The initial settlement amount was $24.2 million. Thirteen entities opted out before the final exclusion deadline in 2005, with twelve represented by the law firm Crowell & Moring, which made significant purchases of electrical carbon products. Their opt-out activated walk-away rights for the Morgan, Schunk, and Carbone settlements (the SGL agreement lacks this provision). 

Subsequent discussions led to the Crowell & Moring Plaintiffs agreeing to rejoin the Morgan, Schunk, and SGL settlements while excluding the Carbone settlement. This rejoining was made possible by a reduction in Class Counsel's requested attorneys' fees from 33 1/3% to 25%, enhancing the net value for the remaining class members. The Carbone settlement was renegotiated down from $6 million to $3.7 million, ensuring the Carbone Defendants would not terminate their settlement agreement. Due to these modifications, the Court ordered a Supplemental Notice to be sent to all relevant parties, including the 451 class-member claimants and one other opt-out entity, as per the Order filed on March 27, 2006.

Preliminary approval was granted for the amended settlements and for the Crowell Moring Plaintiffs' request to withdraw their opt-out notices and rejoin the class for the Morgan, Schunk, and SGL settlements. Notice was provided to interested parties to solicit objections, but no opt-outs or objections were received regarding the settlements, attorneys' fees, or other related requests. The Claims Administrator confirmed the absence of objections to the Amended Carbone Settlement or any settlements with the Morgan, Carbone, Schunk, or SGL Defendants, as well as to the Court's provisional decision to allow the Crowell Moring Plaintiffs to rejoin the class, the Plan of Allocation, and requests for attorneys' fees and incentive awards.

The Settlement Class is certified under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) for the four proposed settlements. The Settling Defendants consented to this certification, and all potential class members received adequate notice. The class is sufficiently numerous, with over 4,000 members, making individual joinder impractical. Common legal and factual issues regarding alleged price-fixing and market allocation satisfy Rule 23(a)(2). The representative plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class, and they are adequately represented by experienced Class Counsel, meeting Rule 23(a)(3) and (4) requirements. Common questions predominate over individual issues, demonstrating that a class action is the superior method for adjudication under Rule 23(b)(3). No objections to class certification were raised, and the Court approved the certification with minimal opt-outs noted.

Twelve Crowell & Moring Plaintiffs opted out of four settlements in 2005, triggering the Defendants' right to withdraw from the Morgan, Carbone, and Schunk settlements due to the sales volume associated with these plaintiffs, while the SGL settlement did not include such a provision. Following negotiations, the plaintiffs and the defendants reached agreements regarding foreign purchases and the plaintiffs chose to rejoin the Morgan, Schunk, and SGL settlements, finding them more favorable than continuing litigation. The defendants consented to this rejoining, and the Court granted provisional approval for the plaintiffs to revoke their opt-outs, pending notice and opportunity for class claimants to object. A Supplemental Notice detailed the Court’s preliminary determination supporting the rejoining, emphasizing it was in the best interests of the Settlement Class. Class members were informed of their right to object by May 1, 2006, and no objections were raised by that deadline or during the final hearing on May 12, 2006. The excerpt notes that while the rules do not specify procedures for rejoining after opting out, analogous federal rules indicate that court approval is necessary for withdrawing objections to settlements, ensuring that such withdrawals do not unduly advantage or reward the objector.

The Crowell Moring Plaintiffs seek to retract their prior decision to opt out of a proposed settlement, prompting the Court to evaluate whether this withdrawal confers any undue advantage to them over other class members and if the resulting settlements serve the best interests of the Settlement Class. The Court finds that allowing the Crowell Moring Plaintiffs to rejoin the settlements with Morgan, Schunk, and SGL is beneficial, as it prevents these Settling Defendants from withdrawing, thus preserving the settlements. The argument that the rejoining of the Crowell Moring Plaintiffs diminishes the claims of other class members is countered by the notion that the alternative would be no settlement at all. No class member relied adversely on the Crowell Moring Plaintiffs' initial opt-out, as the timing did not influence their decisions to participate.

