State v. Waring

Citations: 701 S.E.2d 615; 364 N.C. 443; 2010 N.C. LEXIS 915Docket: 525A07

Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina; November 5, 2010; North Carolina; State Supreme Court

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In the case of State of North Carolina v. Byron Lamar Waring, the events unfolded on November 8, 2005, when Raleigh police responded to a report of a rape and possible assault at an apartment complex. Officer David Naumuk was the first responder and encountered Andrew Bennett Pipkin, who was calling for help while assisting the victim, Lauren Redman. Redman was found severely injured, sitting in a pool of blood with her intestines exposed, and was without underwear. Pipkin described hearing cries for help and found Redman after she called to him from below. She indicated that she had been attacked by "two black men." 

Upon arrival, Officer Naumuk secured the scene and, along with Sergeant Munn, conducted a preliminary search of Redman's apartment, discovering significant blood and no signs of forced entry. Pipkin attempted to aid the victim by pressing a towel against her wound and remained with her until paramedics arrived. Despite their efforts, Redman was pronounced dead shortly after being placed in the ambulance, where multiple life-threatening injuries were noted, including tape wrapped around her neck.

A state medical examiner concluded that the victim died from multiple injuries, which included five stab wounds, abrasions, and contusions to her head and neck, as well as hemorrhaging in her eyes likely caused by asphyxiation. The victim sustained twenty-three stab wounds to her torso, including superficial wounds, and additional injuries such as contusions on her upper extremities and abrasions on her knees and vagina. Police identified Byron Lamar Waring, a nineteen-year-old male, as a suspect. On November 9, 2005, detectives found Waring at his home and he consented to an interview, during which he provided several statements that were later presented at trial. Waring described an incident occurring late on November 7 and early on November 8, 2005, when he and Joseph Sanderlin went to the victim's apartment with duct tape. They claimed to be retrieving items for a friend, but upon arrival, they restrained the victim after she let her guard down. Waring and Sanderlin bound her hands with tape, but when the victim managed to free herself, Waring gagged her with a towel. Sanderlin then used a pocket knife to threaten and rape the victim while Waring held her down. After the assault, Waring became enraged when the victim defied him, leading him to punch and stomp on her. Sanderlin, having retrieved a butcher knife, began stabbing the victim, and Waring participated in the stabbing before searching for the victim's belongings. Ultimately, Sanderlin encouraged Waring to "finish her" and left with the victim's keys.

The victim pleaded for her life, stating she was about to die, while the defendant responded that he "got to" kill her. After denying her a request for water, the victim showed signs of losing consciousness. The defendant exited the apartment with a butcher knife, was driven by Sanderlin to Barringer Street in the victim's car, and discarded the knife in a street drain. He later noticed blood on his clothes, took a shower, and removed between $80 and $100 from the victim's wallet, keeping $20 while Sanderlin took the rest. He disposed of his bloody clothes in a dumpster, discarded the victim's wallet in the woods, and later used the victim's car to buy cigarettes. The defendant did not contest critical evidence during his trial, including his fingerprints at the victim's apartment and the blood on his shoes. The jury found him guilty of first-degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule related to robbery and rape. 

During sentencing, expert testimony revealed the defendant's mental health issues, including a right hemisphere brain disorder and personality disorders, which impaired his judgment and ability to conform to the law. Witnesses described his academic struggles and lack of discipline at home. The State countered with an expert who acknowledged the defendant's intellectual challenges but diagnosed him with an antisocial personality disorder and suggested possible malingering. The jury found three aggravating circumstances for sentencing: the murder was committed during a felony (rape), for pecuniary gain, and was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.

Four statutory mitigating circumstances were identified by jurors out of eight presented: the defendant acted under duress and domination of another person, both per N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(f)(5); his capacity to appreciate criminality was impaired per N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(f)(6); and he aided in apprehending another capital felon per N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(f)(8). From fifty-nine nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, jurors found two significant: the defendant suffers from borderline intellectual functioning and cognitive impairments. Despite these findings, the jury determined the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating factors, leading to a unanimous recommendation for the death penalty, which was imposed on 9 July 2007. The defendant appealed under N.C.G.S. 7A-27(a).

In pretrial issues, the defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement on 9 and 10 November 2005, arguing he was in custody without receiving Miranda warnings prior to his confession. He claimed that subsequent evidence obtained after the warnings were administered was tainted under Missouri v. Seibert. Additionally, he asserted that law enforcement did not respect his right to silence and that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to present evidence of his mental competence at the suppression hearing. The State countered that the defendant had not preserved these issues for appeal, except for the ineffective assistance claim, due to lack of objection at trial. The trial court held a pretrial hearing where evidence was presented regarding the investigation, including identification of the defendant by a witness, Brad Sasser, and the discovery of the defendant’s fingerprint at the crime scene, leading police to seek an interview with him.

Sergeant Robb instructed Robb to approach the defendant, who was standing 20 to 30 feet away. Robb, dressed in civilian clothes, identified himself as a police officer and informed the defendant he needed to talk. He clarified that the defendant was being detained but not arrested, and he did not restrict the defendant's movement, indicating he would have allowed the defendant to leave if he chose to. Robb sought to maintain a low-impact approach during the encounter. When asked about weapons, the defendant disclosed he had a knife on him and consented to Robb retrieving it. Robb then asked the defendant to sit on the curb until detectives arrived, to which the defendant complied.

Detectives Ken Copeland and Jacquie Taylor arrived shortly after, introduced themselves, and told the defendant he was not under arrest and had a few minutes to talk, which the defendant accepted. The defendant mentioned having been warned by Sasser that police were looking for him but expressed his willingness to cooperate, stating he had nothing to hide. Detective Copeland asked if the defendant would accompany them to the police department for an interview, and the defendant voluntarily agreed.

Prior to getting into the police car, the defendant allowed Detective Copeland to pat him down for weapons. The defendant was not handcuffed and walked freely into the police station at approximately 9:00 a.m. After being escorted to the Investigative Division and offered coffee, Detective Copeland left the defendant unattended in a small interview room. At around 9:15 a.m., Detective Taylor entered to conduct the interview, beginning with questions about the defendant’s relationship with the victim's roommate and other acquaintances. The defendant explained he had met them at a recent party and had been spending time with Sasser.

Detective Taylor questioned the defendant about his activities on November 7, 2005, the day before a murder. The defendant claimed he visited the victim's apartment with Sasser, Hobgood, and Dominic Copeland around 10:00 p.m. for approximately ten minutes to retrieve belongings. Afterward, Sasser drove the defendant and Dominic home, with Dominic taking a cab. The next day, the defendant learned from Matt Johnson of the victim's death. When asked about a cousin named Joey, the defendant initially stated Joey was not present at the apartment but later claimed he was, stating Joey's full name was "Joey Jose" and he had returned to New York. Detective Taylor suggested checking train records, to which the defendant proposed Joey may have gone to Durham instead.

