Brown v. Hartt Transp. Systems, Inc.

Citations: 725 F. Supp. 2d 210; 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71169; 2010 WL 2804134Docket: 2:09-mc-00059

Court: District Court, D. Maine; July 14, 2010; Federal District Court

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Kevin Brown, a former Director of Sales at Hartt Transportation Systems, Inc., experienced two heart attacks and subsequently faced reassignment while on medical leave. Upon his return, he was terminated three weeks later. Brown alleges that Hartt violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), by not reinstating him to his position and discriminating against him due to his disability. Additionally, he claims retaliation for taking medical leave, violating the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and Maine Family Medical Leave Requirements (MFMLR), and failure to provide his complete personnel file as required by the Maine Employment Practices Act.

Hartt filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims except the personnel file issue, which was opposed by Brown. The Magistrate Judge recommended denying Hartt's motion on the ADA, MHRA, FMLA, and MFMLR claims but granting it for the Rehabilitation Act claim. Both parties objected to portions of the recommendation. Hartt contested the use of circumstantial evidence for claims of retaliation and discrimination, while Brown accepted the recommendation on the Rehabilitation Act but disagreed with the finding regarding his disability status under the ADA. The Court reviewed the record and affirmed the Magistrate Judge's decision, denying Hartt's motion for summary judgment on all claims except the Rehabilitation Act claim.

Mr. Brown's claims under the FMLA and MFMLR were evaluated using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework due to the absence of direct evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory intent. The Magistrate Judge determined that Mr. Brown established a prima facie case by demonstrating he took a qualified leave, suffered adverse actions from Hartt through reassignment and termination, and showed a causal link between his medical leave and these actions. Hartt acknowledged the legitimacy of the adverse actions. However, the Judge found that Mr. Brown raised a genuine issue regarding whether Hartt's justifications were pretextual, supported by strong temporal proximity and other circumstantial evidence. Notably, Hartt's management exhibited positive sentiments about company performance around the time of Mr. Brown's reassignment, and there were no significant prior performance concerns raised against him. Furthermore, Hartt's failure to communicate with Mr. Brown post-return and the exclusion from social activities further questioned its stated justifications. Collectively, this circumstantial evidence suggested that Mr. Brown's decline in standing at Hartt was linked to his medical condition and FMLA rights, indicating a setup for failure. 

Hartt's objections focused on the Magistrate Judge's treatment of the demotion and termination as a unified issue, arguing that separate analyses were warranted due to differing facts associated with each event. The objection contends that this approach overlooked evidence of perceived managerial deficiencies in Mr. Brown prior to his leave. Nonetheless, the importance of temporal proximity in establishing a causal connection in retaliation claims was emphasized, as recent discharge following protected activity is strongly indicative of retaliation.

The adverse employment actions of reassignment and termination occurred shortly after Mr. Brown took medical leave, suggesting a possible retaliatory motive. Mr. Brown asserts that prior to his leave, his work performance was satisfactory, and he regularly interacted with colleagues. After returning, he was assigned to a historically unsuccessful division with unreasonable expectations, resulting in decreased communication with colleagues and inconsistent explanations from supervisors regarding his reassignment. This evidence may indicate that the employer's explanations for the adverse actions are pretextual. The court must determine whether the employer’s stated reasons or Mr. Brown’s allegations of pretext are more credible. 

Hartt objects to the Magistrate Judge's inference of retaliation based on three circumstantial facts: Mr. Brown's reassignment, the change in his relationship with supervisors, and a conversation with Mr. Castonguay. Hartt argues these facts do not reasonably infer retaliatory or discriminatory motives. However, the court must view the record favorably for the nonmoving party at the summary judgment stage, allowing for reasonable inferences that could lead to a favorable verdict for Mr. Brown. Although Hartt claims the reassignment decision was logical due to Mr. Brown's skills, there is also significant evidence suggesting the reassignment was intended to set him up to fail, creating a trial-worthy issue regarding Hartt's motives.

Mr. Brown's decreased communication with colleagues, possibly attributable to his own actions, may suggest an effort by Hartt to bolster Mr. Michaud's supervisory role. However, evidence indicates that Mr. Brown's status at Hartt significantly declined after his heart attack, potentially due to discrimination or retaliation related to his medical condition and Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) rights. Hartt's argument regarding Mr. Castonguay's lack of animus in a conversation with Mr. Brown is insufficient; the McDonnell Douglas framework applies only when direct evidence of animus is absent. Viewing the facts in Mr. Brown's favor reveals a genuine factual dispute regarding whether his reassignment was a legitimate business decision or discriminatory. Hartt's objections are overruled.

