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Matarese v. Archstone Pentagon City
Citations: 761 F. Supp. 2d 346; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73603; 2011 WL 63907Docket: 1:09-mj-00857
Court: District Court, E.D. Virginia; January 5, 2011; Federal District Court
The case involves Linda B. Matarese and her husband, Domenic Matarese, as plaintiffs against Archstone Pentagon City regarding alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Virginia Fair Housing Law (VFHL) due to discrimination based on Ms. Matarese's purported handicap. The plaintiffs assert that the defendants failed to provide reasonable accommodations, did not renew their lease, denied them a rental at another property, made discriminatory remarks about Ms. Matarese’s condition, and retaliated against them for filing complaints. Additionally, they contend that the defendants were negligent in employee training regarding FHA compliance. The Court addresses several key issues regarding the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. First, it denies the motion on the grounds that there is a genuine dispute regarding whether Ms. Matarese has a handicap under the FHA. Second, the Court also denies the motion concerning the plaintiffs' refusal to rent claims, noting that the defendants did not adequately prove that their nonrenewal of the lease and refusal to allow rental at another location were lawful, as material facts remain in dispute regarding discrimination based on Ms. Matarese's handicap. Lastly, the Court evaluates claims of discriminatory statements made by individual defendants but finds that the defendants' argument about the context of such statements does not negate the possibility of discrimination. The Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding claims against Nur and Amilcar Garcia due to the absence of evidence linking them to any statements about the rental of their apartment. Conversely, the Court denied the Motion for claims against McGregor and Mann, as evidence indicated a material dispute over potential discrimination in their statements related to rental practices. The Court also denied summary judgment on discrimination claims based on intent, noting a factual dispute over whether Defendants acted with discriminatory motivation, while granting summary judgment on claims of disparate impact due to a lack of evidence showing a neutral policy adversely affecting a protected class. Regarding Plaintiffs' reasonable accommodation claims, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, citing the absence of expert testimony to support the necessity of the proposed accommodations. For the negligence claim concerning employee training on fair housing laws, the Court also granted summary judgment, finding no established legal duty owed by Defendants to train their employees and insufficient evidence to define the scope of such a duty. Finally, the Court granted summary judgment on all claims against corporate Defendants APC, Archstone MultiFamily Series Trust I, and Archstone LLC, as there was no evidence of their involvement in the management or control of the apartment building, with APC not recognized as a legal entity. The background indicates that Plaintiffs Linda and Domenic Matarese have lived in Unit 1405 at APC for over 18 years, with their lease routinely renewed until 2007, when they faced a significant rent increase and subsequent nonrenewal notice in 2008, despite still residing in the apartment under a month-to-month tenancy subject to termination by Defendants. Ms. Matarese asserts that she has endured significant health issues for many years, including severe chemical sensitivities to paint fumes, tobacco smoke, and mold, alongside chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia. She experiences immediate and severe reactions to specific chemicals, particularly volatile organic compounds (VOCs) from fresh paint, which she claims cause neurological and respiratory problems. Her symptoms include dizziness, coughing, difficulty breathing, debilitating headaches, sore throats, and respiratory infections, with some effects lasting for months, severely impacting her breathing and overall quality of life. Dr. Jack Williams, an ear, nose, and throat specialist treating Ms. Matarese since December 2006, supports her claims in an affidavit, detailing that she has exhibited objective physical symptoms after exposure to the identified chemicals. He confirms that these symptoms have persisted over time, stating with reasonable medical certainty that her chemical sensitivities have rendered her disabled and substantially impaired her breathing, work capacity, and social interactions. He emphasizes that her condition is chronic and not merely episodic, indicating that it is difficult to treat due to her sensitivities to many medications and is unlikely to improve. As a result of her condition, Ms. Matarese has not spent a night outside her home in about 15 years and takes extensive measures to avoid exposure to harmful chemicals, including sanitizing her living space. She has communicated her sensitivities and requested accommodations from APC personnel multiple times, providing letters from Dr. Williams