Detective Taylor focused on the timeline and interactions involving the defendant, Joey, and Sasser. The defendant denied returning to the victim's apartment after being dropped off but claimed he would not harm anyone, asserting he only "breaks into houses and cars." Detective Taylor informed him that footprints had been found at the victim's apartment, and he agreed to let them compare his shoes to those prints. While she left the room with the shoes, she learned that the victim's driver's license had been found near the defendant's residence and noticed possible blood on his shoes.

Upon returning, Detective Taylor and Sergeant Perry told the defendant about the license and blood evidence. In response, he reiterated his previous statement but added that Sasser had reacted violently when the victim asked him to leave. When pressed by Sergeant Perry about his presence during the victim's assault, the defendant nodded affirmatively and stated that after Sasser dropped him off, he was called back to the victim's apartment but refused. He later claimed to have arrived between 11:55 p.m. and 12:30 a.m., witnessing Sasser assault the victim before exiting through the back door.

Defendant claimed he left and returned home without witnessing Sasser kill the victim. He provided a diagram of the victim's apartment to Detective Taylor and declined offers for a bathroom break or refreshments. After about ten minutes alone in the interview room, Detective Taylor confronted him with inconsistencies in his statements, revealing she had validated Sasser's alibi. In response, defendant admitted Sasser had sent him to collect money from the victim, claiming an altercation ensued where he hit the victim and stomped on her head before fleeing. He showed Detective Taylor a broken fingernail purportedly sustained during the struggle.

Detective Taylor and Sergeant Perry informed defendant that his jacket, found at a different location, had blood on it, to which he attributed it to the victim's injuries. Following further questioning, defendant was reluctant but eventually wrote the name "Joey Richardson" along with his age and birthday, claiming Joey was present outside while he entered the apartment. He then altered his account, stating he left after the victim fell to the floor, and denied witnessing the stabbing.

After another break, defendant remained unattended for a period before Detective Passley offered him food and later initiated further conversation. When asked if he would tell the truth, defendant affirmed he would, leading to a discussion about his background before returning to the victim's case.

Detectives encouraged the defendant to be truthful during questioning but did not inform him of his Miranda rights. The defendant initially stated that the victim's sliding-glass back door was locked and provided details about how he opened it. He claimed he did not stab the victim after beating her, mentioned discarding his clothes in a trash can, and stated he had taken the victim’s wallet, later throwing it into the woods. Due to inconsistencies in his statements, the detectives continued to question him, leading to a confession where he implicated himself in the murder, stating he and an accomplice, Joey, were sent by a third party, Sasser, to retrieve money from the victim and harm her. The defendant detailed how they entered the apartment under false pretenses, and after Joey assaulted the victim, he was handed a knife and ultimately stabbed her multiple times, despite initially refusing to do so. He became emotional during the confession, expressing remorse, and later altered his claim about Sasser’s involvement. After the confession, the detectives left the room, returned to inform the defendant of his arrest, and subsequently provided him with his Miranda rights, which he acknowledged. The detectives then planned to accompany the defendant to recover evidence related to the crime.

Defendant, restrained in handcuffs and leg irons, was transported by police, providing directions regarding discarded clothing and the recovery of a baseball cap and victim's purse. After a brief emotional goodbye with his girlfriend, he requested a bathroom break and was taken to a police station. Following this, he declined food but requested a drink, which Detective Passley procured from McDonald's. While en route to locate the victim's car, Detective Passley engaged defendant about its whereabouts, prompting defendant to direct them to Barringer Drive, where the vehicle was found. During this time, he admitted to discarding a knife in a nearby storm drain, which was later recovered and found to have blood on it. 

Defendant then identified a second suspect as "Tony Martinez," yet failed to provide concrete details and later retracted this claim, stating he "just had to" give false information. He resisted disclosing the actual name of the second suspect, asserting he wouldn't "snitch." Upon returning to the Raleigh Police Department, defendant's restraints were removed, and he declined further food or drink. Detective Passley later returned to elicit a more accurate statement, leading defendant to confess, implicating "Joey" as the true assailant, revealing that Joey inflicted the most harm while he only acted in a supporting role. Defendant admitted to holding the victim down but denied any sexual assault, attributing his actions to a chaotic situation that spiraled out of control.

Detective Passley interviewed the defendant, who initially denied the presence of others during the incident. After concluding the interview, Passley returned with a shoe belonging to the defendant, who explained he had cleaned it but was unsure about the actions of an accomplice named Joey. The defendant was taken to the magistrate and admitted to Wake County Jail. The following morning, Detectives Passley and Montague re-interviewed the defendant, re-advising him of his Miranda rights, which he acknowledged and waived in writing. He then provided a detailed account of the murder and subsequent events, culminating in a tape-recorded confession that confirmed his earlier statements.

The trial court, during a suppression hearing, established 107 findings of fact regarding the defendant's custody and statements. Key findings included that the defendant was polite, cooperative, coherent, and of average intelligence; he did not refuse to answer questions or request an attorney. The court noted that no coercion occurred, the questioning was non-threatening, and the defendant was comfortable. The trial court concluded that both the verbal and audiotaped statements were voluntary, with no evidence of impairment or misunderstanding of his rights.

The trial court determined that Detective Taylor and Detective Passley did not formally arrest the defendant during their interview before 2:20 p.m. on November 9, 2005, meaning the defendant was free to leave and did not perceive himself to be in custody. Consequently, statements made by the defendant prior to the administration of Miranda rights were deemed voluntary, with no violation of his constitutional rights occurring. However, after 2:20 p.m. on the same day and during a subsequent interview on November 10, the court concluded the defendant was in custody but had been properly advised of his Miranda rights, which he waived knowingly.

The defendant's motion to suppress these statements was denied, leading to his appeal on grounds of alleged trial court errors. The appellate court's review is limited to examining the sufficiency of evidence supporting the trial court's findings and whether those findings uphold the legal conclusions. The State contended that the defendant did not preserve the suppression issue for appeal due to a lack of objection at trial, while the defendant argued that the trial judge's pretrial ruling bound the trial judge's decision, negating the need for a renewed objection.

The appellate court found that a pretrial ruling on suppression is preliminary, necessitating a contemporaneous objection during trial due to potential changes in evidence presentation. Citing precedent from State v. Oglesby, the appellate court indicated that the failure to preserve these issues would require review for plain error. The defendant contested specific findings related to Officer Robb's actions and knowledge during the initial police contact, asserting they were unsupported by evidence. Officer Robb testified he lacked authority to detain the defendant without an arrest warrant and was not fully informed about the investigation details.

The individual had minimal knowledge about the case, specifically that there had been a murder involving a female who was stabbed and that he was a person of interest. The trial court found sufficient evidence to support its findings regarding the encounter between the individual and detectives. The individual contested the trial court's conclusion that he voluntarily accompanied the detectives to the police station, suggesting that a reasonable person would not have felt they had a choice. However, the court maintained that the voluntary nature of his agreement was substantiated by the detectives' testimony, which indicated they informed him he was not under arrest and that he expressed a desire to cooperate. 

The individual also disputed the trial court's finding that no guard was present at the interrogation room door during parts of his questioning. While the detective mentioned a protocol requiring an officer to guard the door, another detective testified that during the initial interviews, the individual was not monitored in that manner. The trial court's findings, supported by competent evidence, hold that its resolutions of conflicting evidence are not subject to appeal.

