State v. Snide

Citations: 479 A.2d 139; 144 Vt. 436; 1984 Vt. LEXIS 494Docket: 83-130

Court: Supreme Court of Vermont; May 25, 1984; Vermont; State Supreme Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

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An interlocutory appeal was filed in the case of State of Vermont v. Ervin Snide, concerning two legal questions certified by the District Court of Vermont. The first question addresses whether the case should have been dismissed with prejudice due to the prosecution's failure to proceed to trial, and the second concerns a potential violation of the defendant's right to a speedy trial under various legal standards, including the Sixth Amendment and Vermont's Constitution. 

The defendant was involved in a DUI incident on June 27, 1982, and was cited while hospitalized. Following an arraignment on July 26, a jury trial was scheduled for October 1, 1982. However, on that date, the prosecution informed the court of its unpreparedness due to the absence of a witness and lack of file review. The defense moved for dismissal based on this lack of preparation, and the court dismissed the case without prejudice, despite the defense's request for a dismissal with prejudice. No legal authority was cited for this dismissal. Subsequently, the State issued a new citation on November 10, 1982, and the defendant was rearraigned.

The defendant later filed a motion arguing that the initial dismissal should have been with prejudice, citing Administrative Order 5, which mandates readiness for trial within six months of arrest. He contended that a dismissal without prejudice undermines the intent of this order by allowing further prosecution. However, the court found that A.O. 5 did not apply since less than six months had elapsed since the citation or information. Moreover, Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b)(2) allows for dismissal if it promotes justice and court efficiency, but the court did not cite this rule in its dismissal. The appeal thus raises critical questions about the application of legal standards related to trial readiness and speedy trial rights.

The court has discretion to dismiss cases that are not actively pursued by the prosecution, as outlined in V.R. Cr. P. 48. This dismissal authority differs from A.O. 5, which mandates a six-month waiting period before dismissal becomes effective. Rule 48(b)(2) permits dismissal for lack of prosecution, akin to V.R. C.P. 41(b), and the court's inherent authority to dismiss civil cases for this reason was established in Capital Savings Bank v. Hammett. The court's decision to dismiss a case without prejudice is generally upheld on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion, which was not the case here. The prosecutor retains the option to reinstate the case if dismissal occurs before jeopardy attaches. 

Defendant requested dismissal on October 1, 1982, prior to the six-month period required by A.O. 5, indicating that this order was not circumvented. The court addressed a second certified question regarding the defendant's right to a speedy trial, noting that the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, filed on January 6, 1983, was denied. Although A.O. 5 aims to expedite criminal proceedings, it does not guarantee a dismissal right and is subject to judicial discretion. The trial court's decision not to dismiss based on A.O. 5 was deemed appropriate. The defendant also referenced common law precedents, including Barker v. Wingo, to argue a violation of his speedy trial rights. However, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decisions regarding both motions.

The right to a speedy trial is a constitutional guarantee that cannot be strictly defined by a set duration. In assessing a defendant's claim of a speedy trial violation, four factors are considered: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and any prejudice suffered by the defendant. The length of the delay serves as a threshold; a delay must be significant enough to be presumptively prejudicial before the other factors are considered. A delay of over six months for an incarcerated defendant typically triggers this analysis. 

For this case, the speedy trial violation timeline is assumed to begin on June 27, 1982. The State contends that the period between the dismissal of charges on October 1 and the issuance of a new citation on November 10 should not count toward the delay. Once charges are dismissed, the defendant no longer has speedy trial rights until new charges are filed. The legal question is whether the time between the dismissal and the new charges is excluded or if it resets the speedy trial period. However, regardless of this distinction, the total delay in this case is less than six months, which does not meet the threshold for presumption of prejudice under Barker v. Wingo. Therefore, as of January 6, 1983, there has been no infringement of the defendant's right to a speedy trial, leading to negative answers to the certified questions posed.