Gunser v. City of Philadelphia

Citations: 398 F. Supp. 2d 392; 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27915; 2005 WL 3054552Docket: Civ.A. 04-3548

Court: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania; November 15, 2005; Federal District Court

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In the case of Gunser et al. v. City of Philadelphia et al., the plaintiffs, six former officers of the Philadelphia Marine Unit, have brought a civil rights action against the City, its police department, and several individual officers. The defendants argue for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs previously settled with the City, which should bar this lawsuit. The case stems from a May 18, 2000 incident involving the collapse of a nightclub into the Delaware River, during which Marine Unit officers recovered empty beer kegs that should have been preserved as evidence but were instead redeemed for cash, allegedly for the Marine Unit’s coffee fund. 

An anonymous tip led to an Internal Investigation Division (IID) inquiry that uncovered misconduct, including the redemption of the kegs and falsification of attendance records to cover for officer Dougherty's absences while refereeing basketball games. Dougherty was ultimately dismissed for conduct unbecoming an officer, despite being acquitted of related criminal charges. The IID investigation found that McGinty and Gunser were also involved in the misconduct, with McGinty admitting to falsifying records and Gunser lying about the keg incident. The IID substantiated the allegations against Dougherty, leading to significant disciplinary actions against several officers involved.

Kowalski falsified daily attendance records to conceal Dougherty's absences while he officiated basketball games and admitted this to IID investigators, who also found that Kowalski lied about not seeing beer kegs stored in unit showers. Allan lied to investigators about his knowledge of the kegs and violated orders by discussing his IID interview with other officers. Price acknowledged knowledge of the kegs but also lied during the investigation. As a result, in March 2002, Allan, Gunser, Kowalski, McGinty, and Price were reassigned for lying and falsifying reports. In November 2002, formal discipline requests were initiated against Gunser, Price, and Kowalski. Gunser resigned in March 2003. The Fraternal Order of Police filed a grievance on behalf of the officers, leading to settlement agreements with the City, which included waiving any claims against the City, expunging disciplinary records, and restoring Kowalski and Price to the Marine Unit. Allan, Gunser, and McGinty received cash settlements and neutral references upon retirement. Dougherty's dismissal was modified to a resignation, with expunged records and benefits reinstated. The Plaintiffs then filed a lawsuit on July 23, 2004, alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and malicious prosecution. The Defendants contend that the settlement agreements bar the Plaintiffs from pursuing these claims, leading to a motion for summary judgment based on the release clauses in the agreements. The court must determine if any genuine issues for trial exist regarding these claims.

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' claims stem from the same subject matter as prior grievances and should be dismissed. In contrast, Plaintiffs (Gunser, Price, Allan, and Kowalski) argue that the release terms do not encompass the current litigation. The interpretation of settlement agreements follows general contract construction principles, where unambiguous terms allow for summary judgment, while ambiguous terms present factual questions for a jury. The determination of ambiguity is a legal question. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants misinterpret the release clause, suggesting it waives their right to pursue claims related to their employment with the City of Philadelphia. However, the Court finds that such interpretation is unnecessary to rule in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs’ claims are tied to the same actions and speech that led to their transfers from the Marine Unit, thus relating directly to the subject matter of their grievance. 

The case of Dodge v. Trustees of the National Gallery of Art, cited by Plaintiffs, is distinguishable; in Dodge, the plaintiff's claims regarding constitutional rights were found unrelated to the settled grievance concerning job removal. In contrast, the current case involves claims arising from the same conduct—specifically, disciplinary actions taken against the officers for statements made during an investigation into Dougherty's conduct, which are central to their First Amendment claims. Thus, the claims are interconnected with the prior grievances regarding their transfers from the Marine Unit due to specific actions and alleged misconduct.

The Plaintiffs were disciplined for making statements deemed false regarding Dougherty's alleged misconduct, which constituted misconduct under the department’s disciplinary code. Their willingness to repeat supportive statements at Dougherty's trial is linked to their statements to investigators. The alleged retaliation involved transferring the Plaintiffs from the Marine Unit, which was the focus of their grievance. Consequently, the Court determined that the Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims are encompassed by the grievance subject matter and the release clause in the settlement agreement.

Count II alleges that Dougherty was deprived of his property right to employment without due process despite being acquitted of criminal charges. This claim is based on his grievance regarding his dismissal and non-reinstatement. Dougherty's employment rights are governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) stipulating that he cannot be discharged or disciplined without good cause, and he lacks a fundamental property right in employment beyond this. The Court concluded that Dougherty's constitutional rights regarding his employment are limited to those provided by the CBA, and since he previously settled his claims under this agreement, his claims in Count II fall within the release clause.

Count III alleges malicious prosecution against all six Plaintiffs. However, only Dougherty faced prosecution, while the other Plaintiffs were not charged. Thus, only Dougherty can pursue a claim for malicious prosecution under 1983, leading to the dismissal of Count III for the other Plaintiffs. Even if the internal disciplinary actions against them were considered malicious prosecution, those issues were part of their grievances and settlement negotiations, thereby falling under the release clause. Dougherty did not grieve the criminal charges against him, so his malicious prosecution claim is not precluded by the settlement agreement. 

For claims alleging the waiver of civil rights, the Court must analyze the circumstances of the settlement agreement's execution to ensure it was made knowingly and voluntarily. This includes evaluating the clarity of the language, whether the consideration received exceeded legal relief, if the signer had legal representation, received adequate explanation, had time to reflect, and understood the release's nature and scope.

The Court evaluated whether evidence of fraud, undue influence, or public interest concerns existed regarding the enforcement of a settlement agreement. The Court concluded that the Plaintiffs' claims were directly related to the settlement terms, which included clear language, consideration received (such as restoration of assignments, cash payment, expungement of records, and neutral references), union representation during negotiations, clarity of the waiver's nature, and a timeline where all events occurred prior to signing the agreement. There was no evidence of fraud or undue influence, nor any harm to public interest. Consequently, the Court determined that the Plaintiffs' waivers were knowing and voluntary, ruling that there were no material factual disputes regarding the settlement's preclusive effect. Summary judgment was granted for Defendants concerning Plaintiffs Gunser, Price, Allan, McGinty, and Kowalski on Counts I and III, with their claims dismissed with prejudice. Dougherty's malicious prosecution claim in Count II was found outside the settlement's scope, allowing him to proceed with that claim. The Court ordered that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was partially granted and partially denied.

Two plaintiffs, McGinty and Dougherty, did not participate in the response to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Gunser, Kowalski, Price, McGinty, and Allan signed a settlement agreement around September 11, 2003, while Dougherty signed a separate agreement on May 6, 2004. The court noted that if the First Amendment claims were allowed to proceed, the plaintiffs would not be recognized as private citizens exercising free speech. Instead, their speech related to personal interest, which does not warrant federal court intervention in employment decisions. The plaintiffs faced disciplinary action for allegedly making false statements during an investigation of Dougherty, which the court viewed as personal rather than public concern. Additionally, while the plaintiffs claimed they were disciplined for indicating a willingness to testify for Dougherty, the court found no evidence linking disciplinary actions to this alleged speech. The court concluded that the federal forum was inappropriate for addressing the plaintiffs' transfer complaints, as their settlement agreement adequately addressed their rights. Furthermore, while a malicious prosecution claim can be pursued under §1983, it requires proof of prosecution, which Dougherty did not provide in his response to the motion.