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United States v. Eischeid
Citations: 315 F. Supp. 2d 1033; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25677; 2003 WL 23471837Docket: CR-03-1167-PHX-DGC
Court: District Court, D. Arizona; December 19, 2003; Federal District Court
Defendant Paul Eischeid faces charges of Violent Crime in Aid of Racketeering (VCAR) for the murder of Cynthia Garcia. On December 4, 2003, Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson denied the Government's request to detain him pending trial under the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The Government sought a review of this decision, leading to a hearing on December 16, 2003, where the Court evaluated the evidence independently, without deference to the magistrate's findings. The Government argues for Eischeid's detention, citing his potential danger to the community and flight risk. It must prove the danger by clear and convincing evidence and the flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence. The Government's case for danger includes: (1) the serious nature of the murder charge, (2) the brutal circumstances of the murder, where Garcia was beaten, stabbed, and left for dead, and (3) Eischeid's affiliation with the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, known for racketeering activities. The Government contends Eischeid is a flight risk due to the severity of the charges, which could lead to a death sentence. However, the Government did not provide affidavits or witnesses during the hearings due to safety concerns but instead offered to supply evidence in camera. The Court rejected the in camera review, emphasizing that such practices undermine the procedural protections of the Bail Reform Act, which include the defendant's right to know the evidence against him and to challenge it through counsel. This position aligns with precedent that stresses the importance of transparency in the judicial process regarding detention hearings. Courts allow in camera presentations of evidence only in exceptional circumstances where there is a "most compelling need" and no alternative means to address that need. The First Circuit has indicated that such presentations are permissible in "very unusual cases," provided the defendant is informed of the evidence's essence through government testimony and requests the in camera review. In this case, Defendant Eischeid did not receive a summary of the in camera evidence nor request its review. During a December 16 hearing, defense counsel objected to the untimely submission of this evidence, but the limitations on in camera proceedings were not discussed. Consequently, the Court is unwilling to base a detention decision on evidence not presented to Eischeid, opting instead to rely solely on the Government's proffer. The in camera evidence will be returned to the Government without review. Defendant Eischeid argued against being deemed a danger to the community or a flight risk, citing factors such as a minimal criminal history (one dismissed misdemeanor), homeownership in Phoenix, 11 years of residence in Arizona, stable employment, a retirement account, a college degree, and no substance abuse issues. These points were reiterated during the December 16 hearing. The Court concluded that the Government failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Eischeid poses a danger to the community. Despite the serious nature of the charges, Eischeid is presumed innocent. The Court found no evidence from the Government indicating that the charges reflect Eischeid's past behavior or that he intends to commit future crimes. Therefore, the Government's failure to provide evidence beyond the accusation, combined with Eischeid's established community ties and responsible lifestyle, led the Court to determine it could not find he is a danger to the community or a flight risk based solely on the charges and proffer presented. The Court expresses concern regarding the severity of the penalty facing Defendant Eischeid and its implications for flight risk. Prior cases highlight that the death penalty can create a significant incentive to flee, but those cases also involved additional factors indicating a propensity to escape, such as transient lifestyles or lack of family ties. In Eischeid's case, no such indicators exist, and the Court is hesitant to classify him as a serious flight risk based solely on the death penalty charge. The assessment of flight risk must consider multiple factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. 3142(g)(1), including the defendant's character, mental and physical condition, community ties, and criminal history, which all favor Eischeid's release. Congress, when drafting the relevant statute, recognized death penalty cases and mandated detention hearings without establishing a rebuttable presumption of detention for such cases. The Court cannot create a presumption of detention based solely on the possibility of the death penalty. Despite uncertainties regarding the appropriate outcome, the Ninth Circuit's guidance is to resolve doubts in favor of the defendant. Consequently, Eischeid will be released under specific conditions to ensure his court appearance and community safety, which include electronic monitoring and restrictions on association with certain groups and possession of firearms. The Court will revisit this decision if evidence emerges indicating he poses a threat or is a serious flight risk. Eischeid is ordered to appear at a hearing on December 22, 2003, to establish further release conditions. Additionally, the Court acknowledges differing views on in camera evidence but aligns with First and Third Circuit decisions regarding procedural protections and due process.