Regarding the Carbone settlement, the Crowell Moring Plaintiffs’ absence led to a renegotiated settlement of $3.7 million, down from $6 million. This adjustment ultimately benefits the remaining class members due to the significant volume of purchases by the Crowell Moring Plaintiffs, making their shares more favorable under the amended settlement. The absence of objections from class members, primarily composed of sophisticated businesses, further supports the settlement's reasonableness.

The Court emphasizes the necessity for settlements to meet the standards of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy, as mandated by Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In assessing these settlements, the Court will apply a nine-factor test established in Girsh v. Jepson to ensure the protection of class members' interests.

The Girsh factors for evaluating a class action settlement include: 1) the complexity, cost, and likely duration of litigation; 2) class reaction to the settlement; 3) the stage of proceedings and discovery completed; 4) risks of establishing liability; 5) risks of establishing damages; 6) risks of maintaining a class action through trial; 7) defendants' ability to withstand a greater judgment; 8) reasonableness of the settlement fund compared to the best recovery; 9) reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of litigation risks. This list is not exhaustive and has been expanded by the Prudential case to include factors such as the maturity of substantive issues, potential other claims, comparisons of settlement results among class members, opt-out rights, reasonableness of attorney fees, and fairness of claims processing procedures. 

The court will evaluate these considerations, starting with the complexities and expenses of continued litigation, which involve significant time and financial resources. The ongoing litigation would require extensive discovery dating back to 1990, potentially involving international witnesses, and the litigation of antitrust allegations could be onerous and costly. The trial is likely several years away, with appeals adding further delays and expenses. The costs incurred by plaintiffs’ counsel are already substantial, with nearly $5.9 million in time and over $490,000 in incurred costs as of May 2006, indicating that this factor strongly supports settlement approval.

Regarding class reaction, the class was notified of the proposed settlements in June 2005 and received supplemental notice in March 2006, with no objections raised by any class member regarding the fairness or adequacy of the settlements.

Only one class member opted out completely, while twelve plaintiffs opted out solely from the Carbone settlement. In May 2006, no class members objected to the proposed settlements, indicating strong support for them. The proceedings had reached a stage where substantial discovery had been completed, allowing plaintiffs to understand the merits of the case, aided by 500,000 pages of documents and expert analysis from economist Dr. Raymond Hartman. Settlements were achieved through arm's length negotiations facilitated by Magistrate Judge Joel B. Rosen, with counsel experienced in federal antitrust litigation. This robust negotiation process, along with the opportunity for counsel to reassess their positions during reopened negotiations from November 2005 to March 2006, bolsters confidence in the settlement's soundness.

Plaintiffs acknowledged significant risks in proving liability, including challenges in class certification due to product diversity and potential statute of limitations issues requiring proof of fraudulent concealment and due diligence. The complexities of litigation, coupled with examples of prior antitrust cases where plaintiffs faced substantial risks of non-recovery, highlighted the uncertainties involved. Despite strong evidence of a price-fixing scheme and criminal convictions, the difficulties in proving such claims at trial underscore the prudence of accepting a settlement to avoid the possibility of no recovery.

Establishing recoverable damages in this class action poses significant challenges. The Court must evaluate the expected value of litigation versus settlement. A rough estimate suggests that the defendants generated approximately $600 million in sales of Electrical Carbon Products during the class period, which, after excluding custom products and adjusting for pricing, results in a potential damages figure of $40 million based on a 10% illegal price premium. This amount, if trebled under the Sherman Act, totals $120 million. The current settlements of $21.9 million represent over 18% of the maximum treble damages and about 55% of single damages, reflecting the difficulties in proving antitrust damages.

The risk of class decertification is acknowledged, with Plaintiffs' counsel indicating that the Settling Defendants may pursue such motions due to product diversity and pricing complexities, which could render the class unmanageable. The proposed settlements mitigate this risk.

Regarding the Defendants' ability to withstand a larger judgment, there is currently no evidence to suggest they could not handle a robust verdict, making this a neutral consideration.

