John Doe v. State of Hawaii Dept. of Educ.

Citations: 351 F. Supp. 2d 998; 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26240Docket: Civ. No. 00-00044 ACK/KSC

Court: District Court, D. Hawaii; February 23, 2004; Federal District Court

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Plaintiff John Doe, a minor represented by his mother Jane Doe, filed a lawsuit against the State of Hawaii Department of Education and several individuals, including school officials, alleging damages from disciplinary actions taken against him at Pukalani Elementary School. The incidents occurred on February 4 and February 19, 1998, while John was participating in the A-Plus after-school program. On February 4, Defendant Sonia Zane allegedly hit John on the back of the head and dragged him by his shirt to the principal's office due to his misbehavior. 

On February 19, Defendant David Keala, the school vice-principal, disciplined John and other students for fighting during lunch. As punishment, they were made to stand with their noses against a wall while wearing "On Detention" signs. After a few students were released for good behavior, John and another boy were left standing when Keala, believing they were misbehaving, threatened to tape their heads to a tree. After returning from the cafeteria, he found the boys climbing the tree and subsequently taped their heads to the tree using masking tape for about five minutes before releasing them. 

The court issued an order dismissing the plaintiffs' counter-motion for summary judgment, granting in part and denying in part the State defendants' motions to strike, and ruling on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment motions. The case involves significant issues regarding the appropriateness of disciplinary measures in a school setting.

Defendant Keala instructed a fifth-grade girl to remove tape after she remarked on his actions, and he apologized to the boys he had released, stating he had warned them. On January 14, 2000, Plaintiff Jane Doe and her son John filed a lawsuit against Defendants, asserting multiple claims including violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, negligence, false imprisonment, assault and battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress, violation of Title IX, and punitive damages. The Court permitted the complaint to be filed under 'Doe' designations and appointed a next friend on January 18, 2000. 

Defendant Keala sought dismissal of several claims via a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and for Summary Judgment on September 10, 2001, arguing for qualified immunity and supplemental jurisdiction dismissal for state law claims. The Court partially granted and denied his motion on November 29, 2001, denying qualified immunity for the 1983 claim related to the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments but granting it concerning the Hawaii Constitution. Claims under the Fifth and Ninth Amendments, Section 1981, and Title IX were dismissed. The Court denied dismissal for Loss of Consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress but granted it for punitive damages. Keala appealed the qualified immunity ruling, and a stay was granted on January 15, 2002.

On February 6, 2002, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint with similar claims. By June 12, 2002, various motions for judgment and summary judgment were filed by both parties. The parties agreed to stay motions pending the Ninth Circuit's decision on Keala's appeal, which affirmed the lower Court's order on June 30, 2003. Following remand, the parties reinstated their motions, leading to further disputes and filings, including State Defendants' opposition to Plaintiffs' motions in December 2003.

On December 18, 2003, Plaintiffs submitted their Opposition to Defendant Zane's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, as well as their Opposition to the State Defendants' similar motion, accompanied by a Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment. An Errata was filed on December 22, 2003, concerning the Opposition and Counter-Motion. On January 8, 2004, the State Defendants replied in support of their motions and opposed the Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion. The Plaintiffs also filed a reply supporting their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that day. Defendant Sonia Zane submitted a Statement regarding her motion and supported the State Defendants' motions with a reply on January 8, 2004. On January 12, 2004, Plaintiffs replied in support of their Counter-Motion. Oral arguments occurred on February 2, 2004, during which the parties announced a settlement agreement that dismissed Defendant Zane from the lawsuit in her individual capacity and withdrew her motion.

Judgment on the pleadings, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(c), is appropriate when there are no material factual issues and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court evaluates the pleadings favorably for the plaintiffs and treats contradictory allegations in the defendants' answers as false. Should the court exceed the pleadings, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment. Summary judgment aims to eliminate unsupported claims and is warranted when the documentation shows no genuine issue of material fact, meaning that a reasonable jury could not find for the nonmoving party. The burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue, which can be done through affirmative evidence or by highlighting a lack of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's claims.

Evidence and reasonable inferences must be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party, with the court refraining from making credibility assessments. Summary judgment will be denied if reasonable minds could differ regarding the evidence's significance. The nonmoving party cannot simply rely on pleadings or vague doubts but must present significant probative evidence to counter the moving party's claims. If the nonmoving party fails to substantiate essential elements of their case, summary judgment will be granted against them.

