Riley v. State

Citations: 988 S.W.2d 895; 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 1694; 1999 WL 130166Docket: 14-97-00437-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; March 10, 1999; Texas; State Appellate Court

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Mark Raymond Riley was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI) after pleading not guilty before a jury. The trial court sentenced him to 180 days in jail, probated for one year, and imposed a $500 fine. Riley raised three points of error on appeal: 1) the trial court's refusal to strike Juror Sixteen for cause, 2) denial of a motion to suppress the audio portion of a video tape, and 3) allowing expert testimony without a proper foundation. The court affirmed the trial court's decision.

During the trial, Officer Holbrook stopped Riley after observing him run a red light. The officer detected alcohol on Riley's breath and noted his bloodshot eyes, leading to his arrest after several field sobriety tests. 

In addressing the juror challenge, Riley's counsel argued that Juror Sixteen exhibited bias by expressing a tendency to believe police officers over non-police officers, which could constitute a basis for challenge for cause. The court noted that a juror's unwavering belief in police credibility could warrant such a challenge, but if the juror's views are ambiguous, the trial court's discretion is upheld. Although the trial judge initially indicated that Juror Sixteen would be excused, confusion arose as she remained on the panel. Riley's counsel requested an additional peremptory strike due to this perceived error. The appellate court acknowledged this procedural error, concluding it had implications for the juror's impartiality.

Appellant's ability to appeal is contingent on whether he preserved the error regarding the trial court's ruling on a venireperson. Harm results only if the appellant used a peremptory strike to remove the venireperson and subsequently suffered detriment from that decision. For error preservation, it is necessary that the appellant exhausts all peremptory strikes, requests additional strikes, and identifies a specific objectionable juror forced upon him due to the trial court's denial of his challenge for cause or additional strikes. In this case, although the appellant used all his peremptory strikes and requested more, his statement regarding Juror Sixteen did not specify an objectionable juror he would have accepted otherwise. Therefore, the error was not preserved for appeal, and the first point of error is overruled.

In the second point of error, the appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress the audio portion of a videotape, claiming it violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The rights to remain silent, counsel, and against self-incrimination apply only to compelled testimony during custodial interrogation. The audio is inadmissible only if it contains compelled testimony elicited through interrogation, which is defined as actions likely to provoke an incriminating response. The appellant's generalized objection to the entire audio portion did not pinpoint any specific part that was objectionable, failing to demonstrate that police actions were likely to elicit incriminating responses. Thus, he did not preserve this error for appellate review, and the second point of error is overruled.

In the final point of error, the appellant argues that the trial court allowed expert testimony without establishing a proper foundation. For expert testimony to be admissible, three conditions must be satisfied: the witness must qualify as an expert, the subject matter must warrant expert testimony, and the testimony must assist the fact finder. The trial court's admission of Officer Holbrook's expert testimony regarding the appellant's toxicity is contested, indicating potential procedural error in establishing these foundational requirements.

The appellant contends that the trial court lacked the foundation to make findings regarding intoxication due to improper expert testimony from Officer Holbrook, who testified about his opinion on the defendant's intoxication based on his training and experience. The appellant objected to the question posed by the State's attorney, arguing it solicited an expert opinion without establishing Officer Holbrook's qualifications as an expert in intoxication assessments. The trial court overruled the objection, permitting the testimony despite the absence of prior evidence concerning Officer Holbrook's relevant training. While lay witnesses can express opinions based on personal perception regarding intoxication, the question allowed Officer Holbrook to base his opinion on both perception and expert qualifications, which was erroneous. 

The court then evaluated whether this error was reversible under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), which considers the impact of the error on the overall proceeding. Despite the improper testimony, sufficient evidence—including observations of the appellant's breath, sobriety tests, and video footage—indicated intoxication. Additionally, Officer Jaime, certified in administering sobriety tests, testified that the appellant had lost normal use of mental and physical faculties due to alcohol. The court concluded that the error did not substantially influence the jury’s verdict and, therefore, affirmed the trial court's judgment.