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Storck v. Suffolk County Department of Social Services
Citations: 62 F. Supp. 2d 927; 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12554; 1999 WL 613304Docket: CV 97-2880
Court: District Court, E.D. New York; August 11, 1999; Federal District Court
Ellen Storck and her children filed a civil rights lawsuit against multiple defendants, including the Suffolk County Department of Social Services (DSS) and various individuals involved in a Family Court case that led to the removal of her son, Aaron Storck, from her custody. The legal action stems from a 1992 Family Court petition alleging that Ellen Storck suffered from Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy (MSP), resulting in the court's finding of neglect and Aaron's removal. The plaintiffs claim violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985, asserting a deprivation of rights without due process. Defendants include county officials, law guardians, DSS case workers, and medical professionals involved in the case. Currently, all defendants have filed motions to dismiss, which the court is addressing, granting some motions while denying others. Aaron Storck was removed from the custody of his mother, Ellen Storck, following a series of medical evaluations and legal proceedings concerning his health and allegations of medical child abuse. Born in 1984, Aaron experienced a Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) episode shortly after birth and was diagnosed with apnea. He was hospitalized multiple times, including in 1988 for an appendectomy and again in 1989 for apnea-related issues, where he was referred to pediatric neurologist Dr. Gerald Novack at Schneider's Children's Hospital. In 1992, during hospitalization, Drs. Meyer Sagy and Phillip Lanzkowski concluded that Aaron did not suffer from apnea and suspected that Ellen Storck was fabricating his condition, suggesting she had Munchausen syndrome by proxy (MSP). Consequently, the doctors contacted the Department of Social Services (DSS), leading to Aaron's removal from his mother's custody after a hearing on August 4, 1992, presided over by Justice David Freundlich. At this hearing, testimony was presented, including from Dr. Laura Nimkoff, who indicated that Johns Hopkins Hospital did not diagnose Aaron with apnea. Further hearings in December 1992 corroborated the initial findings, with testimony from various medical professionals supporting the claim that Ellen exhibited MSP. Justice Freundlich ultimately ruled that Ellen was neglectful and ordered Aaron to remain in foster care, while her older children were allowed to stay under her supervision with DSS oversight. This ruling was upheld on appeal by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. Defendant Feldman served as the law guardian for Aaron's siblings, while attorneys McKenzie and Hilton acted as Aaron's law guardians through the Law Guardian Bureau of the Legal Aid Society. During his foster care in Suffolk County, Aaron's case was overseen by DSS case worker Vivien Misshula. In 1994, custody of Aaron was transferred to his cousins, John and Diane Gintz, in Ohio, where case worker Mary Peabody became involved. Following a December 1992 hearing, the Family Court conducted annual reviews and continued Aaron's foster care placement. A March 1, 1996 hearing found Ellen Storck in contempt of court for violating orders, resulting in a suspended six-month imprisonment sentence. After Ellen moved to Ohio in January 1997, DSS petitioned the Family Court to extend Aaron's placement there, which was granted in her absence on February 24, 1997. Shortly thereafter, Ellen removed Aaron and relocated to Florida. In May 1997, DSS sought to regain custody, leading to an order on June 10, 1997, for Aaron's removal from Florida and temporary custody by Broward County authorities. Despite examinations showing no evidence of medical neglect or abuse, a Broward County judge returned custody to Ellen in January 1998. The plaintiffs allege various misconducts related to Aaron's removal from Ellen's custody, claiming threats of arrest during a 1992 hearing and alleging that testimonies regarding Ellen's mental health were either fabricated or improperly diagnosed. They assert Aaron faced abuse in foster care, including being denied communication with family and religious access, and that requests for intervention were ignored. Misshula allegedly threatened to terminate Aaron's visits with Ellen if he complained. The plaintiffs claim a conspiracy among defendants to hide the abusive conditions in the foster home, with specific allegations against Rosenthal for threatening Aaron about disclosure and Hilton for her role in Ellen's prosecution. Additionally, the plaintiffs assert irregularities regarding DSS withholding Social Security and child support payments, including wrongful withholding of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) meant for Aaron’s care. Plaintiffs allege wrongful conduct by defendants Misshula, Rosenthal, and Feldman toward Aaron's siblings—Dana, Courtney, and Joshua. Key allegations include Rosenthal and Feldman's illegal procurement of the children's medical records, and