In the case at hand, Plaintiffs filed a Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment after the dispositive motions deadline, which was set for July 9, 2003, following an earlier scheduling order. Plaintiffs did not provide justification for the delay and attempted to invoke Local Rule 7.9 to file their counter-motion alongside their opposition. However, counter-motions are still bound by Rule 16 deadlines. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that scheduling orders must be adhered to strictly to maintain judicial efficiency and control over the litigation process. Disregarding such orders undermines the court's authority and disrupts the litigation flow.

In U.S. ex rel. Int'l. Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Judge Ezra determined that Rule 16 governs the amendment of complaints post-deadline, requiring parties to demonstrate good cause to modify the scheduling order. The Court found that Plaintiffs failed to meet the diligence necessary for the 'good cause' standard, as they did not seek to amend the scheduling orders nor acted promptly since State Defendants' Motion for Judgment was filed over a year prior to their counter-motion. Consequently, the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment. 

In response to Defendants' motion to strike various filings by Plaintiffs, the Court ruled the arguments regarding timeliness moot, confirming that the filings were timely as per the agreed deadlines established in a status conference. Defendants withdrew their motion to strike concerning expert witness disclosures, which the Court denied. However, the Court acknowledged that Plaintiffs introduced new claims without amending their complaint, specifically asserting violations of Section 504 related to the failure to provide a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) or an adequate Individualized Education Program (IEP). The Court concluded that these new claims were not supported by the First Amended Complaint.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment in June 2002, but further amendments to their complaint required court approval and a modification of the Amended Rule 16 Scheduling Order, which had set a deadline for amendments on April 12, 2002. Although a new deadline of May 9, 2003, was established by an August 2003 order, Plaintiffs did not file any motion to amend the First Amended Complaint within the subsequent one-and-a-half years. Additionally, they failed to seek modification of the Rule 16 Scheduling Order. The Court emphasized the importance of the Rule 16 order, citing the Ninth Circuit's Johnson decision, which applied a 'good cause' standard based on the diligence of the party seeking amendment. The Court found that Plaintiffs did not demonstrate the required diligence and thus dismissed their claims related to the denial of Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) or Individualized Education Program (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

However, claims alleging discrimination against John based on his disability under Section 504 were not dismissed, as they were part of the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs conceded the abandonment of all claims against Defendant Herman Aizawa, leading to his dismissal from the case. The State Defendants argued that no allegations in the First Amended Complaint supported a violation of H.R.S. 302A-1001 related to gender discrimination. Plaintiffs did not oppose this argument and confirmed the abandonment of this claim, resulting in its dismissal against all Defendants.

Regarding Section 504, State Defendants contended that it does not allow lawsuits against them in their individual capacity. The Ninth Circuit precedent indicated that such actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be pursued against state officials for rights created by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. While the Ninth Circuit has not explicitly ruled on individual capacity suits under Section 504, other circuit courts have concluded that Section 504 does not permit such lawsuits.

The Court grants State Defendants' motion regarding Plaintiffs' Section 504 claims against Defendants Murakami and Yamakawa in their individual capacities, citing persuasive decisions from the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, particularly in light of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Vinson. Regarding Eleventh Amendment immunity, State Defendants argue they are entitled to it under Section 504, contending that Congress exceeded its authority with this legislation and that Hawaii did not waive its immunity by accepting federal funds in 1998. However, the Court finds that the Ninth Circuit has established that acceptance of federal funds constitutes a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, referencing cases such as Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber and others. Consequently, the Court denies the State Defendants' motion concerning Eleventh Amendment immunity for Section 504 claims.

On the issue of respondeat superior under Section 504, State Defendants argue it does not apply, relying on Barnes v. Gorman. However, Plaintiffs assert that it does apply, and the Ninth Circuit has supported this stance as seen in Bonner v. Lewis. The Supreme Court's decision in Barnes focused solely on punitive damages and did not address vicarious liability, thus not overturning the Ninth Circuit's precedent. Therefore, the Court concludes that vicarious liability applies under Section 504 claims.

Under Section 504, a qualified individual with a disability must demonstrate: (1) being disabled as defined by the Act, (2) being qualified to participate in school activities, (3) the school receiving federal financial assistance, and (4) having faced exclusion or discrimination solely due to their disability.

To recover damages under Section 504, a plaintiff must demonstrate intentional discrimination by the defendant. In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs claim that disciplinary measures against John during incidents involving Defendants Zane and Keala violated Hawaii regulations implementing Section 504, thereby discriminating against him due to his disability. However, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case because John was not denied equal access to federally funded benefits or services and that the disciplinary actions did not discriminate against him.

