Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland; July 1, 1999; Maryland; State Appellate Court
A gas explosion in the Kentlands subdivision of Gaithersburg resulted in significant property damage and personal injuries, leading to a complex tort case. On January 21, 1994, Mary J. Wankel and her fiancé, Daniel I. Wilcox, were injured while escaping their burning home after the explosion. Their house was completely destroyed, and neighboring residents, Karen and George Gouzoulis, also suffered damages and injuries. Wankel received over $400,000 from her insurer, State Farm, for property and personal losses, while Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. paid the Gouzoulis for repairs.
On January 16, 1997, Wankel, Wilcox, the Gouzoulis, and their respective insurers filed a five-count complaint against several parties involved in the construction of Wankel's home, including D.R. Horton, the general contractor, and various subcontractors. The plaintiffs alleged that a wooden stake used for a silt fence had punctured a natural gas pipeline during construction, causing gas to leak into the home and explode upon contact with an ignition source.
Defendants, particularly Horton, subsequently filed numerous cross-claims for indemnity and contribution against other contractors involved in the project, including Wright Excavating, A.B. Contractors, Great Seneca Development Corporation, Genstar, and Triangle Landscapers. Horton also brought in Keith Dodson, doing business as Ravenwood Associates, in relation to the silt fence installation.
Appellants were unable to amend their complaint to include Dodson as a defendant due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, despite claiming Horton is liable for Dodson's negligence. Triangle was dismissed from the case in July 1997 after filing an unopposed motion for summary judgment, asserting its work was limited to planting and mulching. The court focused the initial discovery phase on liability, setting a deadline for January 30, 1998. On January 28, 1998, appellants voluntarily dismissed Great Seneca, Wright, and Genstar, against Horton's opposition. Multiple defendants, including Horton, subsequently filed motions for summary judgment. On March 25, 1998, the court granted the appellants' dismissal motion and summary judgment in favor of Horton and A. B., determining that the appellants did not establish proximate causation for the explosion. Horton cross-appealed, questioning the denial of its summary judgment motion and asserting that the appellants lacked expert testimony regarding a contractor's standard of care. Horton also noted the dismissal of its cross-claims and sought to preserve the right to revive these claims post-appeal. The appeal raised questions regarding the sufficiency of evidence against Horton and A. B., as well as the legality of the trial court's summary judgment decisions concerning Wright, Great Seneca, and Genstar's cross-claims. Each cross-appellee raised specific issues, including the sufficiency of evidence for Wright’s liability and the appropriateness of the court's rulings on cross-claims against Great Seneca and Genstar.
Great Seneca, Genstar, and Wright have filed motions to dismiss Horton's cross-appeal, arguing that the court's summary judgment on Horton's cross-claims was based on substantive grounds, not because the claims were rendered moot. They cite Md. Rule 8-602(a)(7), which allows for dismissal of an appeal for failure to submit a timely brief, to support their position that Horton did not adequately address the substantive issues in his appeal. Wright also invokes Rule 8-504(a)(5) for dismissal, highlighting Horton's failure to address the court's ruling regarding Wright's involvement. Horton submitted a Motion for Leave to Supplement Brief shortly before oral arguments, which is opposed by all three defendants and remains pending. The court affirms the trial court's decision, noting that the defendants did not demonstrate causation for the plaintiffs' injuries, rendering the issues surrounding Horton's cross-appeal and his motion to supplement unnecessary for consideration.
The factual background indicates that in March 1992, Horton contracted with Wankel to build a home on Lot 27A in the Kentlands development. The lot's ownership is unclear, with potential ties to either Joseph Afandre or Great Seneca. Horton obtained a building permit in June 1992. The lot is rectangular, with a common-use alley providing garage access. Redland Genstar paved the alley in October 1991. In July 1992, Horton hired Wright for excavation and backfill work, which included two days of foundational work and grading. Wright's invoices confirm completion of initial work by July 8, 1992, with backfill finished by July 26, 1992. Wright returned for final grading on November 19, 1992, and removed excess dirt from the site shortly thereafter. Additionally, Horton's site superintendent contacted 'Miss Utility' on July 14, 1992, to report excavation plans, and invoices indicate installation of silt fencing on Lot 27A in August and September 1992, though specific locations for the fencing are not detailed.
