Hashmi v. Bennett

Citations: 7 A.3d 1059; 416 Md. 707; 2010 Md. LEXIS 693Docket: 15, September Term, 2010

Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland; November 3, 2010; Maryland; State Supreme Court

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In the case of Hashmi v. Bennett, the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed several critical questions regarding medical malpractice liability and joint tort-feasor releases. The petitioners sought to determine whether a judgment against a negligent tort-feasor, already reduced by a settlement with a hospital, could be further diminished by seeking a judicial determination of negligence against hospital employees not originally included in the lawsuit. The court examined the standards for interpreting joint tort-feasor releases in cases involving hospitals with multiple allegedly negligent employees and clarified the number of tort-feasors attributed to a hospital when liability is vicarious. 

The court concluded that the release of the hospital unequivocally includes all of its employees and agents. It ruled that a post-trial judicial determination of the joint tort-feasor status of hospital employees, who were not part of the initial proceedings, is not permissible. The case stemmed from a wrongful death action filed by the Bennetts following the death of Adrian Tyree Bennett due to septic shock, alleging failures by the health care providers, including inadequate diagnosis and treatment of a methicillin-resistant infection. The complaint implicated multiple defendants, including Dr. Kostrubiak and Dr. Hashmi, for their roles in the treatment and subsequent discharge of the patient.

On April 23, 2003, Adrian Bennett was administered a dose of Unasyn at approximately 4:00 a.m., followed by doses of Vancomycin and Ceftriaxone around 10:00 a.m. Despite being monitored by nurses throughout the early morning, he exhibited progressive signs of sepsis. A call was made to Dr. Sahi at 4:00 a.m. regarding Adrian's condition, resulting in a prescription for Ambien, but no healthcare providers were contacted from 7:30 p.m. on April 22 until 4:00 a.m. on April 23. Medical attention for sepsis was first provided at 9:30 a.m., by which time Adrian had developed severe septic shock. He was pronounced dead at 12:45 p.m. after unsuccessful resuscitation attempts.

The Bennetts alleged negligence against Dr. Kostrubiak, citing failures in timely diagnosis and treatment of Adrian's infection, lack of appropriate consults, and insufficient admission to the ICU. Similar allegations were made against Dr. Hashmi, who was accused of not diagnosing and treating Adrian's septic state adequately. They also claimed Good Samaritan Hospital was negligent for inadequate monitoring, delayed response to nursing calls, and failure to provide timely treatment and proper assessments.

Defendants, including Dr. Kostrubiak, Emergency Physician Associates of Maryland, and Good Samaritan Hospital, denied liability and raised defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. On October 10, 2006, the claims against Dr. Kostrubiak and Emergency Physician Associates were dismissed following settlements, with the Bennetts receiving $400,000. A separate settlement agreement with Good Samaritan Hospital was also in place, following the filing of a Statement of Claim in the Health Claims Arbitration Office of Maryland.

The claim was waived from Health Claims Arbitration, and on September 8, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint (Case No. 24-C-05-008202 OT) in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The Releasing Parties, including Good Samaritan Hospital of Maryland, Inc., intend to settle all claims related to the Statement of Claim and the Complaint against the Released Party as outlined in the Settlement Agreement. "Released Party" encompasses Good Samaritan Hospital and its affiliates, while excluding Dr. Shoaib Hashmi, the non-settling Defendant, and others who may have separate agreements.

If the Releasing Parties pursue claims against any non-released party, those claims will be reduced by the pro rata share of the Released Party or the settlement amount, per the Maryland Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. This reduction applies regardless of the joint liability determination of the Released Party. Dr. Hashmi did not settle nor allege other negligence during the trial regarding claims against him. The jury found Dr. Hashmi negligent, attributing his actions to the injuries and death of Adrian Bennett, resulting in a verdict of $2,295,000 against him. He subsequently filed motions for remittitur, claiming the verdict exceeded the statutory cap on non-economic damages and sought further reductions under the Maryland Contribution Among Joint Tort-Feasors Act.

Dr. Hashmi claimed entitlement to contribution under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act from multiple parties, including Emergency Physician Associates of Maryland, Dr. Kostrubiak, Good Samaritan Hospital, and three hospital employees: Dr. Hina Sahi, Nurse Kathleen Bosse, and an unidentified emergency room nurse. The Bennetts opposed this claim, arguing that the additional alleged joint tort-feasors were not named defendants, had not admitted liability, and were not found liable in court. They contended that the Good Samaritan Release only contemplated one joint tort-feasor. Following a hearing, Judge Kaye A. Allison reduced the judgment to $1,795,000 in accordance with the statutory cap on noneconomic damages and ruled that the contribution from the joint tort-feasors would be divided into three shares instead of five, resulting in a judgment of $598,333.33 against Dr. Hashmi. Dr. Hashmi's appeal was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals, which held that the Good Samaritan Release clearly identified Good Samaritan Hospital as the joint tort-feasor, while the hospital employees, being non-parties to the settlement, could not attain joint tort-feasor status.

