Vanderzanden Farms, LLC v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC

Citations: 323 F. Supp. 2d 1075; 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12865; 2004 WL 1465689Docket: CV 03-779-BR

Court: District Court, D. Oregon; June 24, 2004; Federal District Court

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VanderZanden Farms, LLC, an Oregon family farm, filed a lawsuit against Dow Agrosciences, LLC, alleging damage to its tulip crop due to the herbicide Gallery, which is manufactured by Dow. The farm claims strict product liability and negligence based on defects in Gallery's labeling. Dow seeks summary judgment, asserting that the claims are preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332.

The facts indicate that VanderZanden purchased Gallery in February 2002 and applied it as directed. Subsequently, the tulip plants exhibited signs of damage. The court noted that the label on Gallery, which the EPA had approved, included a warning about its application on ornamental bulbs. However, Dow was later informed of an EPA-approved amendment to the label advising against using Gallery for commercial bulbs, but the EPA did not enforce a deadline for its implementation or require existing products to be re-labeled. 

The court concluded that federal law, as established by the Supremacy Clause, preempts state law claims when congressional intent is clear. Accordingly, the court granted Dow's motion for summary judgment, acknowledged VanderZanden's request for judicial notice, permitted Dow to submit supplemental authority, and deemed VanderZanden's motion to compel and Dow's motion for a protective order moot.

Preemption can be express or implied, with Congress's intent evident in the statute's language or structure. In FMC Corp. v. Holliday, the Supreme Court emphasized that if a statute contains an express preemption provision, there is no need to infer intent from other parts of the act. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) regulates pesticide labeling and use, explicitly prohibiting states from imposing additional or differing requirements. FIFRA preempts common law claims that require state labeling standards that diverge from federal regulations. Such state tort claims based on inadequate labeling are preempted because they would compel manufacturers to alter federally compliant labels.

The preemption analysis referenced in Taylor is significantly influenced by Cipollone, where a majority of circuits have ruled that failure to warn claims against pesticide manufacturers are preempted by FIFRA. The plaintiff argues that Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr altered this preemption analysis, suggesting it casts doubt on previous circuit rulings regarding FIFRA. However, the plaintiff fails to cite any relevant federal case supporting this claim, relying instead on an Oregon Court of Appeals decision, Brown v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., which found Medtronic changed the Cipollone analysis. The court in Nathan Kimmel, however, upheld that Medtronic did not affect FIFRA's preemption analysis, emphasizing that claims there arose from general negligence rather than direct violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).

In this case, the plaintiff's claims stem solely from the EPA's labeling requirements. The plaintiff asserts that the labels approved by the EPA were inadequate, leading to damages. The court concludes these claims are preempted by FIFRA. The plaintiff further contends that the EPA supports the position that FIFRA does not preempt state tort claims, citing an amicus brief from the EPA in a California case.

Defendant filed a Motion for Leave to Submit Supplemental Authority, arguing that the EPA has retracted its earlier position in Etcheverry and now contends that FIFRA preempts state law claims. The Court granted both Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice and Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority, considering the arguments from both sides regarding the EPA's stance. Citing Nathan Kimmel, the Ninth Circuit's rejection of a similar argument, the Court also dismissed Plaintiff's claims. Consequently, the Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice of the EPA's position and Defendant's Motion for Leave to Submit Supplemental Authority. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Document Production and Defendant's Motion for Protective Order were denied as moot. Additionally, Plaintiff challenged Defendant's facts about the Gallery label amendment, claiming insufficient evidence, but Defendant provided an affidavit supporting its claims. Plaintiff acknowledged during oral arguments that further discovery would not alter the summary judgment outcome.