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Jiricko v. Bennett, Bricklin & Saltzburg, LLP

Citations: 321 F. Supp. 2d 636; 2004 WL 1053002Docket: Civ.A.03-5809

Court: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania; May 7, 2004; Federal District Court

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Milos Jiricko filed a pro se lawsuit against Judge Paul K. Allison of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, the law firm Bennett, Bricklin, Saltzburg, LLP, and attorney Howard G. Ford, stemming from a prior case involving Jiricko's automobile insurance claim against GEICO Insurance Company. Jiricko alleged that Judge Allison's management of the case violated his constitutional rights and that the defendants conspired to infringe upon those rights. The legal action began on April 1, 2003, when Jiricko asserted multiple claims, including breach of contract and emotional distress, against GEICO concerning an uninsured motorist accident. 

The defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint, which were granted by the court due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, all claims against Judge Allison and the Bennett Firm were dismissed. Additionally, Jiricko's motions for a protective order and to schedule a pre-trial conference were denied as moot. The court ordered the closure of the case for statistical purposes. The proceedings included various motions and objections filed by Jiricko in the underlying state case against GEICO.

On July 18, 2003, GEICO moved to compel arbitration for the plaintiff's uninsured motorist claim. Judge Allison held a conference on August 13, 2003, where she ordered the claim to arbitration per policy provisions, retained jurisdiction over bad faith and other claims, and stayed all proceedings pending arbitration. On the same day, she appointed Richard C. Low, Esq. as the plaintiff's arbitrator. The plaintiff attempted to add Howard G. Ford as a defendant on August 21, 2003, but Judge Allison denied this on September 4, warning of potential sanctions for violating the stay order. As of that date, arbitration was still pending, while the Court of Common Pleas retained jurisdiction over remaining claims. 

On October 21, 2003, the plaintiff filed a pro se complaint, invoking various federal statutes and constitutional amendments, though the legal basis was unclear. He claimed Judge Allison's delays in his Court of Common Pleas case violated his constitutional rights and contended that her actions during a conference breached his rights to fundamental justice and fair hearing. The plaintiff sought to correct the record and requested a proclamation for Judge Allison to cease infringing on his rights. Additionally, he argued that the Bennett Firm defendants were jointly liable with the uninsured motorist and sought $375,000 in damages and punitive damages. Subsequently, Judge Allison filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 7, 2003, and the Bennett Firm defendants filed their own motion to dismiss on November 13, 2003, to which the plaintiff responded later that month.

The Court will review both motions outlined in the Memorandum, recognizing that pro se plaintiffs are held to a lower pleading standard, which requires that their complaints be interpreted liberally. The Supreme Court has established that a court cannot proceed without jurisdiction, as noted in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a court can dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction. The Court will analyze whether the motion challenges the complaint's jurisdiction on its face or based on factual evidence. A facial challenge argues that the complaint does not adequately allege subject matter jurisdiction, where the court must accept the complaint's allegations as true and resolve the issue as a legal question. Conversely, if the motion questions the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court may evaluate evidence outside the pleadings, without assuming the truth of the plaintiff's allegations.

Judge Allison's Motion to Dismiss asserts that the Court should dismiss claims against her based on Federal Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) for several reasons: 1) subject matter jurisdiction is lacking under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine regarding state court adjudications; 2) jurisdiction is barred by the Eleventh Amendment for claims enforcing state law against a state official; 3) the Court should abstain from jurisdiction if there are ongoing state proceedings; and 4) absolute judicial immunity protects Judge Allison from damage claims related to her state court decisions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as summarized by the Third Circuit, prevents federal courts from reviewing state tribunal decisions directly.

Congress has granted the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to review state court decisions, preventing lower federal courts from addressing claims that would require deeming state court rulings incorrect or invalidating them. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars claims if they were either actually litigated in state court prior to the federal filing or are inextricably intertwined with state adjudications. The court may evaluate evidence beyond the pleadings to ascertain its jurisdiction in such cases. 

In the present matter, the plaintiff argues violations of his constitutional rights stemming from Judge Allison's actions in state court, including delays and procedural handling. The relief sought by the plaintiff—such as correcting the state court record and ordering Judge Allison to comply with constitutional standards—illustrates that his claims are closely linked to the state court proceedings. Thus, the court finds that these claims are inextricably intertwined with the state adjudication, leading to a lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, resulting in the granting of the Judicial Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

Additionally, Judge Allison contends that the Eleventh Amendment restricts enforcement of state law against a state official, that the court should abstain from jurisdiction due to ongoing state proceedings, and that absolute judicial immunity protects against damage claims. However, since the court determines it lacks jurisdiction based on Rooker-Feldman, it does not address these additional arguments.

The Bennett Firm defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), claiming that the plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a valid cause of action. They assert the following key points: (1) the Complaint lacks factual support for its claims; (2) the defendants are protected by conspiracy immunity as attorneys representing their clients; (3) the court lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to review state court decisions; and (4) the court should abstain from interfering in an ongoing state court matter.

The court determined that the plaintiff's claims against the Bennett Firm defendants are closely connected to a prior adjudication in state court, particularly citing an incident during an August 2003 conference where defendant Ford allegedly interrupted the plaintiff. As such, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear these claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and granted the motion to dismiss, thereby dismissing the claims against both the Bennett Firm defendants and Judicial Defendant Paul K. Allison. The court did not address the other arguments presented by the Bennett Firm defendants due to the jurisdictional ruling.