The discussion highlights the principle of contribution among tort-feasors, contrasting it with the common law rule that imposed full liability on a single tort-feasor. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was established to allow tort-feasors to seek contribution from one another for shared liability. Section 3-1401 defines "joint tort-feasors" as parties jointly or severally liable for the same injury, regardless of whether a judgment has been entered against all. Section 3-1402 codifies the right of contribution, stipulating that a tort-feasor is entitled to seek contribution only after discharging the common liability or paying more than their pro rata share.

Section 3-1403 establishes that recovering a judgment against one joint tort-feasor does not release other joint tort-feasors from liability. Section 3-1404 clarifies that a release of one tort-feasor reduces the claim against remaining tort-feasors by either the amount of the consideration paid for the release or by a specified proportion, unless otherwise stated in the release. Section 3-1405 notes that a release can extinguish the right to contribution among tort-feasors if it specifies a reduction in the injured party's recoverable damages by the released tort-feasor's pro rata share. Dr. Hashmi argues that the release language is ambiguous, claiming it refers to multiple individuals as joint tort-feasors. In contrast, the Bennetts assert that the release clearly identifies Good Samaritan Hospital as a joint tort-feasor and that Dr. Hashmi failed to demonstrate that specific agents of the hospital were independent tort-feasors. The interpretation of the Good Samaritan Release follows contract interpretation principles, focusing on the clear language of the contract as understood by a reasonable person at the time of its execution. Dr. Hashmi highlights that "Released Party" or "Releasee" encompasses all hospital employees and agents, excluding himself, which includes various roles within the hospital.

The term "Released Party" specifically excludes Shoaib Hashmi, M.D., and any non-settling defendants or those with separate Settlement Agreements. The ambiguity in the Release language pertains to whether it addresses a single joint tort-feasor share or multiple shares for Dr. Sahi, Nurse Bosse, and Nurse A. The Bennetts reference Section IV of the Release, which designates Good Samaritan Hospital as "a Joint Tortfeasor," indicating that any claims made against non-released parties will be reduced by the pro rata shares of the Released Party as per the Maryland Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. Section I broadly defines "Released Party" to include hospital employees and agents, excluding Dr. Hashmi, while Section IV affirms Good Samaritan Hospital's status solely as a joint tort-feasor. The Court of Special Appeals has concluded that the Release identifies Good Samaritan Hospital as a joint tort-feasor, and only parties to the Release (the Bennetts and Good Samaritan Hospital) can determine joint tort-feasor status. Dr. Hashmi's argument, suggesting that the actions of Dr. Sahi, Nurse Bosse, and Nurse A establish them as joint tort-feasors in a separate proceeding, is rejected, as they were not named defendants in the original action nor joined as third-party defendants as required by Rule 2-332(a). Dr. Hashmi’s approach to demonstrate negligence of these individuals in a post-judgment proceeding without their notification or defense is not permissible under the rules.

The Court has not recognized any form of "judicial determination" of joint tort-feasor status without the parties being original defendants or third-party defendants. In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, the Court ruled that only parties to a case can be classified as joint tort-feasors. The case involved separate complaints by Louis L. Dickerson and William L. Zenobia against various asbestos manufacturers, which were consolidated for trial. Both plaintiffs received substantial compensatory damages, and a stipulation led to cross-claims for contribution and indemnity among the defendants. Raymark, Inc., which had settled with the plaintiffs before the trial, was not included in the cross-claims. Anchor Packing Co. sought indemnity from Raymark, claiming it was a primary source of asbestos products. The trial court granted cross-claims against all settling defendants, including Raymark, leading to a proportional reduction of damages awarded to the plaintiffs and an indemnity ruling in favor of Anchor Packing.

The Court reversed these decisions, stating that Raymark was incorrectly deemed a joint tort-feasor due to insufficient evidence against it at trial. Furthermore, because Raymark was neither named as a defendant nor impleaded as a third-party defendant, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a cross-claim against it, violating procedural requirements under Rule 2-322 related to service and notice. Similarly, in the current case involving Dr. Hashmi, no evidence was presented against the three hospital employees, who were also not named as defendants or impleaded. Consequently, the Court concluded that Dr. Hashmi could not seek to reduce his judgment share by claiming joint tort-feasor status for the employees without proper notice or opportunity to defend, aligning with precedent established in other related cases.

In Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, the Maryland Court ruled that a manufacturer of asbestos products cannot seek contribution from settling co-defendants found not liable in tort. The court in Keene Corp. v. Levin emphasized that a final judgment cannot be made until cross-claim liability is resolved, as a joint tort-feasor's liability may allow for a contribution that could adjust the judgment amount. Allgood v. Mueller established that settling co-defendants found not liable are considered volunteers for their payments, and a non-settling, liable defendant is not entitled to judgment reduction. In Swigert v. Welk, summary judgment for a settling third-party defendant was deemed inappropriate as negligence had not been adjudicated. Collier v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. recognized a pre-trial order where all defendants were assumed to have cross-claims for contribution. Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ruled summary judgment improper despite a settlement because liability had not been established. The case of Washington v. Washington Hospital Center highlighted that a party must assert a claim for contribution to obtain a reduction in damages, reinforcing the principle that only parties involved in the case can be considered joint tort-feasors. Dr. Hashmi could have pursued claims against others by filing a third-party complaint instead of relying on a post hoc argument. The judgment of the Court of Special Appeals was affirmed, with costs to be borne by the petitioners. The spelling of "tortfeasor" was noted as a complex issue, with variations in usage among different sources.

