Garrett v. BD. OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALABAMA

Citations: 354 F. Supp. 2d 1244; 16 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 735; 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488; 2005 WL 281226Docket: 2:97-cr-00092

Court: District Court, N.D. Alabama; January 13, 2005; Federal District Court

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The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, in a memorandum opinion issued on January 13, 2005, revisited a case involving Patricia Garrett, who had previously sued the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB) under both the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The court had granted summary judgment for UAB on January 13, 1998, dismissing Garrett’s claims with prejudice due to a perceived lack of jurisdiction. This dismissal was based on the court's failure to recognize significant jurisdictional differences between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, which the parties had treated as equivalent. 

Garrett appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which ruled on October 26, 1999, that both statutes were valid avenues for her disability discrimination claim against UAB. The Eleventh Circuit clarified that a state cannot claim immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Notably, the circuit court did not address the jurisdictional basis stemming from the state's acceptance of federal funds, which waives such immunity. The district court speculated that Garrett may not have emphasized this additional basis in her arguments, relying instead on the Equal Protection clause as the foundation for federal jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court erred in its dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari on UAB's petition before the remand order could be carried out. The Court's opinion did not address the alternative jurisdictional basis under the Rehab Act and simply reversed the Eleventh Circuit, aligning with this court's prior decision in Board of Trustees of The University of Alabama v. Garrett. Upon returning to this court, Garrett informed the Eleventh Circuit that the alternative jurisdictional basis had not been considered. In response, UAB acknowledged a significant oversight and effectively conceded that the Rehab Act provided jurisdiction over Garrett's disability claim against her state employer. UAB did not raise arguments related to the law-of-the-case doctrine or waiver of the new argument but admitted to waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity concerning potential Rehab Act liability.

The Eleventh Circuit sent the case back to this court, which scheduled a hearing on the waiver evidence. UAB subsequently admitted its substantial receipt of federal funding, acknowledging the jurisdictional implications. Given the similar elements and relief provided by the ADA and the Rehab Act, the extensive litigation culminating in the Supreme Court became largely academic. The omission of the Rehab Act jurisdictional issue over the years proved ironic, and had Garrett filed a Rule 59 motion addressing this oversight, the outcome might have differed.

UAB has now filed another motion for summary judgment, asserting that Garrett fails to establish her claims under the Rehab Act for disparate treatment and retaliation. Garrett, a highly qualified registered nurse at UAB, was diagnosed with breast cancer and granted leave for treatment, which included a lumpectomy and subsequent therapies. Following her recovery, she returned to work without requesting special accommodations, and UAB's management had previously provided reasonable accommodations, including sick leave, throughout her treatment.

Garrett has not identified any requested accommodations that were denied by UAB. After expressing fatigue, UAB suggested transferring her to a less stressful position without a pay cut, a proposal Garrett did not object to but was unhappy with. Instead, she independently sought a nursing position at a UAB-operated nursing home, which UAB approved at a reduced salary only after her explicit request. The idea for the transfer originated from Garrett, not UAB supervisors, who merely consented to her voluntary decision. 

The concept of a 'constructive transfer' has not been formally recognized in legal precedent, and Garrett has not pleaded it. Therefore, her resistance to a proposed transfer with no pay reduction cannot be deemed an adverse employment action. Garrett voluntarily accepted a different, lower-paying position, and there was no coercion involved. If an adverse action were assumed, the court questions whether Garrett qualifies as 'disabled' under the Rehabilitation Act, noting a lack of evidence showing substantial limitations in major life activities such as dressing or working. The judge reflects on personal experiences with cancer, emphasizing the potential for recovery and the ability to return to work post-treatment. The judge contemplates whether his experiences might bias his decision-making but asserts that both he and Garrett have regained their capacities to perform their jobs, despite the challenges faced during treatment.

The judge emphasizes that perceptions of cancer patients being 'on the way out' are misguided. While cancer can be psychologically and physically challenging, it does not automatically render a person disabled. The judge references the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Carruthers v. BSA Advertising, Inc., which, although focused on the ADA, is applicable to Rehabilitation Act cases. The court discussed 'working' as a potential major life activity but noted the Supreme Court's reluctance to classify work impairment as an ADA disability. In Carruthers, the Eleventh Circuit required that a plaintiff must demonstrate that they are perceived as significantly restricted in their ability to perform a class or range of jobs, rather than just one specific job. The judge concludes that Garrett did not provide evidence of being unable to perform a broad range of jobs after treatment, as she was able to work with UAB. Therefore, Garrett was not considered a 'qualified person with a disability,' and any perception of her disability was more reflective of her own views than those of her employer.

UAB's knowledge of Garrett's cancer treatment does not imply that it regarded her as permanently disabled. Garrett's belief that she experienced adverse employment action is deemed irrelevant to whether she is a "qualified person with a disability," categorizing it as a collateral issue. In addressing Garrett's retaliation claim, UAB argues that the Rehabilitation Act (Rehab Act) may not provide remedies for retaliation, but the court assumes it aligns with the ADA, which does recognize such a cause of action. However, Garrett faces significant barriers: 

1. She fails to identify a specific retaliatory act, as UAB provided all requested accommodations. Without a prior complaint, UAB's actions cannot be construed as retaliation.
2. Regarding her transfer to a nursing home position, it was voluntary and initiated by her, thus not qualifying as an adverse employment action. Additionally, the transfer lacks temporal proximity to any protected activity, undermining claims of causation as established in Higdon v. Jackson, which states that a substantial delay between protected conduct and adverse action, without further evidence, fails as a retaliation claim.

The court clarifies that not all dissatisfaction constitutes an adverse employment action. Garrett's unhappiness with UAB's actions does not substantiate a claim under the Rehab Act. If UAB had denied accommodations or unilaterally demoted her after her return, a claim might have been valid. However, since she voluntarily transferred and did not wait for UAB's actions regarding her alleged disability, her complaints lack merit. Consequently, UAB’s motion for summary judgment will be granted. Additionally, the court notes that the issue of jurisdiction regarding the Rehab Act claims and state immunity needs further examination by the district court.