Finally, the individual argued that the trial court erred in concluding he was not in custody for Miranda purposes before admitting to stabbing the victim. The determination of custody for Miranda warnings involves both legal and factual questions. The court will review whether the trial court's findings are supported by evidence and if its legal conclusions apply the law correctly to those facts. It was noted that police are not obligated to provide Miranda warnings to everyone they question, nor does the requirement arise solely because the questioning occurs at the station or the individual is suspected by the police.

The determination of whether a person is "in custody" for Miranda purposes hinges on the totality of circumstances, specifically whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement akin to an arrest. This assessment is objective, focusing on the interrogation's circumstances rather than the subjective perceptions of the officers or the individual. Key factors include whether the suspect was informed they could leave, whether they were handcuffed, the presence of uniformed officers, and the nature of security surrounding them.

In this case, the defendant was told he was detained but not arrested and voluntarily agreed to accompany detectives to the police station, expressing eagerness to talk. During the interrogation, he was never restrained and was often left alone with an unlocked door. He was cooperative, received bathroom breaks, and was offered food and drink. The officers did not threaten him or deceive him, nor did they confront him with false evidence. The trial court concluded that the defendant was not in formal custody until he admitted involvement in the crime, after which he was read his Miranda rights. The defendant's claim that he was "detained" did not equate to being in custody for Miranda purposes, as any initial detention ceased when he voluntarily engaged with the detectives.

Robb repeatedly informed the defendant that he was not under arrest, a fact confirmed by arriving investigators, which mitigated any confusion about his status. Relevant case law supports that individuals informed they are not under arrest and who voluntarily interact with police officers are not considered to be in custody. The defendant's inability to leave the interview room without supervision does not equate to being under arrest, as restrictions in police facilities are standard and do not indicate formal custody. Consequently, the defendant was not in custody during his time at the Raleigh Police Station, and his statements, including a confession, were deemed voluntary and admissible in court. 

The defendant claimed that his right to silence was not adequately respected while he was with Detective Passley and Officer Lindsey in a police car for three hours. Although he expressed reluctance to disclose the identity of another individual involved in the crime, arguing this constituted an invocation of his right to silence, the investigators continued to question him. The court ultimately found that his statements were properly admitted as they were made voluntarily and did not violate his rights under Miranda.

A criminal defendant can terminate custodial interrogation at any time by expressing a desire to remain silent, as established in *State v. Murphy* and *Miranda v. Arizona*. However, if a defendant's invocation of the right to silence is ambiguous, police are not required to stop questioning immediately, as clarified in *State v. Forte*. In this case, the defendant's statement about not "snitching" was deemed ambiguous and did not constitute a clear invocation of the right to silence, thus allowing continued questioning. 

Additionally, the defendant argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his lawyers did not present evidence of his limited intellectual functioning during the suppression hearing. Despite the absence of this evidence at the hearing, the court found no indication that the defendant was confused or unable to understand his rights, noting that he answered questions coherently. The defense counsel's strategic decision not to raise the issue may have been reasonable, as indicated in *State v. Frogge*. The court dismissed this claim without prejudice, allowing the defendant to potentially raise it in a post-conviction motion.

In matters of jury selection, the defendant alleged that the State improperly used peremptory challenges to exclude African-American jurors, Glenda Rogers and Francine Johnson, based on race. The review of such discrimination aligns with the standards set by the Fourteenth Amendment and North Carolina Constitution, as noted in *State v. Maness*. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits race-based challenges to potential jurors, as highlighted in *Batson v. Kentucky*.

A claim of improper racial basis for a peremptory challenge initiates a three-step process. The claimant must first demonstrate a prima facie case of intentional discrimination based on the "totality of the relevant facts." If successful, the burden shifts to the State to provide a race-neutral rationale for the challenge. Finally, the trial court assesses whether the defendant has proven "purposeful discrimination." The court's decision is upheld unless clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court emphasizes that a Batson challenge requires more than a superficial justification; if the stated reason is found lacking, it does not diminish its significance if a plausible rationale is later imagined. All circumstances indicating racial bias must be evaluated. In this case, the defendant alleges a Batson violation when the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge against Glenda Rogers, an African-American woman. Ms. Rogers was the fourth African-American juror examined, following the State's successful challenges of the first three based on their opposition to the death penalty. During voir dire, Ms. Rogers initially expressed strong opposition to the death penalty but later showed inconsistency in her responses regarding her ability to serve on a jury that could impose a death sentence.

A juror, Ms. Rogers, expressed mixed views on the death penalty during voir dire, initially stating she wouldn't personally support it but indicating she could follow the law if required. She provided background on her employment as a debit card specialist and her role as a church videographer, and clarified her media consumption habits. Notably, she revealed that her brother was a murder victim, which she did not disclose on her jury questionnaire. When the prosecutor revisited her stance on the death penalty, she acknowledged her ability to consider it under the law. Subsequently, the State exercised a peremptory challenge to strike Ms. Rogers, prompting the defendant to raise a Batson objection, arguing that the challenge was racially motivated given her status as an African-American woman. The defendant noted that other jurors with similar views on the death penalty were not challenged. The trial court found that the defendant did not establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, denying the Batson objection and allowing the prosecutor to provide race-neutral reasons for the challenge, which included references to the race of key witnesses in the trial.

Ms. Rogers expressed her opposition to the death penalty, indicating a belief in divine punishment but struggling with her stance during jury selection. The prosecutor noted her inconsistent responses regarding her ability to serve, highlighting that she initially felt she could not participate but later suggested she could. This ambiguity led the prosecutor to question her suitability as a juror, especially since the State seeks jurors who are not personally opposed to the death penalty. Additionally, the prosecutor pointed out discrepancies in Ms. Rogers's jury questionnaire and her voir dire testimony, particularly concerning her family's victimization and her television habits.

The passage references the standard for establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection, stating that this threshold is low and intended to shift the burden to the State to provide race-neutral justifications for peremptory challenges. Relevant factors include the races involved and the prosecutor's behavior regarding juror selection. The State provided reasons for its peremptory challenge against Ms. Rogers, but the trial court did not formally address these justifications and ultimately denied the defendant's Batson challenge, leading to a limited review focused on whether the trial court erred in its initial determination regarding the prima facie showing of discrimination.

Defendant raised a Batson challenge, arguing that the prosecutor's peremptory strike against Ms. Rogers was racially motivated, similar to previous strikes against jurors Metz and Skiff, who expressed concerns about the death penalty but were ultimately accepted. Juror Metz stated he could follow the law despite personal issues with the death penalty, while juror Skiff indicated a preference for life without parole. The defendant noted that Ms. Rogers was the only one of the three who initially expressed personal opposition to the death penalty. Although no pattern of discriminatory challenges was established, the Constitution prohibits striking even one juror for discriminatory reasons. The trial court considered the differences in jurors' views on the death penalty and the racial dynamics of the case—an African-American defendant and a white victim—finding that the defendant did not establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Furthermore, the trial court's statement about the standard for determining discriminatory motivation was deemed a misstatement; however, the judge correctly applied the appropriate standard in practice, confirming that the defendant bore the burden of showing that the peremptory challenge was motivated by discriminatory purposes. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying the Batson challenge.

