Opp v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc.

Citations: 56 F. Supp. 2d 1027; 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10641; 1999 WL 507271Docket: 97 C 7781

Court: District Court, N.D. Illinois; July 12, 1999; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

In the case of Shelley Opp v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc. and Soraghan Moving and Storage, Inc., the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois addressed motions for summary judgment regarding the plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff Shelley Opp, who relocated from California to Illinois following her separation from her husband, sought to move her personal belongings from their former residence. She contacted Soraghan Moving and Storage, an agent of Wheaton Van Lines, to arrange the move.

The court noted that Ms. Opp communicated her moving requirements through her brother, an employee at Soraghan. Despite receiving initial estimates and an "Estimate/Order for Service," Ms. Opp did not sign the first forms but later revised her list of items to be moved and received updated documentation. A necessary "walk-through" of the house was conducted by a Wheaton agent to assess the items for moving. Ultimately, Ms. Opp signed a new Estimate/Order for Service, indicating she intended to declare a property value of $10,000 for insurance.

The court ruled in favor of the defendants, granting their motions for summary judgment on Count I and Count II of the amended complaint, while denying the plaintiff's motion. The ruling underscored the procedural developments in arranging the move and the communications surrounding the valuation of the property.

Ms. Kloempken informed Ms. Opp that property valuation for insurance purposes should occur at shipment. Following this, Ms. Opp engaged Pamela Comparin from Soraghan, who requested a check for the services. Ms. Opp coordinated with Mr. Opp to ensure the movers could access their property. On July 1, 1997, Wheaton's agent notified Ms. Opp of a flat tire on the moving van but assured its repair. Mr. Opp signed a bill of lading permitting Wheaton to transport Ms. Opp’s belongings, which included a section on carrier liability. The document stated that without a specific release, the carrier's maximum liability would be determined by the declared value or $1.25 per pound. Mr. Opp handwrote "60/lb" on the form, which indicated a release to that value. There were also sections for replacement value protection that remained unfilled. Ms. Opp claimed Mr. Opp relayed that the van driver insisted on the 60 cents per pound release and was uncertain if he had written that on the bill. Mr. Opp later confirmed the pickup was complete. The property was weighed at 1,700 pounds in California. On July 8, 1997, Ms. Comparin informed Ms. Opp that her belongings were in transit and requested a check, which Ms. Opp provided. That same day, a train struck the truck carrying her belongings, causing significant damage. Ms. Comparin notified Ms. Opp of the damage on July 14, and Ms. Opp inspected the property the next day, estimating the replacement value of the damaged items at $8,165.00. Ms. Comparin returned the check to Ms. Opp on July 15.

On July 15, 1997, Ms. Opp identified several missing items from her property, which she could not locate during a subsequent visit to Soraghan's office in early October 1997. She estimated the replacement value of these missing goods at $1,035.00, in addition to three other boxes lost during or after an accident, valued at $1,614.50. Overall, Ms. Opp calculated her total losses at $10,814.50. On September 17, 1997, she received a letter from George Carlisle, Director of Consumer Affairs for Wheaton, indicating her property damage recovery would be limited to $1.25 per pound shipped. Ms. Opp filed her initial Complaint on November 6, 1997, and received a check for $2,625.00 from Wheaton on December 23, 1997, which she neither cashed nor returned. On May 22, 1998, she filed an Amended Complaint, alleging property damage against both Defendants in Count I and fraud against Defendant Soraghan in Count II. The parties are currently seeking summary judgment on these counts. 

Summary judgment is applicable when there are no genuine issues of material fact, enabling judgment as a matter of law. The movant initially bears the burden of proof, which shifts to the non-movant if met. The court must view all evidence favorably towards the non-movant without assessing credibility or making inferences.

Count I references the Carmack Amendment, which holds interstate carriers liable for damage to transported goods. To establish a prima facie case for damages under the Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the goods were delivered in good condition, arrived damaged, and that damages are quantifiable. A defendant can avoid liability by proving the damage resulted from specific exemptions, including acts of God, public enemies, the shipper's actions, public authorities, or the inherent nature of the goods.

Defendants acknowledge their status as motor carriers under the Carmack Amendment and confirm a contract to transport Ms. Opp's property from California to Illinois. They do not dispute that the goods were in good condition before transport and were damaged during transit, nor do they claim the damage resulted from uncontrollable forces. The Court's sole issue is determining the amount of damages. The Carmack Amendment allows carriers to limit liability through a written agreement with the shipper, provided the limitation is reasonable. Defendants assert their liability is limited to $1,020.00, based on a contract signed by Mr. Opp.

To validate this limitation, the carrier must meet several criteria: maintain a tariff, secure the shipper's agreement regarding liability, offer a choice of liability levels, and issue a receipt or bill of lading prior to transport. Defendants have provided a tariff and supporting affidavit, which the Court finds authentic and compliant with regulatory requirements.

Ms. Opp argues that her agreement was not secured, as Mr. Opp signed the bill of lading without consulting her. However, if Mr. Opp acted as Ms. Opp's agent, then their agreement may be valid. The Court must determine if an agency relationship exists based on Illinois law, which requires assessing the principal's control over the agent and the agent's ability to affect the principal's legal relationships. The Court concludes that Ms. Opp had the right to control Mr. Opp’s actions regarding the shipment, establishing an agency relationship between them.