Lastly, the reasonableness of the proposed settlement amounts must be assessed against the potential recovery discounted for litigation risks. Claims submitted indicate that valid Class Plaintiffs could expect a gross recovery of approximately 12-15% of their purchases from the Settling Defendants, equating to a potential treble damage recovery of 4-5% of total purchases. Thus, the proposed settlement could be seen as roughly equivalent to full recovery if the class prevails at trial.

The proposed settlement for the Class Plaintiffs, based on an expert's preliminary opinion that anticompetitive conduct may have raised prices by 8-10%, is assessed to provide approximately half of the optimal recovery under that hypothesis. When factoring in a hypothetical 50% chance of non-recovery, the settlement, estimated to cover 12-15% of the Class's purchases, aligns with the equivalent of half of a treble damage recovery for a 10% price overcharge. This outcome is deemed advantageous for the Class, given the anticipated range of antitrust harm (5-10% of purchase price) and the risks involved. 

The discussion also references the Prudential considerations, which, while overlapping with the Girsh factors, are not exhaustive. Certain factors, such as experiences in individual litigations and the development of scientific knowledge, are not relevant in this context. The ongoing Emerson case involves other claimants assessing their litigation chances against the Carbone Defendants, although the court lacks a firm basis for predicting its outcome. 

Regarding attorneys' fees, the requested amount for the Carbone settlement remains at 33 1/3% of the settlement fund, while earlier settlements saw a reduction to 25%. The overall requested fees constitute about 26% of the total fund when excluding costs. The settlement provisions require court review of fee applications, ensuring transparency and justification based on detailed records of counsel's work. The Class has had opportunities to review these applications, and the absence of objections to the requested fees further indicates their reasonableness, which will be evaluated in further detail.

Prudential considerations require evaluating the fairness and reasonableness of the claim processing procedure under the settlement. The Court maintains jurisdiction over the formation and administration of qualified settlement funds. Claimants submitted Proof of Claim forms to the Claims Administrator, Heffler, Radetich. Saitta, LLP, with the Net Settlement Fund distributed pro rata to claimants based on their direct purchases of Electrical Carbon Products from January 1, 1990, to December 31, 1999. The Claims Administrator will review and audit the claims, recommending amounts to the Court for approval.

The Court finds the settlement method fair and reasonable after considering all relevant factors. Class Counsel requested attorneys' fees of 25% of the gross settlement funds for the Morgan, Schunk, and SGL Settlements, and 33 1/3% for the Carbone class settlement, totaling 26% of the overall settlement fund. The total attorneys' fees sought are $5,700,003.10, with additional costs and expenses totaling $493,078.17. The lodestar for all plaintiffs' counsel is $5,860,512.75, based on hourly rates from 2003, significantly lower than current rates. The fee request represents 26% of the total $21.9 million settlement fund and approximately 97% of the claimed lodestar amount.

Under Rule 23(h), the Court must find facts and state conclusions regarding attorneys' fees in class actions. This case employs the percentage-of-recovery method to determine fees, rewarding counsel for success while penalizing for failure. The lodestar method serves as a cross-check for the reasonableness of the percentage fee awarded.

The Court will evaluate the factors influencing the percentage-of-recovery award from a common fund and perform a lodestar analysis cross-check. In antitrust cases, class counsel acts as a private attorney general enforcing antitrust laws through civil litigation. Awarding attorneys' fees from the common fund encourages class actions and attracts skilled counsel. The percentage-of-recovery method is preferred in these cases, allowing courts to allocate fees based on the fund's success.

In the Third Circuit, key factors for analyzing fee awards in common fund cases include: 1) size of the fund and number of beneficiaries; 2) objections from class members regarding settlement terms or fees; 3) attorney skill and efficiency; 4) complexity and duration of the litigation; 5) risk of nonpayment; 6) time invested by plaintiffs' counsel; and 7) awards in similar cases. Additionally, three other considerations are recognized: 1) the value of benefits to class members attributed to class counsel; 2) the fee percentage likely negotiated in a private contingent fee agreement; and 3) any innovative settlement terms.