and Dr. Oral Alpan, an allergist, confirming her medical issues and the necessity of avoiding triggers like paint, smoke, and mold. Dr. Alpan's letter notes her treatment for various allergies, chemical sensitivities, chronic fatigue syndrome, and fibromyalgia. Dr. Williams urged APC to refrain from exposing Ms. Matarese to harmful substances, citing her chemical sensitivities and bacterial rhinosinusitis, which could worsen her health. He provided a Medical Verification Letter confirming her disability under the FHA and emphasized that avoiding exposure to paint, chemicals, fumes, tobacco smoke, and mold would enhance her quality of life. During renovations at APC from 2007 to 2008, which included routine painting, Ms. Matarese experienced severe reactions. APC used paint deemed durable for metal surfaces, despite her request for non-VOC paint. Following a respiratory infection, Ms. Matarese presented a letter from Dr. Alpan requesting no exposure to paint, but APC insisted on using VOC paint for her unit. Defendant Mann acknowledged Ms. Matarese’s sensitivities but claimed non-VOC paint would be too costly. He denied her request to paint windows off-site and instead suggested temporary relocation to a hotel, which she declined due to concerns over chemical exposure. In June 2008, Ms. Matarese reacted adversely to paint used on drywall installed by Defendant Garcia, leading to severe respiratory symptoms. Her subsequent requests for accommodations related to nearby painting projects were also denied. Defendants assert they offered multiple accommodations to Ms. Matarese to mitigate her exposure to volatile organic compounds (VOCs) from painting, including scheduling the work while she was away, delaying it until she could stay with her mother, and covering hotel costs during the job. Ms. Matarese rejected all offers. While the Plaintiffs claim ongoing denial of accommodation requests in 2009, a letter from Defendants' counsel acknowledged her disability and stated that all reasonable accommodation requests would be granted. Ms. Matarese also reported sensitivity to smoke in the non-smoking building and requested weather stripping replacement to reduce smoke infiltration; her request was denied, and instead, three air purifiers were provided. Defendants received multiple complaints from other tenants regarding Ms. Matarese's behavior in common areas, including verbal confrontations about smoking and inappropriate conduct observed by contractors. Plaintiffs contend that these complaints were not documented in accordance with APC protocols. Regarding the non-renewal of Plaintiffs' lease, in summer 2008, Defendant McGregor indicated approval for non-renewal and sought examples to justify the decision, leading to the identification of Ms. Matarese's behavior as problematic. On August 8, 2008, Ms. Matarese was informed she must vacate her unit due to perceived violations related to her complaints about accommodations for her sensitivities and her interference with other tenants' smoking rights. Following this, her and Ms. Bauman's units were listed for rental, and in an October 2008 call, Defendant Mann confirmed that Archstone would not renew her lease or allow a transfer to another property. Defendant McGregor advised Ms. Matarese to explore other housing options, indicating high competition in the market. Subsequently, he instructed Archstone personnel to be cautious about renting to her and to monitor her use of her maiden name. An operations manager recommended adding her to the decline list at Saferent, which assesses rental applications. On August 12, 2008, Plaintiffs received a lease nonrenewal letter with no explanation, requiring them to vacate their unit by November 11, 2008. This was later amended to a December 31, 2008 deadline. Plaintiffs remained in the unit under month-to-month tenancy terms, allowing for eviction with proper notice. On July 31, 2009, Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint, which was amended twice, asserting multiple claims of discrimination based on handicap under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Virginia Fair Housing Law (VFHL). The claims include refusal to rent, discrimination in rental terms, failure to make reasonable accommodations, discriminatory statements, coercive actions, negligence, and retaliation. Only some counts remain active before the Court. Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which Plaintiffs contest. The Court will grant summary judgment if no genuine material facts exist, with the burden on the Plaintiffs to demonstrate a genuine dispute. Material facts are defined as those that could affect the case's outcome, determined by substantive law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when evidence allows a reasonable jury to potentially rule in favor of the nonmoving party. Under Rule 56(e), the nonmoving party must present specific facts through affidavits, depositions, and other evidence to demonstrate this issue. In this case, the Court denied the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Ms. Matarese's discrimination claims, determining that her condition does not meet the "handicap" definition under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The