Chavez v. McIntyre

Citations: 424 F. Supp. 2d 858; 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7689; 2006 WL 467971Docket: Civ.A. 505CV00034

Court: District Court, W.D. Virginia; February 28, 2006; Federal District Court

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Francisco C. Chavez filed a lawsuit against T.A. McIntyre, Brian Whited, and Joe Gerndt under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, alongside various state claims including intimidation, harassment, assault, emotional distress, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The incident occurred on June 17, 2003, when Chavez, a Mexican national, was confronted by Officer Gerndt outside his home after his wife reported concerns about him driving under the influence. Officers Whited and McIntyre assisted in the arrest for public intoxication. Chavez alleges he was subjected to excessive force, including being maced, thrown to the ground, and beaten with a nightstick. He faced charges of public intoxication and assaulting an officer, but was acquitted of all charges. Chavez's claims include excessive force, conspiracy to deny constitutional rights, failure to intercede against excessive force, and discriminatory treatment. The defendants sought to dismiss the conspiracy and failure to intercede claims, arguing insufficient grounds for conspiracy due to lack of "plurality of actors." The court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, emphasizing that a complaint should only be dismissed if no set of facts could support relief, and that all allegations should be accepted as true and viewed favorably towards the plaintiff.

The defendants argue that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies, indicating that there is no plurality of actors since all three were police officers for the Town of Front Royal during the alleged incident. To prove a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants acted jointly and that an overt act furthering the conspiracy resulted in a deprivation of a constitutional right. The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine protects corporate officers from liability, as they cannot conspire with themselves, and their actions are viewed as those of the corporation. This immunity remains intact even when officers are sued individually, unless an agent commits unauthorized acts in furtherance of a conspiracy. The Fourth Circuit acknowledges that unauthorized acts by employees could establish a conspiracy claim, as seen in Hodgin v. Jefferson, where the court ruled that if an officer acted contrary to corporate policies, such acts could lead to liability. The current case parallels this situation, suggesting that the plaintiff's allegations sufficiently invoke the exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, allowing the claim to proceed.

In Count Three, the plaintiff alleges that certain defendants had the opportunity to intervene to prevent constitutional violations but failed to do so with intentional conduct or deliberate indifference. The defendants contend that there is no legal basis for a separate claim of "failure to intercede." However, the Fourth Circuit has recognized a cause of action for bystander liability under § 1983, as established in Randall v. Prince George's County, where officers may be obligated to protect citizens' constitutional rights from other officers' misconduct. The principle asserts that police officers must act to prevent the violation of rights occurring in their presence or knowledge.

An officer can be held liable for bystander liability if they: 1) are aware of a fellow officer violating an individual's constitutional rights; 2) have a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and 3) consciously choose not to act. The court has determined that the plaintiff has adequately asserted a claim for bystander liability under Count III, citing 42 U.S.C. 1983 for Failure to Intercede. The plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the defendants had the chance to intervene to prevent excessive force and unreasonable seizure against Mr. Chavez but failed to do so due to intentional conduct or deliberate indifference. The court finds sufficient factual allegations supporting the claim that certain defendants were aware of the excessive force and had the opportunity to intervene yet chose not to. The Fourth Circuit recognizes a cause of action for bystander liability under §1983. Consequently, the defendants' motion to dismiss Count III is denied. The court orders that the defendants' motions to dismiss are denied and directs the Clerk to send certified copies of the Memorandum Opinion and the Order to all counsel of record.