Shaurette v. Capitol Erecting Co.

Citations: 23 Wis. 2d 538; 128 N.W.2d 34; 1964 Wisc. LEXIS 429

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court; April 28, 1964; Wisconsin; State Supreme Court

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On January 24, 1959, Bernard Shaurette sustained injuries while working as a pot man at the Advance plant in Milwaukee due to a portion of the monorail system falling on him. The monorail, originally installed by Capitol Erecting Company in 1950 and re-erected after a fire in 1951, comprised a 110-foot I beam suspended about 10 feet above the foundry floor. Witnesses testified that the rail fell due to failures at the welds connecting it to the support structure. Employees observed that the rail had not broken itself, but had come loose at the welds. Melvin Gentz, the personnel manager at Advance, noted that the company had not altered the monorail since its reinstallation and acknowledged that oil and dirt occasionally caused maintenance issues. Safety engineer Raymond Brengosz conducted regular inspections and confirmed no significant design changes had occurred post-reconstruction. Plant superintendent Thomas L. Meyers indicated that both the rail and hangers had pulled loose, attributing the failure to the welds. William Mervin from Thelen Erecting Company, who oversaw the system's reconstruction after the accident, reiterated that the hangers had broken loose without any rail damage. An objection was raised concerning the relevance of Mervin's opinions on welding practices.

Mervin provided testimony indicating that butt-welding was uncommon and that a two-by-two clip is typically used to enhance weld strength. He noted that while the hangers used were likely adequate, they were improperly attached to the rail. In his rehanging of the track, Mervin added clips and additional sway bracing to address insufficient rigidity of the rail. The only defense witness, Edgar Burkhardt, a retired investigator, stated he could not access his investigation records related to the Shaurette accident but recalled that the monorail had functioned without issue for eight years prior to the incident. 

Capitol, the appellant, raised two issues on appeal: whether sec. 330.155 of the statutes, enacted after the commencement of the action, bars the plaintiff's case, and whether there is credible evidence supporting the jury's liability findings against the defendant. The statute, effective from August 23, 1961, prohibits personal injury actions related to defective improvements after six years from the completion of the work. Since Capitol re-erected the monorail in March 1951 and the injury occurred in January 1959, the action initiated in June 1960 was potentially barred by this new law. Capitol's motion to amend its answer to include sec. 330.155 as a defense was denied by the trial court in January 1963. 

The statute does not indicate legislative intent for retroactive application, adhering to the principle that ambiguous statutes should be interpreted to apply only prospectively. Capitol argued for retroactivity, referencing remedial statutes, but the case cited involved restoring a plaintiff's remedy rather than extinguishing one post-commencement. The court highlighted that the current situation relates to denying a remedy after the action had already begun, thus raising concerns about the statute's retroactive application.

The Steffen Case introduces a critical qualification regarding retroactivity in remedial statutes, emphasizing that such retroactive application is permissible as long as it does not infringe upon vested rights. The principle was outlined in State ex rel. Davis v. Starr Lumber Co., which noted that remedial statutes could be retrospective without impairing contracts or vested rights, primarily aiming to enhance existing rights and remedies. Capitol references Schultz v. Vick, where the court determined that the removal of a notice-of-injury requirement constituted a procedural change rather than a violation of vested rights. The notice requirement was deemed a condition precedent, not a statute of limitations. It was acknowledged that substantive rights in automobile accident cases arise at the time of the incident, and the statute of limitations extinguishes causes of action in Wisconsin.

Capitol's reliance on New York Life Ins. Co. v. State is countered by the distinction that, in that case, the relevant New York ruling predated the initiation of the plaintiff's action, whereas the statute in the current case was enacted after the action commenced. The Swanke case established that retroactive statutes shortening limitations would be unconstitutional without a grace period for affected parties to initiate their claims. It was ruled that existing actions cannot be undermined by changes in limitation periods after they have begun. Thus, a statute of limitations cannot retroactively defeat actions already initiated prior to its enactment.

The plaintiff's legal claim originated under common law and was pending in circuit court when the legislature enacted section 330.155, Stats., which could not retroactively affect the plaintiff's rights. The existence of a potential claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act does not influence the applicability of the statute in this case. The trial court's judgment was based on a jury's special verdict that found Capitol negligent in the construction of the monorail system. On appeal, the focus is on whether credible evidence exists to support the jury's findings, particularly given the trial court's approval.

Testimony was provided by several Advance employees who witnessed the accident. Byron J. Schmid and Thomas R. Olinger noted that the rail had not broken but had separated from the welds. Personnel manager Melvin Gentz confirmed that the break occurred where the rail was welded to the roof beam, while plant superintendent Thomas L. Meyers indicated that the rail had "pulled loose" from the hangers, suggesting the welds had failed. 

The defense presented only one witness, a former investigator, who stated there had been no prior issues with the monorail system. Plaintiff's witness William Mervin, an experienced supervisor in monorail construction, asserted that the hangers were improperly attached and that better welding practices should have been used. He reinforced the system during repairs. 

Capitol challenged Mervin's testimony, arguing prejudicial error due to alleged deficiencies in his expertise and the basis of his opinions. However, the trial court's determination of an expert's qualifications is generally upheld unless there is an abuse of discretion, and no objections to Mervin's qualifications were raised during the trial.

Mervin's testimony regarding the customary practice of butt-welding in monorail system erection was challenged by Capitol, which argued that a question about the supporting hangers exceeded Mervin's qualifications. The trial court overruled this objection, affirming Mervin's status as an expert based on his extensive professional experience in monorail construction and his direct involvement in observing and repairing the system post-accident. The court noted that an expert with personal knowledge can provide testimony without the need for hypothetical scenarios. Capitol claimed that the jury could only conclude that the rail had fallen and any inference of negligent erection would be speculative. However, the court clarified that juries are allowed to draw reasonable inferences from proven facts, even if undisputed, and apply their common knowledge and experience to the evidence. The jury was properly instructed on negligence, and sufficient evidence supported their verdict, leading to the affirmation of the circuit court's judgment. Additionally, the court indicated that the customary installation of monorail systems was not material to the case's issues and did not impact jury instructions. Relevant statutes and case law were referenced to support these points.