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Knopik v. Amoco Corp.
Citations: 96 F. Supp. 2d 892; 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9232; 2000 WL 664373Docket: 97-1134 (MJD/AJB)
Court: District Court, D. Minnesota; May 4, 2000; Federal District Court
Duane L. Knopik filed a lawsuit against multiple corporations alleging patent infringement related to two patents he holds: U.S. Patent No. 4,183,407 (407 Patent) and U.S. Patent No. 4,323,122 (122 Patent). The 407 Patent pertains to an exhaust system for removing underground contaminant vapors, while the 122 Patent involves a process for recovering organic liquids from contaminated underground areas. Both patents utilize collector elements placed below the ground connected to conduits that facilitate the recovery of contaminants. The defendants, including Amoco Corporation, Mobil Corporation, and EnecoTech Midwest Inc., have moved for summary judgment, claiming either that the 407 Patent is invalid or that they have not infringed upon the patents. Before addressing the validity and infringement claims, the court is set to engage in claim construction of the disputed patent language, noting that claim construction is a legal matter. This process is critical as it determines the scope of the patent claims before a literal infringement analysis can be conducted, which involves interpreting the claims and assessing whether the accused products or methods infringe based on this interpretation. To determine the meaning of patent claims, the Court must evaluate intrinsic evidence, including the patent itself—claims, specification, and prosecution history. The analysis starts with the wording of the claims, acknowledging that terms are generally interpreted based on their ordinary meanings, unless the patentee defines them differently in the specification. The specification serves as a detailed description of the invention, which must be clear enough for someone skilled in the art to reproduce it. While the specification is crucial for understanding claims, it does not define the scope of rights, which is reserved for the claims themselves. Specific examples in the specification typically are not incorporated into the claims. The prosecution history also plays a critical role in clarifying patent claims, reflecting the patentee's understanding during the patent application process. However, like the specification, it cannot expand or limit the claims' terms. Intrinsic evidence is usually sufficient to resolve ambiguities, but if necessary, the Court may consider extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony and technical literature, to clarify scientific principles or technical terminology, provided it does not contradict the claims. Regarding the specific '407 Patent, which contains a single claim related to a process for removing contaminant vapors from underground areas, there is a disagreement between the Plaintiff and Defendants over the interpretation of the phrase "removing contaminant vapors from contaminated underground areas." The Plaintiff contends that it refers to the operation aimed at eliminating most or all contaminants over time, while the Defendants argue it pertains to the removal of any amount of contaminant vapors. The Court analyzes the term "remove" using its ordinary dictionary definition, concluding that engagement in the process of the '407 Patent begins as soon as it is initiated, without needing to complete it. The Court rejects the Plaintiff's interpretation that "removal" implies completing the process, emphasizing that the specification does not clearly support adding limitations such as "completely" or "substantially all." The term "contaminated underground areas" is determined to be unambiguous and not limited to soil, as the claims specify that the areas must be contaminated without restricting the definition to soil alone. The Plaintiff's arguments referencing soil conditions are insufficient to restrict "underground areas" to soil. Regarding "shaft," Defendants argue that it refers to a cylindrical or rectangular structure extending downward, while the Plaintiff contends that it could refer to any hole, regardless of shape. The Defendants support their position by referencing Figure 1 of the patent, which illustrates a vertical shaft. They assert that element 1 specifies a singular shaft excavated to a point within the contaminated area, implying a particular geometry. The Plaintiff counters that the claim language does not impose specific geometric requirements or limit the number of shafts. The Court notes that the dictionary defines "shaft" broadly as any long hollow structure extending downward, thus supporting the Plaintiff's interpretation that no specific shape or quantity of shafts is mandated by the claim language. The ordinary definition of 'shaft' indicates it is a long hollow structure. The claim specifies that this 'shaft' must extend from the ground surface into the contaminated area, leading the Court to define it as a vertical or inclined hollow opening of uniform, limited cross-section. The claim is restricted to a single shaft. Regarding 'collection elements,' both parties