Smith v. Lattimore Materials Co.

Citations: 287 F. Supp. 2d 667; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18649; 2003 WL 22391254Docket: 4:02CVC27

Court: District Court, E.D. Texas; March 24, 2003; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Defendant Lattimore Materials Company successfully moved for summary judgment in a case filed by Kenneth Smith under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Smith alleged that his disability, stemming from a neck and shoulder injury and mental health issues, prevented him from adhering to a 7:00 a.m. work start time after being informed of a schedule change on October 10, 2000. He claimed he had previously been allowed to start as late as 9:00 a.m. Following the schedule change, Smith expressed a desire to resign to pursue a job at a gun range, signing a resignation form on October 19, 2000, which he admitted was voluntary rather than a termination. 

The Court explained that summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden rests with the moving party to demonstrate the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's claims. If the nonmovant cannot show specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial, summary judgment is warranted. The case emphasizes that even if the nonmovant provides evidence, summary judgment may still be granted unless sufficient evidence exists to support a jury verdict in their favor.

Summary judgment may be granted if evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative. To establish a cause of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), a plaintiff must demonstrate four elements: (1) a disability as defined by the ADA, (2) qualification to perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation, (3) termination or denial of employment benefits by a covered entity, and (4) that such actions were based on the disability. The plaintiff can prove discrimination either through direct evidence or by the McDonnell Douglas framework, which requires establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. In the absence of direct evidence, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, after which the plaintiff must show that this reason is false and that the real motive was unlawful discrimination.

The defendant, Lattimore, contends that the plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. To do so, the plaintiff must show he has a disability, is qualified for the job, faced an adverse employment decision due to his disability, and was treated less favorably compared to non-disabled employees. The ADA defines "disability" in three ways: (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities, (B) having a record of such an impairment, or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. Determining if a person has a disability involves an individualized inquiry, specifically whether the plaintiff's impairment substantially limits major life activities beyond working.

Major life activities include various functions such as caring for oneself and performing manual tasks. The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity considers the nature, severity, duration, and expected long-term impact of the impairment. The plaintiff claims his medications for pain and depression limit major life activities; however, he has not provided sufficient evidence to prove he has a record of an impairment that meets ADA criteria. His only assertion is that the medications cause grogginess, which does not demonstrate a substantial limitation. Consequently, the court finds in favor of the defendant regarding the disability issue, and the analysis will continue to assess whether the alleged disability impacts the major life activity of working, as defined by regulations.

The inability to perform a specific job does not equate to a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Factors to assess substantial limitation include the geographical area accessible to the individual, the job from which they are disqualified due to an impairment, and the number and types of jobs, both similar and dissimilar, from which they are also disqualified in that area. The plaintiff has not provided evidence showing that his condition prevents him from performing an entire class or a broad range of jobs. His inability to start work at a particular time does not constitute a substantial limitation in working. 

The court must also determine if the plaintiff qualifies as disabled under specific regulatory definitions, including having a record of impairment or being regarded as having one. The plaintiff has not demonstrated evidence of a disability record nor that he was viewed as disabled by the employer. Even if he were considered disabled, the court questions whether he is otherwise qualified for the position, as he must show he can perform essential job functions or that reasonable accommodation would enable him to do so. 

Attendance and punctuality are deemed essential functions for the job, and the plaintiff's alleged disability impacts his ability to report to work on time. The court finds that the expectation of regular attendance is a legitimate business requirement. The plaintiff's request for a flexible schedule is considered unreasonable, and his tardiness, attributed to medication for depression, renders him unqualified for the job functions. Therefore, he cannot seek protections under the ADA, as he attempts to avoid the same performance standards expected of his colleagues.

Plaintiff is deemed unqualified under the ADA due to inability to perform essential job functions and the ineffectiveness of his proposed accommodation. Although Plaintiff claims he suffered an adverse employment decision due to his resignation, the Defendant argues there was no adverse action since the resignation was voluntary. Plaintiff contends he resigned after learning of a new reporting time of 7:00 a.m., asserting constructive discharge due to intolerable working conditions, as defined in *Brown v. Bunge Corp.* To establish constructive discharge, Plaintiff must demonstrate that conditions were unbearable for a reasonable employee, considering factors such as demotion, salary reduction, and harassment. However, Plaintiff did not present adequate evidence for these factors, as he experienced no demotion, salary cut, or degrading reassignment. The requirement for a 7:00 a.m. start time was applied to all employees without evidence of discriminatory intent. The court finds that Defendant provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff's termination, and Plaintiff failed to prove that this reason was a pretext for discrimination. Consequently, the court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing all claims against it with prejudice.