Misshula's interference with the children's schooling by providing false information to school officials regarding their medical examinations and sports participation. Misshula is also accused of unlawfully obtaining Dana's school counseling records. Defendant Peabody allegedly threatened Dana against seeking medical help, while Feldman is accused of breaching confidentiality by publicly discussing the children's medical conditions and attempting to remove Joshua from his anti-seizure medication. Additionally, the plaintiffs claim procedural irregularities in Florida, asserting that Justice Freundlich improperly contacted a Broward County judge about Ellen Storck's supposed danger to Aaron. Ellen alleges improper detention in Florida and interference by Michael Berry, a non-defendant, with the investigating doctor. The plaintiffs' amended complaint, comprising thirty-four pages and 136 paragraphs, lays out seven causes of action. The first seeks a declaratory judgment declaring unconstitutional Section 1072 of Article 10 of the New York Family Court Act, arguing it denies full constitutional protections to criminal defendants, violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The second cause of action, against DSS and case workers Misshula and Peabody, alleges failure to protect Aaron from abuse in a foster home, withholding financial support from his Ohio foster parents, and interfering with favorable physician reports, thereby denying a fair hearing. This is claimed to have violated the siblings' rights to privacy and was allegedly retaliatory against the plaintiffs for opposing neglect proceedings. All actions are asserted to have occurred under color of state law, infringing upon the plaintiffs' rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. The third cause of action targets assistant Suffolk County attorney Gary Rosenthal for allegedly improper ex parte communications, threatening Aaron, and conspiring with Berry for an illegal arrest in retaliation for the civil rights action. The third cause of action claims a violation of the plaintiffs' due process rights. The fourth cause of action targets law guardians Feldman, McKenzie, and Hilton for allegedly colluding with state actors Misshula, Peabody, and Rosenthal by failing to protect Aaron from abuse in Suffolk County foster care. Feldman is specifically accused of improperly subpoenaing Joshua's pharmaceutical records, while Hilton's sole allegation involves her role in prosecuting the plaintiff for criminal contempt. Collectively, these defendants are alleged to have infringed upon the plaintiffs' equal protection rights under the Sixth Amendment and due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. The fifth cause of action is directed at doctors at Schneiders who cared for Aaron, accusing them of illegally detaining him from July 22 to August 6, 1992, and providing false testimony about Ellen Storck's MSP, thereby violating her constitutional rights concerning custody and due process. The sixth cause of action is against Dr. Schreier, who is alleged to have given false testimony at a December 1992 hearing regarding Ellen Storck’s MSP, purportedly in conspiracy with defendants DSS and Rosenthal, depriving the plaintiffs of due process. The seventh cause of action targets DSS, Rosenthal, Misshula, and Peabody for a violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(6)(2) relating to the illegal subpoena of Aaron's siblings' educational records, which is claimed to have infringed upon their federally protected privacy rights. The case commenced in May 1997 with a request for injunctive relief to prevent DSS from taking Aaron into custody. The court denied this request, finding no likelihood of success on the merits, and remanded related family court proceedings, a decision later affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeals court recognized Ellen Storck’s rights regarding custody but concurred with the lower court's findings. In September 1998, the court allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, and motions to dismiss are currently under consideration. Defendants seek to dismiss the case on multiple grounds, primarily invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which asserts that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state court judgments. Suffolk County Assistant County Attorney Rosenthal and DSS case workers Misshula and Peabody argue that plaintiffs' claims essentially aim to contest a state family court ruling. Additionally, several defendants are claiming absolute immunity: Rosenthal for prosecutorial functions, and law guardians Feldman, Hilton, and McKenzie, as well as the defendant doctors, for their respective roles in the case. The law guardians also alternatively seek qualified immunity. Furthermore, the defendants argue that the complaint does not adequately allege they are state actors and lacks sufficient factual basis for conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985, particularly citing insufficient allegations of discriminatory intent. Defendant Feldman additionally contends that claims based on New York State law regarding the subpoena of medical records are inapplicable. The