The Court notes John fully participated in the A-Plus program, which was available to all students, indicating no basis for a Section 504 claim from this participation. The claim relies solely on the disciplinary actions of Zane and Keala, which, while inappropriate, did not exclude John from school activities or deny him school benefits. The Court highlights that there is no evidence showing Zane was aware of John's disability during the relevant incident, nor was Keala aware of it in the subsequent incident. Thus, no reasonable fact finder could conclude that Zane or Keala acted based on John's disability.

Regarding Defendants Murakami and Yamakawa, there is no evidence of their involvement in the incidents or any knowledge of the likelihood of harm to John, leading the Court to find that they also did not discriminate against him.

Consequently, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs fail to establish a necessary element of their prima facie case, resulting in no genuine issue of material fact and entitling State Defendants to judgment as a matter of law. The Court will also consider the argument regarding monetary damages, where it has been established that intentional discrimination requires showing 'deliberate indifference' by the defendant, which the Plaintiffs have not met, given the lack of knowledge of John's disability by Zane and Keala.

Deliberate indifference requires more than mere negligence; it involves intentional conduct. The court found that punitive damages against Defendant Keala were inappropriate because no reasonable jury could conclude he acted with bad faith or malice, especially since he had no knowledge of Plaintiff John's disability. Similarly, Defendant Zane was found not to have acted with deliberate indifference, as there was no evidence of his awareness of John's disability or any bad faith on his part. Defendants Murakami and Yamakawa were also deemed not to have acted with deliberate indifference, as they were not personally involved in the incidents and lacked knowledge of any wrongdoing. Consequently, the court concluded that the Hawaii DOE could not be held liable for intentional discrimination or deliberate indifference toward John due to the absence of evidence supporting such claims.

The court ruled that Plaintiffs could not establish a basis for liability under Section 504 against A-Plus, nor could they prove that John was excluded or discriminated against because of his disability, thereby failing to establish a prima facie case. As a result, no material facts existed to dispute, leading to the conclusion that State Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court granted the motion to dismiss the Section 504 claims against Defendants Murakami and Yamakawa in their official capacities, Hawaii DOE, and A-Plus. 

Regarding Section 1983 claims, the State Defendants argued for dismissal against Murakami and Yamakawa in their individual capacities, citing their lack of direct involvement and the principle that respondeat superior does not apply. They additionally claimed entitlement to qualified immunity, emphasizing that supervisory liability under Section 1983 does not extend to cases of mere negligence.

Supervisors can be held liable for constitutional violations only if they were personally involved in the deprivation or if there is a sufficient causal connection between their wrongful conduct and the violation. Specifically, they must have played an affirmative role in the alleged deprivation, such as initiating actions that they knew or should have known would result in constitutional harm. In the case at hand, the court determined that Defendants Murakami and Yamakawa were not personally involved in the incidents involving Defendants Zane and Keala, as they were not present at the scenes and there was no evidence linking them to the actions of Zane or Keala. Consequently, the court found no genuine issue of material fact and granted judgment in favor of Murakami and Yamakawa regarding individual liability under Section 1983.

Additionally, regarding claims against Murakami and Yamakawa in their official capacities, the court ruled that these claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. A lawsuit against state officials in their official capacities is considered a lawsuit against the state itself, which provides them with immunity from damages claims. The court referenced several precedents affirming that neither the state, its agencies, nor its officials acting in official capacities qualify as "persons" under Section 1983. Therefore, the court granted the motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claims against Murakami, Yamakawa, the Hawaii Department of Education, and A-Plus based on this immunity.

State Defendants' motion is granted regarding Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against Defendants Murakami and Yamakawa in their official capacities, as well as against Hawaii DOE and A-Plus. For individual capacity claims, State Defendants assert that Murakami and Yamakawa are entitled to qualified immunity under Hawaii law, citing relevant case law that protects nonjudicial government officials performing public duties. The Court agrees, noting that Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of malice or personal involvement in the alleged intentional torts, leading to the conclusion that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Consequently, the Court grants judgment for Defendants Murakami and Yamakawa regarding Plaintiffs' state law claims, including False Imprisonment, Assault and Battery, Negligence, Gross Negligence, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Loss of Consortium.

Additionally, the Court recognizes that the State of Hawaii retains Eleventh Amendment immunity concerning state claims brought in federal court, as this immunity extends to claims under supplemental jurisdiction. While Hawaii's sovereign immunity is waived for torts by its employees under the Hawaii State Tort Liability Act, this waiver does not extend to Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts.

