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Accent Energy Corp. v. Gillman

Citations: 824 S.W.2d 274; 1992 WL 11110Docket: 07-90-0211-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; February 23, 1992; Texas; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case concerns an appeal by Accent Energy Corporation and its majority shareholder against minority shareholders following a jury verdict favoring the minority shareholders in a derivative action. The minority shareholders alleged a breach of fiduciary duty, claiming that the majority shareholder failed to disclose a lucrative investment opportunity. The court evaluated whether there was a duty to disclose such opportunities to minority shareholders and assessed the propriety of the trial venue in Hutchinson County. It concluded that, as the corporation was not a close corporation, there was no obligation to disclose investment opportunities to minority shareholders. Furthermore, the court found that the venue was improperly set in Hutchinson County, as the cause of action did not accrue there. As a result, the trial court's judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for transfer to Dallas County. The case highlights the application of fiduciary duty principles and Texas venue statutes in derivative actions, emphasizing the procedural responsibilities of parties in securing venue hearings.

Legal Issues Addressed

Fiduciary Duty and Corporate Opportunity Disclosure

Application: The court found that Waters, as a majority shareholder, was not obligated to disclose an investment opportunity to minority shareholders, as the corporation was not formed as a close corporation.

Reasoning: Consequently, corporate officers and directors are not obligated to disclose investment opportunities to minority shareholders.

Obligation to Secure Venue Hearing

Application: Accent and Waters bore the responsibility to secure a hearing on their motions to transfer venue, and the court found no waiver of these motions due to the delay caused by Gillman and Windle's request for discovery continuance.

Reasoning: Accent and Waters were responsible for securing a hearing on their motions to transfer venue, as stipulated by Tex.R.Civ. P. 87(1).

Texas Venue Statute Application

Application: The court held that Waters should be sued in Dallas County, where he resides, as the cause of action did not arise in Hutchinson County, negating the trial court's venue decision.

Reasoning: Thus, Gillman and Windle failed to demonstrate that any part of their cause of action arose in Hutchinson County, leading to the conclusion that the trial court erred in its venue decision.

Venue in Derivative Actions

Application: The derivative action initiated by Gillman and Windle was for the benefit of the corporation, which is considered a party plaintiff, thereby not allowing venue determination based on the personal residence of the plaintiffs.

Reasoning: This aligns with the precedent set in Morgan v. Box, which stated that a derivative action for the corporation's benefit positions the corporation as a party plaintiff, thus not allowing the plaintiff to determine venue based on personal residence when the corporation resides elsewhere.