In response to Hartt's Motion for Summary Judgment, which claimed Mr. Brown did not demonstrate a substantial impairment necessary for his disability claim, the Magistrate Judge found otherwise, affirming that Mr. Brown was perceived as having a significant impairment. Although Mr. Brown did not contest this conclusion, he objected to the finding that he failed to prove a substantial impairment. The Court overruled this objection, clarifying that Mr. Brown may still present arguments regarding being "actually disabled" at trial.

The Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge's recommended decision, granting Hartt's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claim while denying it for all other counts. Mr. Brown's lawsuit includes allegations of violations of multiple acts related to his demotion and termination following medical leave. Hartt's motion for summary judgment was partially conceded by Mr. Brown concerning the Rehabilitation Act claim.

Kevin Brown was employed by Hartt Transportation Inc. starting in September 2001 and was promoted to Sales Manager in July 2003, reporting to General Manager Jeffrey Castonguay. During his tenure, he managed a sales team that included Dan Michaud, who was hired in November 2005. On November 3, 2006, Brown suffered a heart attack, leading to medical leave from November 6, 2006, to January 22, 2007. While on leave, Hartt supplemented Brown's short-term disability payments. In January 2007, Michaud was promoted to Director of Sales, and upon Brown's potential return, he was informed he would report to Michaud and transition to a salesperson role. Brown learned of this change during a visit to the office on January 15, 2007, when he had not yet received medical clearance to return to work. Castonguay assured him he could take as much leave as needed and would maintain his previous salary and benefits upon return, without mentioning any performance issues. Brown's physician cleared him to return to work without restrictions on January 17, 2007, and while he did not require accommodations, he requested leave for physical therapy sessions. However, shortly after his office visit, Hartt expressed dissatisfaction with Brown's work performance, citing customer complaints. He officially returned to work on January 22, 2007, and met with Castonguay and Michaud on his first day back.

Castonguay and Michaud directed Brown to focus on the Company's flatbed freight business between January 18 and 22. Castonguay emphasized Brown's ability to gather detailed customer information to enhance Hartt's freight business. Brown was instructed to gather information and make personal visits to identified flatbed customers. Upon returning to work, Brown was provided with a computer and access to the Company's instant messaging system, while his pay and benefits remained unchanged. However, his role changed as Michaud became the director of sales, with Brown tasked specifically with developing sales accounts in the flatbed sector.

Castonguay expected Brown to provide high-quality information to grow the flatbed business, while Brown contended that he was expected to make 5 to 6 flatbed sales calls daily, which he deemed unreasonable. After his first week back, Brown expressed concerns to Michaud about the quantity of calls affecting their quality. During that week, Michaud gave instructions on the information required from sales calls.

Hartt claimed that Brown's post-return sales performance was unsatisfactory regarding both the number and quality of calls, which contributed to the decision to terminate his employment three weeks later. Discrepancies arose concerning Brown's attendance at a landscaping show, where he claimed to have made several good contacts but only provided Michaud with one business card, according to Hartt. Brown denied this and stated he had provided multiple cards, supported by his affidavit. Castonguay expressed disappointment over the perceived lack of benefit from Brown's attendance at the show, which Brown attributed to misunderstandings about the event's focus and his customer connections. Castonguay later felt that Brown was not meeting expectations, returning limited information after two calls in his second week back.

Brown provided Michaud with reports on his sales calls for both the second and third weeks after his return to work. Castonguay expressed concerns about Brown's demeanor and attitude, suggesting he did not want to be employed. On February 12, 2007, Michaud completed a report summarizing his post-return activities and subsequently informed Brown of his termination, a decision supported by Castonguay and Hartt. Hartt's Mr. Hartt cited Brown's lack of performance as the reason for termination, based on reports from Castonguay. There was no indication that Brown was terminated due to concerns about future medical costs related to his health.

Hartt asserted that Michaud's promotion to Director of Sales was effectively predetermined before Brown's leave, leading to conflicting testimonies between Brown and Michaud regarding workload distribution during 2006. Additionally, Hartt's management had discussed restructuring the sales department and potentially replacing Brown prior to his heart attack.