A state can waive the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar by enacting a statute that permits lawsuits; however, such consent applies only to state courts and not to federal courts. All state entities, including agencies and employees acting in official capacities, possess Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court grants the State Defendants' motion regarding the plaintiffs' state law claims against Defendants Murakami and Yamakawa in their official capacities, as well as against Hawaii DOE and A-Plus.

Regarding punitive damages, the State Defendants request judgment against all defendants; however, the plaintiffs only claim punitive damages against Defendants Keala and Hawaii DOE in their First Amended Complaint. The court finds punitive damage claims against all defendants, as suggested in the plaintiffs' opposition, are new and unsupported by the original complaint. The plaintiffs did not amend the complaint or request an extension of deadlines set by the court, leading to the dismissal of these claims.

The court grants the State Defendants' motion concerning punitive damages against Defendants Murakami, Yamakawa (both in individual and official capacities), and A-Plus. The court agrees with the State Defendants' arguments that (1) Hawaii has not waived its immunity to punitive damages, (2) punitive damages are not permissible under Section 504, and (3) punitive damages are unwarranted. The Hawaii State Tort Claims Act (HSTCA) retains the state's sovereign immunity regarding punitive damages. Additionally, since the Hawaii DOE shares the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, no punitive damages can be awarded under Section 1983. The Supreme Court has ruled that punitive damages cannot be awarded in Section 504 cases. The court concludes that there is insufficient evidence of bad faith or outrageous misconduct by the state defendants to justify punitive damages. Consequently, punitive damages claims against Hawaii DOE are barred, and the court grants the State Defendants' motion on this matter.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied following the Court's acceptance of State Defendants' Motion for judgment on Plaintiffs' Section 504 claims. The Court dismisses Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment and grants in part and denies in part State Defendants' Motion to Strike. The Court grants State Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Summary Judgment, while also dismissing Plaintiffs' claims related to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) for failure to adequately assert them in their First Amended Complaint and for not meeting the diligence required by the Rule 16 "good cause" standard to modify the scheduling order. 

Defendant Aizawa is dismissed as Plaintiffs abandoned claims against him. Claims under H.R.S. 302A-1001 are also dismissed due to lack of supporting facts and concession of abandonment. The Court dismisses Section 504 claims against Defendants Murakami and Yamakawa in their individual capacities, while denying the motion regarding Eleventh Amendment immunity for Section 504. However, the Court finds Plaintiffs have not demonstrated exclusion from benefits or intentional discrimination, and holds that they have released all Section 504 claims. 

The Court grants State Defendants' motion regarding 42 U.S.C. § 1983, citing Eleventh Amendment immunity for the State of Hawaii and its officers, and dismisses claims against Defendant Zane in her official capacity. Lastly, the Court grants State Defendants' motion concerning state law claims.

Defendants Hawaii DOE, A-Plus, and individual Defendants Murakami and Yamakawa, acting in their official roles, are protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity, which has not been waived regarding state law claims in federal court. Consequently, the Court dismisses the state law claims against Defendants Keala and Zane in their official capacities. Individually, Defendants Murakami and Yamakawa are granted qualified immunity against the state law claims. The Court also grants the State Defendants' motion concerning punitive damages, dismissing such claims against Defendant Keala, previously ruled on in a prior order. The State of Hawaii maintains sovereign immunity against punitive damages associated with state claims and is protected from punitive damages under Section 1983 due to sovereign immunity, with the Supreme Court ruling that Section 504 does not permit punitive damages. The Court finds that punitive damages are unwarranted. Additionally, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking liability judgment on their Section 504 claims against Hawaii DOE and A-Plus is denied, as the Court has granted the State Defendants' motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and Summary Judgment. Thus, the only remaining claims are Section 1983 and state law claims against Defendant Keala in his individual capacity. The order concludes with a series of notes providing context about the case, including the diagnosis of a plaintiff and prior agreements between parties regarding defendant dismissals.

On November 14, 2003, the parties were directed to re-notice their motions, with hearings scheduled for February 2, 2004. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Notice for their June 12, 2002 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the same day. The State Defendants submitted a Second Amended Notice on November 19, 2003, while Defendant Zane filed her Amended Notice on November 20, 2003. On November 24, 2003, Plaintiffs also filed a Notice of Hearing for their June 24, 2002 Amended and Supplemental Memorandum. The Court permitted this filing and allowed the State Defendants to reinstate their July 1, 2002 Motion to Strike, which they amended on November 25, 2003. Defendants Zane and Keala joined the Motion to Strike on December 5 and December 16, 2003, respectively.