Dodson testified at his deposition that Buffet, the site manager, directed him to install a silt fence along the asphalt alleyway to prevent soil erosion, despite the area being marked with yellow flags indicating an underground gas line. Although Dodson was unsure of the precise depth of the gas lines, he estimated they were typically buried about three feet deep based on his 15 years of experience. During questioning, Dodson confirmed that he placed the silt fence near the alley and was aware of the gas line's general location marked by the yellow flags.
Dodson mentioned that he may have also installed silt fence at the rear of Lot 27A, a claim corroborated by other witnesses. On October 23, 1992, Horton hired A.B. to repair the silt fence previously installed by Dodson. Employees of A.B., Tom Atkins and Burt Leffingwell, testified that they used stakes measuring 2.2.42 and typically drove them about ten inches into the ground. These stakes, usually made from hardwood, come pre-stapled to the fencing material. Atkins noted that A.B. was not required to contact "Miss Utility" before silt fence installation and described processes for repairing 'blowouts' or tears in the silt fence, which involved reinforcing and restapling the fabric as needed.
Leffingwell testified about A. B's repair of a blowout in the rear left corner of Lot 27A, specifically along the edge of the asphalt alleyway. Horton arranged for the removal of silt fencing, but Robert Richter, Horton's corporate designee, could not confirm the timing of its removal relative to Wankel's move-in date on November 30, 1992, nor who performed the task, only that a labor service was likely used. Over thirteen months later, on January 21, 1994, Wankel's house was destroyed by an explosion and fire under cold conditions with a frozen ground. Investigators from the Montgomery County Fire Marshal's office, Washington Gas Company, and the Maryland Public Service Commission responded, finding evidence of natural gas in the ground around the house. Pressure tests indicated a leak in a two-inch plastic distribution line under the rear alley, where excavation revealed a 3/4" hole in the pipe created by a sharpened wooden stake found 34 inches deep. The Gas Pipeline Failure Investigation report concluded that the ground's freezing likely caused the stake to move upward, allowing natural gas to escape and migrate into the house, where it was ignited by an unknown source. William Hinde from Washington Gas described the excavation process, noting that the stake was initially not visible and only became apparent after extensive digging.
The backhoe did not remove earth material directly above the location of the stake. The stake was uncovered using digging bars and shovels during the excavation of the hole. The witness, Hinde, confirmed that he hand-dug down to the gas line depth and was standing over the hole when it was unearthed, but he did not see the stake in the gas line, nor did anyone else present indicate that the stake was embedded in it. Hinde acknowledged awareness of previous incidents involving stakes piercing plastic gas lines but could not specify details.
The Montgomery County Fire Marshal's report indicated the fire originated on the first floor due to a natural gas leak. Walter Rothfuss from Rothfuss Engineering Co. investigated the incident and concluded that a wooden stake, likely a grade stake, had penetrated the gas line. Rothfuss noted extreme weather conditions, including freezing temperatures and ice cover, which would have impeded the gas's natural dispersion. Instead, gas likely followed paths of least resistance through buried utility lines to enter the building's foundation, potentially igniting from various sources within the home.
The investigation revealed the gas line had been penetrated by a wooden stake, which was part of a silt fence that was required to be placed at a specific depth. Given the depth of soil covering the distribution line, it is deemed improbable that the silt fence's installation caused the leak unless there was significant soil fill or the stake was driven deeper than required.
Rothfuss served as an expert witness for the appellants and provided deposition testimony regarding a stake found at the incident scene, initially identified as a silt fence stake due to a fragment of fabric attached to it. He speculated that the stake might have also been used as a grade stake after its initial function. However, Rothfuss explicitly stated that he would not opine at trial whether the stake was serving as a silt fence stake immediately prior to perforating the gas line, acknowledging uncertainty about how the stake penetrated thirty-nine inches below the surface. Rothfuss confirmed that he had not been asked to evaluate the stake's insertion or excavation methods related to the gas line incident, nor had he been tasked with determining how the stake came to be near the gas line. Ultimately, he concluded that the situation remained indeterminate after an exhaustive investigation that was deemed unproductive.