During jury selection, the defendant asserted a Batson objection after the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against Francine Johnson, a prospective juror. The trial court requested the prosecutor to provide reasons rebutting claims of racial or gender discrimination. The court's phrasing indicated a misunderstanding of the Batson standard, mistakenly suggesting the defendant needed to prove race was the sole motive for the challenge. However, this miscommunication did not affect the court's application of the law. The trial court ruled that the defendant did not establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination regarding the challenge against another juror, Rogers, prior to the prosecutor's presentation of race-neutral reasons for the challenge.

The defendant argued that the State's challenge against Johnson was racially motivated. Johnson, an African-American female, was the eighth African-American juror examined, with only two African-American jurors ultimately selected for the jury. During voir dire, the prosecutor questioned Johnson about her views on the death penalty, noting that she had not formed a definitive opinion on the subject despite recent contemplation. Johnson expressed that she was still undecided, indicating her struggle to formulate a position based on personal and familial considerations related to capital punishment.

The prosecutor outlined the responsibilities of jurors in capital cases, emphasizing the conditions under which a defendant can receive a life sentence or death penalty. Juror Johnson confirmed her understanding and expressed her ability to vote for either sentence under appropriate circumstances, stating she would not have any reluctance and would consider the evidence. The prosecutor inquired about her background, including her occupation as a city bus driver, her partial college education, and her interests such as church activities and television shows. Johnson disclosed a prior arrest for driving a vehicle with an altered VIN, but noted the charges were dismissed.

The prosecutor challenged Johnson peremptorily, leading the defendant to object based on Batson grounds, highlighting that both of the State's peremptory challenges were against African-American females who indicated they could impose the death penalty. The defendant argued that Johnson's responses were neutral and did not justify the challenge beyond racial and gender considerations. The trial court found a prima facie case and required the State to provide race-neutral reasons for the challenge.

In response, the prosecutor expressed concern that Johnson, born in 1957, had not formed her views on the death penalty despite being instructed to consider it prior to jury selection. The prosecutor noted her lack of engagement with local or national news, contrasting it with her preference for cartoons, and stressed concern over her inability to articulate any personal opinions about capital punishment, indicating a detachment from the topic.

The State asserts that felony murder is a likely verdict in this case, emphasizing the significance of jurors who are not opposed to the death penalty. The prosecutor notes the strategic selection of jurors, particularly in light of limited peremptory challenges, and expresses a preference for jurors who can impose the death penalty under appropriate circumstances. The prosecutor clarifies that their focus is solely on death penalty views, not on race or gender, and states they have not addressed race in any questioning of potential jurors, contrasting this with the defense's approach.

A specific juror's criminal history is scrutinized; she was arrested and charged with a felony, which was not dismissed until a lengthy period later due to the inability to locate the victim. Despite her explanation that someone else took the blame for the felony charge, the prosecutor highlights the serious nature of the indictment and the considerable time the case remained unresolved. Additionally, the prosecutor mentions other convictions on the juror's record, including a failure to return rental property, while indicating some uncertainties regarding other potential convictions. Overall, the prosecutor seeks to illustrate concerns about the juror's fitness to serve based on her felony charge and broader criminal history.

The excerpt outlines a legal argument regarding the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges during jury selection, specifically concerning a prospective juror named Johnson. The defense contends that Johnson's responses about the death penalty were neutral and more definitive than those of white jurors who were not challenged by the State. The defense also questions the legitimacy of the prosecutor's concerns about Johnson's criminal record, arguing inconsistencies in the charges and suggesting that other jurors with criminal backgrounds were accepted. 

The trial court ultimately ruled that the prosecutor provided sufficient race-neutral reasons for Johnson's dismissal, concluding that the defendant did not demonstrate racial discrimination by the State. Throughout the jury selection process, the prosecutor exercised nine peremptory challenges, two of which were against African-Americans, resulting in a 50% acceptance rate of African-American jurors. The text emphasizes that even a single improper peremptory challenge based on race constitutes a Batson violation, suggesting that statistical data alone is not definitive. The excerpt highlights the importance of comparative analysis of jurors to assess potential discrimination, as the prosecutor's reasons for striking Johnson may not hold when compared to non-black jurors who were allowed to serve. The prosecutor cited Johnson's lack of formulated opinions on the death penalty, her limited media consumption, and discrepancies in her criminal record as the basis for the challenge.

The prosecutor's examination of jurors included a peremptory challenge against Ms. Johnson, justified by three race-neutral reasons. First, the prosecutor expressed concern over Johnson's lack of established views on the death penalty, arguing that her response indicated uncertainty. In contrast, white jurors Metz and Skiff clearly stated they were not opposed to the death penalty, with Metz asserting its necessity and Skiff acknowledging a preference for jury deliberation on such matters. Only Johnson failed to articulate a position on the death penalty during questioning, which led to the conclusion that the prosecutor's reasoning was not pretextual.

Second, the prosecutor noted that Johnson was "completely removed" from local and national news, a reason deemed less compelling but still consistent when compared to other jurors who demonstrated awareness of current events, such as Skiff and Metz, who actively engaged with news media.

Lastly, the prosecutor cited Johnson's prior criminal charges as a reason for her challenge, which the defendant argued was pretextual since white jurors with similar records were accepted. The defendant highlighted that the prosecutor had accessed Johnson's criminal history but did not do the same for white jurors, pointing out inconsistencies in Johnson's responses compared to her record. An example given was juror Wilson, who had acknowledged a DUI arrest on his questionnaire yet was seated on the jury. Overall, the analysis concludes that the prosecutor's reasons for challenging Johnson do not appear to be pretextual based on the presented comparisons.

The trial court found that prospective juror Wilson had two DUI convictions, but it is unclear if the prosecutor accessed Wilson's AOC records before voir dire. The defendant contends this suggests the prosecutor was selectively checking minority jurors. Prospective juror Johnson had an unclear response on her questionnaire regarding prior charges, which the prosecutor deemed reasonable to investigate further, asserting that a lack of clarity did not indicate racial discrimination. The court noted that the prosecutor’s inquiry into Johnson’s record was not racially motivated. 

The defendant argues that white jurors with criminal records, like Wilson, were not challenged while Johnson was. Johnson indicated a charge related to a false vehicle identification number (VIN) that had been dismissed, but later records revealed additional undisclosed charges against her. The prosecutor cited these charges and Johnson's unclear explanation as reasons for the peremptory challenge.

In contrast, Wilson acknowledged his DUI convictions on his questionnaire, and while the prosecutor initially expressed satisfaction with him, the judge later revealed Wilson's two DUI convictions after checking AOC records. Despite this, the prosecutor remained satisfied with Wilson. The defendant claims this disparity indicates pretext in the prosecutor's reasoning; however, the court concluded that Wilson and Johnson were not similarly situated, undermining the defendant's argument.

