State v. Sweeney

Citations: 701 S.W.2d 420; 1985 Mo. LEXIS 294Docket: 66955

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri; December 17, 1985; Missouri; State Supreme Court

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Jay Steven Sweeney was convicted of receiving stolen property under RSMo 570.080 and sentenced to five years in prison. He appealed, claiming several errors by the trial court, including the denial of a directed verdict based on the argument that the property was not stolen, the jury not being required to find the property was stolen for a guilty verdict, the admission of his prior conviction through tape-recorded statements, the failure to suppress evidence from a prospective search warrant, the refusal to disclose a confidential informant, and a violation of his right to a speedy trial.

The case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri after a reversal in the Court of Appeals, specifically to address the interpretation of RSMo 570.080 regarding an individual who receives property believing it to be stolen when it is not. The conviction stemmed from an undercover police operation where a detective, posing as a dealer in stolen goods, engaged with Sweeney's business partner and later arranged a meeting with Sweeney to sell a watch, which was falsely presented as stolen. 

The detective obtained a search warrant based on an affidavit stating arrangements were made to borrow a watch, which was confirmed to have a substantial value. During the meeting, Sweeney was informed the watch was stolen, and he expressed intent to replace its internal workings to avoid detection. After verifying the watch's value, Sweeney placed it in a drawer at his business, from which it was later seized by police. Sweeney ultimately withdrew $1,000 to pay for the watch. The court emphasized that Sweeney misinterpreted the statute by neglecting certain explicit language and the principle that legislative intent must be derived from the statute's language itself, ensuring that every part of the statute is given meaning.

Legislative changes to statutes are understood to have intentional effects, as established in State ex rel. Thompson-Stearns-Roger v. Schaffner. The controlling statute, RSMo 570.080, enacted in 1977 and effective in 1979, replaced the previous 'receiving stolen property' statute, RSMo 560.270, which mandated that the property received be explicitly proven as stolen. The new statute significantly altered the requirements: it removed the necessity for the property to be definitively stolen and instead required only that it be 'property of another.' Additionally, the intent element was broadened to include scenarios where the defendant knows or believes the property is stolen.

The appellant's interpretation of the statute is challenged; he mistakenly associates the term 'stolen' in the title with the statutory requirements. The title is deemed a general descriptor and does not modify the specific provisions of the law. Furthermore, subdivision 2 of RSMo 570.080 lists admissible circumstantial evidence to establish knowledge or belief regarding stolen property, including prior criminal activities and transactions involving property purchased below its reasonable value. This listing is nonexclusive and does not negate the statute's clear language that criminalizes receiving property of another while believing it to be stolen. Direct proof of the crime's elements remains unaffected by the admissibility of circumstantial evidence outlined in subdivision 2.

Copious direct evidence supported each element of the charges, and its admission was deemed proper regardless of its relation to the items listed in subdivision 2 of RSMo 570.080.1. The statute has been broadened to encompass not only stolen property but also property that the accused believes to be stolen, targeting those involved in fencing stolen goods. The evidence demonstrated the appellant's intent to deprive the rightful owner of their property, making the trial court's instructions valid. 

The appellant also contested the admission of a tape-recorded conversation with an undercover detective, arguing it violated the rule against admitting evidence of other crimes. The tape included discussions relevant to the appellant's intent regarding the purchase of a watch he believed to be stolen, including his precautions to avoid detection due to his probation status. This evidence was deemed relevant and not in violation of the rule, as it was intertwined with the current charges.

Additionally, the appellant challenged the validity of a search warrant obtained by the detective before the watch was sold to him. The timeline included the appellant expressing interest in purchasing a stolen watch, followed by the detective's verified application for a search warrant on the day of the offense. The warrant was issued based on the detective's indication that arrangements had been made to borrow the watch, with execution timing planned for after the transaction.

A warrant was issued by the court based on evidence presented. The appellant borrowed a watch and subsequently purchased it from a detective, placing it in a cabinet drawer. Later, officers executed the warrant at the appellant's business, arrested him, and seized the watch. At trial, photographs of the watch were admitted into evidence despite the appellant's objections. He challenged the warrant's validity under RSMo 542.271 and the admissibility of the evidence, claiming violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments concerning unreasonable search and seizure.

RSMo 542.271 allows warrants for property that has been stolen or acquired unlawfully. The appellant contended that the statute only permits warrants for items already stolen and did not address RSMo 542.276, which outlines the criteria for valid warrants, including the need for probable cause and judicial authorization. The court found that these criteria were met, and the evidence supported probable cause for issuing the warrant. 