Court found material disputes regarding whether Ms. Matarese's impairment (1) substantially limits her breathing ability, (2) has a documented history, and (3) is regarded by Defendants as a handicap. The FHA defines handicap as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities, which are central to daily life. The assessment of a handicap is case-specific, considering evidence to determine if the impairment's nature, severity, and duration significantly affect the individual's ability to perform major life activities compared to the average person. Factors in evaluating limitations in breathing include the impairment's nature, severity, duration, and long-term effects. The Court identified disputes around the nature and severity of Ms. Matarese's impairment, its duration, and its impact, which prevent summary judgment. Additionally, Defendants' argument that her condition is too episodic to qualify as a handicap is not determinable as a matter of law due to these material disputes. There are also unresolved facts regarding whether Ms. Matarese has a record of impairment, defined as a history of or misclassification as having a substantial limitation on major life activities. Claims related to disability often require tangible evidence, such as medical reports or employment forms, to establish a "record of" a qualifying impairment. Simply having a prior illness is insufficient for plaintiffs to demonstrate a record of disability; they must show substantial limitations on major life activities due to their impairments. In the case of Ms. Matarese, there is a material fact dispute regarding whether she possesses such a record. She informed APC personnel about her breathing difficulties related to chemical exposure and provided letters from two physicians, along with a Medical Verification Form from Dr. Williams. This evidence leads to questions about whether Ms. Matarese qualifies for protection under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). Furthermore, there is also a dispute about whether she was regarded as disabled. A person is considered "regarded as" disabled if a covered entity mistakenly believes they have an impairment that significantly limits major life activities. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Mann recognized Ms. Matarese's chemical sensitivities and that Defendants sometimes granted her accommodation requests, though they argue this was standard practice for all tenants and not indicative of regarding her as handicapped. The determination of Defendants' motives behind providing accommodations is left to factfinder assessment. The Court denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment concerning Ms. Matarese's handicap qualification. Additionally, the Court also denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' refusal to rent claims under 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(1) and Virginia Code 36-96.3(A)(8). Defendants did not conclusively demonstrate that their actions—nonrenewal of the lease, conversion to a month-to-month tenancy, and refusal to rent elsewhere—did not violate these statutes, and there are material fact disputes regarding potential discrimination based on Ms. Matarese's handicap. The Court rejects Defendants' assertion that Plaintiffs could not claim discrimination because they were not outright refused a rental, as the conversion of their lease still impacts their housing rights. The statute prohibits discrimination in apartment rental based on handicap, and the nonrenewal of a lease is included in this prohibition. Defendants failed to provide case law supporting their claim that violations occur solely at the initial lease decision, as prior case interpretations under section 3604(a) are not applicable here. The Court identified a material dispute regarding whether Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs, particularly Ms. Matarese, during the lease nonrenewal and the transition to a month-to-month tenancy. Defendants argue their decision was justified by past complaints about Plaintiffs, but Plaintiffs counter that there is no documented evidence of such issues and that concerns raised were linked to their requests for reasonable accommodations. Additionally, statements made by Defendant McGregor suggested that the refusal to renew was due to the burden of accommodating Ms. Matarese’s needs, indicating possible discriminatory intent. Consequently, the Court denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the claims related to refusal to rent. Furthermore, the Court denies summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims against McGregor and Mann while granting it against Nur and Garcia under FHA section 3604(c) and Virginia Code section 36-96.3(A)(3) for making discriminatory statements regarding rental preferences. The Court applied an "ordinary listener" standard to assess whether the statements made by Defendants suggested a preference or bias against the Plaintiff due to her handicap, concluding that material factual disputes exist warranting further examination. Defendant McGregor communicated to Ms. Matarese that the decision not to renew her lease was authorized by Mann