Wilson's voir dire testimony aligned with AOC records, while Johnson's responses were inconsistent and incomplete. Wilson had a misdemeanor conviction, whereas Johnson faced felony charges; the prosecutor accepted other jurors with only misdemeanor issues. Wilson openly stated he was not opposed to the death penalty, in contrast to Johnson, who was evasive. This pattern suggests the State's preference for jurors not opposed to the death penalty. The court found the State's race-neutral justifications credible, concluding that race was not a significant factor in the exclusion of Johnson, and rejected the defendant's Batson claim due to a lack of evidence for purposeful discrimination.

The defendant sought to remand the case for further fact-finding based on *Snyder v. Louisiana*, where the Supreme Court criticized a trial judge's failure to substantiate a prosecutor's claim regarding a juror's nervousness. The court noted that in *Snyder*, the trial judge did not directly assess the juror’s demeanor, which limited the Supreme Court's review to only one of the prosecutor's reasons for the strike. The Court found discriminatory intent in that case due to inconsistencies with similarly situated jurors. However, this case does not involve similar intangible observations, so *Snyder* is deemed inapplicable. The court encourages trial judges to make findings to clarify jury selection processes that may not be fully captured in the record.

The absence of a specific finding does not prevent appellate review if the record allows for an objective evaluation of relevant factors, negating the need for remand. The defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly permitted the State to challenge prospective juror Ewbank for cause based on his conflicted views on the death penalty. Ewbank expressed that while he intellectually recognized the law, he felt personally opposed to capital punishment. Despite the prosecutor's attempts to clarify Ewbank's position, he remained uncertain about his ability to impose a death sentence. The trial judge determined that Ewbank's beliefs would significantly impair his duties as a juror and upheld the State's challenge. The court emphasized that it has broad discretion in jury selection matters, and a juror may be excused for cause if their views on the death penalty would hinder their performance in accordance with their oath. This principle is supported by precedents indicating that even unclear opinions on capital punishment can justify a juror's dismissal.

The Supreme Court acknowledges that trial judges may determine a prospective juror’s inability to impartially apply the law, warranting deference to the court's judgment. The trial court found that prospective juror Ewbank's beliefs were ambiguous and thus ruled appropriately regarding his ability to serve in a capital sentencing proceeding. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's challenge for cause against Ewbank. 

The defendant argues that the jury selection process violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to the exclusion of African-American jurors and those opposed to the death penalty, referencing Wainwright v. Witt and Witherspoon v. Illinois. According to these precedents, jurors should not be excused unless their death penalty views would significantly hinder their duties. The trial court applied the Witt standard correctly, and prior rulings in State v. Barts confirm that death qualification of a jury does not violate constitutional provisions. The defendant's request to reconsider Barts was denied. 

Additionally, the defendant claims the trial court erred by preventing defense counsel from discussing the presumption of life without parole during voir dire. The court sustained objections from the State regarding assertions that the law favors life sentences and that the burden lies with the State to prove death as the appropriate sentence beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant contends these rulings were incorrect, arguing that under North Carolina law, a life sentence is imposed if the jury does not unanimously find aggravating circumstances, regardless of their opinions on the appropriateness of the life sentence.

Defendant asserts that a life sentence is both the presumed and sole sentencing option until aggravating circumstances are proven, citing North Carolina General Statute section 15A-2000(b), which mandates a unanimous jury recommendation for sentencing in capital cases. If the jury cannot reach a unanimous decision, the judge must impose life imprisonment. The statute is designed to prevent jurors from feeling pressured to vote for either a death or life sentence without engaging in honest deliberation. The court has ruled that informing the jury about the automatic life sentence if they cannot agree would be improper. Furthermore, it is clarified that North Carolina law does not presume a life sentence. 

Defendant challenges the voir dire process, claiming the prosecutor misled prospective jurors by stating that the jury must unanimously decide on a death or life without parole sentence, while neglecting to emphasize that the State must prove the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating factors. Despite this, the court found that any potential omission was rectified by proper jury instructions, which jurors are expected to follow. Defendant also contends that the prosecutor's comments incorrectly suggested that the jury had to unanimously recommend a life sentence, imposing an undue burden on the defense; however, if the jury does not agree, the court will enforce a life sentence regardless.

A jury's recommendation for a life sentence or death must be unanimous, as established by N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(b) and affirmed in *McCarver*, 341 N.C. at 388-94. The jury is required to respond to Issues One, Three, and Four on a standard form in capital cases with a unanimous 'yes' or 'no.' If the jury fails to reach unanimity, a life sentence is mandated, but they should not be informed of this consequence. The prosecutor's approach did not impose an additional burden on the defendant, nor did the trial court err in rejecting the defendant's objection regarding juror presuppositions of guilt, which were necessary for voir dire related to sentencing.

Regarding trial issues, the defendant contended that the trial court improperly allowed the State to introduce eighteen autopsy photographs of the victim, arguing they were inflammatory and redundant. The admissibility of such photographs requires balancing their probative value against potential unfair prejudice, a decision resting within the trial court's discretion and only reversible if unsupported by reason. Photographs are permissible despite being gruesome if they serve a relevant purpose, as reinforced in *State v. Harris*. Following testimony from Dr. Cynthia Gardner about her autopsy findings, the State sought to introduce the photos to aid in understanding the victim's injuries. The trial court reviewed the photographs, determined they depicted distinct injuries without excessive repetition, and admitted them as relevant evidence. The appellate review concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this ruling, as the photographs were pertinent and not unduly prejudicial.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by upholding the State's objection to defense counsel's recross-examination of Detective Taylor about Joseph "Joey" Sanderlin's lack of cooperation during his initial police interview regarding the murder of the victim. Specifically, the inquiry aimed to highlight Sanderlin's denial of involvement in the crime, which defendant claimed was relevant to his proposed mitigating circumstance of aiding in the apprehension of a capital felon and to counter the State's theory of joint culpability. 

The trial court has discretion to manage the scope of cross-examination, and its decisions are upheld unless it can be shown that they improperly influenced the verdict. In this instance, Detective Taylor testified about obtaining DNA samples from Sanderlin, who had consented to the process. When defense counsel attempted to question Taylor about Sanderlin's denial of involvement, the State objected on hearsay grounds. The defense contended this testimony was not offered for the truth of Sanderlin's statements but to demonstrate his lack of cooperation. However, the court found that Sanderlin's statements constituted hearsay, as they were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

The court ruled that defendant failed to demonstrate how Sanderlin's denial was relevant to his own guilt, especially given defendant's admissions of his actions during the crime. The evidence of Sanderlin's lack of cooperation had minimal relevance to the jury's determination of defendant's culpability for first-degree murder, and the State's questioning did not provide grounds for defense counsel to explore Sanderlin's statements further.

Defendant sought to demonstrate Sanderlin's lack of cooperation to support the (f)(8) mitigating circumstance, but this occurred during the guilt phase of the trial. At sentencing, the jury was instructed on this mitigating factor, and the trial judge acknowledged Sanderlin as a capital felon, with some jurors finding the mitigating circumstance. The trial court did not err in sustaining the State’s objection to the evidence, and defendant was not prejudiced.