On January 28, 1998, two days before the close of discovery, the appellants moved to voluntarily dismiss certain co-defendants, which was opposed by Horton. The dismissal motion was still pending when Horton and A. B filed for summary judgment on January 30, 1998, seeking judgment on all claims. Concurrently, Great Seneca filed its own summary judgment motion, asserting that the appellants could not establish a prima facie case against it, as reflected in their dismissal motion.
Great Seneca contended it held no liability for any negligence attributed to Horton or A. B. as both were independent contractors. Genstar and Wright also sought summary judgment, with Wright asserting it was not involved in the silt fence's installation or removal and challenging Horton's cross-claims for indemnification on the basis of a lack of contractual entitlement and absence of evidence linking Wright to any negligence. Genstar supported its motion by stating that there was no evidence identifying who caused the gas line puncture.
On February 12, 1998, appellants opposed the motions, arguing that a jury could infer from Atkins's deposition that A. B. left the silt fence stake near the puncture. They highlighted Atkins's opinion that the stake was a silt fence stake and asserted that A. B. had a duty to contact 'Miss Utility' before conducting repairs, emphasizing that foreseeability of the explosion was a jury question. Regarding Horton, appellants claimed credible evidence showed that Horton or its subcontractor negligently placed the silt fence over the gas line, arguing expert testimony was unnecessary but citing their expert, Salvatore J. Ficarro, as sufficient.
Ficarro testified that it was negligent to install a silt fence over a natural gas line and that it was the contractor's responsibility to supervise this aspect. He confirmed his opinions were based on personal experience rather than industry standards. He also indicated that while the contractor could delegate responsibilities, it did not relieve them of accountability, particularly if issues arose during inspections.
On February 26, 1998, a hearing was held by the circuit court, which subsequently issued an eighteen-page memorandum opinion and order on March 25, 1998, docketed on March 30, 1998. The court granted the appellants' motion to dismiss Great Seneca, Wright, and Genstar but clarified that these parties were not completely dismissed due to pending cross-claims against them. It then examined various motions for summary judgment.
Regarding Great Seneca, only Horton opposed the motion, arguing that the 'offending stake' was not on the Wankel property, suggesting potential liability for Great Seneca but not Horton. The court determined that the stake's source and location were not material since, regardless of the fact-finder's conclusion, Great Seneca could not be liable to Horton due to the dismissal of claims against Great Seneca.
In examining Wright's motion for summary judgment, the court found no evidence linking Wright to the stakes, rejecting Horton's indemnification claim based on a lack of joint tortfeasor relationship. The court similarly granted Genstar's motion, dismissing Horton's claims for contribution and indemnification as no evidence indicated negligent actions by Genstar.
Horton had also moved for summary judgment on three grounds: the necessity of expert testimony on standard of care, lack of evidence for a breach of duty, and absence of proximate cause for injuries. The court disagreed with Horton on the first two grounds but agreed on the third, leading to a summary judgment in favor of Horton. It noted that appellants failed to present a qualified expert on the contractor's standard of care, while the court found the expert, Salvatore Ficarro, qualified to testify on the standard of care owed by general contractors. Ultimately, the court acknowledged genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Horton, through its subcontractors, breached a duty owed to the appellants.
Appellants provided circumstantial evidence indicating that Horton, through Dodson, installed a stake over a gas line. The court determined that Horton and A. B were obligated to notify 'Miss Utility' prior to repairs on the silt fence, with violations potentially indicating negligence. However, the court found the evidence related to A. B's repairs sufficient to counter Horton's motion for judgment concerning a breach of duty. The court deemed summary judgment inappropriate, noting circumstantial evidence of Horton's failure to remove all stakes when the silt fence was taken down.
