Adam v. Linn-Benton Housing Authority

Citations: 147 F. Supp. 2d 1044; 2001 WL 694532Docket: CIV. 00-6166-TC

Court: District Court, D. Oregon; March 20, 2001; Federal District Court

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Christine Adam, a 37-year-old disabled woman, filed a complaint against the Linn-Benton Housing Authority and several individuals, alleging discrimination under federal and state laws and emotional distress under Oregon law. The case arose after her Section 8 rent assistance was threatened due to missed paperwork deadlines. Her caseworker, Heike Scott, initiated termination proceedings, but after a hearing presided over by James Hackett, the termination was rescinded. Despite the initial threat, Adam was never denied her subsidies. Following the hearing, accommodations were offered to her regarding her disabilities, including assistance with paperwork. Adam's claims included violations of the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, Oregon Revised Statute 659.425(3), and emotional distress. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing there were no material facts in dispute warranting a trial. The standard for summary judgment requires the moving party to show the absence of genuine issues of material fact, shifting the burden to the opposing party to provide evidence to the contrary. The court evaluates evidence favorably for the nonmoving party.

In Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., the Ninth Circuit emphasizes the principle that any reasonable doubt regarding the existence of a genuine issue of fact should be resolved against the moving party. Inferences from facts must favor the non-moving party, and summary judgment is inappropriate when different ultimate inferences can be drawn. However, the non-moving party must present specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial, as mere speculation is insufficient. 

Regarding the plaintiff's federal claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case demonstrating disability, knowledge of the disability by the defendants, necessity for accommodation, and refusal to accommodate in FHA claims; exclusion or discrimination due to disability in ADA claims; and denial of benefits solely due to disability in Rehabilitation Act claims. 

In this case, the plaintiff failed to present sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case. The undisputed facts indicate that the plaintiff was informed of the termination of her Section 8 benefits due to incomplete recertification paperwork but was also informed of her right to a hearing, which she requested. The hearing led to the reversal of the termination decision. This internal review process negates the basis for her discrimination claims, as no actual denial of benefits occurred. The plaintiff's argument that she was not required to seek a hearing does not hold, given that she was informed of her rights and acted upon them, resulting in the restoration of her benefits. Consequently, the claim of discrimination is unfounded based on the timeline of events.

A discrimination claim was rejected in Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt University due to the plaintiff having successfully challenged the allegedly discriminatory decision via an internal grievance procedure. Similarly, in Brooks v. City of San Mateo, a plaintiff could not claim discrimination after abandoning an internal review that could have corrected an adverse employment decision. In the current case, the plaintiff did not suffer a denial of housing assistance benefits, thus failing to maintain claims under the Fair Housing Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, or Rehabilitation Act. Summary judgment favored the defendants on these claims.

Regarding the plaintiff's claim under Oregon Revised Statute 659.425(3), which prohibits discrimination against disabled persons in public accommodations, the court found that no discrimination occurred since the Housing Authority's internal hearing process rescinded the decision to terminate benefits before it took effect. Therefore, summary judgment was granted to the Housing Authority.

For the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court outlined the necessary elements under Oregon law but determined that preliminary agency decisions, even if erroneous, do not constitute extraordinary transgressions of socially tolerable conduct. The plaintiff failed to present any material facts supporting this claim, resulting in summary judgment for the defendants.

In conclusion, the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, leading to the dismissal of the action. Notes indicate that the facts considered were either undisputed or based on the plaintiff's account, and emphasize that no denial of Section 8 assistance occurred, which is central to the claims regarding reasonable accommodation.

The court highlights a regulation from the Department of Housing and Urban Development that prevents defendants from questioning the specifics of a participant's disability. The plaintiff seeks damages and equitable relief to prevent future issues, with defendants already agreeing to satisfactory accommodations, which the court will not alter. The Housing Authority is the sole defendant in this claim. The court finds the Housing Authority's argument—that it does not qualify as a "place of public accommodation" under the relevant statute—persuasive. The statute refers to "customers" and "patrons," and legislative history indicates it aims to combat discrimination in retail and commercial settings. Even if discrimination occurred, recovery against the Housing Authority under ORS 659.425(3) appears unlikely.