Defendant raised issues regarding the State's closing arguments, asserting that the trial court erred by not intervening sua sponte during a supposedly improper argument. The standard for review requires showing that the prosecutor's comments were so improper that they rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. The State suggested that a mark on the victim's forehead could have been caused by defendant's shoe, referencing testimony from a forensic pathologist who noted a contusion on the victim’s forehead but could not identify its cause. Other evidence indicated that defendant admitted to punching and stomping the victim, supporting the prosecutor's implication. The prosecutor’s remarks were deemed not grossly improper, as counsel is allowed to argue presented facts and reasonable inferences.

Additionally, defendant claimed that the prosecutor expressed a personal opinion regarding his guilt in closing arguments, stating the evidence was overwhelming for first-degree felony murder during a robbery.

The evidence presented aligns with legal standards, indicating that the prosecutor's arguments during closing statements were improper but not sufficiently egregious to have tainted the trial's fairness. Specifically, the prosecutor expressed personal beliefs regarding the defendant's guilt and discussed the circumstantial evidence of intent related to a stabbing, which, while erroneous, did not warrant a trial court's intervention without an objection from the defense. The prosecutor also referred to Sanderlin's actions as constituting burglary in the context of premeditation and deliberation, but this reference did not charge Sanderlin or the defendant with burglary, nor did it imply that the jury should consider it as an aggravating circumstance. The court found no fundamental unfairness stemming from this comment. The defendant additionally claimed ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to object to these arguments, but to prove such a claim, the defendant must demonstrate both deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice, as established in Strickland v. Washington.

Counsel’s performance is deemed deficient when it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, as established in Strickland v. Washington. To demonstrate prejudice from this deficiency, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different absent the errors. In this case, despite potential deficiencies in trial counsel’s failure to object during closing arguments, the overwhelming evidence against the defendant indicated no prejudice from the prosecutor's improprieties. The defendant's claim that the State improperly suggested a motive for the murder by stating that the victim was killed to eliminate her as a witness was found to be distinguishable from precedent cases, specifically State v. Williams, where the argument was deemed grossly improper due to lack of evidence. Here, the prosecutor's argument was a reasonable inference from the evidence presented and was contextually appropriate regarding premeditation. Additionally, the defendant challenged the jury instructions on acting in concert, asserting that the State should prove he had the requisite intent to commit the crime independently. The trial court's instruction clarified that individuals acting together with a common purpose can be held liable for crimes committed by one another, regardless of individual intent. The court upheld this instruction as appropriate.

The trial court outlined the elements of first-degree murder, emphasizing that the defendant or an accomplice must have intentionally killed the victim with malice using a deadly weapon. If proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury may infer the killing was unlawful and malicious, although they are not compelled to do so. Additionally, the defendant or accomplice must have acted after premeditation, indicating that the intent to kill was formed, even briefly, before the act. Similar instructions were given for felony murder relating to rape and robbery. The defendant contended that these instructions did not require the jury to find his specific intent and could lead to a conviction based on the intent of an accomplice, referencing State v. Barnes, which supported the concept of acting in concert. The court confirmed that the trial court's instructions were appropriate, as Barnes overruled State v. Blankenship.

In the sentencing phase, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by not intervening during the State's opening statement, which he claimed inflamed the jury's emotions and misled them regarding the evidence presented. The State's remarks shifted focus from the victim to the defendant, asserting that the victim's family would not be heard, which the defendant argued could bias the jury. The court noted that the management of opening statements lies within the trial court's discretion.

An opening statement serves to inform the court and jury about the nature of a case and the evidence to be presented. In reviewing the defendant's claims regarding the prosecutor's opening statements, it was determined that there was no objection from the defendant, leading to an analysis of whether the statements were grossly improper. The prosecutor's comment that the jury would shift focus from the victim to the defendant aligned with the defendant's own opening statement, which indicated a similar structure for presenting evidence. The State's reference to the victim's loved ones not being heard from again was seen as a legitimate forecast of the proceedings rather than an attempt to inflame the jury's emotions. Brief mentions of victims in closing arguments are generally acceptable, as established in prior cases. The prosecutor's references were deemed appropriate and not grossly improper, as they provided a correct summary of the penalty phase. The defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object was rejected since the statements were not improper. Additionally, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in allowing the State's cross-examination of Dr. James Hilkey, who testified for the defense, asserting that the State mischaracterized his findings. Dr. Hilkey had diagnosed the defendant with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, a cognitive disorder, and indicated features of schizotypal and dependent personality disorders, contributing to his assessment of the defendant's behavior at the time of the alleged crime.

The cross-examination of Dr. Hilkey revealed significant points regarding the defendant's psychological evaluations. Dr. Hilkey asserted that the defendant's results from the TOMM test did not indicate malingering and defended his scoring method as ethical despite not using a score sheet. He evaluated the defendant's performance on the Milner Forensic Assessment of Symptoms and concluded it did not suggest malingering. However, he invalidated the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI) test due to the defendant's excessive symptom reporting, stating the results were not useful. Dr. Hilkey cited three reasons for the test's invalidation, emphasizing the defendant's extreme psychological vulnerability as a key factor.

In contrast, Dr. Hazelrigg, a rebuttal witness for the State, disagreed with Dr. Hilkey’s assessment, interpreting the defendant's symptom over-reporting as potentially indicative of malingering rather than a genuine appeal for help. This disagreement between experts highlighted the contested nature of the defendant's mental capacity and psychological disorders at sentencing.

The prosecutor's questioning was deemed appropriate and within the trial court's discretion, aimed at demonstrating that expert opinions could vary regarding the evidence presented. The court referenced prior cases to support the legitimacy of this line of questioning, emphasizing the acceptable scope of cross-examination in eliciting alternative conclusions from expert testimony.

The record does not indicate bad faith in the questioning nor any abuse of discretion by the trial court in overruling the defendant's objection. The court dismissed the defendant's argument regarding the trial court's failure to intervene on its own when the State accused Dr. Hilkey of unethical behavior and when it questioned him about the defendant's potential for future violence. The defendant's failure to object during cross-examination requires plain error review on appeal. The defendant did not specifically assign plain error regarding these issues, resulting in a failure to preserve them for appeal. Nevertheless, the court found no merit in these issues, noting that Dr. Hilkey's response to the ethics question was adequate and that the prosecutor's question about future violence was ambiguous and not asked in bad faith. The trial court did not err in not intervening. The defendant also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to these questions, but the record was insufficient to address this, allowing for future post-conviction consideration.

Regarding the evidence of the defendant's intelligence, the trial court sustained the State's objection to introducing opinion evidence about the defendant's IQ from Ms. Harriet Borom, a special education teacher. She testified about the defendant’s struggles in school and expressed skepticism about prior IQ test results. However, when she speculated that his IQ might be in the mid to high sixties, the State's objection was successful.

