You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.

Grimes v. CATOOSA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Citations: 705 S.E.2d 670; 307 Ga. App. 481; 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 4115; 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 1144Docket: A10A1647

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; December 17, 2010; Georgia; State Appellate Court

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil
The Court of Appeals of Georgia addressed the case of Grimes v. Catoosa County Sheriff's Office, where James Michael Grimes sought to expunge his criminal record after the charges against him were nolle prossed. The Catoosa County Sheriff's Office, following the district attorney's directive, denied his request for expungement, leading Grimes to appeal to the Superior Court of Catoosa County. The trial court dismissed his appeal, asserting that Grimes's prior indictment barred him from expungement. Grimes contended this dismissal was erroneous and that his indictment should not prevent expungement since the charges had been nolle prossed. 

The appellate court agreed with Grimes, stating he retained the right to seek expungement despite having been indicted. The court emphasized that under OCGA 35-3-37(d), individuals indicted but later having charges nolle prossed are eligible for expungement. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case, indicating that the law allows for expungement requests under specific circumstances, including cases where charges have been dismissed after an indictment. The court's review focused on statutory interpretation, aiming to uphold the legislature's intent while considering the procedural aspects of expungement under Georgia law.

An individual has the right to expunge their criminal records under OCGA 35-3-37(d)(3) if the prosecuting attorney determines that the charge was dismissed without pursuing an indictment or filing an accusation. If an indictment or accusation has been filed, records cannot be expunged unless specific conditions are met, including that charges were nolle prossed, dead docketed, or dismissed for reasons outlined in OCGA 35-3-37(d)(7). OCGA 35-3-37(d)(9) allows individuals indicted or charged by accusation to request expungement if those charges were later dismissed or nolle prossed. However, if the prosecuting attorney objects within 60 days of receiving the request, the agency must deny the expungement, and the individual can appeal as per OCGA 35-3-37(d)(6). The court emphasized that all parts of the statute should be harmonized and must serve a meaningful purpose. It concluded that an individual can seek expungement if the charges are nolle prossed, but the request can be denied if there is an objection from the district attorney. In Grimes's case, the trial court erred in dismissing his appeal without determining whether the criteria for expungement were met, given that the charges against him were nolle prossed. As such, the court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Grimes's assertion that a de novo hearing was necessary for his appeal is rejected. His appeal falls under OCGA 35-3-37(d)(6), which specifies that the review should follow the procedures outlined in OCGA 50-13-19, requiring a court review based solely on the record, without a jury. The court is obliged to hear oral arguments and accept written briefs upon request as per OCGA 50-13-19(g). The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions. Notably, the appellate record does not clarify the nature of the underlying charge. Additionally, OCGA 35-3-37(d)(7) outlines circumstances under which a record may not be expunged, including situations involving plea agreements, legal barriers to evidence, unavailability of witnesses, judicial economy in light of other charges, completion of pretrial diversion programs without expungement stipulations, prosecution related to a pattern of criminal activity in other jurisdictions, and cases involving diplomatic immunity.