Given the need for close judicial scrutiny of fee arrangements in class action settlements, the district court must conduct thorough assessments of the reasonableness of fee awards. While protecting class members from unreasonable fees, the Court also seeks to determine a fair percentage commensurate with class counsel's efforts. In the absence of objections to Class Counsel's fee application, the Court makes these determinations without adversarial input, with the lack of opposition being a significant factor in favor of approval, particularly when class members are sophisticated entities.

The Court evaluates the proposed settlements using the Gunter and Prudential/AT factors. 

1. **Size of Fund and Beneficiaries**: The settlements create a total fund of $21,900,000, representing over 3% of class members' purchases in the U.S. during the class period. About 5,000 class members received the Class Notice, with 451 class claimants and twelve Crowell Moring Plaintiffs opting into the final Morgan, Schunk, and SGL settlements. Class Counsel played a vital role in negotiating substantial settlements.

2. **Absence of Objections**: There are no objections from class members regarding the settlements or the requested attorneys' fees, which are set at 33 1/3% of the common fund in the Carbone settlement. This lack of objections indicates that the fee request is perceived as fair.

3. **Skill and Efficiency of Attorneys**: Class Counsel and Liaison Counsel demonstrated significant skill and effectiveness in class action and antitrust litigation. The Court noted their preparedness, industry knowledge, fairness, and candor. They successfully navigated dispositive motions and secured extensive discovery from defendants. Their negotiation skills were particularly evident during the complex renegotiations of the settlements, ensuring favorable outcomes despite potential withdrawals from defendants.

4. **Complexity and Duration of Litigation**: This antitrust case involved over two dozen cases across multiple federal courts and has been active for three years. The issues are intricate, and the circumstances present challenges, highlighting the uncertain nature of the litigation outcomes.

Numerous substantive and procedural challenges exist in the litigation, which may exceed the capabilities and resources of less experienced counsel. The prolonged nature of the litigation implies a significant risk of delayed payments for counsel’s efforts and expenses, justifying this risk in fee awards. The potential challenges in establishing liability and damages, as well as maintaining class certification, have been previously analyzed. The settlements achieved by Class Counsel, considering the uncertainties involved, support a substantial fee award. 

The requested attorneys' fees are not expected to result in an unwarranted windfall for Plaintiffs' counsel; they have committed thousands of hours to the case, with efforts increasing due to difficult settlement negotiations, and will continue to manage the claims process. The requested fee percentage aligns closely with the lodestar amount, indicating its reasonableness.

Seeking approximately 26% of the common fund (excluding expenses), the fee aligns with national benchmarks suggesting that awards typically range from 25% to 30%. However, applying a singular benchmark may be misleading, particularly in large cases where recovery amounts are significantly high or where risks of non-recovery are low. The Third Circuit rejects strict benchmarks in favor of qualitative assessments, advising that comparisons with fees in similar cases should be one of several factors considered. Recent studies indicate that for large settlements, the average fee awards are lower than typical percentages, and cases not exceeding $100 million may warrant lower percentage recoveries. The current case's context suggests that the percentage sought is appropriate given the circumstances.

Plaintiffs' counsel references various recent antitrust cases in the Third Circuit where fee awards exceeded the 26% requested here, highlighting examples such as a 32% fee in *In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig.* and a 33% fee in *In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig.* The requested fee is deemed reasonable against these precedents. The benefits to class members are attributed primarily to Class Counsel, although some contributions arose from prosecutions by the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division related to price-fixing in electrical carbon products. Unlike other cases where governmental efforts played a significant role, Class Counsel independently developed the case theory and conducted discovery.

The analysis also addresses the potential fee had the case been subject to a private contingent fee agreement, concluding that the 26% fee aligns with what would typically be negotiated, especially given the substantial risks and complexities involved. Lastly, Class Counsel demonstrated creativity and perseverance by rekindling settlement negotiations after other plaintiffs opted out, thereby reducing their fee requests for certain settlements to enhance overall appeal and facilitate recovery for the class.