court will evaluate these motions under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows dismissal only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts to support their claim. The court must accept the truth of the factual allegations in the complaint and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is emphasized, highlighting that federal claims are inextricably intertwined with state court judgments if the federal claim's success hinges on a determination that the state court erred. Plaintiffs' complaint may be construed as an attempt to challenge the state court's custody decision regarding Aaron, which would invoke the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, barring such claims. However, the plaintiffs' allegations extend beyond merely contesting the family court's ruling. Some claims, particularly those questioning the credibility of medical testimonies provided by specific doctors, directly contradict the family court's findings in the neglect proceedings and would undermine its decision, thus falling under the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar. Conversely, the plaintiffs' assertion that Section 1072 of the Family Court is unconstitutional is not precluded by Rooker-Feldman, nor are allegations of conspiracy involving case workers and the county attorney regarding Aaron's care, as these issues were not litigated in the state court. Consequently, only the claims against the doctors are barred by Rooker-Feldman, while other claims may proceed. To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must demonstrate a violation of constitutional rights under state action, specifically alleging that Ellen Storck's due process rights concerning her custody of children were infringed. A child can be removed from a parent's custody without a hearing if there is an immediate threat of harm, although the parent's constitutional rights to notice and a hearing are only postponed, not eliminated. For a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted "under color of state law," which excludes purely private conduct, regardless of its discriminatory nature. Liability attaches only to those with governmental authority, whether acting within or misusing that authority. The determination of state actor status involves assessing reliance on government assistance, performance of governmental functions, and the unique nature of the injury caused by governmental authority. Private individuals may be liable under Section 1983 if they conspire with state actors, requiring specific allegations of overt acts related to the conspiracy. Such liability can be imposed even if the state actor is immune, and a private individual must establish a basis for immunity if claiming it while being charged with conspiracy. Additionally, private individuals can also be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for conspiracy to violate civil rights, which applies to both private individuals and state actors. The statute at issue does not create substantive rights but serves as a remedy for rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. A claim under Section 1985 requires five elements: 1) a conspiracy; 2) motivation by racial or other discriminatory animus; 3) intent to deprive individuals or groups of equal protection; 4) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and 5) injury. Claims under Section 1985, similar to those under Section 1983, must include specific factual allegations; vague or conclusory claims are insufficient for surviving a motion to dismiss. The "class" affected by discrimination must be defined beyond simply the victims, requiring a basis of racial or class-based animus. The Supreme Court in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic explored this concept, determining that a class of "women seeking abortion" does not qualify as a protected class under Section 1985, rejecting the idea that all classifications based on a woman's ability to have an abortion constitute sex discrimination. Additionally, the defendants, comprised of doctors and law guardians, are seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, arguing they are not state actors and therefore not liable under Section 1983 or Section 1985. Courts have established that mere testimony in court does not qualify a person as a state actor. In assessing whether a court-appointed representative acts on behalf of the state or the individual, it is noted that independent judgment in the client's best interest, such as that exercised by legal services agencies, does not render them state actors under Section 1983. Guardians ad litem, though court-appointed, exercise independent professional judgment and are not considered state actors under Section 1983, as established in various cases, including Di Costanzo v. Henriksen and Offutt v. Kaplan, which affirm their entitlement to absolute immunity as judicial officers. Similarly, private hospitals and physicians reporting child abuse under state law do not qualify as state actors. Consequently, the court concludes that neither the law guardians nor the doctors involved in this case are state actors. The mere appointment by a state court or payment from