Hernandez Marrero v. CROWLEY AMERICAN TRANSPORT

Citations: 206 F. Supp. 2d 279; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11594; 2002 WL 1363506Docket: Civ. 99-2047 SEC

Court: District Court, D. Puerto Rico; June 12, 2002; Federal District Court

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Defendants Crowley American Transport, Inc. and related entities moved for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under various statutes, including Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and Puerto Rico's Law No. 100. The court reviewed the motion and the plaintiffs' opposition, ultimately granting the defendants' motion and dismissing the case with prejudice.

The factual background indicates that Mario Hernández Marrero, employed by Crowley Towing and Transportation Co. (CTT) since June 27, 1989, was laid off on February 28, 1997, when CTT ceased operations in Puerto Rico. Hernández later worked for Crowley Environmental Services (CES), which operated until September 1998 before closing and leading to another layoff. During his employment at CES, Hernández applied for two positions with Crowley American Transport, Inc. (CAT), including a Coordinator II role, which required specific qualifications such as office experience, knowledge of ocean documentation, and bilingual skills.

Detail-oriented work demands extensive follow-through, effective organizational and communication skills, and proficiency in standard office equipment. The working environment is a typical office setting with minimal exposure to excessive noise or hazardous conditions, though compliance with safety rules is necessary. The position may require prolonged sitting and extended viewing of screens, with the possibility of overtime.

Defendants claim the Plaintiff lacked sufficient experience in import documentation for international transport, asserting less than one year as a Warehouse Coordinator. His responsibilities included coordinating equipment usage, maintaining computerized inventory records, and managing project invoices. Despite seventeen years as a Boarding Agent, which involved coordinating vessel arrivals and customs processes, this experience did not satisfy the requirement for handling import documentation.

Hiring decisions for the position were made by a team of four Hispanic individuals, all over 40 years old. Although Jirau urged Armellini to interview the Plaintiff despite his unqualified resume, the team concluded he did not meet the job requirements. On January 26, 1998, Maryanne Macknin, aged 50 with fifteen years of relevant documentation experience, was hired instead. Evidence indicates that from December 1997 to February 1998, 70% of employees in the Freight Services Department at Port Everglades were over 45 years old and Hispanic.

The Plaintiff also applied for a "Supervisor, Stevedoring" position in Jacksonville on January 22, 1998. The role required supervision of terminal operations, effective communication, and familiarity with import/export processes. Preferred qualifications included formal training or an Associate's Degree, along with bilingual skills (English/Spanish) and the ability to work in varied environmental conditions.

Compliance with safety and health rules is mandatory. Essential job requirements for the "Supervisor, Stevedoring" position include overtime, short notice travel, weekend duties, and 24-hour on-call status. Ms. Bobbie Burch led the initial screening and interviews for this position. After reviewing the Plaintiff's resume, Burch concluded that he lacked supervisory experience and did not possess comprehensive terminal operations experience, leading to his exclusion from interviews. On February 5, 1998, Mr. Thomas Bouchelle, 45 years old and deemed the most qualified candidate due to his prior relevant experience, received a job offer. Following his rejection for the positions, the Plaintiff alleged age and national origin discrimination.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b), a party can move for summary judgment at any time. The court may grant this motion if the evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact, entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. The First Circuit requires that for a fact dispute to be "genuine," it must allow a reasonable factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of the non-moving party. "Material" facts are those that could affect the case outcome under applicable law. Not all factual conflicts necessitate a trial; only those that could change the suit's outcome if found favorably to the non-moving party meet the materiality threshold. In summary judgment, the court does not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations, and if multiple reasonable inferences exist, the court cannot favor the inference least favorable to the non-moving party.

The moving party must initially demonstrate an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's claims. The nonmovant is required to provide specific facts in an appropriate evidentiary form to establish a trial-worthy issue, rather than relying on vague assertions. If the nonmovant fails to present such evidence, summary judgment may be granted.

