Braxton v. United States

Citations: 358 F. Supp. 2d 497; 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2718; 2005 WL 433635Docket: Civil Action No. 7:04CV00380, Criminal Action No. 3:02CR00019

Court: District Court, W.D. Virginia; February 14, 2005; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Walter Lee Braxton filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence for conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, following his guilty plea on February 3, 2003. The United States sought to dismiss his motion, and the court, having notified Braxton as required by Roseboro v. Garrison, noted that he failed to respond. Consequently, the court deemed the motion ripe for consideration and ultimately denied Braxton's § 2255 motion.

Factual and procedural history reveals that Braxton was indicted on September 12, 2002, for conspiracy and distribution of over fifty grams of crack cocaine. He pled guilty to conspiracy, with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment stated clearly in his plea agreement. Braxton waived his rights to appeal sentencing guideline issues and to collaterally attack his sentence. On July 10, 2003, he was sentenced to thirty years, the lower end of the guideline range. Although his attorney requested a downward departure based on sentencing disparities with co-defendants, the court denied this request.

Braxton claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that his attorney misrepresented potential sentencing outcomes and failed to file an appeal despite his request. He also contended that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment based on Blakely v. Washington, arguing that the drug quantity and firearm enhancement were not established by a jury or admitted by him. The court found that the record conclusively showed Braxton was not entitled to relief and declined to hold a hearing.

Braxton's waiver of his right to file a 2255 motion is found to be valid by the court, as it was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily within the context of his guilty plea agreement. The government contends that this waiver, which included relinquishing the right to appeal his conviction and sentence, is enforceable. The court notes that Braxton's claims do not meet any exceptions that would invalidate such waivers. Although the Fourth Circuit has not explicitly ruled on the validity of 2255 waivers, it has suggested they are generally valid, aligning with rulings from multiple other circuits. 

For a waiver to be valid, it must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and the imposed sentence must not exceed legal maximums or rely on unconstitutional factors like race. Braxton does not claim his sentence was excessive or based on any impermissible factors. The determination of whether his waiver was knowing and intelligent considers the specifics of his case, including his background and conduct. During the guilty plea hearing, Braxton confirmed his understanding of the waiver with his attorney and the court, affirming that he voluntarily waived his right to challenge the judgment under 2255. He demonstrated competency to plead, stating he was an adult, had a tenth-grade education, and was not under the influence of substances at the time. Additionally, he expressed satisfaction with his legal representation.

The court confirmed that Braxton's plea was voluntary, as he denied any coercion or promises beyond the plea agreement when questioned by the court. This affirmation supports the conclusion that his guilty plea and 2255 waiver are valid. The court referenced the Fourth Circuit's stance on similar waivers being voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Regarding Braxton's Blakely claim, the court ruled it barred by his waiver of the right to collaterally attack his sentence, stating that even if considered, the claim would be denied because the Blakely and Booker decisions do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. 

For his second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court noted that the Fourth Circuit has not explicitly ruled on whether such claims can be barred by a valid 2255 waiver. However, the court concluded that a valid waiver should preclude ineffective assistance claims unless they directly challenge the validity of the plea or waiver. The court reinforced that defendants can waive fundamental rights, including the right to file a 2255 motion based on ineffective assistance, and emphasized the importance of enforcing such waivers for both governmental efficiency and the interests of defendants seeking plea bargains.

District courts in the Fourth Circuit have differing views on whether a defendant who has waived their right to file a 2255 motion can later assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the same provision. In Moon v. United States, a court held that such claims fell outside the scope of a valid 2255 waiver, while United States v. Parker determined that a valid waiver precludes claims of ineffective assistance unrelated to the validity of the plea or waiver. Although Parker is unpublished, it aligns with conclusions reached by several other circuits, such as in United States v. Cockerham.

The court finds Parker's reasoning more persuasive, distinguishing it from Moon, which relied on the precedent set in Attar regarding direct appeal waivers. The court notes that ineffective assistance claims are generally not heard on direct appeal and should be raised in a 2255 motion unless the record conclusively demonstrates ineffective assistance. It argues that allowing an exception for ineffective assistance claims would undermine the effectiveness of 2255 waivers, as such claims could easily be framed as Sixth Amendment challenges, rendering waivers meaningless.