Affidavits based on personal knowledge that present admissible trial facts may be considered by the court in determining material issues of fact, per Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Legal memoranda and oral arguments do not constitute evidence. Material fact disputes do not impede summary judgment, and when a moving party bears the burden of proof, they must establish a prima facie case for summary judgment. Once this is demonstrated, the nonmoving party must present specific facts to show genuine issues for trial. The ultimate burden of proving no genuine issues of material fact lies with the moving party.

The Court noted that Plaintiffs did not seek to amend the scheduling order, instead relying on Local Rule 7.9. Even if Plaintiffs' counter-motion were considered, it would be deemed meritless. Defendant Keala had timely filed an Answer to the original Complaint on April 27, 2000, with no substantive changes from the First Amended Complaint, except the addition of claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which cannot be asserted against individuals. Consequently, Keala's Answer to the original Complaint is considered applicable to the First Amended Complaint.

Defendant Keala's official capacity is treated similarly to a lawsuit against the state itself, sharing the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State Defendants, including Keala, asserted this immunity in their Answers to both the original and First Amended Complaints, filed on April 28, 2000, and February 19, 2002, respectively. The Court finds no prejudice to the Plaintiffs regarding this assertion and concludes that their Counter-Claim lacks merit. 

Regarding the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the definition of Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) includes provisions for public expense, meeting state standards, and conforming to an individualized education program (IEP). The Court notes that Plaintiffs settled their IDEA claims for the 1998-1999 school years and failed to exhaust administrative remedies for any other periods. The Court also dismisses Plaintiffs' Section 504 claims against Defendant Zane due to the settlement.

Additionally, the Court does not need to address whether Congress abrogated the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity with Section 504, citing relevant case law that supports the rejection of the state’s arguments on this matter.

The Court recognizes that the Barnes decision raises questions about the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Bonner regarding the application of contract-law rules to respondeat superior in Section 504 claims. However, until the Ninth Circuit applies Barnes to that doctrine, the Court adheres to existing precedent. The parties agree that Plaintiff John meets the first three elements of the claim, with only the fourth element in dispute. Although FAPE and an IEP are federally funded benefits under IDEA, the Court dismisses the Section 504 claims related to these benefits, citing the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies or their release of the claims.

Additionally, the Court clarifies that the A-Plus program is a latch-key babysitting program, not an educational program. There is no demonstrated connection between the Zane incident, which occurred in the A-Plus program, and the Keala incident during lunchtime recess, leading the Court to conclude that no reasonable jury could find a likelihood of the latter based on the former. The Court also finds no basis for extending the imputation of a public employee's knowledge to their employer regarding employee actions.

The plaintiffs' reliance on historical incidents involving Defendant Keala is insufficient as no evidence suggests these incidents were reported, undermining claims of a propensity for violence. Lastly, the Court addresses the plaintiffs' use of Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, clarifying that it did not establish sufficient evidence for intentional discrimination but merely assessed if any evidence existed. Unlike in Delano-Pyle, there was no indication that Defendant Keala was aware of any disabilities related to Plaintiff John.

One or two isolated incidents of inappropriate discipline do not amount to a denial of services or benefits, nor do they constitute discrimination as per the standards established in Duvall. The Court clarifies that a lawsuit against officials in their official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the state itself, leading to the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Section 504 claims against Defendants Keala and Zane. The Court finds no ambiguity in the settlement agreements, concluding that Plaintiffs have released all claims related to Section 504, thus barring them from raising those claims in this lawsuit. Consequently, the Court does not consider the State Defendants' argument for qualified immunity.

Additionally, Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims against Defendant Zane are dismissed due to the settlement, and the State of Hawaii is granted Eleventh Amendment immunity regarding these claims. This immunity applies equally to claims against Defendant Zane in her official capacity, leading to their dismissal for judicial economy. The Court previously dismissed Section 1983 claims against Defendant Keala in his official capacity. Defendants Murakami and Yamakawa are found entitled to qualified immunity, making further discussion of their involvement unnecessary. The Court also dismisses Plaintiffs' state law claims against Defendant Zane due to the settlement, and reiterates that lawsuits against officials mirror suits against the state, leading to the dismissal of state law claims against Defendants Keala and Zane in their official capacities. The Court previously dismissed the punitive damages claim against Defendant Keala and will discuss punitive damages claims against the Hawaii DOE later. Finally, the Court does not address the State Defendants' argument regarding Plaintiff Jane’s standing to assert a Section 504 claim, nor the dismissal of Section 1983 claims against Defendant Keala in his official capacity from the previous order.