At the time of Brown’s termination, Hartt’s FMLA policy did not comply with federal law regarding reinstatement. Hartt claimed to inform employees about their FMLA rights during orientation; however, Brown contended that he was not made aware of these rights and received no comprehensive policy documentation. Brown also stated he was never informed of his reinstatement rights concerning his position after his leave. Hartt denied this but only referenced a conversation where Castonguay indicated Brown would have a sales job upon his return. Both parties acknowledged that Hartt had terminated fourteen employees for exhausting their FMLA leave during the specified period.

Hartt contends that the evidence cited by Brown is not material to his case, arguing that it fails to demonstrate any deprivation of rights for employees who separated after exhausting family and medical leave. Hartt finds insufficient evidence to infer a pattern of termination related to family medical concerns. Brown counters that this evidence illustrates his hesitance to extend his leave and supports his claim that he was encouraged to maximize his short-term disability benefits. The court overrules Hartt's objection regarding the materiality of this fact, allowing it to be considered alongside Castonguay's encouragement for Brown to remain on leave.

Both Castonguay and Hartt exhibited limited knowledge of Hartt's nondiscrimination policy. Castonguay recognized the existence of a policy but could not confirm if it prohibited discrimination against disabilities without a written version from Brown's employment period. Hartt admitted to a lack of familiarity with the policy but acknowledged the illegality of disability discrimination. The court finds Hartt's knowledge of the policy relevant, yet does not infer discrimination simply from his unfamiliarity with its specific language.

Brown asserts that no concerns regarding his job performance were communicated to him prior to his heart attack, a claim accepted for summary judgment despite Hartt's denial. Although Brown acknowledges a discussion regarding a conflict with a colleague, he does not admit fault or criticize himself. During Brown's tenure as Director of Sales, Hartt experienced annual revenue growth, with the company significantly increasing its fleet size while he worked alongside only one other salesperson. Brown claims responsibility for securing Wal-Mart as a client, earning recognition in the form of a new company car. The court credits these statements for summary judgment purposes, overruling Hartt's objections regarding their materiality.

Brown negotiated a contract with Flakeboard and was instrumental in developing company policy on international freight, an area previously unexplored by Hartt. By 2006, Brown was responsible for several key accounts, including Poland Springs, Georgia-Pacific, and Sysco. Within his first 10 months at Hartt, he received a $6,000 raise, followed by a $10,000 raise in October 2004 due to his effective performance as Sales Manager. In February 2006, his salary increased by $109.61 per week, reflecting his ongoing contributions, which were acknowledged by Castonguay, who noted a 20-25% profitability growth during Brown's tenure as Director of Sales.

Brown reported that Hartt did not provide him with a laptop, unlike a colleague, and that his desktop had printing issues, impacting his ability to manage tasks efficiently. These conditions existed before and after his heart attacks, and do not indicate retaliatory or discriminatory motives. Michaud did not express concerns regarding workload disparities after June 2006.

Brown suffered two heart attacks in late 2006, leading to multiple hospitalizations and medical leave from November 6, 2006, to January 22, 2007. He claimed that his medical expenses amounted to $188,000, supported by a document he cited, although Hartt objected to its admissibility due to hearsay concerns. Hartt stated it is self-insured up to $40,000 per individual, with an affidavit clarifying they only paid $40,519.11 for Brown's medical costs. Brown accepted this lower amount as reflective of his medical expenses. He also claimed Castonguay indicated that severe medical conditions are costly for Hartt, a statement that Hartt denies through Castonguay's affidavit. For summary judgment purposes, Brown's testimony is credited.

Hartt contends that Brown's testimony regarding his termination is not credible because Brown previously stated he was not told he was terminated due to medical costs. However, Brown also indicated that Castonguay mentioned employee medical conditions were costly to the company, allowing both statements to be considered credible for summary judgment. Prior to Brown's heart attack, Castonguay did not discuss with him any consideration of replacing him or restructuring the Sales Department, though Castonguay later admitted to informal discussions about Brown's potential replacement that began in late August and intensified thereafter, with no written records of these conversations.

Brown requested his personnel file on March 1, 2007, but Hartt did not provide certain memoranda related to Brown's performance prior to his heart attack. Hartt acknowledges this omission but objects to the admissibility of the Maine Human Rights Commission Investigator's Report cited by Brown, claiming it is hearsay. Brown argues that the report is admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) and supports this with an affidavit, which the court accepts as a material fact for summary judgment.