In this case, the plaintiff alleges discriminatory refusals to hire by CAT based on age and national origin, violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII. The burden rests on the plaintiff to prove that these factors were determinative in the hiring decisions. While direct evidence of discrimination may be rare, plaintiffs often must use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. 

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in a refusal to hire scenario, the plaintiff must show: (1) membership in a protected class, (2) qualification and application for the position, (3) rejection despite qualifications, and (4) that the position remained open and the employer continued seeking applicants with similar qualifications. This prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination.

The burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff throughout the proceedings, but the employer can rebut this presumption by providing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the hiring decision. At this point, courts will not question the employer's business judgments regarding hiring.

In Scott v. University of Mississippi, the Fifth Circuit established that a plaintiff may present a case to a jury if there is evidence demonstrating that they were significantly more qualified than other candidates chosen for the position. The court emphasized that judges lack the expertise to evaluate qualifications in specialized fields compared to those with relevant experience. As such, judges should avoid overriding the assessments of qualified evaluators unless the differences in qualifications are starkly evident.

The excerpt also notes that once an employer fulfills certain procedural requirements, the presumption established under the McDonnell Douglas framework is nullified. At this point, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s stated legitimate reasons for an adverse employment decision were merely a pretext for discrimination. To succeed, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that suggests the decision was influenced by discriminatory motives. 

Most ADEA and Title VII cases that fail to survive summary judgment do so at this stage. The determination of what constitutes adequate evidence of pretext or discriminatory intent is typically case-specific, with courts generally requiring more than isolated instances of alleged discrimination. For example, in Mulero-Rodríguez, the First Circuit found that comments made by the employer about the plaintiff's age, while not directly linked to the termination decision, could create a connection suggesting discriminatory motives when considered with other evidence.

Overall, the courts maintain that evidence of discriminatory animus needs to be substantial, and vague instances are insufficient unless they form a credible pattern indicating that impermissible factors may have influenced employment decisions.

In Mulero-Rodríguez, the court referenced a case where affidavits from employees indicated that a plaintiff's boss expressed intentions to eliminate older employees to form a new team, leading the district court to conclude that a reasonable jury could find the dismissal's stated reason to be pretextual and indicative of discriminatory intent. Conversely, in Irizarry v. Fortuño, the court determined that isolated remarks, such as the defendant being called "the Terminator" and his focus on "rejuvenation," were insufficient to establish an inference of age discrimination. ADEA and Title VII cases hinge on whether the plaintiff meets the standard to defeat summary judgment, with courts rejecting vague assertions and requiring "specific instances of unlawful discrimination." 

The current case presents procedural issues, as defendants argue that plaintiffs' opposition to the summary judgment motion violates the "anti-ferret rule" by failing to provide a concise statement of material facts in dispute, as mandated by Local Rule 311.12. The court has previously ruled that non-compliance with this rule results in the admission of the moving party's statement of material facts. Although failure to comply does not automatically grant summary judgment, it complicates the non-movant’s case. In this instance, plaintiffs did not submit a separate statement of contested material facts and have largely admitted to the facts presented by the defendants, providing minimal challenges without specific record references or contradicting evidence.

All material facts in the Defendant's statement of undisputed material facts are deemed admitted. The Plaintiff's claims of age and national origin discrimination are unsupported by specific evidence, relying instead on conclusory allegations. The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework, specifically not meeting the second and fourth prongs. 

For the "Coordinator II, Documentation" position, Defendants provided affidavits indicating that the Plaintiff lacked the required one year of experience in international transportation documentation. For the "Supervisor, Stevedoring" position, the affidavits stated that, although the Plaintiff had some knowledge of terminal operations, he was not qualified to supervise all areas, as necessary. 

Moreover, the positions were filled shortly after the Plaintiff's application by candidates who were significantly more qualified: Ms. Maryanne Macknin, who was older than the Plaintiff and had 15 years of relevant experience, and Mr. Thomas Bouchelle, who was only slightly younger but had previously performed the same supervisory duties. 