and cited their frustration with accommodating her sensitivities to paint and cigarette smoke. Under the ordinary listener standard, this could indicate that the decision was influenced by her handicap. Additionally, Mann's later statements regarding the refusal to transfer Ms. Matarese and other plaintiffs to a different Archstone building, without providing reasons for their ineligibility, may also suggest discriminatory intent. The Court denies the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment concerning claims against McGregor and Mann due to material factual disputes about potential discrimination. However, the motion is granted for claims against Nur and Garcia since there is no evidence linking them to discriminatory statements regarding the housing rental. The Court also distinguishes between claims based on discriminatory intent and those based on discriminatory impact. It denies the Defendants' motion regarding claims of discriminatory purpose because there is a factual dispute regarding whether their stated non-discriminatory reasons for nonrenewal were merely a pretext. For claims of intentional discrimination, it is sufficient for plaintiffs to show that discriminatory animus was a motivating factor, shifting the burden to defendants to provide a legitimate reason for their actions. The plaintiffs successfully presented evidence indicating that such animus influenced the decisions related to Ms. Matarese's housing. Defendants allegedly failed to respond adequately to Plaintiffs' accommodation requests, with McGregor stating that APC was "tired" of accommodating Ms. Matarese's chemical sensitivities during the nonrenewal notification. The burden then shifted to Defendants to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their actions, which they claimed was based on tenant complaints and Plaintiffs' noncompliance with community policies. Plaintiffs countered that Defendants' rationale was pretextual, noting the absence of documented complaints in their APC file and asserting they had not troubled other tenants. Additionally, Ms. Matarese's purported misconduct was linked to her accommodation requests and Defendants' responses. This established a material factual dispute regarding Defendants' motives, leading the Court to deny their Motion for Summary Judgment concerning discriminatory intent. Conversely, the Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' disparate impact claims. Plaintiffs needed to demonstrate that a specific neutral policy resulted in discrimination against a protected group. The Court found that Plaintiffs failed to identify a facially neutral policy causing significant disparate effects. Although they argued that routine maintenance and VOC paint disproportionately affected those with chemical sensitivities, they only provided evidence of impact on Ms. Matarese without demonstrating a broader discriminatory effect on others in the protected class. Consequently, the Court ruled in favor of Defendants on the disparate impact claims. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs' claims for failure to provide reasonable accommodations under 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(3)(B) and Va.Code. 36-96.3. The plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that the proposed accommodations were necessary, failing to meet the burden of proof required to establish each element of their claims. Under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), reasonable accommodations must be (1) reasonable, (2) necessary, and (3) provide equal opportunity for a person with a handicap. For an accommodation to be reasonable, it must be both effective and proportional to its implementation costs, with courts considering the costs and benefits as well as potential alternatives. Importantly, reasonable accommodations should not impose undue financial or administrative burdens. To establish necessity, plaintiffs must show a direct link between the accommodation and the equal opportunity provided to the handicapped person, essentially demonstrating causation. Accommodations must afford equal opportunity but are not required to alleviate all inconveniences faced by the handicapped individual nor provide benefits exceeding those available to non-handicapped individuals in unrelated matters. In this case, the plaintiffs did not establish that the proposed accommodations were necessary to afford Ms. Matarese equal housing opportunity, lacking the required demonstration of a direct connection between the accommodations and the benefits entitled to a person with a handicap. The Court determines that expert testimony is essential for the Plaintiffs to establish their claims regarding reasonable accommodations for Ms. Matarese's housing situation due to chemical sensitivities. The only evidence presented is an affidavit from Dr. Williams, which lacks the necessary qualifications as he is not an expert on reasonable accommodations. His statement does not sufficiently demonstrate that the proposed accommodations would specifically alleviate Ms. Matarese's handicap to ensure her equal opportunity in housing compared to others. Consequently, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs' reasonable