City of Scranton v. FIRE FIGHTERS LOCAL

Citations: 20 A.3d 525; 190 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3402; 2011 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 157; 2011 WL 1226275Docket: 1253 C.D. 2010

Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania; April 4, 2011; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

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The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania upheld a trial court's decision to vacate an arbitration award in a dispute between the City of Scranton and the Fire Fighters Local Union No. 60. The arbitration arose from a grievance regarding the applicability of the Municipalities Financial Recovery Act (Act 47) to matters governed by the Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (Act 111). The trial court found that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by relying on a "binding past practice" that had been eliminated from the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) due to the City's Act 47 recovery plan and a prior court decision.

The City had been designated as financially distressed in 1992 and operates under a recovery plan that includes specific provisions affecting labor relations. Key provisions relevant to this case include the City's rights to determine organizational structure, job duties, employee schedules, and the elimination of minimum manning requirements in CBAs. Additionally, any protections for past practices or unspecified rights in the CBAs were eliminated, allowing the City to negotiate future agreements without being bound by previous practices.

The court affirmed the trial court's ruling, supporting the City's authority to implement changes as outlined in the recovery plan, which prioritizes cost containment and management rights over the Union's claims based on historical practices.

In Scranton Fire Fighters (2009), the 2006 interest arbitration award was modified to incorporate provisions from the 2002 Recovery Plan. In the case of Fire Fighters Local No. 60 v. City of Scranton, 937 A.2d 600 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), the court examined a grievance arising from the 1996-2002 collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which included provisions ensuring the continuation of past agreements, arbitration awards, and practices beneficial to the bargaining unit. The CBA also mandated cooperation on safety, including periodic meetings and training. 

The 1996 CBA expired on December 31, 2002, and prior to January 2004, the Fire Department's standard deployment for automated alarms involved 13 firefighters using two engine companies, one rescue company, one truck company, and a supervisor's vehicle. In inclement weather, deployment was occasionally reduced to one engine company, involving 10-11 firefighters. In January 2004, the fire chief issued memoranda to unilaterally reduce the standard deployment but did not implement this policy or notify the Union until January 2005. 

During ongoing litigation for a new CBA, the Union filed a grievance regarding the automated alarm response under the safety and past practice provisions of the 1996 CBA. The Arbitrator denied the grievance, concluding there was no violation of the CBA and that the practice of deploying two engine companies was not established by mutual agreement. The Arbitrator noted that a significant majority of automated alarms are false and that reducing the deployment did not significantly compromise firefighter safety. The Union's petition to vacate the Arbitrator's award was denied by the trial court, leading to an appeal. The appellate court found that the Arbitrator's reliance on the origin of the past practice, which was not addressed by the parties, did not meet due process standards of fairness, resulting in a remand for further evidence presentation on the issue.

On remand, the Arbitrator conducted an evidentiary hearing and, in August 2009, issued a Remand Award asserting that the automated alarm response practice stemmed from a mutual agreement in the 1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The Arbitrator cited Article VIII, Section 8 of the 1996 CBA, concluding that this past practice is binding and subject to change only through mutual agreement, thereby sustaining the grievance retroactively to the date of the Remand Award. Following this, the City filed a petition to vacate the Remand Award, which the trial court granted, stating that the Arbitrator exceeded his powers by relying on past practice language that had been eliminated by a prior decision modifying the 2006 Interest Award. 

The Union raised six issues for review, arguing that the trial court erred in vacating the Remand Award, claiming the Arbitrator did not exceed his authority and that the trial court deviated from established deference to Act 111 arbitration awards. The Union also contended that Section 252 of Act 47 does not apply to arbitration awards and that an Act 111 arbitration award mandates legislative action by the City. In its argument, the Union maintained that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the Arbitrator erred in law by not considering the modifications from the Scranton Fire Fighters (2009) decision. The Union argued that the trial court mischaracterized the Arbitrator's jurisdiction and authority and that an "error of law" should not be a basis for vacating an arbitration award. The City countered that the trial court's determination that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority was appropriate given the failure to consider the prior court decision.