Because the Plaintiff has not met the second and fourth prongs of the McDonnell test, he has not established a prima facie case of discrimination, and his claim is subject to summary judgment. Even if the Court considered the Plaintiff's unsupported assertions, he still fails at the second stage of the McDonnell test, as the Defendants have provided legitimate reasons for their hiring decisions. Therefore, the burden shifts back to the Plaintiff to demonstrate that these reasons are mere pretexts for discrimination.

Plaintiff Hernández applied for two positions but was not hired for either. In Port Everglades, his interviewers were two Hispanic women over 40, and a team of four Hispanic women, three over 40, determined he did not meet the job requirements. The selected candidate, Ms. Macknin, was older and more qualified than Hernández. In Jacksonville, Hernández was considered for the "Supervisor, Stevedoring" position, but Ms. Burch, also over 40, concluded he lacked the necessary qualifications. The hired candidate, Mr. Bouchelle, had relevant job experience and was 45 years old. 

Hernández failed to provide evidence of discriminatory intent by CAT, relying solely on speculation regarding age and national origin discrimination. His only support for claiming discrimination in the "Coordinator II, Documentation" position was that a younger white female was hired, despite her being only three years younger. He also noted the low presence of Puerto Ricans in the Port Everglades office, but his claims lacked substantiation beyond his personal beliefs. The department had a diverse composition, with 70% Hispanic employees and 70% over 40 years of age. 

The court referenced the case of Santiago v. Canon USA, Inc., indicating that subjective beliefs alone do not suffice to counter a motion for summary judgment. Consequently, the absence of substantial evidence led to the dismissal of Hernández's claims under the ADEA and Title VII with prejudice. Additionally, his claim against CES for being placed on a probationary period was deemed time-barred, as he did not exhaust administrative procedures required for discrimination claims within the established time limits set by the EEOC.

In Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Inc., the court addressed the time-sensitive nature of discrimination claims, emphasizing that a limitation period exists to protect both the rights of individuals and the interests of employers. The plaintiff filed a discrimination charge over 575 days after employment with CES, failing to meet the required timeframe for filing with the EEOC or relevant agency, resulting in the claim being time-barred and dismissed with prejudice.

The plaintiff also lacked a viable constitutional claim, as it was insufficiently pleaded and unsupported by evidence, leading to its dismissal with prejudice. Regarding claims under Federal Executive Order No. 11246, which prohibits discrimination by federal contractors, the court noted that individuals do not have a private cause of action against such employers, leading to the dismissal of these claims as well.

Concerning supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, the court highlighted the principle that a district court may exercise such jurisdiction only when federal claims are present. Since all federal claims were dismissed before trial, the court determined it should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, leading to their dismissal as well. This aligns with established legal precedents emphasizing that dismissal of all federal claims typically warrants the dismissal of related state claims to maintain judicial efficiency and fairness.

In Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegria, the court ruled on the dismissal of various claims. The dismissal of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claims led to the dismissal of related pendent state law claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as established in previous case law. The court emphasized that federal question jurisdiction was contingent on the dismissed ADEA count and noted the absence of complete diversity or other grounds for jurisdiction. It indicated that supplemental jurisdiction should not be exercised when state law claims significantly outweigh federal claims. The Supreme Court's principles of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity were cited, supporting relinquishment of jurisdiction when state issues predominate. Consequently, the plaintiffs were found ineligible for awards under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), leaving only the possibility of pursuing claims under Puerto Rican statutes. As a result, the claims under ADEA, Title VII, Federal Executive Order No. 11246, and the U.S. Constitution were dismissed with prejudice, while claims under Puerto Rico's Law No. 100 and Article 1802 were dismissed without prejudice. Judgment will be entered accordingly. Additionally, Local Rule 311.12 mandates that motions for summary judgment must be accompanied by concise statements of undisputed material facts, which are deemed admitted unless disputed by the opposing party.