agree that element 2 requires at least two. The Defendants interpret 'collection element' as a pipe, while the Plaintiff argues it can encompass any device, including those not made from pipe, provided they have perforations allowing vapor entry while preventing soil entry. The specification describes collection elements as closed-end tubes with walls that are crush-resistant and not easily deformable, with preferred materials being metal or rigid plastic. The Court defines 'collection elements' as two or more perforated structures that meet these criteria. Disputes arise over the terms 'lower end' and 'upper end.' The Plaintiff interprets 'lower end' as below the ground surface and 'upper end' as open to the atmosphere. The Defendants contend that 'lower end' refers to the underground terminal point of the conduit. The Court concludes that 'lower end' means the last part of the conduit located underground, rejecting the Defendants' request to define it as a specific point. For 'upper end,' the Court agrees it refers to the portion of the conduit opening to the atmosphere. The term 'conduit' is interpreted by the Plaintiff as any device providing a flow path for fluids, including contaminant vapors. Defendants contend that the term 'conduit' refers to a single channel, typically a vertical pipe within a shaft. The Court interprets 'conduit' by analyzing the claim language, its ordinary meaning, and the patent specification. The claim specifies 'a conduit,' leading the Court to agree with Defendants that only one conduit is indicated. The ordinary definition of 'conduit' is a channel for fluid conveyance. The patent specification clarifies that the invention can function without a pipe, with the shaft itself serving as the conduit. Consequently, the Court defines 'conduit' as a channel for conveying contaminant vapors, which can be either a pipe or the shaft itself. The Court declines to impose a vertical orientation requirement on the conduit, as this is neither in the ordinary meaning nor explicitly stated in the specification. It stipulates, however, that one end of the conduit must be open to the air, while the other must reach a point below the surface in the contaminated area. The parties dispute the angular relationships between the invention's components. The Plaintiff claims a single angular relationship—between the conduit and the collection elements—while the Defendants assert there are two: one between the conduit and the collection elements and another between the collection elements themselves. The Court begins its examination with the claim language, which states that the collection elements and conduit are 'angularly spaced from each other.' This language could imply just one angular relationship, but the specification suggests otherwise, indicating that the collection elements must be angularly disposed to each other, not parallel, with a preferred angle of at least 20° to 30°. Despite using 'should' instead of 'must,' the specification indicates that angular arrangement is crucial. Given the ambiguity between the claim and specification, the Court considers the prosecution history relevant. The Defendants argue that this history serves as intrinsic evidence for claim interpretation and limits the claim's scope through prosecution history estoppel, which prevents the patentee from asserting meanings that were disclaimed during the patent's prosecution. Arguments made during this process must be understood in context. The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel limits the scope of equivalents by examining both what was surrendered during patent prosecution and the reasons behind such surrender. Defendants argue that the prosecution history of the '407 Patent supports their interpretation of Element 3. Initially, the Plaintiff submitted five claims, including an apparatus claim (Claim 1), a method claim (Claim 5), and dependent claims (Claims 2-4). Claims 1 and 4 specifically required the collection elements to be angularly disposed from the conduit and from each other, while Claim 5 required angular spacing between the collection elements and the conduit. The Plaintiff contends that the different language in Claim 5, which eventually became Claim 1, does not necessitate an angular relationship between the collection elements. Furthermore, the principle of claim differentiation cannot expand claims beyond what is supported by the specification, which advocates for a narrower interpretation. Claim 5 was rejected by the Patent Office under 35 U.S.C. 103 as unpatentable due to prior art references, namely U.S. Patent No. 4,026,355 (Johnson et al.) and U.S. Patent No. 166,357 (Gray). Johnson details vertically placed pipes for methane removal, while Gray describes a radial array of groundwater collection elements. The patent examiner concluded that all features of the claimed invention were disclosed by Johnson except for a manifold and angularly perforated collection elements, with Gray providing the latter. The examiner determined it would be obvious to combine the two references. The Plaintiff argues he distinguished his invention from Johnson by emphasizing that it replaces