In Re the Complaint of Royal Carribean Cruises Ltd.

Citations: 459 F. Supp. 2d 1275; 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77646; 2006 WL 3042742Docket: 04-20155 CIV

Court: District Court, S.D. Florida; October 23, 2006; Federal District Court

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Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. (RCC) initiated a legal action on January 22, 2004, seeking exoneration from liability or limitation of liability following an incident involving a 2003 Yamaha Wave Runner, owned by RCC. The claim arose after Claimants Keith and Mark Howard rented the Wave Runner on July 7, 2003, while participating in a guided tour during their cruise to Coco Cay, Bahamas. RCC contends that the Howards signed a 'Personal Watercraft Express Assumption of Risk, Waiver, Release of Liability' agreement, which should protect RCC from claims of personal injury that the Howards subsequently filed.

The matter was reassigned to a different judge on June 8, 2004, and RCC's motion for summary judgment was filed on September 25, 2006. Claimants opposed this motion, and RCC replied shortly thereafter. The Court, after reviewing the motions, decided to partially grant and partially deny RCC's motion. A stay was previously placed on the case pending a decision from the Florida Supreme Court regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements involving minors. Following the Court's lifting of the stay on December 5, 2005, the case proceeded, with some factual disputes remaining concerning the details of the incident in question.

Approximately 12 Wave Runners, each accommodating one to two passengers, participated in a tour around Coco Cay. During the second or third leg of the tour, the Claimants crashed into an island, with disputes arising over whether the crash resulted from the Claimants' failure to follow the tour leader's directions or the tour leader's failure to maintain a safe distance from the island. Additionally, there is contention regarding whether Keith Howard's failure to wear eyeglasses while operating the Wave Runner contributed to the incident. It is confirmed that the Wave Runners lacked brakes and operated using an off-throttle steering loss system.

Petitioner Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 25, 2006, which Claimants Keith and Mark Howard opposed on October 5, 2006. The Petitioner responded on October 16, 2006, making the motion ready for adjudication. Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party must initially demonstrate the absence of material facts, after which the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show specific facts that warrant a trial. The court must view evidence favorably toward the non-moving party.

RCC argues that a Release signed by Keith Howard precludes his claims for recovery related to injuries from operating the Wave Runner. While the authenticity of the Release is not disputed by the Claimants, they contest its enforceability, noting that Howard executed the Release on July 7, 2003, which purportedly absolves RCC from liability for injuries resulting from his use of the Wave Runner.

Courts require clear and unequivocal contractual language to enforce a release, reflecting the parties' intentions. In this case, the Release explicitly states that the RENTER (RELEASOR) fully releases Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. from all claims related to their use of personal watercraft, thus being deemed valid and enforceable. Claimants argue the Release is unenforceable due to alleged safety violations by the jet ski tour leader, claiming this caused an accident. However, the Court finds this argument unpersuasive as no legal authority was provided to support the idea that such violations invalidate a release. The safety rule against operating within 100 yards of the shore was clearly defined, and Keith Howard, who signed the release multiple times, was aware of it but chose to disregard it. The Court concludes that allowing him to avoid the terms of the release would undermine the effectiveness of such legal protections. 

Regarding Mark Howard's claims, the Court disagrees with RCC's argument that the Release executed by Keith Howard on behalf of his minor son is enforceable. While RCC cites several cases supporting parental pre-injury releases, the Court acknowledges Mark Howard's status as a minor, which complicates the enforceability of the Release against him.

RCC's reliance on various court cases regarding parental pre-injury releases fails to acknowledge a critical distinction made by those courts: the validity of such releases is generally upheld for activities associated with schools, community, or volunteer-run events, but not for private, for-profit activities. For instance, the Ohio Supreme Court in Zivich upheld a parental pre-injury release for a youth soccer league managed by volunteers, affirming that parents can bind their children to exculpatory agreements in nonprofit contexts. Similar rulings occurred in Sharon, Hohe, and Gonzalez, where courts supported releases for minors participating in voluntary school and community activities.

Conversely, the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Shea addressed the enforceability of a parent-executed arbitration agreement within a commercial travel context, concluding it was valid for tort claims. However, the court explicitly cautioned that its decision should not be interpreted broadly to validate parental pre-injury releases, particularly in for-profit scenarios. Despite this caution, Shea acknowledged the existing legal distinction between releases for nonprofit activities and those for private, for-profit activities. This distinction was also recognized by the Florida District Court of Appeals in Gonzalez, which cited Shea to uphold a parental release for a minor's participation in a high school fire training program.