The Court must determine whether Mr. Opp acted within the scope of his authority as an agent for Ms. Opp. An agent can possess actual authority, based on the principal's authorization, or apparent authority, based on a third party's reasonable belief of such authorization. Although Mr. Opp did not testify, evidence suggests he reasonably believed he was authorized to limit the Defendants' liability. Ms. Opp requested his assistance with the movers, and he signed the bill of lading as her "authorized agent," which reinforces his belief in his authority. His actions, including supervising a "walk-through" and granting the movers access to the property, support the notion of apparent authority, as Defendants could reasonably perceive him as acting on Ms. Opp's behalf.

Ms. Opp argues that her failure to designate Mr. Opp as her agent on the Estimate/Order for Service negates any agency relationship. However, apparent authority can arise from both formal and informal actions. Ms. Opp's request for Mr. Opp's assistance, made after signing the Estimate/Order, could lead a reasonable person to conclude she intended for him to act as her agent. The Court rejects the argument that the lack of formal designation prevents a finding of agency. Additionally, under Illinois law, a principal is bound by an agent's actions that are necessary for executing the agent's express authority. Ms. Opp was aware that Mr. Opp would need to inform the movers about liability limitations, as indicated on the Estimate/Order. Given her absence during the property pick-up, it was necessary for Mr. Opp to make decisions on her behalf regarding the movers.

Mr. Opp had both actual and apparent authority as Ms. Opp's agent, and he agreed to limit the Defendants' liability, demonstrating that the shipper consented to the limitation, thereby fulfilling the second part of the Hughes test. For the third part of the Hughes test, it is established that Mr. Opp had a reasonable opportunity to select from multiple liability options available in the bill of lading he signed. The bill provided options for declaring the shipment's actual value or limiting liability to $60 per pound; if left blank, the value would default to $1.25 per pound. Despite Ms. Opp's claims that Mr. Opp did not recall writing "60/lb" and was pressured by the van driver, these statements are hearsay and inadmissible in the context of summary judgment. Even if considered, they do not negate Mr. Opp's opportunity to choose different liability levels, particularly since he acknowledged signing the bill, which clearly outlines these choices. Thus, the third part of the Hughes test is also satisfied. The Court has confirmed Mr. Opp's authority as Ms. Opp's agent and that a bill of lading was issued prior to shipment, fulfilling the fourth part of the Hughes test.

Regarding the reasonableness of liability limitations under the Carmack Amendment, while the Seventh Circuit has not defined specific factors, other circuits suggest that limitations should only be invalidated in cases of intentional destruction or theft by the carrier. Courts have upheld liability limitations even in instances of willful deviations, provided there is no fraud or intentional misconduct. This Court agrees that such limitations should be enforced absent evidence of fraud or intentional misconduct, which is not present in this case.

In Count II of the Amended Complaint, Ms. Opp alleges fraud against Defendant Soraghan for requesting full payment after the accident. Soraghan seeks summary judgment, asserting that Ms. Opp has not demonstrated that any Soraghan employee was aware of the accident during the communication.

Soraghan submitted an affidavit from Ms. Comparin, who contacted Ms. Opp on July 8, 1999, regarding payment. The affidavit states that on July 8, 1997, Ms. Comparin was unaware that the truck containing Ms. Opp's belongings had been struck by a train. Consequently, even when the facts are viewed favorably toward Ms. Opp, she does not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding Count I of her Complaint. As a result, the court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants Wheaton and Soraghan, limiting liability to $1,020. Additionally, summary judgment is granted to Defendant Soraghan on Count II of the Amended Complaint as well.

The court notes that both parties raised similar issues in cross-motions but will initially only consider the Defendants' motions, assessing facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. It highlights that Ms. Opp’s damages hinge on whether Defendants effectively limited their liability. The court rules on damages related to the liability limitation and clarifies that the notation "60/lb" fulfills the bill of lading requirements, indicating substantial compliance with contract obligations.

Ms. Opp asserts that the Defendants cannot limit their liability to 60 cents per pound, citing Mr. Carlisle's communication and a subsequent check indicating an acknowledgment of liability at $1.25 per pound as per the bill of lading’s default amount. However, the court notes that a corporation's Director of Consumer Affairs' initial position does not restrict the corporation from later asserting a different legal argument, nor does it imply bad faith. Thus, Defendants may validly claim a liability limit of 60 cents per pound despite their earlier assumption. 

The legal framework governing claims under the Carmack Amendment remains uncertain—whether it is governed by federal common law or state law. Although federal law has been applied in similar contexts, no precedent specifically addresses the Carmack Amendment, prompting the court to apply Illinois common law. Both federal and Illinois agency law recognize actual and apparent authority, which is relevant here.

Ms. Kloempken claims to have informed Ms. Opp that the shipper must declare the carrier's liability on the bill of lading, a statement Ms. Opp disputes. The court must view facts favorably towards Ms. Opp, yet the language in the Estimate/Order for Service implies that the determination of liability was not finalized and required further agreement from Ms. Opp or her representative. Since Ms. Opp did not provide such agreement, it is unreasonable for her to assert ignorance of this requirement. The Estimate/Order references a full property value of $10,000, which the court interprets as Ms. Opp indicating the property's value rather than committing to that liability level. The significance of the numbers 85, 65, 45 remains unexplained in the record, leading the court to conclude they are not pertinent to the case.

Lastly, hearsay is inadmissible in summary judgment as it is at trial, and any evidence must be properly authenticated or admissible through an affidavit to be considered.