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Winfield v. Renfro
Citations: 821 S.W.2d 640; 1991 WL 202268Docket: 01-90-00298-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 11, 1991; Texas; State Appellate Court
David Mark Winfield appeals a judgment establishing a common-law marriage with Sandra Renfro and granting a divorce. The Court of Appeals of Texas, on October 10, 1991, reversed and remanded the case. Winfield argues that Renfro failed to prove each essential element of her common-law marriage claim, specifically that both parties must have represented to others in Texas that they were married. Under Texas Family Code section 1.91, a common-law marriage requires: 1) mutual agreement to be married, 2) cohabitation in Texas as husband and wife, and 3) representation to others that they are married. The jury was asked if they believed Winfield and Renfro entered into a common-law marriage, with instructions mirroring the statutory language, except for minor omissions. While the charge generally reflected the elements of section 1.91, the court found that the errors in the jury charge could have led to an improper judgment. The standard for reversible error requires that it must have likely caused the incorrect judgment, referencing prior case law. Thus, the court concluded that the errors warranted a reversal and remand. Winfield objected to the omission of the word "there" from the jury charge, arguing it was significant due to limited evidence suggesting he may have acquiesced to being identified as married to Renfro, particularly given their time together was mostly outside Texas. The court determined that excluding "there" constituted an error that likely influenced the jury's verdict. Renfro's defense was based on broad form submission principles, as required by the Texas Supreme Court, but the court disagreed, citing the contested nature of the evidence regarding representations of marriage in Texas. In addressing the sufficiency of evidence for a common-law marriage, Winfield challenged the support for each required element: 1) agreement to be married, 2) cohabitation in Texas as husband and wife, and 3) representing to others in Texas that they were married. The court clarified that it must view evidence favorably towards the jury's verdict for legal sufficiency and assess all evidence for factual sufficiency, emphasizing the jury's role in determining witness credibility. The elements of common-law marriage must co-exist, with the agreement to marry being evidenced by an intention for a permanent marital relationship. Winfield argues there is no evidence of an agreement to marry Renfro, while Renfro presents her testimony as direct evidence of such an agreement. She claims that following her pregnancy, they informally agreed to marry on April 11, 1982, but opted against a formal ceremony due to Winfield's concerns about potential media backlash and its impact on his endorsements. This testimony is deemed sufficient to establish the existence of an agreement to marry, supported by case law (Collora v. Navarro and Giessel). On the factual sufficiency challenge, Winfield provides evidence against the existence of an agreement, stating he never intended to marry Renfro, did not stay overnight with her, and was unaware of any honeymoon plans. Additionally, he notes that Renfro did not declare herself married on insurance documents or tax filings, and she identified their child with her surname. However, Renfro counters this by noting Winfield's purchase of a condominium in Houston, where she lived and where he frequently visited, suggesting cohabitation and shared life as indicators of their intent to marry. The court concludes that despite Winfield's arguments, the collective evidence presented by Renfro is sufficient to support the claim of an agreement to marry, thereby overruling both the legal and factual sufficiency challenges raised by Winfield. Winfield argues that Renfro failed to prove they lived together as husband and wife in Texas on or about April 11, 1982, the date specified in the jury question. A common-law marriage in Texas requires three elements to coexist, including cohabitation in Texas, as established by Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 1.91(a)(2). Living together in another state does not fulfill this requirement. The jury was tasked with determining whether a common-law marriage existed on or around April 11, 1982. The term "on or about" allows for some temporal flexibility, as established by case law, which has upheld variances in dates from 19 days to three months without being prejudicial or misleading. The critical date affects both the validity of the marriage and the size of the community estate; an earlier marriage date would yield a larger estate. Renfro is limited to proving the common-law marriage elements as they may have existed up to August 1982. Winfield claims there is no evidence of cohabitation in Texas during this period. Renfro cites evidence suggesting they stayed in a hotel for three days, and that Winfield encouraged her to find a home in Houston, indicating plans for cohabitation. However, Renfro admitted that Winfield did not return to Houston until August 1982, indicating they did not reside together in Texas between April and August. While Renfro’s testimony supports living together starting in August, it does not cover the period in question. The evidence provided is deemed sufficient to counter Winfield's legal sufficiency challenge regarding the cohabitation element. The court affirmed that Winfield and Renfro's living arrangements met the legal sufficiency for the element of living together as husband and wife, despite Winfield's claims to the contrary. Winfield testified he did not reside with Renfro and purchased a condominium solely for his