Townsend v. Mabus

Citations: 736 F. Supp. 2d 250; 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94949; 2010 WL 3563089Docket: Civil Action 10-0218 (ESH)

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; September 13, 2010; Federal District Court

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Defendant Ray Mabus filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment against plaintiff Lorraine Townsend in her civil action regarding constitutional and breach of contract claims. The motion, supported by a detailed memorandum and 26 exhibits, argues for dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction and asserts that plaintiff's termination and performance ratings were based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. The court had previously instructed plaintiff on her responsibilities regarding evidence submission, emphasizing that defendant's assertions would be accepted as true unless contradicted by plaintiff. In her three-page opposition, Townsend failed to address the jurisdictional arguments or specify which factual assertions she disputed, lacking any factual allegations to support her claims. She misinterpreted defendant's position, believing that prior adverse EEOC and MSPB rulings barred her from pursuing the case in federal court; however, the defendant maintained that evidence from those proceedings justified summary judgment, not that they precluded her lawsuit. Plaintiff's objections centered on the claim that the defendant had not produced any new facts relevant to her case.

Hearing transcripts from the proceedings are part of the administrative record, which the Court can rely on in Title VII cases. The administrative record is admissible for the trial judge's consideration, and additional testimony would supplement rather than duplicate it. The plaintiff's claims are subject to de novo review, but this does not justify her request for discovery that duplicates existing records. The plaintiff has not adequately specified why discovery is necessary, failing to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). Consequently, the Court does not need to grant time for discovery before addressing the defendant's summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff also argues that the defendant's summary judgment motion is untimely due to the absence of an answer to the complaint; however, a defendant can file for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after discovery closes, without needing to file an answer first. The plaintiff's assertions do not demonstrate a genuine issue for trial, nor does she provide sufficient justification for the discovery needed to oppose the summary judgment. Additionally, she has not addressed the defendant's arguments for dismissal, and established case law indicates the Court lacks jurisdiction over her breach of contract claims and that her constitutional claims are invalid. Therefore, the Court will grant the defendant's motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, with a separate order to follow.

Defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff's breach of settlement and contract claims, asserting that only the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over such claims against the federal government when the relief exceeds $10,000. This is supported by case law, including Greenhill v. Spellings, which establishes the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims for breach of settlement agreements related to discrimination complaints. Additionally, the defendant argues for the dismissal of constitutional claims, stating that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for federal employment discrimination and that the government has not waived its immunity for any constitutional torts related to personnel actions. This is substantiated by Brown v. General Services Administration, which reaffirms Title VII's exclusivity. 

The defendant's dismissal argument regarding constitutional claims is categorized as a failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) rather than a jurisdictional issue under Rule 12(b)(1). The plaintiff's claim regarding the use of testimonies from the administrative record is incorrect, as established in Hackley v. Roudebush, which allows for the admissibility of such transcripts under certain Federal Rules of Evidence. The plaintiff did not specify objections to the administrative record or provide adequate reasoning against relying on sworn testimonies from an MSPB hearing. Furthermore, the plaintiff's opposition lacks a motion or affidavit under Rule 56(f) to justify her inability to present essential facts.

Consequently, the Court will dismiss the breach of settlement claims without prejudice, allowing them to potentially be pursued in the Court of Federal Claims, while dismissing the constitutional claims with prejudice since the plaintiff cannot bring them in any court.