In late 2006, Castonguay first discussed with Michaud the possibility of him becoming Director of Sales while Brown was on leave. Castonguay decided to promote Michaud during Brown's medical absence, and this promotion was communicated to some employees via email on January 4, 2007, without informing Brown until he returned on January 15, 2007. At the time of Brown's leave, the Sales Department consisted of Brown, Michaud, and a part-time employee. Despite being on leave, Brown maintained daily contact with the office.

Michaud did not inform Brown about his promotion or Brown's demotion during a conversation. On January 15, 2007, Brown visited Hartt to drop off papers and discovered Michaud occupying his former office and desk, with Brown's belongings boxed up. Michaud revealed he had been promoted while Brown was demoted to a salesperson, and Hughes would assume Michaud's previous role. Brown expressed his refusal to accept the demotion without legal action. Later that day, Castonguay advised Brown to stay on short-term disability, suggesting it would alleviate stress upon his return, and mentioned Hartt would supplement his income during this period. Hartt contested that any office restructuring was linked to Brown's health, asserting decision-makers were unaware of his potential return. Castonguay failed to cite Brown’s work quality as a reason for the demotion. Brown claimed the demotion was illegal and communicated his desire to return to work, but Hartt ceased the supplemental disability payments that same day, which Brown contended was a direct result of his statements. Hartt did not deny the payments ended on January 15 but clarified it was unrelated to Brown's comments. Brown returned to work on January 22. Castonguay noted in a memo that they hesitated to inform Brown of the payment discontinuation due to his health concerns. A few days later, Brown met with Hartt, who allegedly stated that the company faced significant financial losses while Brown was on leave, which Hartt denied, citing Hartt's deposition. Brown's testimony was typically favored in summary judgment, but it did not substantiate his claims regarding the meeting.

Brown experienced a significant decline in job performance and financial loss for Hartt during his absence. Although he was released to return to work without restrictions by Dr. Bruehl on January 17, 2007, the doctor advised against heavy lifting, which was not a part of Brown's sales duties. Brown was required to complete ongoing cardiac rehabilitation, which conflicted with his work schedule. Upon returning, he was relocated to a less private office and reported to Mr. Michaud, losing his previous supervisory role and authority. His job as a salesman was deemed less prestigious, and he no longer had disciplinary responsibilities for the Sales Department. Additionally, he was assigned a less significant vehicle for company use and faced limitations in his customer base, particularly losing former van customers and focusing on the seasonal flatbed business, which had historically been unprofitable. Hartt's flatbed division had consistently lost money over several years. On his first day back, Michaud directed Brown to develop potential flatbed customer leads and expected him to make several sales calls daily. Brown reportedly generated new business during his initial week back, despite the company's claim that he needed time to adjust and strategize for his sales efforts.

Mr. Michaud's deposition indicates that Mr. Brown's work in January likely resulted in some business activity for the subsequent season, although Hartt disputes this assertion due to perceived deficiencies in the supporting evidence. Michaud's email to Brown on January 25, 2007, requested detailed information about sales calls, including shipper names and pricing, which Brown provided, but there was a lack of entries for pricing in the reports submitted. Hartt critiques the quality of the information Brown obtained. 

Communication between Mr. Castonguay and Mr. Michaud regarding Brown's performance was minimal, with Castonguay only inquiring about Brown's activities once during the second week of Brown's return. Post-medical leave, Hartt did not engage in further discussions with Brown about his performance before his termination. In contrast, before his leave, Brown had regular interactions with Castonguay and Hartt. After returning, Brown felt isolated, as his attempts to engage with colleagues were largely declined.

On February 12, 2007, Brown reported his activities to Michaud, who subsequently terminated him less than an hour later, with no formal explanation provided beyond a vague statement about not needing him anymore. There was no termination letter issued. Brown anticipated his termination, citing past experiences of colleagues returning from medical leave to short tenures. Testimony from Peter Freeman corroborates Brown's perspective on the situation.

Testimony from Brown regarding the discriminatory motive in Hartt's employment decisions is deemed unreliable, particularly concerning the termination of Darlene Frati after her husband's heart attack. Brown recounted that Castonguay instructed him to compile a file on Frati to facilitate her dismissal, but did not definitively connect this request to the medical crisis. Brown's uncertainty about the timing of Castonguay's request and its correlation with Frati's husband's health issue undermines any inference of discriminatory intent. 

