Hepburn Ex Rel. Hepburn v. Athelas Institute, Inc.

Citations: 324 F. Supp. 2d 752; 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12494; 2004 WL 1497832Docket: CIV.A. WDQ-02-3179

Court: District Court, D. Maryland; July 1, 2004; Federal District Court

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Mark Hepburn, represented by his mother Deborah Hepburn, filed suit against Athelas Institute, Inc. and NCIA after a choking incident at a facility that caused him severe, permanent injuries. The case involved claims under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Initially, all claims against NCIA were dismissed due to improper service, while Hepburn's § 1983 claim against Athelas remained. Subsequently, Athelas filed a Third-Party Complaint against NCIA, alleging negligence in meal preparation, asserting that NCIA's actions led to the suit against Athelas and seeking indemnification and contribution.

NCIA moved to dismiss this Third-Party Complaint, arguing that § 1983 does not allow for indemnification or contribution, and contended that Athelas's negligence claim was merely a restatement of its other claims, lacking a duty owed by NCIA to Athelas. The court noted that a motion to dismiss under Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6) should only be granted if no possible relief could be granted based on the allegations made. It emphasized that all allegations must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and if any basis for relief is present, the motion to dismiss should be denied. Ultimately, the court recognized that federal law does not provide an express right of contribution under § 1983, referencing relevant case law.

In Miller v. Apartments and Homes of New Jersey, the Third Circuit implied a right to contribution under federal common law in the context of Section 1983. However, this view has faced criticism, primarily for conflicting with Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and the Supreme Court's ruling in Northwest Airlines, which denied a right to contribution under Title VII. Courts, including Mason v. The City of New York, have noted that Section 1983 does not provide a right to contribution, emphasizing that federal law can sometimes leave gaps that must not be filled by extension of contribution rights. The Supreme Court in Northwest Airlines also underscored that federal statutes like the Equal Pay Act and Title VII do not benefit employers, hence contribution should not be implied for their protection. Similar reasoning applies to the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, which were not designed to protect conspirators. Legislative history lacks any indication that Congress intended to create a right to contribution, and Section 1988 is viewed merely as a framework for remedies under existing civil rights statutes, not a source for new causes of action. Contribution, being derivative, may not constitute a new cause of action under Section 1988, as established in past case law.

Section 1988 allows federal courts to supplement federal civil rights law with common law principles, adapted by state law, when federal remedies are inadequate, provided these principles align with the U.S. Constitution. In Maryland, the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort-feasors Act (Md.Code Ann. 3-1401 et seq.) defines joint tort-feasors and establishes a right of contribution once one party settles the liability. However, this Contribution Act does not apply to state constitutional torts, which arise from violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and are distinct from common law torts that may be subject to certain immunities. The Local Government Tort Claims Act and the Maryland Tort Claims Act outline indemnity rights for state and local officials and promote the idea that local governments should bear the financial burden of compensating for constitutional torts committed by their employees during official duties. There is no Maryland case where the Contribution Act has been recognized to permit contribution among constitutional tortfeasors, and allowing such contribution for § 1983 violations would contradict federal law. The goals of § 1983—compensation and deterrence—are undermined by reducing defendants' financial liability while shifting the risk of a tortfeasor's insolvency onto the plaintiff, making contribution inappropriate in this context.

In cases involving joint tortfeasors or a contributorily negligent plaintiff, damages may be apportioned based on comparative fault principles. However, under Section 1983, the culpability required reduces the necessity for equitable damage distribution among tortfeasors. Qualified immunity protects police officers from 1983 claims if their actions are deemed objectively reasonable, while the professional judgment standard only imposes liability when a decision significantly deviates from accepted professional norms. Efforts to invoke equity principles by petitioners and amici suggest an assumption that legislative intent allows law violators to mitigate consequences through equity, although indemnity and contribution are generally not permitted for intentional tortfeasors.

Athelas's third-party contribution and indemnity claim will be dismissed as it conflicts with 1983 provisions. Athelas also alleges negligence against NCIA, claiming a duty to provide safe habilitation, which NCIA breached by negligently preparing food, leading to damages incurred from defending against Hepburn's complaint. However, under Maryland law, negligence claims must identify a breach of duty owed directly to the plaintiff, which Athelas fails to do since it relies on NCIA's duty to Hepburn. Consequently, the negligence claim restates an unavailable contribution and indemnity claim and does not meet legal standards.

In conclusion, Athelas's claims for contribution and indemnity are not viable under these circumstances, and its negligence claim does not satisfy Maryland law requirements, leading to the granting of NCIA's motion to dismiss the counterclaim. Federal law governs Athelas's contribution and indemnity claims, and these claims are derivative of Athelas's potential liability under 1983.

Contribution is characterized as a derivative right rather than a distinct cause of action, meaning that claims for contribution related to 1983 liability derive from federal law, not independent state law. Shareholder derivative actions also reflect federally established rights, indicating they are federal claims. The concept of contribution is closely tied to the substantive rights established by civil rights legislation, influencing federal courts' operations as well as the rights and liabilities of involved parties. 

The Fifth Circuit outlines four theories of contribution: (1) outright disallowance to prevent aiding wrongdoers, (2) pro tanto which reduces the award dollar-for-dollar against non-settling tortfeasors, (3) pro rata dividing damages equally among tortfeasors, and (4) proportional allocation based on each tortfeasor's fault. Importantly, there is no contribution right recognized at common law.

In Maryland, respondeat superior applies to deter constitutional torts, holding local governments liable for their agents' constitutional violations but not common law torts. Maryland law does not protect government actors exhibiting gross negligence or malice from liability. This policy prevents the use of the Contribution Act to create rights of contribution in cases involving gross negligence under 1983 liability, as outlined in relevant Maryland statutes.

Furthermore, municipal liability for 1983 claims does not extend to broader contribution rights derived from state statutes not tailored for constitutional torts, reinforcing the limited scope of such federal rights. The Fifth Circuit has affirmed the appropriateness of applying federal common law when federal law is insufficient and state law would conflict with it.

The Fifth Circuit highlighted the complexity of applying Maryland's right of contribution to § 1983 claims, suggesting that this analysis aligns with the federal common law under § 1988. In the context of qualified immunity, a plaintiff's actions are already considered when assessing the reasonableness of officials' conduct. Police officers are afforded qualified immunity as long as their actions are deemed objectively reasonable based on the circumstances and existing law. The standard of professional judgment implies that a plaintiff's comparative fault does not absolve the defendant from liability. Even if a plaintiff exhibits gross negligence, this does not mitigate the consequences of the defendant's actions. Thus, while gross negligence may not preclude contribution under certain statutes, its presence in § 1983 cases suggests caution against extending additional protections to culpable defendants. Additionally, indemnity rights in § 1983 cases are unavailable for similar reasons as those barring contribution rights.