Baltimore Transit Co. v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.

Citations: 72 A.2d 4; 194 Md. 611Docket: [No. 91, October Term, 1949.]

Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland; October 1, 1991; Maryland; State Supreme Court

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The Court of Appeals of Maryland reviewed an appeal from the Baltimore Transit Company regarding a judgment favoring Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. for damages to a 1948 Plymouth sedan after a collision with two of the Company's streetcars. The incident occurred on July 8, 1948, at approximately 5:45 PM at the intersection of Liberty Street and the Company's tracks in Baltimore City, under clear and dry conditions.

The accident involved the Revere car, driven by Harry G. Harper, who was second in line at a traffic light. As traffic received a green light at Liberty Street, Harper began to move forward. A witness, Robert Simonaire, driving behind Harper, observed the Revere car's brake lights activate just before a northbound streetcar approached. Simonaire's car was struck by the subsequent southbound streetcar after the initial impact with the Revere vehicle. Harper described the northbound streetcar as moving slowly and stated he did not believe he needed to stop before crossing the tracks.

The case hinged on the circumstances of the traffic signal and the actions of the drivers involved, with evidence presented by both parties concerning the timing and positioning of the vehicles at the time of the collision. The testimony highlighted the confusion and rapid sequence of events leading up to the accident, particularly regarding the visibility and speed of the streetcars involved.

A witness observed a northbound streetcar approaching while he was driving, approximately 25 to 30 feet away. Unable to determine the streetcar's exact speed, he noted it was traveling faster than when he first spotted it. He applied the brakes but realized he would stop on the tracks, so he accelerated to clear them. The northbound streetcar struck his car at the left front fender and door but with minimal force. Afterward, he attempted to exit the vehicle through the left door, which was jammed, and then tried the right side. As he did so, a southbound streetcar hit the right side of his car, causing it to spin and become wedged between the two streetcars.

The driver estimated he had been stationary for a short time, not exceeding a couple of minutes, after the initial impact. He was traveling at around 20 miles per hour just before crossing the tracks. A nearby witness, Pfannensteel, confirmed seeing the driver slow down before crossing the tracks and noted that the northbound streetcar was approaching. He observed the southbound streetcar about 30 feet away when the northbound streetcar collided with the automobile. There was a brief interval of a couple of seconds between the two collisions. Another witness, Asch, described hearing a screech before seeing the northbound streetcar strike the vehicle amidships, stating it made no effort to stop. He noted the southbound streetcar was also traveling faster than 25 miles per hour and attempted to stop but was unsuccessful, ultimately wedging the car between the two streetcars.

The testimony indicates that the southbound streetcar attempted to brake before a collision, but either the brake mechanism or wheels malfunctioned, making it difficult to stop. The southbound streetcar was approximately 30 to 35 feet away from the collision site. Both streetcar operators had extensive experience, with the operator of the northbound streetcar, Mr. Burnham, describing how he attempted to stop when he observed an automobile accelerating towards him. Despite his efforts, the northbound streetcar collided with the automobile at close range, pushing it a few feet upon impact. Another witness, Mr. Schwind, operated the southbound streetcar and saw the automobile before the collision, noting he also hit the automobile shortly after the northbound streetcar did. The evidence presented by the appellee aimed to establish fault, but the appellant raised objections, claiming there was no rational basis for the verdict due to contributory negligence. The court noted that if the plaintiff's own evidence demonstrated no grounds for a verdict in their favor, it was the court's duty to direct a verdict for the defendant. Previous case law was cited to support the notion that recklessly proceeding into apparent danger constitutes negligence, emphasizing that both streetcars and automobiles must exercise due care to avoid accidents on shared streets.

In the case United Rwys. Electric Co. of Baltimore v. Mantik, various precedents establish that a driver is guilty of contributory negligence if they attempt to cross a streetcar track when it is evident that a streetcar is approaching. Specifically, if a driver makes a deliberate effort to cross despite clear danger or grossly miscalculates their ability to clear the track before a collision, they are considered to have acted with obvious negligence, which precludes recovery for injuries sustained. The evidence indicated that the driver had a clear view of the intersection and the approaching streetcars, with an approximate distance of 200 feet from the accident site to the intersections. Testimony suggested that the driver saw the northbound streetcar at a significant distance but still attempted to cross before it, indicating contributory negligence. The assertion that the streetcar operator did not attempt to stop the vehicle before the collision was deemed implausible, given the operator's testimony and the established stopping distance of large streetcars traveling at speed. Consequently, the court concluded that the case should have been withdrawn from jury consideration, barring the application of the last clear chance doctrine, as the driver’s actions demonstrated negligence as a matter of law.

Harper experienced no personal injuries in the accident, which involved a collision between his automobile and a streetcar. A witness, Pfannensteel, stated that Harper slowed down while crossing the tracks when the northbound streetcar appeared to accelerate and hit him. However, the witness's description of the car's location lacks clarity, raising doubts about the accuracy of his observations. His conflicting statements suggested that he could not have simultaneously seen the southbound car at two different distances from the scene, undermining the credibility of his testimony.

Another witness, Asch, observed the automobile moving south and noted a screeching sound before the streetcar struck it, claiming the streetcar made no effort to stop. He indicated that the streetcar came close to halting and caused minimal displacement of the automobile. Asch also mentioned the southbound car’s speed but could not ascertain when its brakes were applied. Schwind, the operator of the southbound car, claimed he could have avoided a collision if the automobile hadn’t moved several feet toward him after the initial impact.

Overall, the evidence suggests that neither the northbound nor the southbound motormen recognized Harper's peril in time to prevent the collisions. The testimonies from the appellee's witnesses were deemed incredible, effectively contributing nothing to the case. Chief Judge McSherry's assertion that the sum of zeros in evidence equals zero reinforces the conclusion that the claims made by these witnesses do not substantiate a verdict.

In a legal dispute regarding a collision between a streetcar and a truck, the court addressed the issue of negligence and the applicability of the doctrine of last clear chance. The court referenced previous cases indicating that even if the streetcar's speed was deemed unreasonable, there was no evidence that it contributed to the accident. Specifically, it noted that the truck was only 40 feet away from the streetcar when it entered the tracks, and even at a speed of 25 miles per hour, the streetcar could not stop within the necessary distance, making the collision inevitable.

The doctrine of last clear chance, which allows recovery if the defendant had the final opportunity to avoid the accident, was deemed inapplicable because the plaintiff's negligence was the last act leading to the incident. Evidence showed that the operators of both vehicles exercised reasonable care but were unable to prevent the accident. The court rejected the argument that the driver of the automobile could have escaped harm after the collision, concluding that the appellee's agent, Harper, was contributively negligent. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment in favor of the appellant, ordering costs without a retrial.