United States v. Furrow

Citations: 125 F. Supp. 2d 1170; 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18500; 2000 WL 1874208Docket: CR 99-838 NM

Court: District Court, C.D. California; September 19, 2000; Federal District Court

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Buford O'Neal Furrow, Jr. faces prosecution for the murder of U.S. postal worker Joseph Ileto and shootings at the North Valley Jewish Community Center, along with firearms offenses. The initial indictment, issued on August 19, 1999, included three counts: murder of a federal employee, use of a firearm in a felony causing death, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Following three months of grand jury testimony from 43 witnesses, a superseding indictment on December 2, 1999, added thirteen counts, including racial interference and additional firearms offenses.

Furrow's motion for sanctions alleges abuse of the grand jury process. The court outlines the legal standard governing grand jury powers under the Fifth Amendment, emphasizing their broad investigative abilities to ascertain crimes and perpetrators. While grand juries can act on various types of information, their investigative role must not be misused for mere discovery in ongoing cases. The court notes that once an indictment is issued, utilizing the grand jury for the primary purpose of gathering additional evidence against the defendant is prohibited.

Utilizing a Grand Jury solely to prepare a pending indictment for trial is improper; however, the government may have multiple legitimate purposes for summoning a witness. Even if an improper purpose exists, if a legitimate purpose is also found, the court's determination is not clearly erroneous. The Grand Jury can investigate other individuals involved in criminal activities and consider affirmative defenses to assess whether prosecution should proceed. Its role includes protecting the innocent and preventing arbitrary accusations. The mere incidental benefit to the prosecution from grand jury testimony does not constitute abuse of process. A good faith inquiry into related charges is permissible even if it reveals evidence against an indicted person. The law presumes that grand juries act within their authority and their proceedings are generally regarded as regular unless specific irregularities are demonstrated. Courts should refrain from interfering with grand jury processes unless compelling reasons are presented, placing the burden on defendants to prove abuse. In this context, the government contends that the current motion is a renewal of previous motions aimed at halting grand jury proceedings, which alleged improper use of the grand jury to gather evidence for the penalty phase against the defendant, without prior knowledge of witness identities or access to grand jury transcripts.

Judge Paez denied the request for emergency relief due to insufficient factual support and has scheduled a hearing for the motion. The Defendant's motion from November 24, 1999, sought to quash specific grand jury subpoenas and to stay the grand jury investigation, but was withdrawn on December 6, 1999, after the grand jury returned a superseding indictment and disbanded. Since the Defendant did not receive a full hearing on his earlier motions and the current motion is based on new evidence, the court will address its merits.

The Defendant argues that the government improperly utilized the grand jury to collect evidence for the penalty phase of his upcoming trial, specifically objecting to inquiries regarding his mental health, substance use, social behavior, and personal relationships. The government claims that the grand jury's main objectives were to identify those responsible for the August 10, 1999 shootings, ascertain the Defendant's possible religious and racial animus for charges under Section 245, and evaluate his specific intent for those charges. 

The Defendant contends that it was inappropriate for the government to summon personal friends and family members who did not witness the shootings. However, the court notes that grand juries are permitted to seek information from individuals not present at the crime scene if they can provide links to criminal conduct. The court finds no impropriety in summoning non-percipient witnesses and acknowledges that the government is allowed to investigate potential co-conspirators.

While the Defendant claims that questions regarding his character and personal life were improper, these concerns were only raised in his reply brief, limiting the government's opportunity to address their relevance. The court concludes that lack of relevance does not equate to improper purpose and does not view the questioning as evidence of grand jury abuse. The government maintains that the inquiries about the Defendant's relationships were intended to evaluate any racial and religious animosity he may harbor, which the Defendant concedes is a valid line of inquiry related to the hate crime allegations. The grand jury transcripts appear to support the government's focus on this issue during witness interrogations.

