Bluman v. FEDERAL ELECTION COM'N

Citations: 766 F. Supp. 2d 1; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1649; 2011 WL 52561Docket: Civil Action No. 10-1766 (RMU)

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; January 7, 2011; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Plaintiffs Benjamin Bluman and others have filed a constitutional challenge against the Federal Election Commission (FEC) regarding a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), specifically § 303, which prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions or expenditures related to elections. The FEC argues that a three-judge court lacks authority to hear the plaintiffs' claims. The court partially grants the plaintiffs' application for a three-judge court, acknowledging that since 1976, foreign nationals have been barred from contributing in any election context under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), a prohibition that was reiterated and updated in the BCRA. The plaintiffs, who are foreign nationals residing in the U.S., assert that the BCRA's restrictions infringe on their First Amendment rights by preventing them from contributing to political candidates and committees. They seek a declaration that these provisions are unconstitutional as applied to them. The court is now set to evaluate the arguments presented by both parties under the relevant legal standards.

The defendant argues that the plaintiffs' request for a three-judge court under § 403 is precluded by the Supreme Court's ruling in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, which held that a three-judge court lacks authority to assess the constitutionality of BCRA provisions when the activities they prohibit were already illegal prior to the BCRA's enactment. The defendant claims that even if the plaintiffs succeed in challenging BCRA § 303, the existing prohibitions from pre-BCRA § 441e would persist, thus failing to redress the plaintiffs' injuries and undermining their standing.

In response, the plaintiffs contend that McConnell is distinguishable from their case, asserting that in McConnell, the plaintiffs' injuries stemmed from both BCRA and other existing provisions of FECA, meaning a ruling on BCRA alone would not alleviate their injuries. They argue that § 303 of the BCRA is the sole law at issue prohibiting their proposed activities, and they assert that the pre-BCRA statute has been entirely replaced by § 303, thus not contributing to their claimed injuries.

The McConnell decision involved challenges to contribution limits under both BCRA and FECA, with the Court noting it lacked jurisdiction to address the FECA limits in a three-judge court. The plaintiffs assert that if a three-judge court were to rule against § 303, there would be no other prohibitive law remaining, contrasting with the McConnell case where other laws still imposed limitations. The defendant acknowledges that the pre-BCRA prohibition on foreign contributions is no longer in effect, having been replaced by the BCRA.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a three-judge court for their constitutional challenge to BCRA § 303, as their proposed activities, despite being banned prior to the BCRA's enactment, warrant review. BCRA § 403 mandates that any action for declaratory or injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of the BCRA be heard by a three-judge court. However, the court denies the plaintiffs' request for such a court to review the constitutionality of the FEC's regulation (11 C.F.R. 110.20), which implements BCRA § 303. The defendant contends that the three-judge court lacks jurisdiction over challenges to the FEC's regulations, as BCRA § 403 only covers constitutional challenges to the BCRA itself. The plaintiffs argue they are not independently challenging the regulations, asserting that these regulations are tied to the statute and would be invalidated if the statute is found unconstitutional. Nonetheless, referencing the Supreme Court decision in McConnell, the court concludes that challenges to the FEC's regulations cannot be raised in a facial challenge to the BCRA and must be pursued separately. Consequently, while the court grants part of the plaintiffs' application for a three-judge court, it denies their request regarding the FEC regulation. The court also addresses a procedural contention regarding Local Civil Rule 7(m), agreeing with the plaintiffs that they were not required to confer with the defendant prior to filing the application under Local Civil Rule 9.1.