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Blankenship v. State
Citations: 780 S.W.2d 198; 1989 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 203; 1988 WL 138262Docket: 964-86
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas; November 15, 1989; Texas; State Appellate Court
Elmer Dwayne Blankenship was convicted of burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02, with the jury sentencing him to eight years in the Texas Department of Corrections. The conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals, but Blankenship appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the burglarized premises qualified as a "habitation" as defined in Texas Penal Code § 30.01(1). The Court of Criminal Appeals granted discretionary review due to potential conflicts with previous cases, specifically Jones v. State and Moss v. State. The incident occurred on August 19, 1984, when W.J. Weeks, the property owner, was informed by his son, Perry, about a suspicious blue van parked at Weeks' rent house. Upon investigation, Weeks discovered a smashed window and missing air conditioner units. Perry pursued the van, obtaining its license plate before the police intervened. At trial, it was established that Blankenship had stolen an air conditioner, a lawn chair, and a gasoline can from the house, which had been unoccupied for two years, with utilities disconnected. The court needed to determine if the premises constituted a "habitation," as defined by law, which requires a structure adapted for overnight accommodation of persons. The definitions of "habitation" and "building" under § 30.01 were highlighted, noting that a "habitation" must be suitable for overnight accommodation, even if not currently used as such. The court referenced Jones v. State, which emphasized that the structure must have been adapted for overnight accommodation at the time of the offense or previously used for such purposes. This case sets the stage for evaluating the sufficiency of evidence regarding the nature of the premises involved in the burglary. The court of appeals determined that the jury had sufficient evidence to classify the rent house as a habitation. It rejected Jones's position that the classification should depend on the type or amount of furniture or utility connections. The court emphasized that a structure designed and intended for living qualifies as a habitation, as supported by the definition in Black's Law Dictionary. The court distinguished this view from Jones's requirement that a structure must be adapted for overnight accommodation, which was critiqued by Chandler v. State, where it was noted that an unfurnished apartment could not reasonably be deemed suitable for such use. The Chandler opinion highlighted the necessity for a structure to be fit for overnight accommodation at the time of the offense, not merely intended for it in the past. In comparing cases, Hargett v. State was cited, where the residence was fully furnished and thus clearly adapted for overnight use, unlike the house in Jones. The court asserted that all subsequent decisions have adhered to the standard established in Jones. The Blankenship opinion was criticized for failing to acknowledge the Jones standard and instead relying on a dictionary definition without considering the evidentiary standards set forth in prior rulings. The court noted that historical occupancy of the house provided no insight into its suitability for overnight accommodation in 1984, underscoring that the jury's findings were not aligned with the authoritative legal framework established in Jones. A house described as having "two bedrooms" but lacking beds is deemed unsuitable for overnight accommodation. While the house is "wired for electricity," it cannot supply power without an installed meter. Water access via an external meter is not practical for nighttime use unless it is available from indoor faucets. The owner's testimony indicated minimal personal belongings inside, primarily for storage, including garden tools and air conditioners, with no suggestion that these items were intended for habitation. A stored air conditioner cannot provide comfort without a power source. Consequently, the evidence fails to demonstrate that the structure qualifies as a "habitation" under legal definitions established in prior cases, particularly Jones v. State. The court recognized that the premises, although previously rented, was not suitable for overnight accommodation. While sufficient evidence exists for a burglary conviction of a building, it does not support a burglary of a habitation charge, leading to an acquittal order. The court refrained from addressing potential retrial for lesser offenses. Dissenting judges criticized the majority for redefining "habitation" and reassessing trial evidence. The definitions of "habitation" and "building" from the Penal Code were reiterated, emphasizing the necessity of the structure being adapted for overnight accommodation at the time of the offense. The Jones Court established two key theories regarding the interpretation of "habitation" in burglary statutes. First, it emphasized that the heightened penalties for burglary of a habitation are aimed at protecting private homes, concluding that "adapted" should not broadly include any structure that could be converted for overnight use. The court rejected the notion that every structure capable of future conversion qualified as a habitation. Second, the court distinguished "habitation" from "building," asserting that since a building is defined as a structure intended for habitation, "habitation" must encompass more than just a place capable of overnight accommodation. Subsequent cases, such as Moss v. State, upheld the Jones definition, though it was clarified that the structure in question must still be adapted for overnight accommodation at the time of the offense. In Hargett v. State, the court found sufficient evidence to classify a rented house as a habitation, highlighting that it was furnished and previously occupied, despite the new tenants not having moved in yet. The inconsistency in applying Jones versus Hargett has led to varied outcomes in Court of Appeals