Witnesses with prior personal relationships with the Defendant were questioned about his views on racial and religious minorities, including inquiries into his ties to the Aryan Nation, a white supremacist group. Such questions were deemed relevant to the grand jury's investigation of a potential Section 245 violation, which necessitates the offender to act based on the victim's race, religion, or national origin. Testimonies from the Defendant's friends, family, and coworkers focused on his mental health, substance use, and overall ability to function in society, which are critical in assessing whether he could form the specific intent required for the charges. The government argued that these inquiries were aimed at understanding the Defendant's capacity to act knowingly and purposefully, particularly in light of factors like anger or substance abuse that could obscure his intent.

Clint Mathews reported that the Defendant experienced panic attacks but remained functional. The Defendant objected to the relevance of past medication needs and mental health inquiries, suggesting they were intended to counter his mitigation evidence. However, the grand jury is not restricted to witnesses with knowledge of the Defendant’s state of mind on the specific date of the offenses and is tasked with determining probable cause for each charge. Thus, exploring the Defendant's mental capacity and intent while on medication was appropriate.

The grand jury's role includes assessing both the potential guilt and innocence of the accused, allowing for inquiries into possible defenses, such as mental incapacity. The court found no abuse of discretion in the grand jury's investigation, which aligns with its duty to ensure that indictments are well-founded.

The Department of Justice mandates that prosecutors must disclose substantial evidence negating guilt to the grand jury before seeking an indictment. Failing to present such evidence would go against public policy. The government is permitted to investigate a defendant's mental capacity, even if the inquiry may yield evidence pertinent to sentencing. The timing of subpoenas can indicate their purpose; however, absent irregularities, courts generally accept the government's stated reasons for grand jury proceedings. In previous cases, such as Simels and Kovaleski, the timing of subpoenas raised concerns about prosecutorial intent, while in Ruppel, the timing did not suggest misconduct. In the current case, a superseding indictment followed a thorough investigation, and the defendant's claims regarding earlier charges do not undermine the legitimacy of the grand jury's actions. The grand jury is obligated to conduct a comprehensive investigation, independent of whether earlier evidence existed.

A grand jury investigation is considered complete only when all leads have been pursued and witnesses examined. The Defendant failed to prove that the primary purpose of the grand jury's post-indictment activities was to bolster the prosecution's case. The government appropriately continued its investigation into the murder after the initial indictment, aiming to identify additional conspirators. The grand jury's function includes examining possible further offenses, even during an ongoing prosecution. Evidence obtained during this phase, related to the Defendant's future dangerousness or factors relevant to sentencing, does not indicate abuse of process, especially if such benefits are incidental. The grand jury operates under broad investigatory powers, and the Defendant did not demonstrate any exceeding of this authority or present substantial evidence of abuse. Consequently, the motion for sanctions against the grand jury is denied. The court also noted that the Defendant's request for grand jury transcripts prior to August 26, 1999, is moot since the government provided them. The burden of proof regarding the proper use of the grand jury was not shifted to the government as the Defendant failed to show sufficient evidence. Lastly, the investigation into the Defendant's relationship with Debbie Mathews was deemed relevant for determining potential testimonial privileges.

The government released Ms. Mathews from her grand jury subpoena without conceding any privilege. Her connections to the Aryan Nation and her prior relationship with the Defendant, alongside the Defendant's attempts to contact her around the time of the shooting, justified the government's pursuit of her testimony. During oral arguments, the government clarified its inquiry into the Defendant's patronage of prostitutes. The key issue is whether the Defendant has demonstrated that the government's inquiries were primarily improper, which he has not done. The Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Williams established that while the government is not penalized for not presenting exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, this does not imply that such presentations are improper. Additionally, the Defendant claims a flow chart indicates that all seven firearms in the indictment were found on August 10, 1999, but he did not provide this chart in his motions. He does not dispute the government's assertion that the grand jury was justified in investigating who assisted the Defendant, a felon, in acquiring the firearms.