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Vogt v. Corbett
Citations: 563 N.E.2d 447; 138 Ill. 2d 482; 150 Ill. Dec. 560; 1990 Ill. LEXIS 93Docket: 69252
Court: Illinois Supreme Court; September 26, 1990; Illinois; State Supreme Court
In the Supreme Court of Illinois case Gregory Vogt v. Dr. Maxwell Corbett (138 Ill.2d 482, 1990), the court affirmed the dismissal of a third-party complaint for contribution filed by the Vogts against Dr. Corbett and Dr. Acuna. The dismissal was based on the medical malpractice statute of repose, which prohibits actions for damages arising from patient care after four years from the date of the alleged negligent act. The case referenced prior rulings, including Hayes v. Mercy Hospital, which established that such third-party actions are subject to this statute. The court also considered whether this ruling was consistent with Stephens v. McBride, which determined that notice requirements under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act do not apply to contribution actions against governmental entities. The background involved a car accident on May 6, 1978, followed by medical treatment complications that led to negligence claims against various parties, including the medical personnel involved. Ultimately, the appellate court upheld the trial court's decision, confirming that the medical malpractice statute barred the Vogts' third-party complaint. Appellants argue that the four-year statute of repose in the medical malpractice statute does not apply to contribution actions. However, the court's previous ruling in Hayes established that the statute does indeed apply to such actions, affirming the appellate court's decision that supported this interpretation. Appellants reiterate arguments previously rejected in Hayes, including their assertion that contribution actions are equitable and therefore outside the statute's scope. The court clarified that "action for damages" encompasses all claims against healthcare providers for injuries stemming from patient care, whether legal or equitable. Additionally, appellants claim that the statute of limitations for contribution actions should prevail over the statute of repose, a position also dismissed in Hayes. Appellants introduce a new argument, asserting that the decision in Hayes conflicts with the earlier ruling in Stephens v. McBride, which found that notice provisions in the Tort Immunity Act did not apply to contribution actions against governmental entities. The court distinguishes between the two cases, noting that while Stephens addressed notice requirements not applicable to contribution actions, Hayes was based on the legislative intent for the medical malpractice statute to include contribution actions. Ultimately, the court reaffirms its stance from Hayes, ruling that the four-year repose period applies to contribution actions, and thus the trial court's dismissal of the appellants' third-party action, filed over two years after the repose period, was appropriate. The appellate court's decision is affirmed, with Justice Ryan abstaining from the case's consideration.