state funds does not change this status, nor does the requirement for independent judgment negate their non-state actor status. Regarding the plaintiffs' conspiracy claims under Section 1983, the court finds the allegations insufficient. The claim against law guardian Hilton is based solely on her participation in prosecuting the plaintiff, which lacks adequate factual support. The allegations against defendants Feldman and McKenzie are slightly more detailed, suggesting their presence at a meeting concerning Aaron Storck’s foster care. However, since they did not make threats or directly participate in any alleged conspiracy to conceal abuse, these claims do not meet the threshold required to establish a conspiracy under Section 1983. Overall, the court dismisses the claims against the law guardians and the doctors as state actors and finds the conspiracy allegations inadequate. Defendant Feldman is accused of improperly subpoenaing Joshua's medical records and violating confidentiality by discussing the case on television. These actions, while potentially improper, do not constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights or meet the requirements for a Section 1983 conspiracy claim, as they lack the necessary element of acting in concert with a state official. Consequently, all Section 1983 claims against Feldman, McKenzie, and Hilton are dismissed. The plaintiffs' Section 1985 claims also fail, as they do not demonstrate the requisite racial or class-based animus necessary for such a claim. The reference to Ellen Storck as a "Munchausen mother" is deemed insufficient to establish class-based discrimination, as such a classification does not align with the legal standards for discrimination under Section 1985. The court determines that discrimination against individuals defined as "Munchausen mothers" does not constitute the type of invidious class-based discrimination intended to be addressed by Section 1985, leading to the dismissal of all claims against McKenzie, Feldman, and Hilton under this statute as well. Additionally, County Attorney Rosenthal is protected by prosecutorial immunity, which shields a prosecutor from liability when acting within the scope of their duties, including initiating prosecutions and responding to allegations of false testimony or suppression of evidence. This immunity extends to actions related to malicious prosecution and improper conduct in court settings, and allegations of conspiracy do not alter this immunity. Prosecutorial immunity extends to not only individual prosecutors but also to officials performing functions similar to those of a prosecutor. Functions that are integrally related to the judicial process are likely to receive absolute immunity. Attorneys initiating and prosecuting child protective orders for social services are granted absolute prosecutorial immunity, as are the departments employing them. However, this immunity is not absolute for all actions; it is designed to protect the prosecutor's office rather than the individual. When a prosecutor acts in an administrative or investigative capacity, their actions are protected only by qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields individuals from liability if their conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights and was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The determination of whether conduct is protected by absolute or qualified immunity depends on the nature of the function performed, rather than the identity of the actor. For example, a prosecutor receives qualified immunity when providing legal advice to police or when holding a press conference. Claims related to the alleged fabrication of evidence are also afforded qualified immunity due to their investigative nature. The mere assertion that a prosecutor acted "under color of state law" but outside their official capacity does not negate absolute immunity. The court must examine the specific activities underlying the claims to determine if they are prosecutorial in nature. In the case of attorney Rosenthal, the allegations include engaging in ex parte communications regarding Ellen Storck's mental health and participating in a meeting about conditions at Aaron's foster home, which was requested by Ellen Storck's attorney. Plaintiffs allege that Rosenthal threatened Aaron with consequences if he revealed the abuse to his mother's attorney and retaliated against Ellen Storck by arranging the suspension of her welfare payments due to her opposition to Aaron's removal. Additionally, Rosenthal is accused of conspiring with attorney Michael Berry to facilitate Ellen Storck's illegal arrest in Florida. The court analyzed these claims under a functional approach and determined that some are subject to absolute immunity, leading to their dismissal. Specifically, claims related to ex parte communications with Justice Freundlich about Ellen's mental health and interactions with attorney Berry during Florida proceedings were dismissed as they pertained to Rosenthal's prosecutorial duties. Claims regarding the suspension of welfare payments and threats made to Aaron, however, did not fall under prosecutorial immunity. The court found that the