The legal standard for summary judgment requires that the moving party demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact exists, allowing judgment as a matter of law (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). A material fact affects the case's outcome under governing law, while a genuine dispute permits a reasonable jury to rule for the nonmoving party. The court must view facts favorably to the nonmoving party and consider all reasonable inferences. If such facts exist, summary judgment should be denied. 

Kevin Brown's complaint includes eight counts, with Hartt Transportation seeking summary judgment on all claims except for the last. The claims are categorized for discussion: counts IV and VI pertain to interference/reinstatement under the Family Medical Leave Act and Maine Family Medical Leave requirements, while counts V and VII involve retaliation claims, and counts I and III address discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Maine Human Rights Act.

Brown acknowledges that summary judgment should be granted against Count II, the Rehabilitation Act claim, while Hartt has not sought summary judgment for Count VIII. Genuine issues of material fact prevent summary judgment on the contested claims. The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) prohibits employer interference with employee rights under the Act, categorized into two types: (1) denial of employee entitlements, where employers can be liable for non-compliance regardless of intent; and (2) discrimination or retaliation against employees for exercising their leave rights, which requires proof of discriminatory intent. The Maine Family Medical Leave Requirements (MFMLR) align with the FMLA in prohibiting interference and discrimination against employees exercising their rights.

Brown's claims involve both categories under FMLA and MFMLR. The evidence suggests that he was not reinstated to an equivalent position after leave, faced negative status due to exercising his rights, and experienced retaliatory demotion and discharge. Specifically, Brown claims Hartt violated the FMLA by failing to restore him to the same or equivalent position after his leave. He argues that the law guarantees reinstatement to an equivalent position regardless of the employer’s intentions. Hartt contends it is entitled to summary judgment, asserting that Brown was returned to a position with equivalent pay and benefits and would have faced demotion irrespective of his medical leave.

Brown has established a genuine issue of fact regarding whether he was restored to an equivalent position after returning from leave, as defined by 29 C.F.R. 825.215(a). Key indicators of his reduced position include: (1) his subordination to Michaud, (2) Michaud and a new staff member occupying Michaud's former office, (3) a decrease in Brown's involvement with his previous sales accounts, (4) a lower status company vehicle, and (5) significantly diminished access to Hartt's general manager and president compared to prior to his leave. Collectively, these changes suggest that Brown was not restored to an equivalent position.

Under the FMLA, the right to reinstatement does not guarantee any position beyond what would have been available had the employee not taken leave (29 U.S.C. 2614(a)(3); 29 C.F.R. 825.216). The employer bears the burden to prove that any adverse changes would have occurred regardless of the leave (29 C.F.R. 825.216(a)(1)). Hartt argues that it can demonstrate such proof, claiming Brown had performance issues before his leave and that decisions regarding his position were finalized prior to his notice of intent to return.

For Brown's FMLA and MFMLR discrimination claims to succeed, he must show that Hartt's decisions to demote and terminate him were motivated by retaliatory intent linked to his exercise of FMLA rights. This involves a burdenshifting framework where Brown must present a prima facie case, including evidence of (1) exercising a protected right under the FMLA, (2) experiencing adverse employment actions, and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse actions. The record shows Brown qualifies under these requirements, having taken qualifying leave and faced demotion and termination shortly thereafter. Hartt does not contest this prima facie case effectively.

A prima facie causal connection is inferred due to the close timing between Brown's leave and his demotion, worsening work conditions after his protests, and the proximity of these protests to his termination. Brown meets the initial burden of proof, prompting Hartt to provide a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions. Hartt argues that discussions regarding promoting Michaud began in May 2006, prior to Brown's leave, but actions were delayed until after the leave. Although Hartt references specific paragraphs from its Statement of Material Facts to support its demotion rationale, concerns arise regarding the clarity of its justification. Upon Brown's return, Hartt asserts that Brown was assigned flatbed calls due to his talent in soliciting customer information. For termination, Hartt cites Brown's poor performance and procedural failures. Hartt fulfills its burden of offering legitimate explanations for the adverse actions; however, the burden shifts back to Brown to prove that these justifications are mere pretexts for discrimination or retaliation. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Brown can demonstrate pretext by showing Hartt's reasons are weak, inconsistent, or implausible. Temporal proximity between actions is relevant, and additional evidence such as the decision-making context, statements from decision-makers, and indications of unfairness can support Brown's claims of discriminatory motive. Brown's argument, supported by strong temporal evidence and questioning Hartt's claims of inevitable demotion, raises genuine issues regarding retaliatory and discriminatory intent.

