Butler v. New York Health & Racquet Club

Citations: 768 F. Supp. 2d 516; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9629; 2011 WL 310333Docket: 08 Civ. 591(PAC)(FM)

Court: District Court, S.D. New York; January 26, 2011; Federal District Court

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Sonia Elaine Butler, a former fitness instructor at the New York Health Racquet Club (NYHRC), filed a lawsuit against NYHRC and her supervisor, Maryann Donner, alleging discrimination based on age, race, and gender, along with retaliation. Butler seeks relief under several federal and state laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Equal Pay Act, and New York State and City Human Rights Laws. Following the close of discovery, the Defendants moved for summary judgment. The court granted this motion regarding Butler's discrimination claims but denied it concerning her equal pay and retaliation claims.

Butler, a 51-year-old African American woman, began her employment with NYHRC in 1998 and became fully disabled in 2009, currently receiving Social Security Disability benefits. During her tenure, she worked as a group fitness instructor (GFI) with a requirement to teach at least twelve classes per week to qualify for benefits. Despite NYHRC's expansion, the overall number of classes declined. Butler specialized in yoga but sought additional non-yoga classes, which were not assigned sufficiently to meet full-time status.

Compensation was based on a per-class payment structure, starting at $30 per class with periodic raises, ultimately reaching $50 for sixty-minute classes and $55 for longer sessions by the end of her employment. In 2006, Butler requested a pay increase to $60 per class, but Donner only offered a $5 raise, which required additional approval from NYHRC's Director of Operations.

Substantial delays occurred in implementing Butler's pay raise, initially communicated by Donner to take effect on February 21, 2006, but later postponed to March 6, 2006. By June 2006, Butler had not received the increase and inquired again, receiving a response that Donner was "working on it," attributing delays to difficulties meeting with Bodnar. During this time, Butler discovered a pay rate sheet indicating that a male, non-African American GFI was earning $70 per hour, leading her to believe she was undercompensated compared to younger, male, or non-African American colleagues. Although Butler finally received her raise for sixty-minute classes in July 2006, her pay reverted to the lower rate for one pay period in August, which Butler alleged was retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint, while NYHRC claimed it was due to Butler missing a class.

On August 8, 2006, Butler filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, claiming that she was paid lower rates than younger, male, or white GFIs. Following her complaint, Butler faced several alleged retaliatory actions: a temporary pay reduction, being labeled a "dangerous employee" in an email mistakenly sent to her by Donner, receiving a written reprimand for tardiness, and a delayed response to her request to be added to the substitute teacher list. The EEOC issued Butler a right to sue letter on October 30, 2007, leading her to file a pro se complaint on January 30, 2008, alleging violations of Title VII, ADEA, EPA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL due to discrimination based on race, color, gender, and age, as well as retaliation for her complaints.

On January 23, 2009, Rebecca J. Osborne represented Butler as document discovery commenced, continuing under Butler's original pro se complaint. In December 2009, the parties consented to jurisdiction for deciding summary judgment motions. The Defendants filed their motion on February 22, 2010, with Butler opposing on March 16, and the Defendants replying on April 5, making the motion fully submitted.

The parties dispute the existence and content of a pay rate sheet Butler claims to have seen, as well as any alleged pay disparities among Group Fitness Instructors (GFIs) based on race, age, and gender. NYHRC's analysis is limited to June 2006, the month Butler purportedly saw the pay sheet, indicating Butler earned an average of $47.65 per class, slightly below the GFI average of $50.65. Following a raise, Butler's rate increased to $52.65, above average. NYHRC asserts that nearly 70% of GFIs earned less than $50 per class in June 2006, and that many higher-paid instructors were older than Butler and predominantly female. Butler contests these claims, citing discrepancies between the Defendants' summary data and actual payroll records from 2003 to 2008. She argues that two white male instructors without yoga certifications were paid higher rates than her, despite her qualifications.