The appellant did not seriously dispute the existence of probable cause but argued that RSMo 542.271's language was exclusive in dictating when warrants could be issued. The court noted that this interpretation had not been previously addressed in case law and considered the appellant's arguments insufficient. The careful procedures followed for the warrant's issuance suggested that the officers acted in reasonable reliance on the warrant, even if its validity were questioned. The court concluded that the exclusionary rule would not apply since the officers acted in good faith based on the warrant issued by a neutral judge, aligning with the precedent set in United States v. Leon. The warrant was not found to be facially deficient, and the officers were justified in their reliance on it.

Officers acted appropriately under the belief they had a valid search warrant, leading to the admissibility of evidence seized in good faith, as established in Massachusetts v. Sheppard. The trial court correctly declined to compel the disclosure of a confidential informant, as their testimony was deemed tangential and not crucial for the defense. The informant's role was limited to introducing the undercover detective to the appellant’s business partner, and they were not present during the critical transactions between the detective and the appellant. The entrapment defense requires evidence that the law enforcement induced the appellant to commit a crime he was otherwise unwilling to engage in, which the informant could not substantiate.

Regarding the appellant's claim of a violation of the right to a speedy trial under the previous statutory provision RSMo 545.780, the court found the appellant did not demonstrate a substantial burden showing that the trial judge abused discretion in handling delays. The delays were partly attributed to the appellant's actions, including securing new counsel and initiating defense motions, and certain delays were excludable under the statute. The court noted no demonstrable prejudice against the appellant due to these delays. Ultimately, the judgment was affirmed, with dissenting opinions indicating differing views on the appellant's charges.

The legislature removed the legal impossibility defense for attempt offenses, allowing convictions for attempting to receive stolen property even if the property is not actually stolen. The court does not believe the legislature intended for the same facts to support charges under both RSMo 570.080 and RSMo 564.011, nor to allow differing punishments based solely on prosecutorial discretion. Jay S. Sweeney appeals his conviction for receiving stolen property, arguing the State failed to prove a submissible case since the property was not stolen. The case arose from a reverse sting operation where an officer, posing as a seller of stolen goods, sold Sweeney a Rolex watch, falsely claiming it was stolen. Sweeney paid $1,000 for the watch, which had a retail value of $9,000. The key legal question is whether one can be convicted of receiving stolen property when the property is not stolen. The State contends Sweeney is guilty because he believed the watch was stolen, citing RSMo 570.080, which states an individual commits the offense if they receive property knowing or believing it has been stolen. However, the court disagrees, emphasizing that a completed offense under RSMo 570.080 requires the property to actually be stolen, a position supported by prior court rulings and the statute's language. The court concludes that the title and text of RSMo 570.080 confirm the necessity of this element. Consequently, the court reverses Sweeney’s conviction and orders his discharge.

A person is guilty of receiving stolen property under Section 223.6 if they know or believe the property is stolen. The State contends that Missouri law, specifically RSMo 570.080, allows for conviction without proof that the property was actually stolen, focusing instead on the defendant's belief regarding its status. This statute simplifies the mental element required for conviction, allowing circumstantial evidence of knowledge or belief, a shift from prior law that required actual knowledge of theft.

The Comment to RSMo 570.080 emphasizes that proving a defendant's belief in the property being stolen is sufficient, reflecting a more realistic standard. However, it does not eliminate the requirement that the property must be stolen. Relevant case law, particularly State v. Hunt, illustrates that a defendant cannot be convicted for receiving property that is not stolen, as legal impossibility remains a defense to completed crimes but not to attempted crimes. Consequently, while a defendant can be guilty of attempting to receive stolen property based on their belief, they cannot be convicted of actually receiving stolen property if the items were not stolen.

The court's decision renders unnecessary the consideration of additional points raised by the defendant on appeal. Under Missouri law (570.080), a person commits the crime of receiving stolen property if they knowingly receive, retain, or dispose of property with the intent to deprive the owner of it, believing it to be stolen. Evidence admissible to establish the receiver's knowledge includes possession of other stolen property from multiple sources, receiving stolen property in a prior transaction within the year, and acquiring stolen property for much less than its market value. Receiving stolen property is classified as a class A misdemeanor unless the value exceeds $150 or the receiver is a dealer in such goods, in which case it is a class C felony. 

The appellant's challenge to the verdict directing instruction was deemed unfounded, as it accurately reflected the statutory elements of the crime and adhered to the standards for instruction modifications. The appellant made statements regarding previous incarceration and concerns about probation compliance. Additionally, the appellant incorrectly claimed a violation of the Missouri Constitution regarding search and seizure, mistakenly citing the wrong article; however, the analysis of the Fourth Amendment claims is applicable to the state constitution. A potential issue of anticipatory probable cause and prospective search warrants under section 542.271 remains unaddressed. The Model Penal Code comments suggest that issues of impossibility as a defense in attempted crimes require jurisdiction-specific analysis.