United States v. Jackson

Citations: 351 F. Supp. 2d 108; 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19219; 2004 WL 2181136Docket: 04 Cr. 340(GEL)

Court: District Court, S.D. New York; September 23, 2004; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Suif Jackson was convicted of four felonies related to firearms, specifically involving a fully automatic Mac-11 machine gun, which he possessed and transported on February 25, 2001. The charges included possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of a machine gun, transportation of an unregistered machine gun in interstate commerce, and possession of an unregistered machine gun, all carrying maximum sentences of ten years. During his plea, Jackson admitted to bringing the machine gun to Manhattan and firing it during an altercation, while expressing uncertainty about whether he injured anyone due to the chaotic nature of the incident and the presence of other shooters.

The altercation arose from a confrontation with another artist, Capone, linked to a feud with Jackson's associate, Kimberly Jones (Lil' Kim). Jackson admitted to firing twenty to twenty-two shots, and the Presentence Report confirms he was responsible for injuring an individual associated with Capone. However, the specific details of how the conflict escalated to gunfire are unclear. Jackson acknowledged his guilt concerning the firearm charges without elaborating on the sequence of events or his perceptions during the shooting. The case illustrates complexities within federal sentencing guidelines and raises constitutional and policy questions relevant to ongoing Supreme Court considerations.

Jackson's post-arrest statement indicates that he and others fired weapons, though he does not specify who shot first or claim self-defense. In a probation interview, Jackson mentioned he "returned fire" after being shot at by Capone's group, asserting his actions were reactive rather than aggressive. His attorneys support this narrative, arguing he only fired in response to gunfire from the rival group and not out of aggression. Conversely, the Government's characterization suggests Jackson initiated the shooting, but their summary lacks clarity on whether it disputes the rival group's involvement. The Presentence Report (PSR) highlights Jackson's extensive criminal history, accumulating fourteen criminal history points, placing him in the highest category (VI) under sentencing guidelines. His past convictions include narcotics sales, weapon possession, attempted robbery, and robbery, with multiple offenses involving firearms and violence. Jackson has faced continuous incarceration or supervision since 1988, with repeated parole violations. Currently, he is serving a state sentence for a crime committed after the incident in question. Given this context, the excerpt argues that a lengthy sentence is warranted to address Jackson's serious offenses and protect public safety, while acknowledging that sentencing guidelines assist in ensuring consistency across cases.

The federal Sentencing Guidelines aim to provide precise sentences for defendants, yet this ambition leads to complex factual determinations that may conflict with the constitutional right to a jury trial, as highlighted in Blakely v. Washington. The guideline calculation in this case exemplifies these complexities and potential constitutional issues, particularly as the sentencing judge may need to declare a defendant guilty of uncharged offenses based on judicial findings rather than jury convictions. The applicable guideline, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1, concerns unlawful firearm possession but involves a complicated cross-reference to U.S.S.G. 2X1.1, which pertains to attempted offenses. The parties agreed in a plea deal that this cross-reference applies, suggesting the guideline for "Assault with Intent to Commit Murder," which has a higher offense level. This raises concerns under Blakely, as the defendant, Jackson, pled guilty only to firearm possession yet is treated as if guilty of attempted first-degree murder—an uncharged offense. The evidentiary record is inadequate to support such a serious finding, lacking the necessary detail to establish guilt for any violent crime. Thus, the case underscores the potential unfairness and constitutional dilemmas inherent in applying the Guidelines.

Murder under federal law is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, which implies a required degree of mental culpability. In New York, murder necessitates the intent to kill or recklessness that demonstrates a depraved indifference to human life. Federal law lacks precise definitions, but some courts suggest malice may involve recklessness, potentially at a lower threshold than New York's standards. 

First-degree murder, necessary for guideline calculations, demands more than mere malice; it involves distinguishing between killings done with malice or intent and those done with deliberation and premeditation—a distinction noted as complex even by prominent jurists. Additionally, an intentional killing may not qualify as murder if it occurs during a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, which requires examining if provocation would incite a reasonable person to fear or rage, mitigating the act.