Hartt's Statement suggests that Brown and Michaud were equal colleagues; however, Hartt's actions raise questions about this portrayal. Hartt placed Brown under Michaud's supervision and assigned him to make sales calls primarily in a struggling flatbed freight sector during the off-season, while preparing a new employee for Michaud's responsibilities. Hartt failed to justify the reasonableness of requiring Brown to make 5 to 6 face-to-face sales calls daily, with an expectation to schedule 25 more for the following week, despite Brown's view that this was unreasonable. These circumstances could indicate retaliatory or discriminatory actions rather than mere personnel realignment. Additionally, Mr. Castonguay and Mr. Hartt's refusal to communicate with Brown upon his return and Brown's exclusion from social outings further support this inference. Castonguay's lack of explanation for Brown's demotion, linked to performance issues, raises doubts about Hartt's rationale. Collectively, this circumstantial evidence may lead a fact finder to conclude that Brown's employment status declined due to his medical condition and/or his exercise of Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) rights, suggesting an intent to set him up for failure.

Hartt also seeks summary judgment against Brown’s claims of disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), arguing that Brown was not substantially limited in any major life activity during the relevant time frame and that there is insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent. Both claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework, which evaluates discrimination based on the terms and conditions of employment as prohibited by the ADA and MHRA.

To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA and MHRA, Mr. Brown must prove three elements: (1) he is disabled as defined by the Acts, (2) he is qualified to perform his job's essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) he was demoted or discharged due to his disability. Hartt's summary judgment motion challenges the first element, arguing that Brown was cleared to return to work without restrictions, suggesting he does not qualify as disabled. If the court finds a prima facie case, Hartt contends that Brown fails to show a genuine issue regarding discriminatory motive.

Brown has sufficiently demonstrated he qualifies as disabled under the MHRA, particularly due to his heart attacks and subsequent medical procedures, which align with Maine's broad definition of disability. However, under the ADA, a qualifying disability must substantially limit a major life activity. Although Brown experienced significant cardiovascular impairment, it must be determined whether this impairment constitutes a substantial limitation under federal law. The EEOC defines "substantially limits" by evaluating the inability to perform major life activities compared to the average person, considering the nature, severity, duration, and long-term impact of the impairment.

The Supreme Court established that "permanent or long term" regulation is integral to determining substantial limitation under the ADA. A mere diagnosis does not suffice to establish a disability; significant differences in severity and duration of an impairment must be considered. For Mr. Brown's 2007 ADA claim, his impairment must be long-term and substantially limiting, regardless of any mitigating measures taken for his health. His cardiovascular condition, following multiple surgeries, including a quintuple bypass and angioplasty, must be evaluated. 

Mr. Brown asserts that as of January 4, 2007, he had undergone three procedures and faced a severe impairment of uncertain duration, potentially with lasting impacts. He had been on leave for two months and anticipated additional time off work. Evidence shows his physician indicated a heightened risk of sudden death post-heart attacks, which persisted during his expected return to work. Additionally, Brown was engaged in a cardiac rehabilitation program at the time of his termination.

Despite this, determining whether his condition constitutes a substantially limiting cardiovascular disability remains challenging. The First Circuit has ruled that while a heart attack may signify a physical impairment, establishing that such an impairment is permanent or long-term can be complex. Previous cases indicate that lay juries might struggle to ascertain the permanence of limitations resulting from cardiac events without expert testimony. The First Circuit has also noted that temporary conditions, even with significant convalescence, may not meet the ADA's long-term requirement as interpreted during Brown's impairment period.

The First Circuit in Guzman-Rosario ruled on a summary judgment dispute, emphasizing the lack of evidence showing a substantial limitation of life activities over a significant duration. While two heart attacks and a quintuple bypass indicated severe cardiovascular impairment, the court found that the duration of the impairment was insufficient to classify Brown as "disabled" under the ADA as it was interpreted at that time. Brown's claims of being disabled, either due to a historical record or being regarded as disabled by Hartt, were examined. The ADA protects individuals discriminated against based on a record of disability or a mistaken perception of disability, but Brown failed to demonstrate that he had a permanent or long-term limitation that significantly affected any life activities. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Arline, which recognized hospitalization for tuberculosis as a substantial limitation, the court noted that Arline involved a lengthy hospitalization exceeding a year. The impact of an impairment must be permanent or long-term, a principle reinforced by the later Williams decision. The court agreed with other circuits that a brief hospitalization does not inherently establish a qualifying disability record. Moreover, prior rulings indicated that the mere fact of hospitalization for an impairment does not suffice to prove a record of disability.