Moring Plaintiffs opted to join three settlements while remaining outside the Carbone settlement, enhancing the settlement class's value. The attorneys' fee request of 26% of the common fund will undergo a lodestar cross-check, as mandated by the Third Circuit. The Court reviewed time summaries from all plaintiffs' counsel, including appointed lead and liaison counsel, and individual attorneys retained prior to consolidation. Relevant documentation includes the "Declarations of Plaintiffs' Counsel" dated September 29, 2005, individual declarations, and updated supplemental declarations submitted on April 10, 2006. The total lodestar amount is $5,860,512.75, with litigation expenses totaling $493,078.17. The total hours worked until September 9, 2005, amounted to 16,767.33, with an additional 532.3 hours reported through March 31, 2006, leading to a conservative estimate of 17,299.63 hours. The average hourly rate is approximately $339, based on historical 2003 rates, which have not been adjusted to reflect current rates. The lodestar analysis is not fully required for the cross-check, but the summary indicates that the requested fees of $5,700,003.10 are slightly less than the lodestar amount, resulting in a lodestar multiplier of about 0.97. This suggests that the requested fees are reasonable and consistent with the work performed, particularly as the multiplier is modest compared to the typical range of 1 to 4 in similar cases. The lodestar cross-check thus supports the reasonableness of the fees sought under the percentage-of-recovery method.

The Court concludes that the requested attorneys' fee of 26% of the $21.9 million common fund is fair and reasonable, considering the efforts of Class Counsel in establishing a settlement for the class, particularly in light of the Justice Department's allegations regarding the electrical carbon products market. The settlement consists of four sub-settlements deemed fair and adequate, with no objections from class members when the initial fee request was disclosed as potentially being as high as 33.33%, which would have totaled $7.3 million. Counsel voluntarily reduced their request to approximately 26%, totaling $6,193,081.40, which is over $1.1 million less than the maximum fee that received no objections. The attorneys demonstrated skill and professionalism, effectively navigating the complexities of civil antitrust litigation, despite initial support from public authorities' investigations. The percentage requested aligns with fees typical for similar high-risk, complex cases. Additionally, the Court approves counsel's request for reimbursement of $493,078.17 in out-of-pocket expenses, which were deemed reasonable and necessary, covering costs such as expert fees and service of process. Detailed inventories of these costs have been reviewed and validated by the Court.

Court-approved expenses for the Carbone settlement amount to $83,330.10, representing 16.9% of the common fund. This figure is deducted from the total recovery of $3.7 million, leading to attorneys' fees and expenses totaling $1,233,333.00 for Carbone. The share for attorneys' fees after expenses is $1,150,003.10, part of the overall fee award of $5,700,003.10 for all settlements. The Court awards a total of $493,078.17 for all expenses, which includes both the Carbone expenses and $409,748.07 for other settlements. 

Incentive awards for class representatives total $72,000, comprising $12,000 each for five plaintiffs and $6,000 each for two others. These awards compensate the representatives for their substantial efforts in discovery and depositions, which benefited the entire class. The proposed settlement class is certified, and all four settlements are approved, resulting in a common fund of $21,900,000 from which the aforementioned payments will be made.

Two orders have been issued: the first certifies the class and approves the settlements, while the second awards attorneys' fees, expenses, and incentive payments from the settlement fund. Class Counsel is awarded $5,700,003.10 in attorneys' fees, with the Executive Committee responsible for allocating these fees based on each firm's contributions, quality of work, and time expended. Additionally, Class Counsel is granted $493,078.17 for litigation expenses. Incentive awards of $12,000 each are given to several class representatives, including SEPTA and the New York City Transit Authority, while BART and the City and County of San Francisco receive $6,000 each.

The Court has approved the final class action settlement with various defendants, including the Morgan, Carbone, Schunk, and SGL defendants, following a hearing on May 12, 2006. The settlement class is certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3), encompassing all persons (excluding federal entities and the defendants) who purchased Electrical Carbon Products in the U.S. from January 1, 1990, to December 31, 1999. Electrical Carbon Products include carbon brushes for consumer products, automotive applications, battery-operated vehicles, and mechanical carbon products for pumps and compressors, with traction-transit applications including railroad uses.