daughter, while he claimed limited stays at the property. Conversely, Renfro presented evidence of a more integrated domestic life, including Winfield sending gifts to her home and acting in a supportive, 'husbandly' manner. The court found sufficient evidence to support that they lived together as husband and wife around April 11, 1982. Regarding the element of "holding out" as married, Winfield argued that Renfro failed to prove they represented themselves as a married couple in Texas. The court highlighted that representation must occur concurrently with the agreement to marry and living together. Evidence presented by Renfro, such as reserving a hotel suite as "Mr. and Mrs. David Winfield," was considered sufficient to establish that they held themselves out as married in Texas. Thus, both the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supported the claim of common-law marriage. Alma Renfro testified about her belief in a common-law marriage with David Winfield, stating that Winfield paid for their hotel stay and that she made reservations under Mr. and Mrs. Winfield. Evidence presented included a mailbox labeled with Winfield’s name and Renfro's assertion that Winfield acquiesced to being identified as married. However, Renfro's claims were contested by Winfield, who argued that evidence was factually insufficient to support the 'holding out' element. Winfield highlighted that Renfro represented herself as single in tax returns, bank records, and insurance applications, and named her daughter Renfro, not Winfield. He noted that Renfro did not use his last name because he instructed her not to. Additionally, when Renfro proposed marriage in front of Winfield's manager, she was informed he wasn't getting married. They traveled separately and logged in under different names at hotels. Winfield dated Tonya Winfield during this period and never introduced Renfro as his wife. Tonya recalled a phone call from Renfro where she referred to herself as Winfield's 'lady,' indicating a girlfriend status. Furthermore, Renfro's mother confirmed that Winfield never introduced her as his wife. Despite Renfro's assertion that the mailbox with Winfield's name indicated a marital status, other evidence, such as her signing documents as single and failing to state a marital status in various contexts, weakened her claim. There was no compelling reason for Renfro to misrepresent her marital status if she were indeed holding out as married to Winfield. Overall, the evidence presented supported the jury’s verdict regarding the representation of marriage in Texas, while also reflecting the factual insufficiency of Renfro's claims. Renfro signed her daughter's birth certificate using her last name, Renfro, and filed her tax return as a single person. The federal government may have a vested interest in her marital status given her relationship with a high-profile athlete. In the case of Giessel, the court recognized a common-law marriage despite the wife filing as single, due to the couple's long-term cohabitation and public acknowledgment as husband and wife. In contrast, Renfro's marriage appears primarily secretive, known only to a few close relatives and acquaintances, undermining claims of a common-law marriage. The marriage lacked public recognition, as Renfro only disclosed her marital status to her mother and occasionally used her partner’s last name publicly. The comparison of Threet and Giessel reveals that a secretive marriage does not equate to a common-law marriage. In Threet, a marriage kept secret from the community did not meet the criteria for common-law status, whereas Giessel involved a widely recognized relationship despite some private aspects. Here, Renfro and Winfield had limited public acknowledgment, with their introduction as husband and wife occurring only twice and lacking community recognition. Thus, the evidence supports that their relationship did not fulfill the holding out requirement for a common-law marriage. The dissent's argument for contradictory evidence lacks merit, as most supporting claims surfaced after the relevant date in question, with minimal evidence of holding out as married around April 11, 1982. A three-day hotel stay with an opposite-sex individual is insufficient to demonstrate that Renfro and Winfield held themselves out as married. The evidence presented primarily supports the view that only Renfro engaged in actions that could be construed as holding out as married, while Winfield did not claim to be married nor did anyone contradict his assertion. During the relevant period, Winfield was openly involved with other women, which Renfro was aware of. Renfro's testimony regarding their relationship contains inconsistencies; for instance, she was introduced by Winfield as a hostess, not a spouse, at a gathering in April 1982. Consequently, the evidence does not sufficiently establish that they presented themselves as a married couple on April 11, 1982. The dissent's argument of "relation-back" is rejected, and based on the evidence's factual sufficiency, the claim that they represented themselves as married on the specified date is deemed unsupported, leading to a reversal and remand for a new trial. In regard to temporary orders and the subsequent trial, Winfield argued that the trial court wrongly issued temporary orders and conducted a second trial after an initial judgment. He maintained that the July 10 'Interlocutory Order of Common Law Marriage' constituted a final judgment, but this Court previously ruled that it was not final due to the separate trial order for the common-law marriage issue and the lack of resolution on divorce and related claims. Therefore, this point of error is overruled. Additionally, Winfield contended that he was denied a jury trial. He claimed the court improperly refused to submit