welfare payment suspension was not linked to prosecution and that Rosenthal's role in the 1993 meeting was investigative. Consequently, the motion to dismiss claims related to threats made during that meeting was denied. The court also addressed the defendant doctors' claims of witness immunity and immunity under New York law, dismissing claims based on their in-court testimony and reiterating that absolute witness immunity protects all participants integral to the trial process. Absolute witness immunity is justified to encourage individuals to testify without fear of civil liability, thus supporting the judicial process. In addition to this immunity, the doctors who treated Aaron Storck seek protection under New York's Child Protective Services Act (CPSA) after reporting suspicions of abuse. The CPSA mandates reporting by individuals who reasonably believe a child is abused and provides immunity from civil liability for those making reports in good faith. The immunity is presumed if the report was made in the course of their duties without evidence of willful misconduct or gross negligence. Plaintiffs allege that the doctors' actions and testimonies violated Ellen Storck's civil rights and due process. However, the court ruled that the doctors are entitled to absolute witness immunity for their court testimony regarding Ellen Storck's suspected medical child abuse (MSP), rendering claims against them based on this testimony dismissible. Furthermore, the court found that the doctors are immune under the CPSA concerning Aaron's detention, affirming that the CPSA applies in civil rights contexts involving allegations of improper child abuse identification. In Thomas v. Beth Israel Hospital, the court upheld the CPSA good faith immunity defense, dismissing a claim against a physician for reporting suspected child abuse. The reporting doctors in this case similarly qualify for this immunity, as their actions were within the scope of their employment. Despite extensive allegations, there is no evidence of willful misconduct or gross negligence by the doctors, supported by Justice Freundlich's assessment of their credibility. Regarding the second cause of action against case workers Misshula and Peabody, as well as attorney Rosenthal, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is raised to challenge the court's jurisdiction. Claims that contradict the family court's ruling on Ellen Storck's mental status are dismissed, though other claims in this action remain. The court has not yet determined the application of qualified immunity for the government employees involved. Qualified immunity may apply if it was reasonable for them to believe their actions did not violate clearly established rights, a matter reserved for jury consideration. In the seventh cause of action, plaintiffs allege violations of 20 U.S.C. 1232(g)(6)(2) related to FERPA, which regulates access to student education records. Plaintiffs argue that the subpoenaing of Aaron's siblings' records without proper consent violated their rights under FERPA. However, the court notes that FERPA does not provide a private right of action. In Fay v. South Colonie Central School District, the court addressed various claims under Section 1983 and FERPA. It acknowledged that FERPA can support a Section 1983 claim but noted that the facts regarding the plaintiffs' FERPA claim are not well-defined at this stage. The court did not resolve whether Ellen Storck retained rights under FERPA after the custody change or the validity of subpoenas for school records. Qualified immunity principles apply to FERPA claims, and since the record is not sufficiently developed, the motion to dismiss the seventh cause of action was denied, pending further factual development at trial. The court dismissed claims against defendant doctors based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, common law witness immunity, and the New York State Child Protective Services Act, as they were found not to be state actors and lacked sufficient conspiracy allegations. Claims against law guardians were similarly dismissed for lack of state actor status and conspiracy pleadings. Claims against defendant Rosenthal were dismissed due to absolute prosecutorial immunity, while claims against Misshula and Peabody were also dismissed. The first cause of action regarding the unconstitutionality of Section 1072 of the Family Court Act remains undismissed, and the court indicated that it could be subjected to a motion before trial. The court confirmed that the case would proceed to trial on the seventh cause of action and parts of the second and third causes. Remaining defendants include DSS, Misshula, Peabody, and Rosenthal, and the court instructed the parties to schedule a status and pretrial conference. The plaintiffs may pursue the first cause of action, and the court will outline a briefing schedule if they choose to do so. The court anticipates the case will soon be ready for trial. Additionally, the court noted that allegations of government conduct must meet a high threshold for substantive due process claims, which the plaintiffs failed to establish. Section 1985 conspiracy claims were also dismissed as they were too vague.