Butler also alleges systemic bias, stating that male GFIs received more class assignments than female GFIs, hindering their path to full-time status. Her analysis shows that a greater proportion of men earned $55 or more per class compared to women. She claims that despite receiving favorable press, she was not offered equivalent pay as two male instructors. In response, NYHRC points out that Butler declined an opportunity for national television, which was offered by Donner. Butler further alleges that Donner exhibited bias against African American GFIs, notably expressing surprise at the support Butler received from her white students and at Butler's employment at NBC, indicating disbelief that an African American could hold such a position. Butler contends that African American GFIs were less frequently assigned additional classes compared to their non-African American counterparts.

Butler alleges discriminatory practices by Donner, claiming she and eight other African American Group Fitness Instructors (GFIs) were either denied additional classes or terminated, while a white GFI was allowed to continue teaching despite complaints and another white GFI retained her class despite low attendance. Payroll records indicate that seven non-African American GFIs sometimes received higher pay per class than Butler, with only two of six African American GFIs earning $60 or more per class compared to 35 of 101 non-African American GFIs during the same period. Butler asserts that Donner favored younger instructors, citing an ageist remark made to an older instructor, Jill Weinstein, and noting that Consuela Moravkova, the oldest yoga instructor, has not taught enough to qualify as a full-time GFI. The Defendants do not dispute Moravkova's part-time status but claim she has not requested full-time employment. They argue that Butler's claims are based on her unsupported opinions and assert that pay rates vary based on class type, duration, time slot, and attendance. Butler counters that Donner has unilateral discretion over pay rates with inconsistent application of these factors.

In the context of legal standards, summary judgment under Rule 56 requires no genuine dispute of material fact. The court must view evidence favorably for the opposing party and accept their evidence as true. The jury resolves credibility and conflicting evidence, while the court determines if material facts warrant a trial. To oppose summary judgment, the non-moving party must provide concrete evidence rather than mere allegations. Under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), it is unlawful for employers to discriminate based on race or age concerning employment compensation and conditions.

To overcome a motion for summary judgment regarding discrimination claims, a plaintiff must meet a three-part burden-shifting test established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, starting with demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination. This requires evidence that the plaintiff is in a protected class, has satisfactory job performance, experienced an adverse employment action, and that the action occurred under circumstances suggesting discrimination. An adverse employment action is defined as a significant negative change in employment conditions.

For Equal Pay Act (EPA) claims, a plaintiff must show that the employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sex for equal work in similar conditions, without needing to prove identical positions. After establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to justify the pay discrepancy based on seniority, merit, production quality or quantity, or other non-gender-related factors.

Retaliation claims under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) require proof that the employee engaged in protected activity, the employer was aware of this activity, an adverse action was taken against the employee, and there is a causal link between the two. 

State and city laws, including the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) and New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), mirror the federal statutes in prohibiting discrimination and retaliation based on age, gender, or race.

In the application of the law to facts, the plaintiff, Butler, asserts an EPA claim by incorrectly stating wage comparisons with two male employees. Upon clarification, it is revealed that the male employees were not consistently paid the higher amounts claimed, undermining Butler's argument. The Second Circuit emphasizes that comparing a plaintiff’s pay to a single male employee may misrepresent the existence of gender discrimination; instead, a proper comparison involves assessing the plaintiff’s wages against the average pay of all similarly situated male employees performing substantially equal work.

A health club's classification as a non-professional venue does not exempt it from scrutiny under the Equal Pay Act (EPA). Butler's selective reference to two instances of higher pay among thousands is insufficient to establish a prima facie EPA violation. However, her claim that thirteen male GFIs received over $58 per class, exceeding her highest rate, provides a minimal basis for such a claim. The Defendants argue that they have justified the higher pay rates for male GFIs, but fail to present undisputed facts supporting this justification. They mistakenly narrow their focus to Butler's pay in June 2006, ignoring other identified pay disparities. Their assertions about Butler's performance and class counts lack documentary support and do not address the broader context of her claims. The Defendants' vague criteria for determining pay rates do not adequately explain the discrepancies in pay between Butler and the higher-paid male GFIs. Consequently, summary judgment on Butler's EPA claim is denied.

