Eagle Trucking Co. v. Texas Bitulithic Co.

Citation: 612 S.W.2d 503Docket: B-9076

Court: Texas Supreme Court; February 24, 1981; Texas; State Supreme Court

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In the case of Eagle Trucking Company v. Texas Bitulithic Company, the Supreme Court of Texas addressed two key questions regarding negligence and vicarious liability. Petitioners Johnnie Wesley Guin and Billy Wayne Peden sued Robert Fitch and Eagle Trucking Company, claiming negligence. Fitch and Eagle Trucking counterclaimed against Guin and Peden and also included United Drilling Company, Texas Bitulithic Company, and G. G Construction Company as defendants. The trial court granted instructed verdicts for the latter companies and ruled against Guin and Peden, awarding damages to Fitch and Eagle Trucking.

The court of civil appeals upheld the instructed verdicts but reversed the trial court's decision that Guin and Peden deserved nothing, determining that Fitch and Eagle Trucking were negligent per se for violating section 93(a) of article 6701d. The Supreme Court affirmed the instructed verdicts but reversed the court of civil appeals regarding the ruling against Guin and Peden. The event leading to the collision involved Guin driving a dump truck owned by Peden and Fitch operating a winch truck owned by Eagle Trucking. Fitch's truck was obstructing the road while pulling a water pump, and despite flagmen being posted, Guin collided with the truck after ignoring the flagman's signals. The trial court focused on the negligence of both Eagle Trucking and Guin in assessing liability.

The jury found cross-defendant Guin negligent for not maintaining a proper lookout, driving at an unsafe speed, and failing to use brakes effectively, which proximately caused damages to Fitch and Eagle Trucking. Despite these findings, the jury left comparison answers blank since only Guin was found negligent. The trial court ruled that Guin owed nothing, while Fitch and Eagle Trucking were awarded damages against Guin and Peden. On appeal, Guin argued that Fitch and Eagle Trucking violated section 93(a) of article 6701d, leading to a reversal of the judgment and a remand for a new trial. However, it was determined that Guin had not raised this section during the initial trial, nor had he proven its essential elements, specifically regarding the vehicle's location on the highway. Peden alleged negligence per se based on a different section (section 138) related to warning devices for stopped vehicles. The appellate court improperly assumed evidence not presented at trial regarding whether the incident occurred within a business or residence district, as such determinations cannot be made through judicial notice. Judicial notice is limited to well-known, indisputable facts, and personal knowledge cannot substitute for judicial knowledge.

The proper standard for judicial notice is whether the fact is 'verifiably certain.' The court determined it could not take judicial notice that the accident occurred 'outside of a business or residence district' due to a lack of verifiable sources for this fact. Guin and Peden, the plaintiffs, failed to demonstrate that Fitch and Eagle Trucking were negligent as a matter of law. Moreover, this case was tried under comparative negligence principles. The jury found that plaintiff Guin was negligent while defendant Eagle Trucking was not. Guin did not request the jury to consider Eagle Trucking's negligence nor did he object to the comparative negligence instructions provided. Consequently, Guin waived any complaints regarding the charge. The trial was not based on negligence per se for Eagle Trucking, and the trial court's charge was deemed error-free. The court of civil appeals incorrectly reversed the trial court's judgment against Guin. Additionally, there was no evidence of vicarious liability for Texas Bitulithic Company or its associates, as Texas Bitulithic, which operated hot mix plants, did not own trucks and had an independent contractor relationship with G. G Construction for hauling sand.

G. G owned two dump trucks and was contracted by Texas Bitulithic to haul sand on a per ton basis. G. G was classified as an independent contractor and lacked sufficient trucks, leading to arrangements with Peden, who owned a third truck involved in an accident. Peden, also an independent contractor and assistant manager at Texas Bitulithic, signed the contract with G. G and provided his truck and driver when needed. Guin, the driver, had autonomy over his hauling decisions, receiving minimal instructions regarding loading and unloading. Peden managed his truck's operation independently, paying for its repairs and insurance, and utilized it for various businesses. The judgments affirmed that both G. G and Peden were independent contractors, with no vicarious liability for Texas Bitulithic or G. G. However, the court of civil appeals incorrectly reversed a trial court decision allowing Fitch and Eagle Trucking to recover damages against Guin and Peden. The motion for rehearing by Guin and Peden was granted, and the court set aside the previous judgment regarding the recovery by Fitch and Eagle Trucking while affirming that Texas Bitulithic and G. G were not liable. The cause was remanded for further proceedings concerning the damages.

Complaints regarding the sufficiency and weight of evidence pertain to two specific jury findings, prompting a remand to the court of civil appeals for fact-finding on those issues. The jury addressed multiple questions regarding negligence by EAGLE TRUCKING CO. and Johnnie Wesley Guin. For EAGLE TRUCKING CO., the jury found no negligence in blocking traffic, failing to keep a lookout, not posting flags, not posting warning devices, or creating a hazardous condition. 

Conversely, Johnnie Wesley Guin was found negligent in maintaining a proper lookout, controlling his speed, and applying brakes but not in failing to turn his vehicle. The jury's subsequent question regarding the percentage of negligence attributed to each party was left unanswered for EAGLE TRUCKING CO. and not answered for Johnnie Guin. Additionally, there was no appeal concerning the order that sustained United Drilling Company's motion for an instructed verdict.