Despite this, the court ruled that appellants did not establish that Horton's actions were the proximate cause of the explosion. It applied the 'substantial factor test,' concluding that a sequence of extraordinary events, independent of Horton's conduct, led to the explosion. These events included the stake detaching from the silt fence, being driven into the ground, and subsequently cracking the gas line, followed by a series of occurrences allowing gas to leak and ignite. The court highlighted the significant time lapse—over thirteen months—between Horton's actions and the explosion. It determined that the connection between any alleged negligence by Horton and the resulting harm was tenuous, and the explosion was primarily caused by intervening forces that eclipsed Horton's potential negligence.
Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Horton and A. B, ruling that the explosion was not a foreseeable outcome of any negligence. Horton's cross-claims against A. B and Dodson became moot due to the granted motions. Although Dodson did not file a motion regarding this matter, the court indicated it would dismiss Dodson as a Third Party Defendant upon a proper motion. Subsequently, Horton and Dodson agreed to dismiss the third-party complaint without prejudice. Appellants and Horton then filed their respective appeals and cross-appeal following the denial of a motion for reconsideration by appellants.
Maryland Rule 2-501(a) allows any party to file a motion for summary judgment at any time, asserting that no genuine dispute exists regarding any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A trial court's decision to grant summary judgment involves a two-part analysis: it must confirm the absence of any genuine dispute over material facts and determine that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The opposing party must provide evidence that demonstrates a genuine dispute regarding a material fact to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Simple general allegations are insufficient; the non-moving party must present detailed and precise factual evidence. When assessing the existence of disputes, courts must favorably consider all reasonable inferences for the non-moving party. If no material fact disputes are found, appellate review focuses on whether the trial court reached the correct legal conclusion.
In negligence claims, a plaintiff must prove four elements: the defendant owed a duty to protect the plaintiff, breached that duty, the plaintiff suffered an actual injury or loss, and the injury was proximately caused by the defendant's breach. The trial court granted summary judgment in this case because it concluded that the appellants could not demonstrate that any alleged negligence by Horton or A.B. was the proximate cause of their injuries.
The court concluded that the appellants could not establish cause in fact or legal causation linking the defendants' alleged negligence to the explosion, emphasizing the significance of intervening events. The appellants argued that the trial court wrongly excluded the jury from determining proximate cause. While multiple events followed the negligent actions of Horton and A.B. that led to the explosion, these events were not unforeseeable as a matter of law. The court noted that proximate causation is complex and must be analyzed case-by-case, reflecting longstanding confusion in legal interpretations, as cited from Yonce v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories. Proximate cause includes two components: cause in fact and legally cognizable cause. The determination of cause in fact examines whether the defendant's actions directly caused the injury, with Maryland courts using the "but for" and "substantial factor" tests for analysis. The "but for" test identifies situations where the injury would not have occurred absent the defendant's conduct, while the "substantial factor" test addresses scenarios with multiple independent causes leading to the same injury. Legal causation considers whether liability should attach based on fairness and policy, acknowledging instances where a defendant's negligence may not justify liability despite being a contributing factor to the injury.
Legal causation hinges on the foreseeability of injury resulting from negligent acts. Liability is not absolved if a person should have foreseen the general danger, even if the specific harm was not anticipated. Maryland courts align with the Restatement (Second) of Torts regarding proximate causation, asserting that an actor remains liable if their conduct is a substantial factor in causing harm, regardless of whether the extent or manner of harm was foreseeable.
The trial court utilized the "substantial factor" test, considering three key factors from Yonce: (a) the number and impact of other contributing factors, (b) whether the actor's conduct created a continuous force leading to harm, and (c) the lapse of time. In this case, the court reasoned that an explosion caused by the installation of a silt fence stake over a gas line required a series of extraordinary events, including the stake becoming dislodged and puncturing a gas pipe, followed by conditions that allowed gas to accumulate and ignite. This situation was compared to Peterson v. Underwood, where a wall collapse caused by construction defects directly led to harm. The court concluded that the causal link in the appellants' case was too tenuous to establish liability.