Self-defense introduces further complexities, such as the defendant's reasonable belief of imminent unlawful force, the initial aggressor's identity, and the possibility of retreat. The court lacks sufficient evidence to resolve whether Jackson acted in self-defense, as the defense argues he did, while the government contests this. Key facts, like whether Jackson fired first, remain unclear. If he did fire first, self-defense may still apply if he reasonably feared an imminent attack; conversely, if he was the initial aggressor or had reasonable alternatives, his defense could fail. The current record does not clarify Jackson's state of mind or whether he feared for his life. Furthermore, even if Jackson's use of deadly force is deemed unjustified, his culpability level is not established, and while premeditation could be inferred, the record does not provide adequate insight into his thoughts during the incident.

Jackson's intent during the shooting incident is unclear; it is uncertain whether he aimed to kill or acted out of panic. This ambiguity raises the possibility of malice, which could classify his actions as murder if death had occurred, but he is charged with attempted murder. Under federal law, an attempt requires the intent to commit the crime, and an "attempted reckless murder" is deemed a logical impossibility. If it were established that Jackson intentionally targeted someone without a self-defense justification, it could potentially reduce the charge to attempted manslaughter, as he may have acted in a moment of quarrel rather than with premeditated malice. A deeper examination of the altercation and Jackson's mental state is necessary to determine the appropriate charge, but current evidence is insufficient for such findings. Convening a factual hearing for attempted first-degree murder would be impractical and raise constitutional concerns, as the distinctions in homicide offenses are traditionally resolved by a jury. A trial to assess Jackson's guilt for such a serious charge without full procedural safeguards would be constitutionally troubling. However, requiring such a trial for a lesser offense like weapon possession would be inefficient. Given Jackson’s circumstances, a sentencing judge would likely impose a significant sentence regardless of the outcome of a hypothetical trial for attempted murder. Therefore, the Court will not conduct a hearing, concluding that the materials presented do not substantiate a charge of attempted first-degree murder or any attempted murder, and thus U.S.S.G. 2A2.1 does not apply.

Possession of a machine gun carries a base offense level of 26 under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(1), which is higher than for typical felon possession due to two aggravating factors: the involvement of a machine gun as defined by 26 U.S.C. 5845(a) and Jackson's history of at least two felony convictions for violent crimes or controlled substances. Jackson’s relevant convictions include attempted robbery in the first degree and robbery in the third degree. The constitutional requirements for applying this offense level are satisfied, as Jackson acknowledged the machine gun's involvement in his guilty plea, and his prior criminal record does not require jury review under Apprendi or Blakely. The offense level may be enhanced if a firearm was used in connection with another felony, but it remains unclear whether Jackson's actions constituted a felony under New York law, thus this enhancement does not apply. After applying a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Jackson's total offense level is 23, leading to a guideline sentencing range of 92-115 months given his criminal history category VI.

Further, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 allows for upward departures from this guideline range if aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist that were not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission. In this case, two factors justify an upward departure: Jackson's actual use of the firearm with hostile intent and the serious injury inflicted on another person as a result. The Sentencing Commission advises upward departures when significant physical injury occurs, and it has been stipulated that the victim sustained serious bodily injury, which was not accounted for in the initial guideline calculation.

Serious consequences arose from Jackson's decision to bring a machine gun to New York on February 25, 2001, leading to gunplay that resulted in injury to the victim. Although not all events of that day are clear, it is undisputed that Jackson's possession and use of the weapon were significant factors in the incident. These circumstances justify an upward departure in sentencing, as the consequences of the crime are critical in determining the appropriate penalty. The Court notes that the guidelines do not account for these facts, which warrant a sentence significantly different from mere possession of a weapon. 

In reviewing relevant guidelines, the Court emphasizes the enhancements for serious bodily injury and the use or discharge of firearms. An upward departure of approximately three levels is deemed appropriate, leading to a sentencing range of 120-150 months. Given Jackson's criminal history and the severity of possessing a machine gun, a sentence of 144 months is justified. This sentence reflects the seriousness of the crime and the additional harm caused by the discharge of the weapon. Jackson's allocution primarily admitted to firing the weapon, and while he did not fully concede to causing serious injury, the Court finds sufficient basis for the sentence based on undisputed facts related to the offense. This sentence is within the statutory maximum for the offenses to which Jackson pled guilty and is supported by straightforward factfinding regarding the nature of the crime.

