Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP

Citations: 537 F. Supp. 2d 1028; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21714; 2008 WL 762244Docket: 07-00444-CV-W-HFS

Court: District Court, W.D. Missouri; March 19, 2008; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Carl Fletcher, representing himself, filed a lawsuit against Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw Eisenbrandt, LLP, claiming racial discrimination due to his termination, which he alleges was influenced by his criminal history as a convicted sex offender. Fletcher asserts that the employer's policies result in a disparate impact on Black employees, citing that Black individuals are incarcerated at a significantly higher rate than their white counterparts. He references the case Green v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., arguing that blanket disqualifications based on felony convictions violate Title VII.

Fletcher seeks to prevent the defendants from enforcing a policy that discharges individuals solely based on prior felony convictions without considering the specifics of the offense, the time elapsed since the conviction, and the job requirements. He also requests reinstatement and back pay. The defendants, however, clarified that Fletcher's termination was based on concerns raised by female employees about working with someone who had a rape conviction, rather than a general policy against hiring felons.

The court indicated that Fletcher needed to either contest the evidence presented by the defendants or substantiate his claims of racial disparities in sex offender statistics, but he failed to provide relevant evidence. Instead, he persisted in arguing general felony conviction disparities. The court noted that the termination was specifically related to a sex offense and that the defendants did not have a blanket policy against hiring individuals with felony convictions, distinguishing this case from the precedent Fletcher cited. The court allowed for additional record supplementation on issues of disparate impact related to sex offense convictions and the business necessity behind Fletcher's termination. Despite acknowledging that his termination was due to a prior sex offense, Fletcher continued to focus on broader issues regarding felony convictions without demonstrating evidence of disparity related to sex offenses specifically.

Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case for a disparate impact claim related to employment termination due to a prior sex offense, lacking evidence of racial disparities in convictions for such offenses. The defendant law firm's policy of not hiring individuals with sex offense records does not disproportionately exclude minorities, thus not violating Title VII. Summary judgment is granted as the evidence does not allow a rational trier of fact to rule in favor of the plaintiff. The law firm has a legitimate business necessity to avoid employing individuals with serious criminal backgrounds to protect employee morale, particularly in unguarded law office settings. Furthermore, the plaintiff's allegations of a blanket policy against hiring individuals with criminal records conflict with the specific circumstances of his termination, which centered on his own record. Current pleading standards require more than implausible claims, and inconsistencies in the plaintiff's pleadings weaken his case, indicating a lack of sufficient basis to proceed. The ruling references the Supreme Court's skepticism regarding judicial control over pretrial burdens and emphasizes the need for plausibility in complaints.

Plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunctions, scheduling and discovery conferences, consolidation of trial with the preliminary injunction hearing, expedited hearings, lifting of the discovery stay, and partial summary judgment have all been denied. The defendants' motion to dismiss individual defendants is denied as moot, while their motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is granted, directing the clerk to enter judgment in favor of the defendants. Additionally, the defendants' motion for a protective order is also denied as moot. An uncontested affidavit by defendant Oliver states that the plaintiff's name remains on the Missouri Sex Offender List and that his termination was justified due to the nature of his offense and concerns from co-workers. The plaintiff's own pleadings indicate he was not questioned about prior felony convictions prior to hiring. The document notes that it is not the court's responsibility to conduct factual research for the parties, but suggests that sex offender registries likely provide identifiable information for statistical comparisons. Furthermore, a Wisconsin agency ruling cited by the plaintiff provides some protection for employees with minor offenses, but the court suggests that no similar protections exist under federal law.