The document outlines several key legal points and references relevant statutes and medical definitions. 

1. The hyphenation preference is to be followed in deference to the Legislature, except when quoting nonhyphenating sources.
2. Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is defined as a bacteria strain resistant to most antibiotics, typically acquired in healthcare settings and transmitted through contaminated hands, clothing, and equipment.
3. Claims against a physician defendant were dismissed with prejudice based on a Stipulation of Dismissal.
4. Rule 2-506 allows for voluntary dismissal of claims without court permission via notice or stipulation before an answer is filed by the opposing party.
5. The terms of a "Joint Tortfeasor Release" discharging Emergency Physician Associates of Maryland and Dr. Kostrubiak are not under dispute in this case.
6. Respondents received $550,000 from Good Samaritan as part of a Settlement Agreement and Release.
7. Rule 2-332 permits a defendant to file a claim against a third party who may be liable for all or part of a plaintiff's claim, effectively making that party a third-party defendant.
8. Section 11-108 of the Maryland Code caps noneconomic damages in personal injury cases at $350,000 for claims arising after July 1, 1986, and $500,000 for claims arising after October 1, 1994.
9. References to "the Act" refer to Sections 3-1401 et seq. of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
10. Dr. Hashmi submitted expert designation letters from Dr. Warren Summer and Dr. Matthew Parker regarding alleged negligence by Dr. Sahi, including failure to recognize the severity of Mr. Bennett's condition and the need for immediate critical care therapy.

This summary captures all significant legal references and findings from the original document.

Dr. Parker's letter outlines several allegations against Drs. Hashmi and Sahi regarding their care of Mr. Bennett, specifically citing failures in timely diagnosis and treatment of his sepsis, including not seeing him promptly upon being called from the emergency room, not placing him in ICU immediately, and not administering IV Vancomycin, which are claimed to have contributed to Mr. Bennett's death. Dr. Parker intends to testify at trial regarding these breaches of the standard of care. 

Additionally, depositions from experts Dr. Summer and Dr. Rosenberg highlight deficiencies in nursing care, particularly by Nurse Bosse, who failed to document vital signs and communicate significant changes to the attending physician. Dr. Rosenberg emphasized the nurses' responsibility to escalate care when necessary. Dr. Hashmi's supplemental memorandum references testimony from Dr. Hugh West, indicating a significant delay in antibiotic administration—over six hours—which he deems unacceptable for a patient with sepsis.

The pro rata distribution of a judgment among joint tort-feasors is governed by the Act, as established in Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co. and further supported by Jones v. Hurst, which emphasize that the judgment burden is allocated based on the number of tort-feasors involved. Dr. Hashmi argues, referencing Chilcote v. Von Der Ahe Van Lines and other cases, that agents and their principals are not considered joint tort-feasors under the Act. Consequently, he claims Good Samaritan Hospital entered a Release agreement to avoid vicarious liability for its employees' actions, yet the Release does not explicitly identify Dr. Sahi, Nurse Bosse, or Nurse A as joint tort-feasors. Instead, it covers all hospital employees except Dr. Hashmi, naming only the hospital as a joint tort-feasor.

Dr. Hashmi contends that a judicial determination post-trial would enhance efficiency, as the Release stipulates that the Bennetts must indemnify the hospital for claims arising from the underlying actions. He cites cases such as Reedon of Faribault, Inc. v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters to support this view, but the court notes that no contribution claims have been filed by him. Additionally, he references Healthcare Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Wilkinson, arguing for the potential judicial determination of negligence for the hospital's employees. However, the court distinguishes Wilkinson from the current case, highlighting that all parties were involved in that action, unlike the current situation. Finally, it is noted that the original Maryland Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act included specific provisions regarding third-party claims among joint tort-feasors.

A defendant in a tort action can seek to include a third-party defendant who may share liability by moving ex parte before answering or on notice after answering. If granted, the defendant can serve a summons and pleadings on this third-party defendant, who must then defend against both the plaintiff's claim and the third-party claim. Additionally, a pleader can assert a cross-claim against a co-party for liability related to the action or seek judgment for contribution against other joint tortfeasors when a judgment has been entered against them. The 1941 Act introduced procedural rules for third-party practice regarding joint tortfeasor status, evolving from earlier limitations in 1947. The Court of Appeals' "General Rules of Practice and Procedure" allowed defendants to bring in third parties who might be liable, and this was later codified in Maryland Rules. The original procedural provisions from the Act were repealed in 1957.