Regarding Butler's Title VII claims, it is established that she is a qualified African American woman, thus falling under two protected categories. The critical issues for her Title VII claims are whether she experienced an adverse employment action and whether that action was linked to discrimination based on race or gender. Butler alleges racial discrimination, asserting she was paid less than at least seven non-African American GFIs, which constitutes a materially adverse employment action. Additionally, she claims denial of opportunities to teach more classes, further supporting her assertion of race-based discrimination.

African-American instructors, including Butler, faced barriers in being assigned additional classes, which raises concerns about racial discrimination. However, Butler's claims of racial bias against her supervisor, Donner, are deemed speculative, lacking concrete evidence such as disparaging remarks or documented instances of bias. Her assertions regarding Donner's reactions to her interactions and appearance do not substantiate claims of racial animus. Additionally, she failed to provide evidence that African American GFIs made fewer requests for classes or were systematically denied opportunities compared to their white counterparts. Statistical analysis of pay rates revealed no significant difference in compensation between African American and non-African American GFIs. Consequently, Butler has not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII, leading to the conclusion that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Regarding gender discrimination, Butler argues that she was paid less than male GFIs, which aligns with her Equal Pay Act (EPA) claim and establishes a prima facie case of gender-based pay discrimination under Title VII. The court must now assess whether the Defendants have effectively rebutted this case. The Defendants argue that Butler selectively interpreted pay records, emphasizing anomalies rather than representative pay rates. They further highlight that in June 2006, a significant majority (79%) of the instructors earning more than Butler were female, suggesting that her pay claims may not reflect gender discrimination.

Defendants argue that Butler's alleged pay disparity is attributed to objective factors such as class size, enthusiasm, and attitude, meeting their minimal burden under the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Consequently, the burden shifts to Butler to demonstrate that these reasons are pretextual and that her lower pay was influenced by gender. However, Butler fails to establish a basis for inferring gender discrimination, as her own statistical analysis indicates that the proportion of male and female Group Fitness Instructors (GFIs) at different pay rates aligns with their overall representation at NYHRC. A significant number of higher-paid GFIs were women, undermining her claim. Thus, the lack of evidence supporting a gender bias in pay leads to the conclusion that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on her Title VII claim.

Regarding Butler's Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim, she does not provide statistical support for her allegations but instead relies on three isolated instances. She notes that a younger GFI received full-time benefits while a 65-year-old GFI did not, but there is no indication the older GFI sought full-time status. Moreover, the older GFI has affirmed satisfaction with her class schedule and denies any discrimination by management. Butler further asserts that management intends to replace older GFIs with younger ones, based solely on an inadmissible hearsay conversation. This lack of admissible evidence fails to substantiate her claims, leading to the conclusion that the Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on her ADEA claim.

Unsanctioned letters from doctors cannot be used to oppose a motion for summary judgment due to their classification as inadmissible hearsay. Butler's claim of age discrimination relies on a comment made by Donner, which suggested a preference for young and attractive individuals from Brazil. However, there is no evidence that Donner denied Butler's requests for additional classes or pay raises in favor of younger Brazilian instructors. As a result, inferring discrimination from this single remark would require impermissible speculation, leading to the conclusion that Butler's ADEA claim should result in summary judgment for the Defendants.

Regarding Butler's retaliation claim, it is established that NYHRC was aware of Butler's EEOC complaint by August 23, 2006. Following her complaint, Butler's pay was temporarily reduced, which the Defendants attribute to Butler's alleged failure to teach a class. However, Butler disputes this claim, and without documentation proving a substitute teacher was utilized, the Defendants cannot conclusively demonstrate that the pay reduction was justified. The causal link between the pay decrease and Butler's EEOC complaint remains contested, preventing summary judgment on this issue. 