cases, with some courts favoring Jones's interpretation and others aligning with Hargett. The prevailing interpretation should focus on whether a reasonable person would consider the structure adapted for overnight accommodation, suggesting that the presence of belongings is relevant but secondary to the structural suitability. Both the majority and Jones have misinterpreted Section 30.01(1) of the Penal Code, which affects how "building" and "habitation" are defined. The Jones ruling inaccurately limits the definition of "habitation" by suggesting that a structure must be explicitly intended for use as a dwelling, which contradicts legislative intent. The Legislature likely aimed to ensure that structures meant for habitation, such as partially built houses, are covered under the law to prevent loopholes. It is argued that the inclusion of "intended for use" does not restrict the definition of a structure "adapted for use as a habitation." While agreeing that burglaries of habitations should incur harsher penalties than those of buildings, it is asserted that this should not be the sole basis for interpreting "adapted." The principle of crime prevention is equally important to punishment. Therefore, a burglar should not be acquitted simply because the structure appears uninhabited for reasons outside their control. The excerpt cites other jurisdictions that have not interpreted similar statutes as the majority has and refers to previous local decisions that align with this interpretation. Furthermore, the majority's approach is criticized for failing to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, effectively acting as a "thirteenth juror." The majority dismisses a house with minimal furnishings as unfit for overnight accommodation, overlooking the jury's findings that supported its classification as a habitation. Evidence presented included the house's bedrooms, kitchen, living room, and functional utilities, alongside testimony affirming the owner's intent to rent it. The conclusion is that ample evidence existed for the jury to determine that the rent house qualified as a habitation. The Court of Appeals correctly determined that whether a structure is "adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons" is a factual question for the trial court. The critical issue on appeal is the sufficiency of evidence supporting the jury's verdict, as established in Jackson v. Virginia. The trial court properly instructed the jury on the definitions of "Habitation" and "building" in accordance with the Penal Code. The jury found the appellant guilty of burglary of a habitation, supported by evidence that the structure was a house formerly occupied by the complainant, currently rented, equipped with two bedrooms, electricity, and water. Additionally, the presence of an air conditioning unit, intended for the comfort of potential occupants, further substantiated the jury's conclusion. The owner's testimony confirmed the structure's suitability for overnight accommodation. This evidence is adequate to support the jury's verdict, even when applying the standards from Jones v. State. The dissent argues for overruling Jones, asserting that the majority's position is incorrect and affirms the Court of Appeals' judgment. The appellant, previously convicted and sentenced to eight years, contested the sufficiency of evidence regarding "habitation," but the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, leading to the State's motion for rehearing and subsequent affirmation by the Court. Evidence indicated that Perry Weeks' rent house was burglarized around 9:00 P.M. on August 19, 1984. Although located 300 yards from Weeks' primary residence and unoccupied for approximately two years, the rent house was equipped with electricity and water service, albeit turned off. It contained personal belongings and had two window air conditioners. Weeks characterized the house as "adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons." The court's primary consideration is whether the evidence sufficiently categorizes the structure as a "habitation" under Texas burglary law, which distinguishes between burglary of buildings and habitations. Burglary of a habitation is a first degree felony, while burglary of a building is typically a second degree felony. In assessing the evidence's sufficiency, the court must view it favorably toward the verdict, determining if any rational fact-finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the structure was a habitation. This assessment follows the precedent set in Jackson v. Virginia, emphasizing that the jury’s reasonableness is not presumed, and the evidence must convincingly support the conclusion of a habitation. The Texas Penal Code defines "habitation" as a structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation, encompassing secured or occupied portions and connected structures. The legal framework establishes a higher penalty for burglary of a habitation due to the sanctity of the home and the increased risk of violent confrontation, as recognized by the Penal Code, which includes the status of a habitation as a factor for elevating burglary to a first degree felony. Burglary statutes have historically protected the sanctity of the home, a principle embedded in state law reflecting ancient common law. Under common law, burglary was restricted to dwelling houses, defined as places of human habitation where occupancy, not ownership, was the key factor. The presence of residents at the time of the offense was irrelevant to this classification. An unfinished house could not be classified as a dwelling, but a business used for sleeping could qualify. Structures not classified as residences only qualified if they were part of a residence's curtilage. Texas law has expanded the definition of burglary since the nineteenth century, maintaining special protections for residences in the pre-1974 Penal Code through two offenses: general burglary of a "house" and "burglary of a private residence at night." The term "house" had a broad definition, encompassing any building for public or private use, while "private residence" was narrowly defined as a building or room actively used