Clark v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF COLUMBUS, MS

Citations: 191 F. Supp. 2d 743; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11434; 2002 WL 448591Docket: 1:02CV1-D-D

Court: District Court, N.D. Mississippi; March 4, 2002; Federal District Court

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The court addresses a motion to remand a case involving Eric Clark, Secretary of State for Mississippi, and the City Council of Columbus, concerning the validity of leases on sixteenth-section lands. The motion is granted, leading to the case's return to the Chancery Court of Lowndes County for resolution. The background involves Mississippi's 1890 constitution, specifically Section 95, which prohibits the donation of state lands to private entities. A 1989 Mississippi Supreme Court ruling established that this non-donation principle prohibits leases of state lands for inadequate consideration. Following this, the local school board in Columbus announced that existing sixteenth-section leases, often leased for minimal amounts, were invalid and required renegotiation, despite their unique 'renewable forever' clauses predating the constitution. Leaseholders responded with a lawsuit in state court, which was dismissed, leading to a federal class action in 1992 seeking class certification and a declaration that the state's actions would violate the U.S. Constitution's Contract Clause. The federal court initially abstained from hearing the case, but this ruling was overturned by the Fifth Circuit, which later allowed the class to be redefined and granted summary judgment favoring the leaseholders. The Fifth Circuit subsequently affirmed this judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding individual class members' entitlements.

On December 3, 2001, the State initiated four lawsuits in Mississippi's Chancery Court to affirm its title to certain sixteenth-section properties and eliminate any title disputes. The Defendants transferred these cases to federal court on January 2, 2002, claiming removal was justified under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a). The Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the cases back to state court on January 28, 2002.

The standard for remand allows defendants to remove cases to federal court only if there is original jurisdiction over the claims, as outlined in 28 U.S.C. 1441(a). If a federal court lacks jurisdiction post-removal, it must remand the case according to 28 U.S.C. 1447. The Defendants claimed that removal was necessary to support jurisdiction in a related class action pending in federal court.

However, the court determined that the All Writs Act does not provide independent federal jurisdiction, as established by the Fifth Circuit, which has maintained that the Act cannot be used for case removal without an existing independent jurisdictional basis. Citing a relevant case involving Texas and the tobacco industry, the court emphasized that extraordinary circumstances, which could justify such jurisdiction, were absent in this instance. Consequently, the court granted the Plaintiffs' motion to remand, concluding there was no independent federal jurisdiction apart from the All Writs Act, and no extraordinary circumstances warranted federal jurisdiction in this case.

The court grants the Plaintiffs' motion to remand, finding no extraordinary circumstances exist to justify removal under the All Writs Act. The Defendants' argument hinges on the potential for inconsistent rulings related to the Lipscomb class action, but the court aligns with the Fifth Circuit's precedent, stating that mere speculation of future conflicts does not meet the threshold for invoking the All Writs Act. The court determines that the State's claims in the Lowndes County Chancery Court—seeking to confirm state title to certain properties—do not jeopardize any aspect of the existing Lipscomb judgment, as those claims were not part of the Lipscomb litigation. Furthermore, the court highlights that it cannot find a legitimate threat of future inconsistency that would warrant federal jurisdiction solely based on the All Writs Act. With no other basis for federal jurisdiction present, the court concludes that the case should be remanded to the Chancery Court of Lowndes County in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). A separate order will follow this opinion. Additionally, it notes that there is no federal question or diversity jurisdiction to support removal, and emphasizes that the All Writs Act cannot be used for removal without extraordinary circumstances that threaten the integrity of a federal court judgment.