The Settlement Class meets the criteria for class certification under Rule 23, as it is too numerous for individual joinder (Rule 23(a)(1)), presents common legal or factual questions (Rule 23(a)(2)), has representative plaintiffs with typical claims (Rule 23(a)(3)), and is adequately represented (Rule 23(a)(4)). Additionally, common issues predominate over individual concerns, making class action the superior method for resolution (Rule 23(b)(3)). The court confirms that adequate notice was given to all Settlement Class members, adhering to Rule 23, including individual mailings and public announcements. The court identifies specific members who have opted out of the Settlement Class, who will not be bound by the final judgment. The Settlement Agreements with the defendants are deemed fair, reasonable, and adequate, and are approved under Rule 23(e). All claims against the Settling Defendants are dismissed with prejudice, while retaining the right to pursue other defendants. The court maintains jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreements and oversee the distribution of settlement funds. Exhibit A lists companies that have opted out of the settlements.

Electrical Carbon Products, as defined in the Third Consolidated Amended Complaint, comprises various types of carbon brushes and mechanical carbon products used in consumer, automotive, and industrial applications, including battery-operated vehicles and railroad systems. Defendants F. Scott Brown, Robin D. Emerson, and Jacobus Johan Anton Kroef pleaded guilty to federal investigation interference, while Ian P. Norris faces extradition from the UK for price-fixing conspiracy. The 12 Opt-Out Plaintiffs previously filed suit in Michigan, now docketed as Civil Action No. 05-6042(JBS) after being transferred. 

Proposed settlements with the Morgan, Carbone, and Schunk defendants included clauses allowing termination if the Opt-Outs' purchases exceeded certain thresholds, which they did. Consequently, these defendants indicated plans to withdraw from the settlements, potentially leading to litigation without agreements. A claims administrator mailed initial notices to 4,887 entities, resulting in 451 claims and 13 exclusion requests, including those from the Crowell & Moring Plaintiffs. 

Only the Crowell & Moring Plaintiffs' claims against the Carbone Defendants will proceed to litigation, while other claims will be resolved through the settlements. A Supplemental Notice detailed the Crowell & Moring Plaintiffs' opt-out decision, subsequent agreements to rejoin the class, and the right to object to the settlements. ThyssenKrupp Elevator's objection to exclusion was denied by the Court, confirming it did not qualify as a purchaser of Electrical Carbon Products. The Court must ensure compliance with Rule 23(c)(1)(B) in defining the class and claims.

A clear definition of the class parameters and a comprehensive list of claims, issues, and defenses for class treatment are essential, as established in Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. The central issues include the existence and scope of a conspiracy to fix prices of Electrical Carbon Products in the U.S. from 1990 to 1999, the conspiracy's efficacy, and the timeline for triggering the statute of limitations. While these issues may not need adjudication if the settlement class is certified, they are relevant under Rule 23(c)(1)(B) for stipulated class settlements. 

The court must find a settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate before binding class members, as per Rule 23(3)(1)(C). There is no concrete data to support assumptions regarding product shrinkage, but a 10% maximum price elevation caused by the antitrust conspiracy is suggested. A hypothetical assumption of a 50/50 chance of non-recovery is posited for illustrative purposes, recognizing uncertainties in strengths and weaknesses of the case, potential claim shrinkage, and statute of limitations issues.

In July 2006, the Carbone Defendants filed motions to dismiss based on jurisdictional issues and statute of limitations for federal claims. Counsel seeks a share of interest earned on settlement funds, totaling $349,718.22 as of April 30, 2006. The court reviewed attorney time summaries for lodestar calculations, which were deemed sufficient for cross-checking, and noted that a more detailed review would likely yield similar results. Adjustments to the lodestar due to claimed excess hours would be counterbalanced by updated billing rates, and a multiplier of 1.28 remains reasonable given the case's complexity and efforts by class counsel.