A metal rod shaped like an inverted "U" was installed by a subsequent tenant or owner in a wall, which later collapsed, resulting in a boy's death. The Court of Appeals determined that the evidence presented could allow a jury to find the defendant negligent in constructing the wall, but ultimately ruled in favor of the defendant due to a lack of evidence linking the negligence to the injury. The court found a critical defect in the plaintiff's case was the failure to establish that the negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. The expert witness did not specify what caused the wall's collapse, only that the wall's original construction was negligent. Additionally, the plaintiff's exclusion of other potential causes, like children pulling on the clothesline, left the jury without sufficient information to assess the negligence's impact on the injury. The court emphasized that the time elapsed between the negligent act and the harm diminished the likelihood of a causal connection without direct proof. It stated that allowing the jury to infer causation without direct evidence would lead to speculation, which is not permissible under Maryland law. The appellants argued that their case differed from prior cases, citing direct evidence connecting the actions of individuals responsible for installing a silt fence over a gas line, leading to an explosion caused by a puncture in the line. The case of Stone v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. was referenced for guidance in assessing the negligence claims.
Stone claimed that the failure to record a loan release prevented him from securing a $50,000 home equity loan over a year after purchasing his home. He sought this loan to buy stock puts to safeguard his investments amid anticipated margin calls on stocks purchased on credit. Consequently, unable to borrow, Stone met the margin call by selling his stocks at a considerable loss. The court ruled that the attorney's negligence was not a proximate cause of Stone's losses, as they fell outside the "general field of danger" the attorney should have anticipated. The court explained that the chain of events leading to Stone's losses—market collapse, forced stock sales due to loan issues, and the attorney's failure to record the lien release—did not establish an acceptable connection between the attorney's negligence and the financial damages incurred by Stone. The court emphasized that the damages were an extraordinary result of the attorney's actions and ruled against Stone's claims. The case was contrasted with Texas Co. v. Pecora, where the negligence of leaving gasoline tanks unsecured was found to have directly caused injuries to children, illustrating the importance of establishing proximate cause in legal claims.
The jury could have determined that the Texas Company was aware, or should have been aware, that the pipes would be disconnected during the tank's removal, and that the open pipes posed a danger. The removal process and subsequent events, including children rolling the tank, the application of fire, and the resulting explosion, were seen as foreseeable outcomes linked to the Texas Company's initial negligence. However, the court concluded that the evidence did not sufficiently establish that the negligence of Horton or A.B. was a substantial factor in causing the explosion. Although the appellants suggested that a puncture in an underground gas pipe led to the explosion, there was no evidence indicating when the pipe was pierced or who was responsible for the stake's presence in the gas line. The appellants failed to prove that any negligence in installing the silt fence or grading was directly connected to the explosion. The expert for the appellants could not ascertain how the stake penetrated the gas pipe, further complicating their claims. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled that the jury could not speculate on fault due to insufficient evidence linking the appellees' actions to the explosion. Generally, causation is a jury question, but in this instance, the appellants did not demonstrate that the alleged negligent acts were a factual cause of the explosion or that the injuries were a foreseeable result of those acts. Each link in the causal chain must be demonstrably connected, regardless of time elapsed between the negligent act and the injury.
The trial court determined that even if the appellees' negligence in leaving a stake in the ground contributed to the explosion, the intervening forces that drove the stake into the gas pipe constituted superseding causes, relieving the appellees of liability. The court referenced the six factors from Restatement § 422 to evaluate whether an intervening force qualifies as a superseding cause. These factors include:
1. The nature of harm resulting from the intervening force being different from the harm anticipated from the original negligence.
2. The extraordinary nature of the intervening force's consequences compared to what was expected.
3. Whether the intervening force operates independently of the negligence or is a typical result of it.
4. The role of third parties in bringing about the intervening force.
5. Any wrongful acts by third parties that may contribute to the harm.
6. The degree of culpability of the third parties' actions.
The trial court assessed each factor, concluding that the removal of the stake, while negligent, should have resulted in harmless consequences. It found the subsequent events leading to the explosion to be unexpected and extraordinary. The court noted that the forces causing the stake to drive down and then up, along with the ignition source, were independent and unrelated to the appellees' actions. The exact cause of the gas line puncture was undetermined.