accommodation claims (Counts V and VI). Regarding the negligence claim (Count XI), the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants, noting that Plaintiffs have not established a legal duty for Defendants to train employees on Fair Housing Act (FHA) reasonable accommodations. Plaintiffs failed to provide legal authority supporting their claim, and reliance on an expert's deposition is insufficient to establish such a duty or define the standard of care. Additionally, the Court grants summary judgment against the corporate entities APC, Archstone MultiFamily Series I Trust, and Archstone LLC. APC is dismissed as it is merely a building name and not a legal entity. The Court also finds that Plaintiffs did not provide evidence that Archstone MultiFamily Series I Trust and Archstone LLC had an active role in operating the building where the alleged discrimination occurred, thus failing to establish liability under the FHA. Plaintiffs' cases are distinct as they fail to establish liability against corporate Defendants, which served only as holding companies without direct involvement in operations. The absence of evidence linking these corporate entities to the operation of APC means mere ownership does not suffice for liability. Citing Johnson v. Flowers Industries, Inc., the court emphasizes that corporate shareholders are entitled to limited liability, as long as they maintain normal control related to ownership. Consequently, the court grants summary judgment in favor of the corporate Defendants on all claims. In conclusion, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is partially granted and denied. Specifically, it is granted for all Defendants on counts V, VI, and XI, on the basis of disparate impact, but denied regarding claims of discriminatory intent. Defendant Nur is dismissed from the case due to prior rulings. Additionally, the motion is granted for Defendant Amilcar Garcia on counts VII and VIII, but denied for other remaining Defendants. Finally, the motion is granted for Archstone Pentagon City and related entities on all counts. The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to the counsel of record. Defendant Garcia became aware of "low-VOC" and "no-VOC" paint in February 2009, which has been used for all painting on the Plaintiffs' floor since that time. Ms. Bauman, the mother of Ms. Matarese and a resident across from the Plaintiffs, had mold exposure issues in June 2008, which the Defendants did not address. The Plaintiffs filed complaints with the Department of Urban Housing and Development and the Virginia Fair Housing Office during this period. They submitted a Second Amended Complaint without prior court permission, but Magistrate Judge Anderson interpreted their pro se filings as a request for leave, which was granted on June 2, 2010. The court dismissed Counts IX and X of their complaint on March 22, 2010, which the Plaintiffs acknowledged applied to the amended complaints. On May 29, 2010, the court granted Defendants' Judgment on the Pleadings against Defendant Katrina Wood for Counts I-VIII and Defendant Deeqa Nur for Counts I-IV, VII, and VIII. Following a hearing on July 23, 2010, Defendant Wood was dismissed from the case due to the absence of remaining claims against her. The court will evaluate whether Ms. Matarese's impairment significantly limits her breathing but will not consider limitations related to her work or social interactions, as she has not provided evidence supporting these claims. Plaintiffs argue that previous cases cited by Defendants regarding episodic impairments may be outdated due to the 2008 amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which took effect on January 1, 2009, after much of the alleged discrimination. However, the only alleged discrimination post-amendment pertains to the Defendants' failure to provide reasonable accommodations, which does not succeed on other legal grounds. Additionally, in a letter dated October 16, 2009, Defendants' counsel acknowledged Ms. Matarese's identified disability. Plaintiffs argue that a particular statement can be attributed to Defendants, indicating that Defendants perceived Ms. Matarese as having a handicap and acknowledged her need for accommodations. However, any admission from this statement is only pertinent to discriminatory actions occurring after the date of the letter in question. The Court's ruling hinges on Plaintiffs' inability to establish a prima facie case, thus not requiring assessment of whether Defendants provided sufficient evidence of a legitimate business need for the contested practice. Plaintiffs further clarify their claim as one of negligent hiring and supervision, focusing on Defendants' failure to train employees regarding the Fair Housing Act (FHA) requirements for reasonable accommodations. They did not assert negligence per se, so the Court will not evaluate the claim under that legal standard. Additionally, Plaintiffs suggest that APC may be an agent of the corporate Defendants, noting that agency is typically a factual question. However, they have not presented evidence to support the claim that APC acted as an agent, leading to a failure to oppose summary judgment on this issue.