The court ruled that a city's explorer program is a standard child-oriented activity, allowing parents to waive their child's litigation rights by consenting to participation. It referenced a recent Southern District of Florida decision which invalidated a parental pre-injury release for a minor participating in a for-profit activity, distinguishing it from school or community activities. Consequently, the court deemed Keith Howard’s parental release for his son Mark Howard unenforceable.

Regarding the doctrine of unseaworthiness, RCC argued it applies only to seamen and not passengers, citing Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun. In Calhoun, following a fatal jet ski accident, the Supreme Court addressed whether federal maritime claims provided exclusive remedies for nonseafarers but did not resolve the applicability of unseaworthiness to non-maritime individuals. The Court noted the unseaworthiness duty had historically extended to longshore workers but had not been expanded beyond that. Therefore, the ruling affirmed that the unseaworthiness doctrine remains confined to seamen and maritime workers, not extending to vessel passengers or guests.

Calhoun involved state law claims unrelated to unseaworthiness, with the Calhouns seeking damages under Pennsylvania's wrongful-death and survival statutes for issues such as negligence and strict liability, including losses like future earnings and funeral expenses. Claimants argue that the Supreme Court's recognition of unseaworthiness in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. does not preclude its application in their case. However, this overlooks that Moragne did not extend unseaworthiness to guests or passengers on vessels. The case arose after a longshoreman was killed, leading to a wrongful death suit based on negligence and unseaworthiness. The defendants claimed that general maritime law did not allow for wrongful death recovery within state waters and that Florida's law did not recognize unseaworthiness as a liability basis. The district court dismissed the unseaworthiness claim, a decision affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that a wrongful death action exists under general maritime law, overruling previous decisions that created inconsistencies in liability based on the nature of the victim's injury or death. The Moragne decision aimed to provide uniformity in maritime law but specifically addressed the rights of seamen and longshoremen without expanding unseaworthiness claims to vessel guests or passengers.

The Eleventh Circuit and the Southern District of Florida uphold the principle in admiralty law that passengers on a ship are not protected by the doctrine of unseaworthiness, as established in Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. The warranty of seaworthiness applies primarily to cargo and seamen, not passengers. Consequently, any disclaimer regarding seaworthiness cannot be interpreted as waiving Carnival's obligation to provide adequate accommodations for passengers. As a result, RCC's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the Howards' unseaworthiness claims is granted. 

In exoneration proceedings, the Court must perform a two-step analysis: first, identifying the acts of negligence or unseaworthiness that led to the accident, and second, determining if RCC had knowledge or privity of those conditions. Although the Howards cannot pursue unseaworthiness claims, the Court will evaluate RCC's negligence in relation to the accident.

RCC argues that Wave Runners are not ultrahazardous, thus denying strict liability for the Howards' claims. However, since the case will be governed by a negligence standard—which includes assessing potential unseaworthiness—the Court will not engage with RCC's strict liability argument. 

RCC also seeks to prevent the Claimants from citing violations of Florida statutory law as a basis for negligence claims. The Claimants did not counter this argument but agreed in their Joint Pretrial Stipulation that the case is governed by maritime law. Citing relevant case law, the Court affirms that Florida statutory law does not apply to this case, barring Claimants from using it as a basis for their negligence claims.

In conclusion, RCC's Motion for Summary Judgment is partially granted: it is granted for Keith Howard's claims and denied for Mark Howard's claims. The case will proceed under a negligence standard, with the Claimants unable to assert claims under unseaworthiness or strict liability, and barred from referencing Florida statutory violations in their negligence claims.

On May 10, 2004, RCC filed an Ad Interim Stipulation for Value of Vessel, claiming an interest of $3,970.60 in the Yamaha Wave Runner, with an annual interest rate of 6%. The U.S. Supreme Court in Kermarec ruled that a claim for unseaworthiness was properly dismissed because it is not recognized under New York common law. Kermarec, who was merely visiting a friend and not engaged in ship work, did not belong to the class of individuals entitled to a seaworthy vessel under admiralty law. In the case of Tungus, the Supreme Court held that when admiralty law incorporates a state's wrongful death action, it must adhere to the state's specific conditions and limitations, reaffirming that without statutory authority, wrongful death claims are not permissible under general maritime law. Lastly, while Claimants mention a potential strict liability claim related to ultrahazardous activities in their Motion for Summary Judgment, this claim is not included in their Answer.