Garner v. COM., DEPT. OF TRANSP.

Citation: 879 A.2d 327

Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania; July 18, 2005; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

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The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas' decision to vacate the suspension of John F. Garner’s driver's license. The common pleas court had found that Garner did not receive adequate warnings regarding the consequences of refusing to take a breathalyzer test, specifically citing deficiencies in the Bureau of Driver Licensing's revised DL-26 form under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547. However, the court determined that the Bureau's form met the updated informational requirements established by the amendments to the Motor Vehicle Code effective February 1, 2004. These amendments mandate that individuals be informed of both the immediate suspension of their operating privilege for refusal and the potential for enhanced criminal penalties for subsequent convictions related to impaired driving. 

On March 6, 2004, Garner was stopped for reckless driving and arrested on suspicion of intoxication. Police informed him of the consequences of refusal by reading and providing the revised DL-26 form, which clearly outlined that refusal would lead to at least a one-year suspension and possible enhanced penalties upon conviction. Garner acknowledged understanding the form but still refused the test. Consequently, the Bureau suspended his license for eighteen months due to his status as a recidivist, as his prior record qualified under the law for a more severe penalty. The court upheld the Bureau's actions in light of the statutory requirements.

In 2001, Garner faced a six-month suspension after being placed in A.R.D. for a DUI. He appealed the suspension, arguing that his refusal to submit to chemical testing was not knowing and voluntary due to inadequate warnings about potential penalties. The common pleas court agreed, determining that the warning on the Bureau's DL-26 form failed to inform Garner, a second-time offender, about a mandatory minimum penalty of ninety days in jail under 75 Pa.C.S. 3804(c). Consequently, the court vacated his suspension, prompting the Bureau to appeal.

The Bureau must prove four elements to sustain a license suspension under Section 1547(b)(1): 1) DUI arrest, 2) request for testing, 3) refusal, and 4) delivery of required warnings, with the first three elements being undisputed. The dispute centers on whether the warnings provided met statutory requirements. The court concluded that the warnings were compliant, noting that the statute does not require detailed explanations of civil suspensions or each criminal penalty. It merely mandates that police inform drivers that refusal will lead to license suspension and potential additional penalties if convicted of DUI. 

The court criticized the common pleas court for imposing a requirement for specificity tailored to individual circumstances, asserting that it is unrealistic to expect arresting officers to know the specific penalties at the time of warning. The court emphasized that the information provided on the DL-26 form was sufficient for drivers to make informed decisions regarding chemical testing. Furthermore, the court rejected Garner’s claim that the warnings were confusing, stating that the paragraphs in question did not contain contradictory information regarding enhanced penalties. Overall, the court reversed the common pleas decision, upholding the Bureau’s warning as adequate under the law.

The statement in paragraph three aligns with the general statement in paragraph four regarding the distinction between civil suspensions under the Implied Consent Law (Section 1547(a)) and penalties for DUI convictions (Section 3802). Licensees often misunderstand this difference. The warning provided in paragraph four of the DL-26 form clearly states that a request for counsel will be treated as a refusal, impacting civil suspension under the Implied Consent Law. Consequently, the order from the Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and Garner's driving privileges are reinstated. The notes clarify that Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition was available for DUI charges prior to its repeal. Additionally, Section 3804(c) outlines sentencing for DUI offenses based on the number of offenses, and emphasizes that driving is a civil privilege contingent upon compliance with testing requirements under the Implied Consent Law.