vapors with air, rather than removing methane for commercial purposes, and from Gray by highlighting the removal of water as opposed to vapors. Despite these arguments, the Plaintiff's own summary in the '407 Patent specification describes the invention as involving angularly disposed collection elements. The court noted that the patent examiner understood the invention to include a radial array, and although the Plaintiff did not claim that his invention necessitated a radial array, he also did not exclude the possibility of parallel collection elements. The prosecution history of the '407 Patent involves discussions about the invention's requirement for collection elements to be angularly disposed from each other. The Court interprets Element 3 of Claim 1 as necessitating two angles: one between the conduit and collection elements, and another between the collection elements themselves. Defendants seek summary judgment to invalidate the '407 Patent, claiming that Plaintiff conceived and reduced the invention to practice over one year before filing the patent application, with the critical date being November 7, 1976. Defendants assert that Plaintiff had commercialized the soil vent system as early as 1974, with installations at various sites. They highlight that all five claims of the patent were initially rejected by the Patent Examiner as obvious, to which Plaintiff responded with a Rule 131 Affidavit, asserting he had reduced the invention to practice before June 30, 1975. Defendants argue that the prior installations constituted public and commercial use under Section 102(b), which aims to prevent inventors from delaying patent application to exploit their inventions commercially. Although Plaintiff acknowledges certain installations occurred in 1973, he maintains that these were experimental due to his inability to determine their effectiveness. Defendants counter that payments for services at several sites indicate commercial use, while Plaintiff contends he only charged for compressor costs, not for the installations themselves. The Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the nature of the prior uses, leading to a denial of summary judgment on the patent's validity. Additionally, Mobil employs independent consultants for vapor remediation system design and installation, specifically utilizing Leggette, Brashears, Graham for tests at an Anoka site. The LBG vapor extraction wells are designed using a single 'straw' method, which features a 24-foot deep shaft with a vertical pipe, the bottom ten feet of which consists of slotted plastic pipe. A fan is attached to draw vapor from the system. Mobil also employs a 'trench' method involving a shallow trench with a horizontally placed slotted pipe connected to a vertical pipe that leads outside, with a blower to draw vapors. Mobil and Enecotech are seeking summary judgment, arguing that neither the single straw nor trench methods infringe the '407 Patent due to the requirement for multiple collection heads in Element 2, which both parties concede applies to these methods. However, the Plaintiff maintains claims regarding multiple straw and trench systems. Mobil contends these do not infringe the '407 Patent because Element 3 requires multiple collection elements to be connected to a single conduit and positioned at angles, which aligns with the court's interpretation of the patent language. The court agrees that these systems do not literally infringe the patent. Furthermore, the defendants assert there is no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, which allows for a finding of infringement if an accused product performs the same function in a substantially similar way. However, the '407 Patent clearly states that the arrangement of collection elements is critical, emphasizing that they should not be parallel. The court notes that the Plaintiff had previously installed a system with parallel elements but failed to disclose this to the PTO during the patent's prosecution, underscoring the patent's guidance against such configurations. The prosecution history indicates that both the PTO and the Plaintiff recognized the invention as involving collection elements that are angularly disposed to one another. A narrow claim by the patentee often precludes infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, even if broader claims could have been made. If the Plaintiff intended to include parallel collection elements, this should have been specified; instead, he explicitly stated that parallel systems were not permitted. Legal precedent establishes that a patentee, who had the chance to negotiate broader claims but chose not to, must bear the consequences of this decision, and thus cannot later assert that parallel systems infringe the '407 Patent. Regarding the '122 Patent, it encompasses one independent claim and one dependent claim related to a process for recovering organic liquids from the water table. The independent claim outlines specific steps including the provision of an opening in the ground, positioning a fluid-tight conduit with a collection head, and the establishment of a connection to a collection vessel to create a