property characterization issues to a jury, arguing that all his assets should be considered separate property based on the absence of a marriage or his New Jersey domicile. The court is instructed that if property characterization issues arise on retrial, and fact questions are present, those should be submitted to a jury. Winfield also argued that separate trials on marriage and divorce effectively denied him a jury trial. Rule 174(b) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allows trial courts to order separate trials for claims or issues to enhance convenience or prevent prejudice. The Texas Pattern Jury Charges recommend separate trials for marriage and property issues. An appellate court will not overturn a trial court's decision on separate trials unless there is an abuse of discretion, as established in Van Dyke v. Boswell. In this case, Renfro claimed a common-law marriage, while Winfield denied it, making the marriage issue critical as it could resolve divorce and property disputes. The trial court's decision to separate these issues was within its discretion and did not infringe upon Winfield's jury trial rights, as the Texas Constitution permits separate trials under certain procedural rules. Winfield raised several additional points of error regarding judgments on owelty and recoupment, the application of the Texas Family Code in property division, the valuation of stock, and child support. However, the court reversed and remanded on the common-law marriage issue, making it unnecessary to address the other points, which hinge on the existence of a valid marriage. A valid marriage is essential for support orders and divorce actions. Justice Mirabal dissented, agreeing on the necessity of proving the three elements of a common-law marriage and emphasizing the importance of the jury's finding regarding these elements as of April 11, 1982. Agreement with the majority's findings includes three key points regarding Winfield and Renfro's relationship on or about April 11, 1982: (1) legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury's conclusion that they agreed to marry; (2) they lived together in Texas as husband and wife; and (3) they represented themselves as married to others. However, disagreement arises concerning the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the claim that they represented to others that they were married. The conflicting testimonies of Winfield and Renfro highlight the jury's role in assessing credibility; the jury favored Renfro's version when discrepancies existed. Relevant evidence summarized includes their relationship history, which began in 1973 when Sandra met David while he played baseball. They developed an intimate relationship by 1975 or 1976, which later ended. Sandra was married to Ira Terrell from 1979 to 1981, during which time she had a son, Sharad, born on January 14, 1979. After reconnecting in 1981, Sandra became pregnant with Shanel during a trip to South America in January 1982. Following this, they discussed marriage, with David expressing concerns about his image regarding fathering a child out of wedlock but wanting legitimacy for the baby connected to the Winfield Foundation for Children. In early April 1982, David proposed an informal marriage ceremony and instructed Sandra to meet him in Dallas on April 11. He requested arrangements for a nice car and a hotel suite, which Sandra booked at the Amfac Hotel under the name "Mr. and Mrs. David Winfield." A confirmation for the honeymoon suite included both names, further indicating their representation of marriage to others. David and Sandra stayed at the Amfac Hotel for three days, during which the hotel provided champagne, roses, and fruit. Upon checkout, David paid and kept the receipt. Sandra later informed her mother that she and David were married, and Alma Renfro testified that Sandra had claimed a common-law marriage. In April 1982, David instructed Sandra to find them a place to live, and his secretary, Pat Caruso, confirmed he intended to buy a condominium in Houston for them. David purchased the condo where Sandra and her son, Sharad, lived, and after the birth of their daughter, Shanel, in September 1982, they all resided there. David supported the family financially, covering housing, food, clothing, medical expenses, and travel. Alma Renfro observed David frequently at the condo, noting his 'husbandly' behavior, and during Christmas 1982, Sandra and the children visited David’s family in Minnesota, where he referred to Sharad as his stepson. David's mother acknowledged Sharad as her grandson and displayed portraits of both children in her home. On Sharad's sixth birthday, David sent him a birthday message as “Daddy.” Neighbor Sarah English believed David and Sandra were married; she was informed of their marriage when moving into her condo and hosted a party honoring them, introducing them as Mr. and Mrs. Winfield, which David did not dispute. Sandra accompanied David to several award ceremonies, including events in New Jersey, Chicago, and Oklahoma. During the proceedings, David married Tonya Turner, who claimed Sandra referred to herself as David's 'lady,' implying a girlfriend status. In contrast, Sandra asserted that she informed Tonya of their marriage, stating they only lacked a formal document. Sports reporter Jerome Armbrister recalled an instance where David and Sandra were introduced as husband and wife at a softball game in November 1983, which was announced to a crowd and broadcasted. Jerome Armbrister, a reporter from the Nassau Guardian, introduced himself to David Winfield and his wife, Sandra. Armbrister took a photo of them and interviewed David, leading to an article that was entered into evidence. David instructed Sandra to bring the newspaper home, where she shared it with her