An arbitration award is limited to requiring actions a public employer can voluntarily undertake. If an award exceeds this limitation, it may be reviewed under a narrow certiorari standard for excess of the arbitrator's powers, particularly when it contradicts the employer's recovery plan. The City contends that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority by basing the Remand Award on past practices that were eliminated by the 2002 Recovery Plan and the Scranton Fire Fighters (2009) decision. The Union failed to identify or negotiate specific practices for inclusion in future collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). The City asserts the Arbitrator ignored the appellate court's mandate, infringing on its constitutional rights.

The trial court agreed that the Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction by relying on eliminated language from the CBA. Citing Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, the Supreme Court highlighted that inherent managerial prerogatives are not subject to mandatory bargaining. The Arbitrator's initial ruling suggested that without the past practice clause, the City’s response to automated alarms fell under management prerogative. Given the elimination of past practice protections, this response is a managerial prerogative, not subject to collective bargaining. The 2002 Recovery Plan's "Management Rights" provision grants the City authority to determine departmental operations and modify responses to alarms, shielding these rights from grievance procedures under Act 111. Thus, the Arbitrator lacked the authority to uphold the grievance regarding automated alarm responses. The Union argues that an arbitrator exceeds authority by ordering illegal acts or addressing issues outside the CBA or employment terms, particularly if inconsistent with a municipality's recovery plan.

The Union argues that the Remand Award complies with Section 252 of Act 47, asserting it neither violates nor alters the 2002 Recovery Plan, specifically its "Elimination of Past Practices" provision, which removes protections for past practices but does not negate their enforceability. The Union's grievance pertains to a "Safety and Health" provision in the 1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), necessitating a review of past practices to determine compliance by the City. The Union claims that the 2002 Recovery Plan does not restrict response protocols for automated alarms, allowing the City to adhere to historical practices without violating the Plan. 

Conversely, the City contends that both the 2002 Recovery Plan and the court's ruling in *Scranton Fire Fighters* (2009) negate the protection of the past practice in question, alleging that the Remand Award disregards this precedent by maintaining the practice of dispatching two engine companies to automated alarms. The City argues that the Arbitrator overstepped his authority by relying on an eliminated past practice, thus addressing matters beyond the employment terms.

The trial court concluded that the 2002 Recovery Plan and *Scranton Fire Fighters* (2009) indeed eliminate protection for past practices, deeming the Union's interpretation unreasonable and rendering Section II-B(16) ineffective. Furthermore, the court indicated that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority by addressing the automated alarm response practice, which was not preserved in the 2006 Interest Award, and noted that such managerial prerogatives fall outside mandatory collective bargaining under Act 111. The Union also contends that the trial court improperly vacated the Remand Award, which deviated from the usual deference to Act 111 arbitration awards.

Section 252 of Act 47 is asserted by the Union to apply to arbitration awards, maintaining that an Act 111 arbitration award mandates legislative action, such as amendments to the 2002 Recovery Plan. The Union references the Supreme Court's acceptance of its appeal in Scranton Fire Fighters (2009) to preserve these arguments for future review. However, similar arguments were previously dismissed by this Court in Wilkinsburg Police Officers Association by Harder v. Commonwealth, upheld by the Supreme Court in 1993. 

The Union further argues that Act 47 should be restricted to economic subjects, asserting that its recovery plan should not address safety conditions. This argument was previously raised and rejected in the Scranton Fire Fighters (2009) case, where the Court found that all provisions of the 2002 Recovery Plan are rationally related to cost containment and efficiency. Without explicit statutory limitations, the Court concluded that no distinction can be made between economic and administrative provisions within the Recovery Plan.

The trial court's order to vacate the Arbitrator's Remand Award was affirmed, with the conclusion that the recovery plan is comprehensive in addressing the financial distress of the municipality. The document notes that adherence to the recovery plan is mandatory to avoid penalties, and any collective bargaining agreements or arbitration settlements must align with the plan’s provisions. Appellate review of Act 111 arbitration awards is limited to specific legal issues regarding the arbitrator's jurisdiction, procedural regularity, powers, and constitutional rights.