Facts traditionally determined by sentencing judges in indeterminate sentencing systems, as endorsed in Blakely, support the Court's discretion in imposing a sentence that may exceed a defendant's expected sentence based on guidelines. The Guidelines do not confer a 'right' to a specific sentence; thus, the requirement for jury findings on facts supporting sentence departures does not violate the right to a jury trial. 

The Court has discretion under U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(c) to decide whether the new sentence should run concurrently or consecutively with the defendant Jackson's existing state sentence related to an unrelated shooting. After evaluating relevant factors from 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and 3584(b), the Court determines that a consecutive sentence is warranted. This decision stems from the seriousness of the new offense, Jackson's violent criminal history, the necessity of public protection, and the fact that his state sentence arises from a separate crime committed after the current offense. The Court dismisses the defense's attempts to mitigate Jackson's criminal record, describing it as appalling and underscoring his dangerousness, thus providing no grounds for leniency.

Additionally, given the constitutional implications raised by Blakely regarding the guideline sentencing system's legitimacy, the Court has adopted a practice of indicating an alternative sentence. This alternative would still result in the same 144-month imprisonment sentence, reflecting an upward departure, even if the Guidelines were deemed unconstitutional. 

The Court concludes with an order for a total sentence of 144 months' imprisonment, running consecutively to the state sentence. Notes clarify that the Presentence Report (PSR) relies on filtered accounts and that while defense counsel asserts certain conclusions from the PSR, these do not accurately represent the probation officer's view. The plea agreement binds the parties but does not restrict the Court from independently calculating the appropriate application of the Guidelines.

The Court is mandated to apply the Guideline sentence relevant to a case without deviation, regardless of differing opinions from the Sentencing Commission or Congress. The excerpt highlights the complexity of federal sentencing laws, particularly under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1, where a violent criminal who attempts murder and inflicts serious injury faces an offense level of 30, resulting in a presumptive sentence of 97-121 months, reduced to 70-87 months for first-time offenders. In contrast, selling 50 grams of crack cocaine incurs an offense level of 32 with a mandatory 10-year sentence, regardless of a guilty plea. Similarly, attempting to obtain child pornography also mandates a 10-year sentence, illustrating leniency towards attempted murder compared to drug and child pornography offenses.

The text further posits that Jackson could not be charged with attempted first-degree murder under federal law due to a lack of jurisdiction, despite potentially fulfilling the criteria. New York's first-degree murder definition diverges from federal standards, and Jackson's actions would not meet the New York Penal Law criteria for attempted murder.

The excerpt references Sir James Fitzjames Stephen's critique of the term "malice" as a judicial classification tool. It clarifies that "crime of violence," as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), includes offenses involving the use or threatened use of physical force, extending to attempts. All robbery degrees in New York are classified as crimes of violence due to their inherent use or threat of force during larceny.

Lastly, it is noted that Jackson's possession of a machine gun likely influenced his willingness to engage in confrontation, contributing to the outbreak of violence, irrespective of who initiated the shooting. This point is supported by the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR), which confirms a companion of Capone observed Jackson's gun before the altercation.

Jackson's machine gun was directly responsible for the victim's injury, a foreseeable outcome of his illegal decision to arm himself. Despite the potential claim of justification for his use of force, this defense appears weak, and it is unlikely Jackson could fully justify his actions if tried. The focus is on the consequences of the crime for which he admits guilt. The sentencing range aligns with the Presentence Report (PSR) and plea agreement, calculated based on an offense level of 27, which includes adjustments for serious injury and acceptance of responsibility. However, the Court opted for a lower base offense level of 26, applying an upward departure, resulting in a total offense level of 26. The final sentence will be less than what the Government sought and what the PSR recommended, reflecting the Court's view that Jackson should not be treated as guilty of attempted first-degree murder. Each offense carries a maximum sentence of ten years, with consecutive sentences permitted by statute.