mother and friends in Houston, without denying any statements made. Armbrister noted that David never sought a retraction of the article. Testimony revealed that while David and Sandra did not explicitly state they were married, friends believed they were based on their behavior. Contradictory evidence included Sandra filing as head of household on her tax returns and checking "no" on a health insurance application regarding her marital status. However, she explained her tax filing choice as David's direction, and he paid her taxes for 1982 and 1983. Other witnesses testified that they discussed a future marriage ceremony, which never occurred. David claimed he only spent 14 days at the condo since September 1982, expected rent payments from Sandra, and denied any agreement to marry. He attempted to retract statements about their marriage after the article's publication. The jury found that evidence supported the conclusion that David and Sandra represented themselves as married through their actions. Testimony suggested they may have entered a common-law marriage around April 11, 1982, and that David was aware of arrangements made for a honeymoon suite under the name "Mr. and Mrs. Winfield." Sandra communicated to her mother shortly after that they were married, and David later instructed her to find a secure condo. David purchased a condo for Sandra and their children, which had the name "Winfield" on the mailbox. This evidence, along with their prior and subsequent actions, supports the jury's conclusion that David and Sandra represented to others they were married around April 11, 1982. The dissenting opinion disagrees with the majority's decision to sustain a point of error regarding the omission of "there" or "in Texas" from the jury question, asserting that while the omission was an error, it was harmless. The jury was instructed to find whether David and Sandra entered into a common-law marriage on or about that date, and all relevant evidence of their "holding out" as married occurred in Texas. This included Sandra reserving a honeymoon suite under their married name, their three-day stay enjoying hotel amenities, Sandra informing her mother of their marriage, and David instructing her to find a secure home in Houston, ultimately leading to him purchasing the condo. The dissent further explains that errors in jury charges are reversible only if they likely caused an improper judgment. In this case, the dissent concludes that the charge error did not result in an improper judgment and would overrule the first point of error. The dissent also notes that it does not affect the case outcome whether remaining points of error are sustained or overruled. In response to a motion for rehearing, David argues that after sustaining the first point, the court should have rendered judgment in his favor rather than remanding for retrial. The dissent agrees with this point, indicating that omission of an essential issue, objected to by a party, means the appellate court must find that the party waived that element and did not meet their legal burden. In *Glendon Invest, Inc. v. Brooks*, the court addressed Winfield's claim regarding the submission of a defective element in a legal issue, specifically the phrase "in Texas." Winfield argued that the absence of this phrase constituted a missing element, necessitating a judgment in his favor. The court disagreed, stating that the omission did not equate to the absence of an entire element, as the critical component was whether the parties represented themselves as married in Texas. The court determined that while the submission was defective, it was not entirely missing. The court referenced several cases to illustrate its position, explaining that in those instances, essential elements were completely omitted, unlike in Winfield's case where the element was merely defective. The cited cases included Koblizek, Glendon Investments, Walker, Velasquez, and Dittberner, where plaintiffs failed to submit necessary issues required for their claims. None of these cases supported Winfield's argument that a defective submission warranted a judgment in his favor. Consequently, the court overruled Winfield's motion for rehearing. The court also noted that the Texas Pattern Jury Charges provide specific guidelines regarding marriage representation and that evidence from 1983 and 1987 was too dated to influence the current ruling. Invitations and introductions at a party referred to the couple as David and Sandra Winfield, with testimony indicating that Winfield heard these references but did not deny or correct them, which could suggest a holding out in late 1983. However, this does not support a holding out for April 1982, as isolated references to them as husband and wife are insufficient evidence. Pat Caruso, Winfield's former secretary, recalled asking him in November 1983 if he was married to Renfro, to which he only smiled, an interpretation of which cannot legally substantiate a marriage claim. Marsha Dewan, a school teacher, testified that in April 1987, Winfield introduced himself as Sharad's stepfather, indicating a holding out in 1987 but not in 1982. Renfro asserted that she informed Tonya of her marriage to Winfield, and while the dissent considers this testimony significant, it does not demonstrate that Winfield held himself out as married in 1982. Additionally, Renfro sought to introduce testimony regarding events from 1983 and 1987, but these were deemed too distant from the relevant date to be considered. A witness noted that at a party in 1983, Renfro and Winfield were introduced as Mr. and Mrs. Winfield, which Winfield did not correct, but this evidence is still insufficient for the 1982 claim. Overall, the evidence lacks sufficient support for Winfield holding himself out as married to Renfro in 1982.