for habitation during the offense. Penalties reflected this distinction, with private residence burglary carrying a minimum five-year sentence compared to two to twelve years for general burglary. The current burglary statute from 1973 not only preserved stricter penalties for residential burglary but also expanded the types of structures classified as residences. Chief Justice Nye, in a concurring opinion in Chandler v. State, emphasized the rationale behind enhanced penalties for residential burglary, citing the unique dangers posed by intruders in homes. However, he questioned the effectiveness of the law in deterring such crimes, noting that it is problematic for a burglar to discern whether a structure is a residence before entering. This highlights a need for a reevaluation of how "habitation" is interpreted under the law. Jones interpreted the burglary statute, concluding that "habitation" refers to a structure or vehicle that is either currently suitable for overnight accommodation or has been used for that purpose in the past and remains suitable at the time of the alleged offense. The definition provided by Jones is deemed unclear and insufficient for juries. In subsequent cases, it has been established that a habitation must either be actively used as a residence during the burglary or be in a condition that could accommodate overnight guests, evidenced by the presence of utilities and furniture. The term "adapted" is highlighted, with the majority in Jones rejecting a broad interpretation that could classify ordinary vehicles as habitations. Instead, they focused on a narrower definition that considers a structure's suitability for overnight accommodation as a subjective factual matter for juries to decide. Relevant factors include current residential use, presence of residential items, and the nature of the structure itself. The court asserts that determinations of whether a place qualifies as a "building" or "habitation" must withstand appeal unless it can be shown that no reasonable jury could have reached such a conclusion. The majority in Jones is criticized for overstepping by making subjective factual determinations. The new standard emphasizes the need for penalties that reflect the seriousness of the offense, aligning the judicial interpretation of "habitation" with statutory definitions. Any conflicting interpretations from Jones or other cases are expressly overruled. The trial court properly instructed the jury on the definitions of "habitation" and "building" as per the Penal Code, resulting in the jury convicting the appellant of burglary of a habitation. The evidence presented demonstrated that the structure in question had several key characteristics: it was a house previously occupied by the complainant, currently rented occasionally, equipped with essential utilities (electricity and water), contained a living room and two bedrooms, had installed air conditioning, was located close to the complainant's residence, served as storage for the complainant's belongings, and was deemed suitable for overnight accommodation by the owner. These factors supported a reasonable conclusion that the structure was "adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons," aligning with established legal standards from previous rulings. The Court of Appeals' judgment was affirmed, with dissenting opinions from Justices Clinton, Teague, Miller, and Duncan, who referenced prior opinions. The excerpt also discusses the legal definitions and interpretations surrounding "habitation," referencing various case precedents that clarify the criteria necessary for a structure to qualify as such under the law. Electricity was functional at the premises, indicating suitability for the owner's return from work-related travel. The conviction for burglary of a habitation was upheld, referencing *Trotter*, where a mobile home with utilities but a disconnected sewer was deemed a habitation despite no current occupants. The Court of Appeals emphasized the need for premises to be adapted for overnight accommodation, as seen in the conflicting interpretations of *Blankenship* and *Jones*. Ultimately, the Corpus Christi court concluded that while the apartment was intended for overnight stays and had been used as such, it was not currently adapted for that purpose at the time of the appellant's entry. The statutory definition of a "habitation" includes any structure suitable for overnight accommodation, and a burglary offense can be classified as a second-degree or first-degree felony depending on various factors, including the nature of the premises and the presence of weapons or injury during the offense. The court has previously examined the distinction between "habitation" and "building" in the context of burglary, with notable cases from the 1970s and subsequent appellate decisions. Key rulings include: - **Jones case**: A new house under contract was not considered a habitation because it had never been lived in, lacked furniture, and possibly lacked utilities. - **Hargett v. State**: A furnished rental property, currently leased but unoccupied, was deemed a habitation. - **Moss v. State**: A vacant house being used for storage, with no utilities and having been unoccupied for two months, was ruled not a habitation. - **Trotter v. State**: A mobile home with furniture but disconnected sewer was classified as a habitation, despite no current residents, contrasting with Moss. - **Lewis v. State**: A one-bedroom apartment was considered a habitation based on the presence of household items, despite possible vacancy. - **Bazroux v. State**: The court ruled that an absence of the occupant for an extended trip did not change the residential status of the structure. - **Chandler v. State**: An unfurnished, unleased apartment, despite having utilities and appliances, was not deemed a habitation as it was not fit for overnight accommodation. The courts' varying interpretations have led to confusion, particularly regarding the use of the term "adapted" in defining habitation. Chief Justice Nye criticized the over-complexities of the Jones standard, which has caused discrepancies between jury findings and appellate court rulings.