vacuum for drawing organic liquids. The dependent claim adds a step for removing gaseous organic vapors from the vessel's exhaust. The parties dispute the definitions of "conduit" and "collection head." The Plaintiff defines "conduit" broadly as any device facilitating fluid flow from underground to the surface, while the Defendants argue it should be limited to a vertically oriented pipe. The Court analyzes the ordinary meaning of "conduit," concluding that it refers to any channel for liquid conveyance, rejecting the Defendants' request to impose additional limitations. The Court finds no specific definition in the Plaintiff's specification that restricts "conduit" to a pipe. References from specific columns and lines of the patent document indicate that certain descriptions pertain only to a specific embodiment and should not be included in the claims. The Court declines to impose a limitation that the "conduit" must be generally vertical, as this is not supported by the term's ordinary meaning or the patent's specification. The term "collection head" is contested, with the Plaintiff asserting it includes a lower end portion, an upper end portion, and a liquid permeable section in between. The Defendants contend it refers to a separate three-part component connected to the conduit’s lower end, comprising a liquid impermeable lower end, a fitted upper end, and a liquid permeable intermediate wall. The Court supports the Plaintiff’s interpretation, noting that the claim specifies a collection head with a closed liquid impermeable lower end, an open upper end fitted to the conduit, and a liquid permeable wall. Regarding "positioning," the Plaintiff defines it as placing or situating something properly, while the Defendants argue for a more limited interpretation based on the patent claim's constraints. The Court adopts the ordinary meaning of "positioning," concluding that it mandates the liquid permeable wall portion to be just above the water table surface and the impermeable lower end just below it. The final term in dispute is "collection vessel." The Plaintiff argues for a broad definition as any structure for receiving fluids from below ground, whereas the Defendants assert it should refer to a large tank capable of withstanding vacuum pressure, including an inlet and vapor outlet. The Court interprets "vessel" based on its ordinary meaning and the patent's specifications, confirming that the claim specifies a collection vessel with an inlet connected to the conduit and a vapor outlet. The vapor outlet in the patent is connected to the exhaust means, and the term "collection vessel" is defined by the Court as a hollow utensil with a tight construction, an inlet to the conduit, and a vapor outlet to exhaust means. The Court rejects the Defendants' argument that "collection vessel" must imply a large tank capable of withstanding vacuum pressures, stating that such limitations arise from preferred embodiments in the patent and are not to be read into the claims. Mobil contends it has not infringed the '122 Patent, asserting its methods for gasoline removal do not involve skimming from the water table but rather utilize a submersible pump to extract both gasoline and water. Mobil's device lacks a collection head connected to a conduit and instead uses a vapor extraction line with a well screen for vapor collection. Mobil's system is described as having a condensate separator for collecting water from the vapor stream, not a collection vessel for liquid gasoline, leading them to argue that the device does not meet the patent's requirements. Conversely, the Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Sandor C. Csallany, claims that Mobil's device does infringe the patent, arguing the well screen functions as a collection head as defined in the patent. However, the Court ultimately concludes that Mobil has not infringed Claim 1 of the '122 Patent. The claim specifies the positioning of the collection head, requiring that the liquid permeable wall portion be just above the water table surface, while the liquid impermeable lower end is just below it. Evidence from the Gallagher Affidavit and Dr. Csallany's declaration demonstrates that Mobil's device does not meet this requirement and does not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents, as it pumps both water and gasoline rather than skimming the water table for gasoline only. Enecotech's Regional Vice President, Steve McManomon, provided a declaration detailing two remediation approaches that do not conform to the required positioning of the collection head in Claim 1 of the '122 Patent. The plaintiff has failed to counter this declaration. Consequently, summary judgment in favor of Enecotech for noninfringement of the '122 Patent is granted. The court orders that Unocal's motion for summary judgment on the '407 Patent's invalidity is denied, while Mobil's and Enecotech’s motions for summary judgment on noninfringement of both the '407 and '122 Patents are granted. Other motions related to summary judgment have been dismissed as moot. Unocal's settlement with the Plaintiff does not negate the court's consideration of the invalidity motion.