The appellants argued that foreseeability is key in determining whether an intervening act is superseding. They contended that the act of a third party driving the stake into the ground raised a factual question regarding its status as a superseding cause. The court had previously established that intervening negligence is not considered a superseding cause if it was reasonably foreseeable.
The Matthews Court referenced a definition of superseding cause from State v. Hecht Company, which states that if negligent acts from multiple parties do not occur simultaneously, the liability of the first negligent party depends on whether the subsequent negligent act was foreseeable. If a reasonable person could anticipate that the second act might naturally follow the first, the first party remains liable. The court agreed with the trial court's assessment that the causes linking an abandoned wooden stake to an explosion were extraordinary and unforeseeable.
In Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, a patient escaped from a high-security mental hospital and, after being mistakenly referred for emergency shelter, stole a van and caused an accident. The driver's insurance sued both the State and the Manor Inn for negligence. The court ruled that the State had no duty to foresee the accident resulting from the patient's escape and granted summary judgment in its favor. It also granted summary judgment for Manor Inn, concluding that the patient's negligent driving constituted a superseding cause of the injuries, as leaving the keys in the ignition significantly increased the likelihood of theft. However, the appellate court found error in granting summary judgment for Manor Inn without a motion but ultimately agreed that the patient's negligence was a superseding cause, justifying the summary judgment.
It was reasonably foreseeable that leaving the keys in the ignition would lead to the theft of the van. However, it is unclear if the thief would drive negligently or cause injury to the plaintiff. While Manor Inn's negligence was the proximate cause of the van's theft, this causal link does not extend to the actions of the thief post-theft. The thief's conduct in taking the van was predictable, but their negligent driving was not. The case is distinguished from *Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Kenney*, where the driver’s negligence was clearly linked to the accident due to obstructed visibility. In *Kenney*, the harm was foreseeable, and the court found proximate cause existed. In contrast, the negligence attributed to the appellees in this case was temporally remote, making it difficult to predict the resulting catastrophe from their actions. A jury could find that a wooden stake punctured a gas line, potentially resulting from a silt fencing stake, but the extraordinary nature of the events leading to the disaster means the trial court did not err in ruling in favor of Horton. The appellants did not sufficiently demonstrate that Horton and A.B.'s negligence proximately caused their harm. Additionally, Maryland Rule 2-332(a) allows a defendant to initiate a third-party complaint.
A third-party complaint can be served on a person who is not a party to the original action but may be liable to the defendant for part or all of the plaintiff's claim. It is characterized as a contingent claim, contingent upon the defendant's liability to the plaintiff. In the case discussed, Horton's claims for indemnity and contribution against several parties were contingent on the possibility of Horton being found liable for damages claimed by the appellants. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Horton, rendering the cross-claims filed by Horton moot and leading to the dismissal of Horton's cross-appeal and the motions to dismiss it. The judgment was affirmed, with costs to be shared equally among the appellants. The excerpt also details the monetary claims made by the appellants on behalf of individuals injured and the cross-claims exchanged among the defendants within specific dates. Additionally, it mentions that Horton's attempt to supplement his brief was denied as it did not comply with procedural rules.
The Maryland Rules do not allow a cross-appellant to file more than one reply brief in response to a cross-appellee's brief, thus Horton is not permitted to supplement his brief based on the cross-appellees' arguments. Richard Richter, Horton's corporate representative, testified that the Kentlands lots were acquired in two groups from different sellers, but he could not confirm the specific group for lot 27A. There is a discrepancy regarding the timing of services provided by Wright; Buffet’s notice to Miss Utility on July 14, 1992, pertains only to the backfill operation since Wright’s work was completed prior to that notice. Bar hole readings, used to measure natural gas levels, are typically taken no deeper than eighteen inches to avoid gas pipelines. Maryland Rule 2-506(a) allows a plaintiff to dismiss an action without leave of court before the opposing party files an answer or motion for summary judgment, or through a signed stipulation by all parties. As Horton opposed dismissal, the moving parties needed to seek court approval under Md. Rule 2-506(b), which restricts dismissal in the presence of a counterclaim unless the counterclaim can be independently adjudicated. The trial court initially assessed Horton's conduct before applying those findings to the case.
