Mielke v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.

Citations: 102 F. Supp. 2d 988; 6 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 869; 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9840; 2000 WL 968830Docket: 00 C 669

Court: District Court, N.D. Illinois; July 11, 2000; Federal District Court

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Nine bus drivers employed by Laidlaw Transit, Inc. filed a lawsuit for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Laidlaw requested summary judgment, claiming exemption from FLSA overtime regulations due to the Motor Carrier Act (MCA), which asserts that the Department of Transportation regulates such employers. However, the court found Laidlaw ineligible for summary judgment because the plaintiffs are primarily school bus drivers, a group specifically excluded from the Department of Transportation's jurisdiction per 49 U.S.C. 13506(a)(1). 

Most facts were undisputed, with the main contention being Laidlaw's classification of its employees. The plaintiffs primarily transported school children, with a significant portion of their interstate trips related to school events. The court emphasized that summary judgment is only appropriate when there are no genuine material facts in dispute and will favor the non-moving party in the event of conflicts. The FLSA mandates that employers engaged in interstate commerce pay overtime, but certain exemptions exist, particularly for employees under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transportation, which does not apply to the plaintiffs in this case.

Title 49, 13501 grants the Secretary of Transportation jurisdiction over motor carriers, while 31502 allows the Department to set qualifications and working hours for motor carrier employees. Laidlaw asserts that it qualifies as a motor carrier and that the plaintiffs, as its employees, fall under the Department’s authority, thereby claiming exemption from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) time-and-a-half provision under 213(b)(1). The plaintiffs, while agreeing with Laidlaw's initial analysis, argue that the Secretary of Transportation lacks jurisdiction over them as they are school bus drivers, a category exempted from regulatory oversight according to 49 U.S.C. 13506(a)(1). This exemption specifically states that neither the Secretary nor the Surface Transportation Board has jurisdiction over vehicles transporting only school children and teachers. Laidlaw counters that the 13506 exemption pertains solely to tariff, licensing, and rate regulation, not to employee qualifications and hours. It supports this by referencing a former version of the school bus exception that explicitly reserved jurisdiction over qualifications and hours to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which has since been removed, leading Laidlaw to argue that the deletion does not negate the Department's regulatory authority. Additionally, Laidlaw cites 49 U.S.C. 31502(b)(1) to assert that the Department is empowered to prescribe requirements for qualifications and hours of service for employees of motor carriers. However, the plaintiffs maintain that 13506's clear exemption for school bus operations undercuts Laidlaw's claims of regulatory authority over their employment conditions.

The Department lacks jurisdiction over school bus drivers, as indicated by 49 U.S.C. § 13506(a)(1), which exempts them from the Motor Carrier Act. This matter is novel in federal case law, with no existing cases directly addressing the implications of this exemption on the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) or its overtime provisions. However, precedents like *Trocheck v. Pellin Emergency Medical Service Inc.* and *Bayles v. American Med. Response of Colorado Inc.* demonstrate that when employees of certain motor carriers are exempt from Department jurisdiction, the FLSA applies. The regulation 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(f) also excludes school bus operations from the Department's oversight, affirming that the Department cannot regulate qualifications or hours for school bus drivers. Consequently, Laidlaw is not exempt under the Motor Carrier Act from the FLSA's overtime requirements. The court denies Laidlaw's motion for summary judgment, noting that the plaintiffs, as school bus drivers, are entitled to judgment regarding Laidlaw's liability under the FLSA. Laidlaw has thirty days to respond to the ruling before the court may enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. 

Additional notes clarify that the distinction between 'motor common carrier' and 'motor contract carrier' was eliminated by the ICC Termination Act in 1995. The excerpt also specifies that 'this part' in § 13506 refers to Part B of Subtitle IV of Title 49, governing motor carriers.