Additionally, within weeks of filing her complaint, Butler received a written reprimand for lateness, a matter she asserts was not typically documented. Although the Defendants argue that the pay reduction is not a materially adverse employment action, Butler presents circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent, including derogatory comments made by supervisors about her following her EEOC filing. These factors indicate a potential pattern of harassment aimed at discouraging Butler from pursuing her claims, warranting a denial of summary judgment for her retaliation claim.

Actions are considered materially adverse if they could dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge, as established in Hicks v. Baines. The Defendants argue that Butler's claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) and New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) are barred by a three-year statute of limitations, claiming there is no evidence of her EEOC charge being cross-filed with state and city agencies, which they assert is necessary for tolling the statute during the EEOC claim's pendency. They also contend that even if timely filings occurred, Butler has not shown that those agencies dismissed her charges, indicating a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

However, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, placing the burden of proof on the Defendants. Butler’s initial discrimination charge explicitly requested dual filing with the EEOC and state/local agencies. When she filed her charge in 2006, there was a work-sharing agreement between the EEOC and the New York State Division of Human Rights, meaning her EEOC filing was simultaneously a timely filing with the Division. There is no requirement under the NYSHRL for Butler to exhaust administrative remedies.

Regarding her NYCHRL claim, although Butler expressed a desire for her claim to be filed with local agencies, there is no administrative exhaustion requirement to pursue this claim in federal court. Additionally, even if the Defendants could demonstrate that Butler did not file her claim with any agency besides the EEOC, the statute of limitations for NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims is tolled while a complaint is pending with the EEOC. Since Butler's EEOC claim was timely filed, the Defendants cannot establish their statute of limitations defense.

Butler also seeks an adverse inference charge due to the New York Human Rights Commission's alleged failure to preserve or produce certain evidence relevant to her case.

At the summary judgment stage, the Court assesses whether factual disputes exist without determining the credibility of differing accounts. NYHRC has claimed no pay rate sheet exists and provided an explanation for missing notes, rendering Butler's request for an adverse inference premature. Consent to the Court's jurisdiction pertains solely to this motion, while jury instruction requests should be made to Judge Crotty for the trial. 

The Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment concerning Butler's claims of age, gender, and race discrimination under Title VII, ADEA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL. However, the motion was denied regarding Butler’s gender discrimination claim under the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and her retaliation claims under Title VII and NYSHRL. A telephone conference is scheduled for February 4, 2011, at 9:30 a.m. to discuss further proceedings, with Ms. Osborne responsible for initiating the call.

Additional notes clarify that Butler, while employed at NYHRC, also worked at New York Sports Club for higher pay per class. She did not proceed in forma pauperis. Some motion papers were filed under seal, and the Court declined to strike portions of the Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement as the chart summarizing pay rates was based on available payroll records, despite Butler's allegations of inaccuracies. Lastly, the New York City Council mandates that claims under the NYCHRL be interpreted more liberally than those under state and federal laws.

Independent construction of all provisions of the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) is essential to fulfill the law's broad objectives, as established in case law including Fowler v. Scores Holding Co. and Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp. Butler's Equal Pay Act (EPA) claim relies on the assertion that while women comprise roughly two-thirds of the New York Health & Racquet Club's (NYHRC) yoga Group Fitness Instructors (GFIs), nearly half of those earning $55 or more are men. However, this claim is flawed; Butler identified 26 male and 59 female GFIs earning $55 or more, indicating that approximately 31% of higher earners are male, which aligns with their overall representation. NYHRC argues that Butler's statistics are inflated by including outlier earnings, such as a male GFI who only exceeded $60 once in over 600 classes. Additionally, Butler acknowledged that 27 female GFIs earned more per class than she did, further undermining her claim. Notably, Butler was hired by Donner, who also influenced her four raises, which complicates her allegations of racial discrimination since the same individual who hired her also made termination decisions. Butler's data shows 13 male and 27 female instructors earning $58 or more per class. The statute of limitations for claims under both the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) and NYCHRL is three years.