The court concludes that the majority of circuits support the view that ineffective assistance claims, which do not challenge the validity of the plea or waiver, are waivable. This perspective is echoed in decisions from multiple circuits, emphasizing that a knowing and intelligent waiver should not be easily circumvented.

Braxton's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not invalidate his 2255 waiver, as such claims are waivable unless they directly challenge the validity of the plea or waiver. The court affirmed that Braxton's waiver was 'intelligent, knowing, and voluntary' according to Fourth Circuit standards. The court must assess whether Braxton's claims pertain to the validity of his plea or waiver. Braxton contends ineffective assistance on two grounds: firstly, that his counsel failed to anticipate a weapons enhancement that increased his sentence, leading him to believe his sentence would be lower; and secondly, that counsel did not file an appeal when requested. 

Despite these claims, the court found that the alleged surprise at sentencing does not invalidate the waiver since Braxton was informed of the maximum penalty he could face, which was life imprisonment. His acknowledgment of understanding this penalty during the plea process indicates that his waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily. Additionally, he confirmed his satisfaction with his counsel at the time of the plea. Thus, even if the claims are taken as true, they do not undermine the validity of the plea and waiver. 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this deficiency resulted in prejudice, meaning there was a reasonable probability he would not have pleaded guilty and would have opted for a trial instead. The court concluded that Braxton's claims did not meet this two-part test, warranting dismissal of the ineffective assistance claim.

Braxton pled guilty with the hope of receiving a reduced sentence for his substantial assistance to the government. His attorney, Ms. Griffin, informed him that he faced a likely thirty-year sentence if he pleaded guilty and explained that the government could not consider a substantial assistance motion unless he did so. On January 8, 2003, Braxton requested a meeting with police officers to provide a proffer aimed at lowering his sentence. This intention is corroborated by statements from AUSA Gould during the sentencing hearing, which indicated Braxton had a good chance of receiving a Rule 35 motion in the future. Additionally, a letter from Griffin to AUSA dated March 24, 2003, indicates Braxton's desire to provide more information to enhance his chances of a substantial assistance motion. 

Despite any potential shortcomings in Griffin's representation, it is likely Braxton would have still pled guilty, as he did not claim that he would have gone to trial if properly informed about his sentencing exposure. Thus, he failed to meet the prejudice requirement for proving ineffective assistance of counsel. Braxton's second claim regarding his counsel's failure to file an appeal after his request is barred by his 2255 waiver, as he did not assert that this failure affected the validity of his guilty plea or waiver, and it occurred months after the plea hearing. Consequently, both aspects of Braxton's ineffective assistance claim were dismissed on the grounds of his valid waiver in the plea agreement. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss Braxton's 2255 motion entirely, advising him of his right to appeal within 60 days and directing the Clerk to send certified copies of the order to the involved parties. The final order confirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's motion and stricken the case from the active court docket.

Certified copies of the order and accompanying memorandum opinion are to be sent to the petitioner and the respondent's counsel. The petitioner claims his sentence is unconstitutional, asserting it was based on factors not stipulated by him and not determined by a jury. Sentences exceeding the maximum penalty defined in the relevant statute are considered unconstitutional, as illustrated in United States v. Leigh, where a sentence of 262 months was ruled excessive against a statutory maximum of 240 months under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). In the present case, under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A), the imprisonment range for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine is ten years to life. The Tenth Circuit has differentiated between valid plea waivers and those that may be considered unknowing or unintelligent, potentially undermining the waiver's validity, as noted in United States v. Cockerham. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit supports this distinction, indicating that a valid appeal waiver does not preclude a 6th Amendment challenge to plea proceedings, as seen in United States v. Broughton-Jones. During the guilty plea hearing on February 3, 2003, the Assistant U.S. Attorney presented evidence against Braxton, including a recorded conversation about purchasing narcotics and video and audio evidence of him selling 74 grams of crack cocaine to a confidential informant, along with additional recorded calls concerning his involvement in the drug conspiracy.