Hospitalizations that occurred over a decade apart suggest a long-term impairment for Brown, who demonstrates being regarded as having a substantial limitation of long-term duration. The "regarded as" provision aims to protect individuals from discrimination based on misconceptions about their impairments. A person qualifies under this provision if a covered entity mistakenly believes they have a substantial impairment affecting major life activities. Brown asserts that Hartt regarded him as having a qualifying disability, supported by evidence including office changes aimed at reducing his stress, concerns about his health communicated to him, a suggestion to remain on disability leave, and the requirement for a full release before returning to work. Hartt's uncertainty about Brown's return further supports the inference that it perceived him as having a long-term impairment. This context also applies to claims of discrimination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Maine Family Medical Leave Requirements (MFMLR). The recommendation is to grant Hartt's motion for summary judgment regarding Count II (Rehabilitation Act) while denying it for other counts. Parties may file objections to this report within 14 days for de novo review. The Rehabilitation Act's applicability is limited to federal entities, and it is acknowledged that Hartt does not qualify, thus warranting the summary judgment against Count II. Hartt does not object to the recommendation to deny summary judgment on other counts.

The Magistrate Judge concluded that Mr. Brown's reassignment constituted a demotion when assessed favorably towards him. Hartt's counsel violated Local Rules concerning the filing of the summary judgment record, specifically failing to properly label and describe exhibits as required by the Court's ECF User Manual. Instead of providing clear descriptions, the exhibits were merely labeled from A to I without sufficient detail, complicating the Court's ability to navigate the record. The Court emphasized that it has no obligation to search for documents not explicitly referenced in the parties' statements of facts. Exhibit I was particularly problematic, consisting of 39 parts totaling roughly 1000 pages, with much of it seemingly irrelevant. Furthermore, there were issues regarding the filing order of certain exhibits, including Exhibit 64, which could not be located as expected, and the misplacement of Mr. Brown's report identified as Exhibit 58. Hartt also presented testimony from Mr. Castonguay regarding Mr. Michaud's comments about Mr. Brown's attitude, but did not address Mr. Brown's hearsay objection.

A hearsay objection was raised against Hartt for citing Mr. Castonguay's deposition, as he was not present, and Hartt's attempt to correct this by referencing Michaud's continued deposition is deemed improper. Hartt's claim regarding Michaud providing a termination letter is contradicted by Michaud's testimony, which stated that Brown did not receive such a letter. A memorandum from Michaud to Castonguay indicates that Brown's dismissal was attributed to poor work quality and failure to follow procedures. Hartt failed to follow Local Rule 56 by not requesting to strike a statement of fact despite raising an objection. There was no request for summary judgment regarding Hartt's compliance with Maine Employment Practices Act. The court overruled several materiality objections from Hartt regarding various statements. Hartt does not dispute that Brown's leave qualified under the FMLA or MFLMR, but fails to show a clear need for Brown's demotion for increased productivity. The timing of Mr. Hartt’s statements after Brown indicated his intention to return to work and challenged his demotion as illegal supports Brown's case, alongside circumstantial evidence of back-dated performance memoranda. Hartt's comparison of this case to Dressler v. Community Service Communications, Inc. is rejected, as the records differ significantly. For claims before June 21, 2007, the broader definition of disability under the MHRA compared to federal law may need to be considered, and even after this date, specific impairments may qualify as disabilities under the MHRA.

Hartt contends that the record fails to indicate a discriminatory motive, focusing instead on the prima facie causation standard, which imposes a relatively low burden. The temporal proximity between Brown's heart attacks and his demotion, as well as between his return from heart-related leave and his eventual termination, meets the third element required for prima facie causation. This is further supported by suggestions for Brown to remain on disability leave and later demands for a full medical release. The excerpt references the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which modifies Section 12102 of the ADA, broadening the definitions and scope of covered individuals but clarifies that these amendments do not apply retroactively and thus do not affect the present case analysis. Additionally, the "regarded as" provision has also been expanded in its definition under the amended ADA.