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Prof. Ass'n of Coll. Educ. v. El Paso Cty. Comm.
Citations: 678 S.W.2d 94; 20 Educ. L. Rep. 1269; 1984 Tex. App. LEXIS 5381Docket: 08-82-00353-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; April 17, 1984; Texas; State Appellate Court
Citizens in Texas are asserting their constitutional right to seek redress from government authorities through "remonstrance," a concept not previously adjudicated in state law. The Texas Constitution, Article I, Section 27, affirms that citizens have the right to assemble peacefully and petition the government for grievances. The court determined that a summary judgment in this case obstructed this constitutional right, leading to the reversal and remand of the decision. The term "remonstrance" is defined as a formal protest or representation made to a governing body urging against a proposed measure. This right dates back to early Texas constitutional drafts and has historical roots in English governance, exemplified by the 1641 Grand Remonstrance presented to King Charles I. The significance of remonstrance was also reflected in early American history, notably in Patrick Henry’s speech to the Continental Congress. The Massachusetts Bill of Rights of 1780 further enshrined the right to seek redress through addresses, petitions, or remonstrances, emphasizing the longstanding value of this right in protecting citizens from governmental overreach. The amended petition filed by the Professional Association of College Educators and faculty member James Semones alleged that a remonstrance, signed by a majority of the tenured faculty, was submitted to the El Paso Community College District's Board of Trustees on December 19, 1979, regarding proposed changes to faculty tenure policies. Paragraph Fourteen of the petition claimed the Board failed to respond or consider the remonstrance, violating the plaintiffs' rights. The petition sought to declare the challenged policies void, issue a permanent injunction for the Board to respond and negotiate, or alternatively, require the establishment of a procedure for handling remonstrances. The defendants' motion for summary judgment argued that the petition did not state a valid cause of action. Summary judgment was granted after the plaintiffs amended their petition, with the court stating that supporting proof is unnecessary if the pleadings alone are insufficient. The court accepted the allegation that the Board did not consider the remonstrance as true. It emphasized that while there is no obligation for the government to negotiate or respond to complaints, there is a duty to consider petitions. The court distinguished this case from others cited by the appellants, which involved specific statutes not applicable here. Ultimately, the trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for trial, allowing the Board to consider the remonstrance without being required to negotiate changes to the policy. Chief Justice Stephen F. Preslar dissented, asserting that the right to petition does not apply in this context. A dispute has arisen between employees and their employer regarding the application of Article I, sec. 27 of the Texas Constitution, which guarantees citizens the right to assemble and petition for grievances against the government. The employees, represented by a remonstrance signed by a majority of tenured faculty, allege that the Board of Trustees failed to respond to their concerns about proposed changes to tenure and dismissal policies, thereby violating their constitutional rights. The court found that this matter is strictly an employee-employer issue, with no governmental rights violation present. It determined that there is no legal cause for action, as the Board's lack of response does not constitute a denial of rights that a court can rectify. The court suggested that the appropriate relief would simply be to require the Board to consider the remonstrance. Additionally, the court highlighted that under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 5154c, sec. 6, employees have the right to present grievances regarding work conditions, and such grievances should be governed by existing statutes or employment contracts rather than the constitutional provision in isolation. The opinion clarified the meaning of "consider" in this context, emphasizing that the Board must reflect on and thoughtfully examine the remonstrance rather than dismiss it outright. Both parties’ motions for rehearing were denied, with one judge dissenting regarding the Appellee's motion.