The defendant contends that the witness's testimony should be considered admissible lay opinion testimony regarding the defendant's lower IQ. However, the court found this opinion inadmissible because the witness had not been qualified as an expert and was merely speculating about a specific score range. The court referenced State v. Fullwood, which allows for expert opinions characterized as guesses if they imply uncertainty rather than conjecture. The objection to the witness's specific opinion was thus upheld.

Additionally, the defendant claimed that the trial court erred by not intervening during the prosecutor's closing argument in the sentencing phase. The defendant argued that the prosecutor misled the jury by suggesting that the same evidence could support multiple aggravating circumstances. The prosecutor outlined three aggravating factors: the murder occurring during a rape, for pecuniary gain, and being especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The prosecutor's argument was bolstered by playing a tape of the defendant's confession, emphasizing the victim's suffering. He argued that the victim did not experience a quick death and that her final moments were filled with dread. The prosecutor then collectively addressed the aggravating circumstances, stressing the particularly egregious nature of the crime: the victim was attacked in her home at night by two assailants, and she was a young, blameless individual with her life ahead of her, highlighting the senselessness of the attack.

The excerpt outlines several critical points regarding the nature of the crime committed against Lauren Redman, describing it as exceptionally brutal and heinous. Key details include:

1. **Nature of the Crime**: The crime involved rape and severe physical violence, with the defendant actively participating in the attack while another individual, Joseph Sanderlin, raped the victim in her living room, leading to significant trauma as noted by Dr. Gardner.

2. **Torture**: Redman was subjected to both physical and psychological torture, including being taped and threatened with knives, resulting in multiple stab wounds and other injuries—totaling forty-seven wounds, including twenty-three stab wounds to her torso and five to her head and neck.

3. **Pecuniary Gain**: The murder was motivated by robbery, as the defendant reportedly used money taken from Redman shortly after the attack, highlighting a contemptible reduction of human life to monetary value.

4. **Prolonged Suffering**: The victim experienced prolonged conscious suffering, attempting to survive after the attack and communicating her distress during a 911 call before succumbing to her injuries.

5. **Aggravating Circumstances**: The text identifies various aggravating circumstances that contribute to the heinous nature of the crime. The defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider multiple aggravating circumstances based on the same evidentiary foundation, which is typically impermissible in capital cases, citing relevant case law to support this claim.

The cumulative weight of the evidence presented is deemed substantial and cannot be dismissed, underscoring the severity and brutality of the offenses committed against Redman.

The judgment in the referenced case was vacated on other grounds, but it was determined that aggravating circumstances are not considered redundant unless there is complete overlap in the supporting evidence. The prosecutor's argument did not suggest double counting of aggravating circumstances. Instead, the prosecutor clearly indicated that the jury would consider three distinct aggravating circumstances and provided specific evidence for each. The prosecutor's closing remarks emphasized the weight and importance of each aggravating circumstance individually, as well as collectively. This approach paralleled the argument in State v. Miller, where separate evidence was deemed sufficient for multiple aggravating circumstances despite some overlap. The trial court did not err by not intervening, and the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance due to trial counsel's failure to object was unfounded, as there was no basis for an objection. The defendant also argued for a jury instruction against using the same evidence for multiple aggravating circumstances, but no timely request for such an instruction was made. Consequently, the trial court was not obligated to provide it, and the defendant's plain error claim was dismissed. The court also noted the potential for the defendant to raise ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the lack of a request in post-conviction proceedings, as the record did not clarify why the request was not made.

The defendant argues that the trial court erred by not preventing the State from making improper closing arguments during sentencing. He claims the prosecutor improperly expressed personal beliefs by using phrases like "I think" and "I believe" when discussing mitigating circumstances. Specifically, the prosecutor commented on the defendant's actions during the crime and his involvement in apprehending another felon, suggesting an awareness of criminality. Additionally, the prosecutor summarized testimony about the defendant's difficult youth, implying that such hardships are common and do not necessarily warrant mitigation. Generally, attorneys should not inject personal beliefs into closing arguments, as outlined in N.C.G.S. 15A-1230(a). While the State contends that the phrases were merely introductory, it acknowledges that the prosecutor's comments crossed a line by presenting personal beliefs. However, the review indicates that the prosecutor's statements, although improper, were not as inflammatory as arguments deemed objectionable in previous cases, such as State v. Jones. As the comments did not provoke an objection and were not egregiously improper, the trial court did not err by not intervening on its own accord.

Defendant asserts that the prosecutor disrespected Dr. Fozdar's opinions during sentencing by implying Dr. Hilkey doubted Fozdar's diagnosis, exemplified by the prosecutor's dismissive comment "laugh, laugh." This statement, while ambiguous, was part of the prosecutor's broader critique of the defendant's expert witnesses, which the court found not grossly improper enough to warrant intervention. The prosecutor's role includes impeaching expert credibility, and although the comment may have ridiculed defense experts, it did not provoke an objection and was not deemed a violation of fair debate rules.

In a related argument, the defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly introduced irrelevant evidence to inflame the jury regarding aggravating circumstances. The prosecutor highlighted the victim's suffering after being attacked, including details of her struggle to seek help and the impact on a bystander, Andy Pipkin, who assisted her. The defendant argues this was an improper justification for the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance. However, precedent allows such arguments when they illustrate the victim's suffering and the crime's brutal nature, thus finding the prosecutor's references to Pipkin's experience acceptable. Lastly, the defendant objects to the prosecutor's emotionally charged, imagined conversation with the victim's father, suggesting it was inappropriate but without specific legal grounds cited for this claim.

A father’s immediate concern upon learning of his daughter's murder is whether she suffered, leading to the acknowledgment that she did suffer and was raped. The defendant argues that the prosecution's closing argument improperly relied on matters outside the record. Under N.C.G.S. 15A-1230(a), attorneys in criminal trials must base their arguments on the record, except for judicially noticeable facts. However, hypothetical examples are recognized as fictional and do not mislead jurors. Previous cases, such as State v. Chapman and State v. Moseley, support the notion that such arguments are permissible if they remind the jury of the victim's suffering without being grossly improper. The defendant also contests the accusation of being part of a street gang and claims there is no evidence of significant gang involvement. The prosecution’s references to "gang life" were more about a lawless lifestyle rather than specific gang affiliation. Notably, the defendant admitted to being involved in a gang for about three years, and evidence from the trial suggested his participation in a gang-related incident. Thus, while the prosecutor did not assert that the defendant had significant gang involvement or that the killing was gang-related, the context includes evidence of his past gang associations.

The prosecutor's statements during closing arguments were supported by evidence and deemed proper. The defendant alleged misconduct when the prosecutor claimed the defense's mitigation case was based on lies and omissions, specifically suggesting that the defense made the defendant's mother the scapegoat for her absence in testimony. The prosecutor emphasized that the defense presented an incomplete narrative, using the adage that a lie can travel far while the truth lags behind, but clarified he did not imply anyone intentionally deceived the jury. He highlighted that the defendant's circumstances, including his homelessness, were misrepresented, and urged the jury to consider the full context and credibility of the evidence presented. 

Although the defense's case included references to the defendant's mother, the prosecutor pointed out evidence of both her negative and positive influences, urging the jury to evaluate the completeness of the mitigating evidence. Evidence showed that the defendant's homelessness was partly by choice, as he had declined offers for assistance and had spent time living elsewhere, contradicting his claims. Ultimately, the court found that the prosecutor's arguments were reasonable interpretations of the evidence and did not constitute gross impropriety warranting judicial intervention.

The defendant claims cumulative error in the prosecutor's closing argument, asserting that although some arguments were not erroneous, the overall impact of other errors does not constitute reversible error. Additionally, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying peremptory instructions on specific statutory mitigating circumstances during the charge conference. The requested circumstances included: (1) the defendant was under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance (N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(f)(2)); (2) the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was impaired (N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(f)(6)); and (3) the defendant aided in the apprehension of another capital felon (N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(f)(8)). The trial court refused the peremptory instructions but provided nonperemptory ones. It did give peremptory instructions regarding nonstatutory mitigating circumstances related to the defendant's borderline intellectual functioning and right hemisphere brain dysfunction. While jurors found the (f)(6) and (f)(8) circumstances, none found the (f)(2) circumstance. The court has previously stated that peremptory instructions should be provided for any mitigating circumstance supported by uncontested and credible evidence. Expert testimony from Dr. Hilkey and Dr. Fozdar supported the (f)(2) and (f)(6) circumstances, indicating that the defendant had cognitive and personality disorders affecting his behavior and judgment. However, this evidence was contested; cross-examinations and rebuttal testimony from the State challenged the credibility of the defense experts. Notably, Dr. Fozdar's admission that the defendant understood right from wrong and did not believe the disorder caused the murder raised inconsistencies with his earlier assessments.

Dr. Hazelrigg, testifying on behalf of the State, contradicted the defendant's experts, asserting that the defendant did not suffer from any mental disorder that would impair his ability to control his behavior or distinguish right from wrong. The trial court referenced State v. Duke, which upheld the refusal to give a jury instruction on the (f)(2) mitigating circumstance due to inconsistent expert diagnoses, indicating that the evidence of the defendant's mental or emotional disturbance was not uncontroverted. Furthermore, the trial court noted that the defendant's actions—specifically covering his hand with his sleeve while picking up a knife—contradicted his claim of an inability to comprehend the criminality of his actions. The defendant's post-murder behavior, including praying for forgiveness after initially lying about his involvement and attempting to dispose of the murder weapon, also suggested deliberation rather than emotional disturbance, aligning with findings in State v. Badgett.

The trial court found that the evidence regarding both the (f)(2) and (f)(6) mitigating circumstances was not uncontroverted, justifying its refusal to provide a peremptory instruction. Similarly, the evidence for the (f)(8) mitigating circumstance, which posited that the defendant aided in the apprehension of Sanderlin, was inconsistent, as the defendant had provided various false identities and resisted cooperating with the police. Thus, the trial court did not err in its refusal to instruct the jury on the (f)(8) circumstance. Lastly, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to consider whether he had "no significant history of prior criminal activity" under N.C.G.S. 15A-2000 (f)(1). Although he initially presented this mitigating circumstance, he later sought to withdraw it. The State argued against this withdrawal, asserting that the evidence warranted its consideration, and the trial court ultimately decided that the evidence supported submission of the mitigating circumstance.

The statute mandates that in capital sentencing cases, judges must instruct juries to consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances supported by evidence as specified in N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(b). Specifically regarding the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance, the court has consistently ruled that trial judges are required to submit this circumstance if there is sufficient supporting evidence. However, this mitigating factor can also disadvantage defendants, as noted in State v. Hurst. The trial court’s decision to submit the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance was reviewed against the entire record. The defendant's criminal history, which included minor offenses such as breaking and entering and several misdemeanors, led the trial court to reasonably conclude that a jury could find no significant history of criminal activity. Therefore, the submission of the (f)(1) circumstance was deemed appropriate.

The defendant also contended that the trial court erred by not providing peremptory instructions on nine nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Although nonperemptory instructions were given, none of the jurors found these circumstances to exist. The court highlighted that the failure to give peremptory instructions is subject to a "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" review, but acknowledged the challenges judges face in recalling evidence at the end of lengthy trials. One specific circumstance the defendant sought a peremptory instruction for involved evidence about his mother’s medication during pregnancy. However, the evidence lacked clarity and credibility regarding its mitigating nature, leading to the conclusion that the trial court did not err in its instructions.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not providing a peremptory instruction on the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance regarding Byron Waring's need for special education services, arguing that he was mainstreamed in an environment with excessive expectations. However, evidence indicated that the defendant had been tested and placed in a special class prior to kindergarten, undermining the claim of uncontradicted evidence. Additionally, testimony revealed that Waring was an active and happy child, challenging the assertion of a negative self-image and feelings of inadequacy at an early age. 

The defendant further argued for peremptory instructions concerning his mother's actions, which included not accepting his cognitive impairments, sabotaging his psychiatric and mental health treatment, and rejecting him throughout his life. Since the mother did not testify, her portrayal relied on third-party accounts. Although the court found that the trial court should have given a peremptory instruction regarding the mother's lack of acceptance of the defendant's deficits, it concluded the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given that the jury had already failed to find mitigating effect from similar circumstances.

Additionally, the defendant raised nine preservation issues, all of which he acknowledged had been previously decided against him by the Court. These issues included the adequacy of the short-form indictment, the trial court's denial of a motion to prohibit the death penalty, and various alleged errors related to jury instructions on mitigating circumstances and the requisite burden of proof.

The trial court's jury instructions are scrutinized for potential plain error regarding the defendant's burden to prove mitigating circumstances insufficient to outweigh aggravating circumstances and whether the aggravating circumstances justified the death penalty. The defendant seeks to challenge prior court rulings and ensure these issues are preserved for federal review. The court finds no compelling reason to deviate from previous decisions.

In assessing the proportionality of the death sentence, the jury identified three aggravating circumstances: the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, was especially heinous, and occurred during a rape. Evidence supported these aggravating factors, and there was no indication of arbitrary influence or bias in the sentencing process. The jury also acknowledged multiple mitigating circumstances, though none fell under the catchall category.

The court's evaluation of proportionality considers similar cases, with the ultimate decision resting on the court's judgment and experience. The aggravating circumstances identified are commonly associated with proportionate death sentences, with two of the four recognized factors applicable in this case. The defendant's actions, including invading the victim's home, further solidified the sentence's appropriateness. Previous cases where death sentences were affirmed despite co-defendants receiving lesser penalties are also referenced to support this review.

A defendant receiving a death sentence while a codefendant receives a life sentence does not inherently indicate disproportionality. The court has previously identified the death penalty as disproportionate in eight specific cases, which are not applicable here. The defendant was involved in a brutal and prolonged killing, justifying the death sentence as proportionate. The court concludes that the defendant received a fair trial and sentencing, with no prejudicial errors found in his conviction or sentence. Thus, the death sentence is upheld as appropriate. Additionally, details regarding the defendant’s identity and relationship to the victim were established pretrial but not presented to the jury, and recent amendments to the Rules of Appellate Procedure do not affect this case as it falls under the previous version.